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Abstract 
 
          “Color No Longer A Sign of Bondage” is an account of the First Kansas Colored 
Volunteer Infantry Regiment from its earliest days in 1862 to the regiment’s triumphant 
return to Kansas in November 1865.  This work encompasses the racial attitudes of the 
black and white communities of Kansas, Indian Territory, and Arkansas, and the military 
service of the regiment through campaigns in the service of the Union’s Army of the 
Frontier.  The evolution of white support for black enlistment in Kansas, the regiment’s 
acceptance by white Union regiments, and the concurrent conflicts with Confederate 
sympathizers and military organizations are central themes of this work.   
     Although black military service in the Union was not officially countenanced in 
Kansas prior to 1863 and the Emancipation Proclamation, the First Kansas Colored 
fought for recognition and shed blood despite the opposition of Kansas civil and military 
authorities alike.  The irregular enlistment and employment of the regiment jeopardized 
its existence through the fall of 1862, and despite official disapproval the regiment 
survived to become a vital part of the Army of the Frontier.  White and black Kansans 
alike took note of the regiment’s military service and through the sterling service of the 
regiment in an unforgiving theater of war, the regiment won the admiration of white 
regiments and a skeptical black civil populace.   
    The deeds of the First Kansas Colored in battle and in garrison ultimately undergirded 
the black drive for civil rights and proved that black men could serve as soldiers in an 
army that often relegated its black soldiers to fatigue duty.  The First Kansas Colored was 
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a fighting regiment that won honors in Kansas, Indian Territory, and Arkansas and by its 
actions demanded respect.  The manhood denied to blacks prior to the Civil War was not 
won through legal battles, but through courageous conduct in war and the blood shed by 
its soldiers in combat.  The First Kansas Colored never faltered in its service to the 
Union; nor did it fail its supporters and the families of those who served in its ranks.  The 
First Kansas Colored proved that color was no longer a sign of bondage and, although 
recognition for its deeds often proved ephemeral, its legacy endures.
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Introduction 
 
     The victory of Free Soil advocates over Pro-slavery factions in Kansas Territory, and 
the admission of Kansas as a free state into the Union, set the stage for change in Kansas   
The genesis of the first black regiment in the west, and arguably the first northern black 
regiment, occurred in Kansas during the summer of 1862, the outcome of a unique 
conjunction of people, politics, legislation and ideology.105  The result of this ferment, the 
First Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry Regiment, derived from abolitionist efforts as 
well as Senator James H. Lane’s ambition to dominate Kansas politics and thereby 
establish a national presence. Subtle as a Kansas thunderstorm, and as incandescent as a 
prairie fire, Senator Lane determined in 1862 to create several regiments of blacks to 
terrorize secessionists in Missouri, Arkansas, and Indian Territory, a specter to haunt 
their imaginations.  
     His creation, the First Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry Regiment came to signify 
the ability of black men in the Civil War west, a visible symbol of black pride and 
strength for Kansans and Arkansans.  The First Kansas Colored Infantry’s experience 
reflected that of other black troops in that its soldiers redeemed their people from slavery 
through blood, and in the process seized freedom and earned the respect of white veterans 
of the Union’s Army of the Frontier.  Unlike many other black regiments, their history 
was one of continual combat, patrols, and skirmishes, and the regiment’s fortune ebbed 
                                                
105 The racial term black is used to describe people now referred to as African-Americans, the period terms 
for those persons of African ancestry now regarded as socially repugnant (“Nigger or darkie,”) terms or 
archaic (Negro, or colored). The term black is the least offensive and most historically accurate term, 
therefore I shall use the term black throughout this work unless sources indicate otherwise.  The sense of 
this term is the same as Frederick Douglass when he referred to Massachusetts being the “first to make the 
black man equal before the law,” as in Frederick Douglass “Men of Color to Arms !” speech found in the 
March 21, 1863 edition of Douglass’s Monthly.  No disrespect is intended, nor does this term seek to 
diminish the African or American component of identity.   
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and flowed with the fortune of the Union forces in Civil War Arkansas.  It is best 
therefore to start from the beginning to appreciate the First Kansas Colored’s origins, and 
the motivations of its founder, Senator James Lane of Kansas. 
     Lane was never an advocate for racial equality; he hated slavery and opposed it 
vociferously in a number of forums, but also advocated separation of the races.  The 
presence of large numbers of escaped slaves and confiscated slaves in Kansas in 1861 
and 1862 provided Lane with the raw material for a slave army that could be wielded to 
achieve his political aims while punishing Southern slave holders.  In the process, the 
state would be rid of the numerous newly arrived contrabands that were upsetting 
Kansas’s social order.  Although acquainted with, but not an acolyte of John Brown, 
Lane commissioned abolitionist officers in the regiment to facilitate his goal of 
destroying slavery.   The men Lane selected constituted a highly politicized group, for 
many served as Underground Railroad conductors in the 1850s, and some were retainers 
of the late John Brown.  Given these backgrounds, it is important to examine the fervor of 
these officers, and determine if their idealism and abolitionism stood true after months 
spent with black soldiers.   
     Portraying abolitionist officers of Colored Regiments as pure souls incapable of acting 
except from the highest goals paints a dishonest picture. The true measure of abolitionist 
commitment was the welfare of their regiment’s soldiers, and how officers related to their 
men in garrison and in combat. The character of the First Kansas Colored Infantry 
Regiment’s officers tells some about who they were, but so do mortality and morbidity 
statistics, and the longevity of the officer corps.  Despite Lane’s careful selection of 
recruiting officers and regimental cadres, Governor Charles Robinson and his successors 
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attempted to appoint officers to the regiment as part of the political patronage system.  
Political favors and individual desire for the rights and privileges of an officer also 
compelled some men to join the regiment; altruism was but one compelling factor for 
seeking a commission to command black troops.  
     As time passed and casualties mounted, the character of the First Kansas Colored 
transformed as well, the losses of campaigning contributing to a steady loss of the 
original officers and soldiers of the regiment.  The officers who recruited the First Kansas 
Colored in 1862, and trained it in early 1863, had been replaced by spring of 1865, by 
men who obtained their commissions through examination boards.  The enlisted ranks 
also lost their original character, black Indians and contrabands giving way to former 
Arkansan slaves and substitutes.  It is fair to say that the regiment that marched south into 
Indian Territory in 1863 was not the same that mustered out of service in October 1865.    
     The regiment experienced trials comparable to other Colored Troops Regiments, but 
the experience of the First Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry Regiment remains unique 
amongst its contemporaries, its illegal recruitment and early commitment an indicator of 
Lane’s political power and influence in 1862 and 1863. Ignoring criticism, Lane refused 
to disband the regiment and shepherded it until its official muster in January 1863.   The 
First Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry Regiment’s recruitment, and employment 
represented a change in national and regional attitudes toward blacks.  The regiment’s 
service disproved notions of race and tested the ideologies of slave owner and 
abolitionist, both sides forced to reappraise their pre-war racial attitudes in the wake of 
black military service against enemies as varied as guerrillas, conventional armies, and a 
hostile white Arkansan population.  Recruited primarily from the numbers of former 
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slaves who fled to Kansas and later volunteers from Arkansas, the First Kansas Colored 
offered black men an opportunity to assert their manhood and prove their worth to the 
Union cause and in doing so, seize their freedom. 
      The “people” who comprised the effort to raise the First Kansas Colored Volunteer 
Infantry Regiment included the black communities of Kansas-urban and rural, contraband 
and free.  Also involved were white Free Staters whose struggles against slavery in the 
1850s created a state intolerant of slavery, wary of freedmen, and unwilling to support 
black enfranchisement, but whose attitudes changed slowly to admit the possibility of 
black military service. Abolitionists led white sponsorship through example, and a small 
but dedicated core of Kansans made clear their willingness to risk their lives and 
reputations on a chance to command black soldiers.  
      Legal precedents  established a climate in which enrollment stood a chance of 
success.  Initially sanctioned under the First Confiscation Act and General John 
Fremont’s stillborn Freedom Proclamation of 1861, the seizure of “contrabands” created 
Lane’s manpower base, while the Second Confiscation Act, convinced Lane to compel 
President Lincoln to approve black military service. President Lincoln’s Emancipation 
Proclamation and subsequent revisions to the Militia Act, legalized black military service 
in capacities other than as military labor. Whereas in antebellum Kansas there were not 
enough black men to form a company, by 1862 there were enough for two regiments, but 
no support for the measure until Senator Lane took up the challenge and created enough 
support through his frenetic and hypnotic oratory to make raising a regiment socially and 
politically acceptable to Kansans.   Still, Lane would not achieve success until he ran 
roughshod over the Wyandotte Constitution and its prohibitions against black military 
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service, breaking the Kansas Militia Law, and the despised Fugitive Slave Law for good 
measure.106  
     Senator Lane issued no apologies for his actions; he utilized the First Confiscation Act 
to justify slave seizures, and rejected the return of slaves to their masters contrary to 
military orders.  Lane reveled in his stubborn, insubordinate, and flagrantly illegal 
actions; he flouted military authority as he fostered political intrigue, and overtly 
supported General John C. Fremont’s Freedom Proclamation in Missouri.  Lane also 
positioned his one-time subordinate James Blunt as the Commanding General of Kansas 
troops.  An ardent abolitionist and former friend of John Brown, Blunt executed Lane’s 
agenda, the General eager to gain prominence in Kansas politics through his wartime 
deeds.  Although both men favored the abolitionist cause, Lane sought and achieved the 
enlistment of blacks, a step that many initially opposed, including President Lincoln. 
Notably, Lane created an army in a state where before 1860 few blacks resided.   
Although contested, the 1860 census records reflect that less than one percent of Kansas’ 
population was black, even the abolitionist citadel of Lawrence was less than two percent 
black.  That enumeration obviously did not reflect the transient populations of fugitive 
slaves on the Underground Railroad.  The numbers do however indicate that a small, but 
significant population of freedmen existed, mainly in eastern Kansas.      
     The recent Kansas constitution barred slavery, and by extension any potential growth 
of the black population except by freedmen immigration.  Kansas appeared as unlikely as 
any of the Northern states to support black military service, but although it lacked the 
                                                
106 D.W. Wilder.  The Annals of Kansas: 1541-1885 (Topeka: T. Dwight Thatcher, 1886), 264-271. 
Especially Article VIII, which mirrored the Federal Militia Act by forbidding black militia participation. 
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blacks necessary for large units, it did contain a small abolitionist army that catalyzed 
social change. 
 
 
Table 1: Kansas Population Statistics, 1860.107 
      Granted Presidential authority to raise three regiments for service and a Brigadier 
general’s commission by President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton in July, 1861, 
Lane returned to Kansas.  Recruitment proceeded rapidly, the ranks of Lane’s 
commanders filled with controversial Kansans that included the ardent abolitionists 
James Montgomery, Charles Jennison, Daniel R. Anthony, and James Blunt.  Lane’s 
political speeches conveyed his unmistakably radical attitude toward emancipation; Lane 
supported arming slaves to work and fight for the country.108 General Fremont, the 
department commander and abolitionist of the first caliber shared this philosophy, and 
despite the need to retain the loyalty of the Border States, Fremont wasted no time 
                                                
107 Wilder, Annals of Kansas, 302, 419.  
108 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. 
Series 3, Volume 1 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Company, 1880-1901), 280-281 (hereafter 
cited as OR: ); Thomas F. Robley.  History of Bourbon County Kansas  (Fort Scott, Kansas: Monitor Book 
and Publishing Company, 1894), 172; Wiley Britton.  The Civil War on the Border, Volume I 1861-1862.. 
(New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1889), I, 129; Leavenworth Daily Times, July 18, 1861.  
Kansas Population Statistics (1860) 
1860 
County     Total   Black 
Leavenworth  12,606 
Douglas    8,637 
Wyandotte    2,609 
Linn     6,336 
Bourbon    7,729 
Shawnee    3,513. 
% State Population 
Total state population: 107,204      667   .6 
 
Lawrence Census Results 
1860 
White   Colored % Population Black 
1,645          25     1.5 
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implementing his abolitionist agenda.  Fremont’s “Proclamation of August 31, 1861” 
exceeded his authority as a department commander, and unilaterally freed any slaves 
owned by secessionists who took up arms against the United States.   
     Alarmed by the consequences of Fremont’s Proclamation, Lincoln modified it, but not 
before large numbers of Missouri slaves flooded the Union lines, and crossed into 
Kansas. Lane, who was campaigning in Missouri as part of Fremont’s forces, eagerly 
distributed copies of Fremont’s proclamation while his brigade marched through 
Missouri.  Lane’s Kansas Brigade, more commonly known as the Jayhawker Brigade, 
became the scourge of western Missouri slave owners.  Kansans settled old scores, 
consciously and deliberately, and in short order emptied the Missouri border counties of 
their slaves in a form of warfare that struck to the heart of slave owners’ wealth.109 
Marked by slave seizures, or “confiscations,” and characterized by slave amnesty and 
challenges to slave owners seeking to recover their slaves from Lane’s camps, the Kansas 
Brigade’s progress through Missouri contributed greatly to the migration of slaves 
westward into Kansas. Lane’s contemptuous communications to his superior, General 
Sturgis, reiterated his abhorrence of the institution of slavery. Lane reiterated that his 
Brigade would be neither “Negro thieves” nor “Negro catchers.” Instead, employing 
Fremont’s proclamation and The First Confiscation Act of 1861 as his justification, he 
accepted the role of slave “liberator.”110 The abolitionist armies of Kansas made no secret 
                                                
109Springfield Daily Conservative, November 17, 1861; Ethan Earle.  Journal of Captain Ethan Earle, 
Company F, First Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry Regiment [Manuscript: Boston: January 1873]. 
(Boston, Massachusetts: New England Historical & Genealogical Society, transcription by Fort Scott 
National Historic Site) - hereafter referred to as Earle Journal, 13; Alberta Pantle, “The Story of a Kansas 
Freedman,” The Kansas Historical Quarterly, volume XI, 1942, Number 4 (November, 1942): 344.; OR: 
Series 1, Volume 3, 477-78, 485-486. 
110 U.S., Statutes at Large, Treaties, and Proclamations of the United States of America, vol. 12 (Boston, 
1863), 319; Lawrence Republican, October 17, 1861, 3; Leavenworth Daily Conservative, October 29, 
1861, 8; OR: Series 1, Volume 3, 516, 748; The Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, Part 4, 
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of their goal to liberate slaves, and by early 1862, the brigade periodically suspended 
campaigning to divest itself of contraband slaves in Kansas.   
     An economic weapon frequently used against Border State secessionists, confiscation 
authorized the seizure of property owned by Southern sympathizers including slaves.  
Confiscated slaves were referred to as “contrabands,” a term derived from General 
Benjamin Butler’s confiscation of a large number of slaves that he declared “contraband 
of war,” rather than return them to their former owners.   Many contrabands remained in 
the rarefied environs of the Lane Brigade’s camps, contrabands employed to drive teams, 
cook, groom horses, and perform camp duties, while officers employed one as a 
servant.111  Colonel Jennsion readily espoused arming slaves and proposed organizing a 
company of contrabands for use as ‘Home Guards,” and admitted to drilling contrabands 
for that role.  One Missouri observer noted that among Jennison’s soldiers “an entire 
company of Negroes, armed, mounted, and uniformed as soldiers of the Union. They 
were led by a slave who had been enticed away from a master who was widely known for 
unwavering loyalty to the Union.”112  Enticement or emancipation, the terms betray the 
observer’s opinions of the “Jayhawker Brigade,” as a collection of thieves and liars as 
liable to prey upon loyal Unionist slave owners as they would secessionists.  The 
                                                                                                                                            
3235. Lane’s Brigade confiscated slaves in such large numbers (Lane admitting to 1,200 at one time) that 
the Confederate General Ben McCulloch felt compelled to write to Judah Benjamin, the Confederate 
Secretary of War, to report one especially large seizure of over 600 slaves from Missouri, an aggregate 
$600,000 in slaves alone.    
111 Richard Cordley.  Pioneer Days in Kansas (Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1903), 150; Donald Gilmore.  
Civil War on the Missouri-Kansas Border (Gretna, Louisiana: Pelican Publishing, 2006), 142-144; The 
Commonwealth, “First Colored Troops,” Colonel Richard J. Hinton’s letter to the editor of the Boston 
Herald, August 20, 1887; New York World “His Black Brigade” as printed in Douglass' Monthly, January, 
1862; The Lawrence Republican”, November 21, 1861; Britton, The Civil War on the Border, vol I, 304; 
Leavenworth Daily Times, November 16, 1861. 
112 Chicago Tribune, November 12, 1861; Britton, The Civil War On The Border, 179; Leavenworth Daily 
Conservative, 24 September, 1861. Official Records, Series I, Volume VIII, 641-42; Cincinnati Daily 
Commercial October 29, 1861;Richard S. Brownlee.  Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1958), 46. 
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regiment employed the law to emancipate slaves regardless of their owner’s political 
loyalties; rarely did political proclivities interfere with liberation. 
     The actual process by which Union regiments obtained contrabands differed in 
degrees from outright violent seizure (labeled “nigger stealing” by many enraged slave 
owners) to providing amnesty for fugitive slaves and protection from recapture, with 
many variations between the extremes.  A former agricultural slave from Missouri 
recalled that when Union soldiers from Kansas liberated him and his fellow slaves, they 
offered them a choice to stay with their masters or to go to Kansas.  However, there 
appeared to be a limit to the Jayhawker Brigade’s coercive methods and in their wake the 
Kansas soldiers left many other slave families that did not want to “emigrate” to Kansas 
to ponder the consequences of staying in familiar surroundings.113   As units confiscated 
slaves and shepherded fugitive slaves to freedom, the numbers of blacks in Kansas 
impressed witnesses who rarely observed blacks in Kansas outside of the larger cities and 
towns before the war.  Initially warmly welcomed by the labor-starved Kansas 
agricultural communities, some towns experienced a shockingly rapid expansion of their 
black communities as the initial contraband trickle swelled from tens to hundreds.     
     One Kansas resident who kept records estimated the “movable property of Missouri” 
passing through his town north of Leavenworth at over 150; whereas Charles Monroe 
Chase, a journalist from Illinois estimated the daily influx of contrabands  into Kansas 
                                                
113 Maralyn Etzler.  The Seizure, Confiscation and Destruction of Property in the Confederacy, 1861-1865  
(Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, 1948); Jeffrey Patrick. “This Regiment Will Leave a Mark: A 
Letter from a Member of Jennison’s Jayhawkers, 1861-1862.” Topeka: Kansas State Historical Society, 
Kansas History, 20, (1997-98); 53-55; Andrew Williams.  Narrative of Former Slave, Spencer Research 
Library, University of Kansas, Lawrence, RH Manuscript, 42.5. 
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from Missouri between 50 and 100.114  Although these estimates capture the raw number 
of arrivals, they fail to convey the change in Kansan communities during the winter of 
1861.  The largest demographic shifts occurred following the arrival of contraband trains 
from Union armies.  Contraband trains differed in size and organization, ranging from a 
modest train of 150 to the generally large and well-organized trains from the Kansas 
Brigade that could contain hundreds of contrabands.  Large numbers of former slaves 
entered Kansas in the vicinity of Fort Scott; one of Lane’s chaplains, Howard Fisher, 
settled some of the contrabands at Fort Scott and the balance in communities in and 
around Mound City.115  
     The citizens of Lawrence, their abolitionist town well known before the war to 
escaping slaves, experienced a heavy influx of contrabands. A letter from John B. Wood 
of Lawrence to the Massachusetts abolitionist and philanthropist, George L. Stearns, 
described the situation in Lawrence, contrabands arriving from Missouri large numbers 
with hundreds employed in harvesting crops. incoming contrabands, and by January 
1862, all remaining vacant houses and rooms contained inhabitants.  The less fortunate 
crowded the streets of the town or sought shelter Although the contrabands tested the 
residents’ ability to provide for both their own and contraband needs, Lawrence and the 
                                                
114 “Affairs in Kansas,” New York Times, October 29, 1861; C.M. Chase Letters, Manuscript 43207, Misc. 
Chase, Kansas State Historical Society, Chase to Editor Lawrence Republican, 19 August 1863: “Since 
May 1861 over 200 entered Leavenworth; Lawrence’s numbers swelled by 400, and an additional 400 
joined fellow contrabands at Mound City and Fort Scott.  In total, over a thousand blacks were believed to 
be in Kansas by late-1861, nearly double the 1860 census numbers, with more arriving daily.” 
115 Walter Meeks.  The Role of Fort Scott, Kansas, in the Civil War (Pittsburg, Kansas: Kansas State 
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surrounding community enjoyed a brief respite from the incoming numbers unlike 
Leavenworth, which experienced almost immediate inundation.  
      Many slaves escaped Missouri by crossing over the Missouri River into Leavenworth 
during the extremely cold winter of 1861, the icy river forming a highway for escaping 
slaves from Missouri; others took the ferry across the Missouri River when it was ice-
free, taking refuge in Wyandotte, (now Kansas City, Kansas).116  The small pre-war black 
population of Leavenworth which originally consisted of freedmen primarily from 
Arkansas, Kentucky, and a few young men from the east, disappeared under contrabands 
in early 1862, when estimated numbers exceed 1,500.  One Wisconsin soldier observed, 
“the city is full of ‘contrabands,’ alias runaway Negroes from Missouri...they are of all 
ages and characters, pious Uncle Toms and half-ape Topseys.”117  While an imperfect 
expression of Leavenworth’s changing population demographics, many Leavenworth 
residents may have agreed with him as they watched Union troops continuously deposit 
contrabands in Leavenworth after operations in Missouri. 
      In parallel with the arrival of contrabands, freedmen drawn by the plight of the 
contrabands and opportunities in wartime Kansas also immigrated to Kansas during this 
time.  Some such as Charles Henry Langston worked with the contraband slaves and 
became pivotal leaders in the black community.118 Leavenworth’s fortunes ebbed and 
flowed with the seasons, contraband numbers fluctuating with the weather and job 
availability on the outskirts of town.  
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     Southern Kansas, in stark contrast to the urban black communities of Kansas, 
contained the miserable camps of newly arrived Union Indian refugees, many rendered 
destitute following defeat by Confederate Indian forces in Indian Territory. Gradually the 
numbers of Union Indians in Kansas increased, and by April of 1862, nearly eight 
thousand were receiving aid.  Amongst the survivors were a number of freedmen and 
formerly enslaved blacks, a considerable portion of the tribes of mixed blood 
parentage.119   Senator Lane seized upon the presence of large numbers of tribal refugees 
in Kansas, the ever-pressing threat of Confederate raids from Indian Territory, and the 
need humanitarian relief, to argue for the recruitment of Indians into Kansas regiments 
for use against similar forces in the Confederate armies.  
      Union manpower demands in the west and the threat of invasion from Southern 
armies encouraged Lane’s protégé, General James Blunt, in May of 1862, to issue 
General Order Number Two, authorizing the recruitment of two Indian regiments 
consisting of Union Cherokees, Seminoles and Creeks to be enrolled as Home Guards.  
Not by accident however, the mustering officer enlisted many Creek and Cherokee 
“wooly headed Indians” who were in actuality black.  After Kansas troops under General 
Blunt invaded the Indian Territory in June, 1862, Union forces confiscated slaves from 
the Creek and Cherokee nations, and transported them north to Kansas where the men 
enlisted into the Union army, while the women worked in the fields.  Many contrabands 
also changed their names to prevent possible pursuit by their former masters.  Joining the 
blacks from Indian Territory were large numbers of freedmen from Arkansas under the 
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protection of Union soldiers.120  The resultant numbers when combined with contrabands 
from Missouri swelled the black manpower pool, and the refugees’ miserable conditions 
added impetus for members of the displaced communities to seek employment as quickly 
as possible to alleviate the suffering of their families.  Initially the outlet for this social 
pressure was the Indian Home Guards, and when blacks were accepted for military 
service, many previously ineligible enlisted. 
     The significance of recruiting Indians into Kansan units posed great implications for 
future black enlistment.  Lane’s and Blunt’s political maneuverings carefully built 
support for eventual black military service by breaking down white resistance to non-
white soldiers.  Instead of taking an abolitionist stance in Kansas papers, Lane’s appeals 
to white Kansans preyed on invasion fears, exploited concerns about future manpower 
drafts (that could be met by potential use of available non-white manpower in lieu of 
Kansan whites), and most significantly, drew attention to the military performance of the 
Indian Home Guard units.  The dearth of Kansan manpower for regiments bore dividends 
for the racially disenfranchised: for Indians it ensured financial support for their 
community and the opportunity for revenge, while for contrabands it offered the ultimate 
prizes of emancipation and social standing in their community.  However, dominant 
racial attitudes required modification before black recruitment became reality.  Kansan  
attitudes toward African-Americans ranged from the virulent rejection of anything 
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resembling racial equality and absolute abhorrence of amalgamation, to joy at the 
prospect of arming former slaves for war. 
     The Kansas white community reacted in various ways to the influx of contrabands, 
some attacking the Kansas Emancipation League as “Nigger stealers,” others firmly 
supporting the right of black men to live free, condemning the kidnapping of contrabands 
and the agitation of Kansan whites that sought to create racial strife. Although Kansas 
didn’t impose Black Law restrictions in its constitution, and Kansans vociferously 
supported the destruction of slavery, Free Staters did not abandon their preference for 
racially separate communities.  Most Free State Kansans desired black labor, not black 
neighbors.  One column from the Leavenworth Daily Conservative spoke volumes to this 
issue, and identified that while Kansans opposed slavery, they also “pledged to driving 
out blacks from their midst,” white efforts toward improving black welfare “originat[ing] 
from a desire of whites to rid themselves of the contraband nuisance.”121  Perhaps 
prevailing attitudes demonstrated attitudes not so long ago the norm in a Territorial 
Kansas dominated by Missourians and their heavy-handed sectional interference.    
     Notwithstanding these sentiments, the contraband presence in Leavenworth 
exacerbated tensions between Missouri and Kansas.  Missourians complained bitterly to 
the Secretary of War of ravaging bands of blacks originating from Kansas invading 
Missouri in search of plunder and revenge, a position confirmed by a member of the 
rabidly anti-slavery Seventh Kansas Cavalry, who noted without hint of sarcasm that the 
contrabands his regiment brought Leavenworth later returned to Missouri where they 
burned and plundered.  The cross-border lawlessness worked both ways, Missouri 
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kidnappers infiltrating into Kansas to steal blacks for sale in Missouri and points further 
south.122 Contrabands lacked security or community, and their uncertain status as 
“contrabands of war,” trapped them in a state between freedmen and slaves. The question 
of what to do with the contrabands grew in urgency as their numbers increased in Kansas.  
Arming them for use as soldiers appeared the least viable option, in 1861 and early 1862, 
opinions against black martial ability greatly outweighing support. 
     Most quarters in Kansas received proposals to arm contrabands poorly, reasons 
varying from black inability to learn the drill evolutions required of soldiers, to racist 
arguments of black timidity and cowardice in the face of white soldiers, as well as the 
racist demon of black savagery and danger of bloody slave uprisings.  John Brown’s 
ghost haunted Americans on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line, and the possibility of 
slave uprisings abetted by white abolitionists a real and frightening prospect so great that 
the Union Army maintained the stance that slave uprisings would be crushed.   A bastion 
of conservatism, many in the Army opposed black enlistment, and maintained that black 
soldiers would disgrace the nation.  Abolitionist Ethan Earle caught a glimpse into this 
mentality after he recommended that rather than enforcing General Halleck’s General 
Order Number Three barring slaves from entering Union lines, they be retained, enlisted, 
and trained as soldiers.   
     Soldiers, having been conditioned to think that the war was a “white man’s war” 
expressed utter contempt for Earle; some officers threatened to resign rather than 
countenance the degradation of the Army, and country’s disgrace by allowing the 
“Nigger” to wear its uniform and use its arms. One example of this sentiment surfaced 
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among the soldiers of the First Kansas Volunteers, they voted to remove the single black 
soldier of their company, complaining that his presence was unbearable.  Senator Lane 
played to similar sentiments when in a speech to the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, he offered 
to supply a black servant for every white soldier, the government policy being that “the 
white man shall fight and the colored man labor.”123 While Lane and others traded 
rhetoric about the value of black soldiers and their potential role in the military, some 
Kansas units in the field also debated the issues, especially those units that witnessed the 
enrollment and employment of the Indian Home Guard soldiers. 
      Although Wiley Britton’s memoirs confirmed that many whites refused to fight 
alongside black soldiers, he believed that Kansans’ revulsion for returning slaves to their 
masters and a pronounced aversion to be though of as slave hunters indicated a change in 
attitudes.  White military prejudices remained strong throughout 1862, but as a 
counterpart to white attitudes, when recruiting opened up for the First Kansas Colored, 
the Indian regiments sent black refugees north with every wagon train from Indian 
Territory to Fort Scott. The irony of manpower-strapped units refusing to utilize blacks as 
soldiers was not lost on the Indian Regiments, their existence due to that very need, and 
when the First Kansas Colored commenced with recruiting, the Indian Regiments 
released some of their mixed race and black members to the regiment.124     
     In contrast to Kansans in other locales, a number of civilians in Lawrence supported 
arming blacks and enlisting them as soldiers.  Their sentiments took form as early as 
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October of 1861, when black men formed into companies and drilled under white 
supervision. Some Kansans like Wiley Britton migrated to Kansas specifically for the 
purpose of supporting the anti-slavery movement in the Free State party, and welcomed 
the idea of black soldiers fighting in the war.125 Whatever their method of demonstrating 
support for black soldiers, private citizens stood little chance of changing the minds of 
their fellow Kansans.   Senator Lane took up that challenge, his recent attempt to 
command a military expedition into Indian Territory defeated by his political rivals, 
Governor Robinson and General David Hunter.  Lane resumed his speeches in support of 
organizing black soldiers for combat duties, and advocated employment of blacks in the 
military as a casualty reduction measure for whites, citing their perceived natural 
resistance to heat and disease ideal qualifications for their use as soldiers in hot and 
pestilential areas of the South.126   In his  crude and caustic manner, he also attacked 
those whites that, although supporting emancipation shied away from recruiting blacks to 
serve in the military.     
     Lane violently rejected what he referred to as “nigger worshipping” expressing dismay 
for Northern sentimentality and resistance to arming slaves while white men died.  
Skillfully setting the context for his recruiting appeal amongst the historic precedents of 
black service during the Revolution and the War of 1812, Lane reminded his listeners of 
the past American and present-day European success in employing black soldiers. 
Allaying fears of uncontrollable black guerrillas, Lane proposed that soldiers be recruited 
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for black regiments and officered by white men, with Sergeants of their own race.127  The 
overt message Lane conveyed was that blacks would fight, and whites, command.  There 
would be no black uprising or weakening of the army by black soldiers.   There was no 
insinuation of racial equality in Lane’s speeches, rather, he spoke of duty and obligation.     
     Lane’s passionate speeches appealed to many, especially his entreaties against 
protecting blacks from war, while white soldiers died in combat to free the slaves.  
Lane’s combination of propaganda and history appealed to the interests of many whites, 
rather than the desires of blacks, and eroded white resistance to black recruitment with 
such blunt statements as “I believe the [N]egro may just as well become food for powder 
as my son,” and “they take to drill as a child takes to its mother’s milk...and soon learn 
the manual of arms.”128  His goals were clear, his ambitions unambiguous, and as the war 
wore on, more Kansans supported his views.   
      Convincing Kansans that the time had come to arm the slaves required Lane to 
identify an issue that appealed to all Kansan whites; he found it in the Confederate threat 
to Kansas’ borders.  Lane linked black enlistment to the survival of Kansas, rather than to 
notions of racial equality.129   Lane recognized that Kansans feared the threat posed by 
Confederate General Sterling Price (a Missourian!) to Kansas, and Price’s threats of 
punishing Kansas for its “marauding and murdering Abolitionists.” Lane exploited their 
anxiety over Kansans’ ability to defend the state with white soldiers alone.  Fear and 
uncertainty constituted key parts of Lane’s campaign to change white attitudes toward 
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blacks enlistment; he later admitted in Congress took over four months to accomplish.130 
The recent influx of contraband men in large numbers reminded Kansans daily of the 
large numbers of black men available for military service if Kansans supported Lane’s 
efforts.   Notwithstanding his campaign, events in Washington overtook Lane’s 
propaganda efforts as legislation supported by increasing numbers of Northern politicians 
granted the President the power to accept blacks for military service. 
     The Second Confiscation Act (July 1862) provided impetus for the recruitment of 
blacks despite federal and Kansas Militia Laws that barred the recruitment of blacks as 
soldiers. The most important section of the Act, Section 11, granted the President 
authority to employ “persons of African descent,” and the power to “organize and use 
them in such manner as he may judge best for the public welfare.”131  Senator Lane knew 
this and perhaps sensing the need to reassert his power in Kansas after his recent defeat, 
he traveled to Washington D.C. where he convinced Secretary of War Stanton and 
President Lincoln to appoint him as a federal Commissioner of Recruiting for the newly 
established Department of Kansas.  Although Lane perhaps never mentioned black 
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enlistment he pursued that policy with a vengeance upon his return to Kansas.132  The 
Second Confiscation Act created an opening that Lane exploited almost immediately, his 
return to Kansas followed the Act’s passage by less than two weeks.   Lane has been 
referred to as a man of the frontier and a man of action.  Both appeared accurate titles 
given his subsequent actions in Kansas in the summer of 1862.  Lane returned to Kansas 
seeking to recreate the balance of power in his favor in the most spectacular fashion. 
Lane could have pursued a field command with little political drama, but instead he 
demanded attention at a time when Union fortunes appeared to be fading against 
Southern armies.  Lane may have, with his flair for the dramatic, have helped to compel a 
measure that ultimately may have saved the Union and emancipate the slaves.  
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Chapter One: 
“War for the Union and Freedom for All Men” 
        
      Senator James Lane’s impending arrival in Kansas must have seemed the return of a 
man of vision to some, and the harbinger of chaos to others.  Lane did very little as a 
half-measure and his agenda for Kansas was written on a grand scale.  Lane took 
inspiration from the changing laws of the United States and Kansas’s swelling black 
refugee population.  Lane in addition to being a politician, was a military man and 
although his most recent service may have resembled that of a warrior-king of past ages, 
his next project would resound across America when it came to fruition. His timing was 
perfect for his purposes, the ground carefully prepared by his partisans while he nursed 
his wounds from the bruising defeat of his schemes for an Indian Territory Expedition.  
The political climate was hot and the factions arrayed into their respective camps.  His 
return could catalyze the disparate factors into a revolutionary state of affairs. 
     Kansas abolitionists eagerly awaited Lane’s arrival, the recent increase of support for 
enlisting blacks filling them with confidence that the Government would recognize the 
recruitment of black soldiers. Parties circulated the names of potential commanders for a 
black Brigade, amongst them Colonel Jennison and Kansas Red Leg commander Captain 
George H. Hoyt, Captain James Williams of the Fifth Kansas, Captain Stewart of the 
Ninth Kansas and Captain Moonlight of the Tenth as regimental commanders.  The 
excitement amongst the black community in Lawrence compelled black men to openly 
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drill in anticipation of a black regiment’s formation.133  Some that formerly rejected the 
concept of blacks serving alongside white soldiers as an insult, expressed a willingness to 
support recruiting blacks as military labor, and believed that black laborers would free 
white soldiers for combat.134 As Kansas sweltered in the heat of July, the debate and 
conjectures suddenly culminated not with a one of Lane’s great pronouncements, but as a 
modest advertisement appeared in the Leavenworth Daily Times.  Ethan Earle, an 
abolitionist shoe merchant, declared that while in contact with Senator Lane, the senator 
voiced his intent to raise a regiment regardless of race.135   Although a nobody to most 
Kansans, Earle boldly announced that black men should stand ready to enlist, with he 
taking the names of those persons wishing to raise companies.  Audacious and hot 
headed, Earle stole Senator Lane’s surprise and preempted Lane by a week with his 
announcement, immediately notifying Kansans that blacks were welcome to join the First 
Regiment Kansas Zouaves D’Afrique.  
      The Leavenworth papers soon verified Earle’s statements, the Daily Times publishing 
Senator Lane’s General Orders Number 1, which established his authority as 
Commissioner of Recruiting for the newly established Department of Kansas, his 
appointment approved by the Secretary of War a week prior. Subsequent issues 
announced Lane’s intention to recruit “persons of African descent,” and on 6 August 
General Orders Number 2, which offered as inducement for enlistment, freedom for the 
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enlisting soldier, mother, wife and children.136  A series of advertisements by Earle and 
James M. Williams, Lane’s authorized Commissioner of Recruiting in Leavenworth, also 
appeared in the Leavenworth Daily Times and Daily Conservative.  Lane commissioned 
Captain James Williams and Captain Henry Seaman Recruiting Commissioners with 
duties encompassing the areas north and south of the Kansas River respectively, but 
despite Earle’s efforts, denied him the same consideration.  The advertisements 
conspicuously promised freedom and liberation, Williams’ advertisement guaranteeing a 
certificate of freedom for those who may have been escaped slaves threatened with 
reclamation by their former masters.   
     Lane’s latest challenge to his opponents in Kansas carried across the United States to 
New York where the New York Times posted Earle’s recruiting announcement as 
evidence to show the absurdity of the wild, crazy-headed fanatical abolitionists in 
Kansas.137  Representing nothing less than statements of abolitionist intent, the recruiting 
advertisements in Kansan newspapers were in contravention to all applicable laws of the 
state and nation.  They also challenged Lane’s opponents to dare and defy his power over 
Kansas politics. 
     Earle’s and Williams’ advertisements differed in subtle ways, but the language 
deserves analysis because of how the two men expressed the terms of enlistment: Mister 
Earle offered membership in a liberating army; Captain Williams, former Fifth Kansas 
Cavalry officer, and Senator Lane’s appointed Commissioner of Recruiting, offered 
freedom for the enlisting soldier and family.  Captain Williams also promised enlistment 
as soldiers with the implication that volunteers would not be laborers, but rather fighters, 
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whereas Earle made no such offer.  It was an important distinction that the militarized 
city of Leavenworth recognized.  Although Union and Confederate armies both employed 
black labor, Williams’ advertisement stipulated black enrollment as soldiers in violation 
of the laws of Kansas and the United States. 
     Lane met with prominent Leavenworth leaders the evening of August 3, the group 
including William D. Matthews, the most prominent black businessman in Leavenworth.  
Also present were Charles Langston, who with Richard Hinton had recently organized 
the city’s contraband relief society, Phillip H. Minor, an Oberlin College graduate, and 
Colonel Jennison and Captain Hoyt. Only Minor announced his intent to join, while 
others opposed it.  Interestingly enough, handbills appeared in the east at this time, and 
reports of recruiting officers for Lane’s regiment in the city of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 
confirmed how divisive recruiting would be if pursued.  Captain Richard Dodge in a 
series of telegrams to Brigadier General Lorenzo Thomas reported outrage amongst white 
recruits and refusal to serve alongside black soldiers.138  No significant information was 
reported regarding local black reactions.  It is tempting to hypothesize if rather than 
enemies of the government, the authors of the handbills and purported recruiters were 
abolitionists linked to Lane.  The timing of the reports is especially interesting given that 
Lane was still negotiating with Kansas black community leaders for their support. 
     The local freedman community’s leaders initially rejected the terms of enlistment as 
offering little for freedmen, Lane’s past offensive offer of black servants to white 
Wisconsin soldiers served as additional disincentive for recruiting, the assumption being 
that black recruits would be utilized as menial labor and not as soldiers. Although many 
                                                
138 Negro in the Military Service of the United States 1639-1886  (The National Archives and Records 
Service General Services Administration, Washington: 1963).  Roll 2, Vol. 3, documents 930-932, 
Hereafter referred to as Negro in the Military Service. 
 
 
36 
 
white Kansans appeared receptive to Lane’s efforts, some wags in Leavenworth took to 
calling the regiment the “Southern Rebellion Grave Diggers,” and “Shovel Brigade” due 
to the impression that the regiment was being recruited to provide laborers for 
fortifications.  Whites incredulously regarded black recruits as fit for digging but not 
fighting.139  Although black leaders agreed to support Lane’s recruiting efforts several 
days later, in the meantime, hundreds of black men answered the recruiting 
advertisements. The strong response drew forth two of Lane’s fellow Kansans, Colonels 
Jennison and Montgomery, who commenced a ferocious competition for command of the 
Regiment.  
      Lane granted the initial advantage to Jennison and appointed him as a Recruiting 
Officer, with assistance from George Hoyt.   Montgomery however preempted Jennison’s 
effort, and when the prospect of a command of a colored regiment seemed likely, 
appealed to Governor Robinson, Lane’s rival for control in Kansas, for appointment to 
command the regiment.  Montgomery savaged any potential Jennison command as a 
“calamity,” and the man “a black cap, and a liar” whilst calling attention to the desire of 
both the regiment’s soldiers (men assembled for enlistment, but were not enlisted until 5 
August) and community leaders at Mound City to see Montgomery appointed regimental 
commander.140   Jennison and Montgomery appeared logical choices, with solid 
abolitionist reputations from their pre-war Underground Railroad experiences, and 
commands in the Kansas Brigade of 1861. However both men’s past actions in Missouri 
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made them less attractive as candidates for command of the Regiment, and repelled 
moderate Kansans by their association with the lawlessness of Lane’s “Black Brigade.”  
Lane also viewed the pair as rivals for political power.  If they gained prestige and broke 
from his control, Lane stood to lose valuable leverage against Governor Robinson. 
     Lane manipulated Hoyt and Jennison in support his recruiting goals, their credibility 
strong amongst elements of both black and white communities.  In turn, the pair 
attempted separately to betray him to Robinson in consideration for future command 
positions.  Hoyt expressed his desires in a letter to Lane’s rival, Governor Robinson in 
which Hoyt described the inner workings of the Regiment.  Hoyt anticipated that 
Williams and Jennison would command two regiments of black soldiers, the first of their 
kind and identically equipped to white regiments, and led by loyal “old fifty-six” and 
“radical” such as Williams and John Bowles.  Hoyt naturally expected to be Jennison’s 
Lieutenant Colonel, or second-in command.141  Perhaps Hoyt wrote Governor Robinson 
anticipating support for the Regiment and believed that establishing the abolitionist 
reputations of Williams and Bowles as well of the company officers would convince 
Robinson of the sincerity of the effort. Hoyt overreached however, and although Jennison 
was popular amongst some groups in Kansas, he failed to command the Regiment, much 
less a brigade of black soldiers in Kansas. 
     In the end, Lane disqualified Hoyt and Jennison after their usefulness ended, the pair 
proving poor candidates due to their disloyalty to Lane, their efforts to solicit Governor 
Robinson’s patronage noted by Lane supporters.  Lane also frustrated Montgomery’s 
efforts, compelling Montgomery to accept a commission to command black troops in 
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South Carolina from General David Hunter, another Lane rival.142 The problem with 
Jennison and Montgomery was their popularity amongst Kansans, and their potential as 
future political rivals.  Lane wanted to terrorize secessionists and reestablish his 
reputation, not raise future rivals for political dominance in Kansas. Lane appointed 
Captain James Williams and Captain Henry Seaman to co-command the regiment in 
anticipation of eventually forming two regiments with each man commanding his own.  
The exact reasons for Lane’s choice are unknown, but the pair offered Lane the ease of 
expediency, non-threatening reputations, little previous evidence of political 
involvement, and a reasonable degree of loyalty.  
       Lane’s recruiting proclamations electrified contraband communities across Kansas, 
and as a result hundreds enlisted within days of the announcements. Judicious recruiting 
officer appointments of men with high social standing in local communities aided 
recruiting. Williams appointed Richard Hinton, well-known friend of the black 
community his first recruiting officer on 4 August.   The first soldier enlisted at 
Leavenworth was Charles Harris, who was sworn in at 10 A.M. on 6 August by 
Lieutenant Hinton, although some muster records record soldiers from Lawrence and 
Mound City enlisting as early as 5 August.143  Officers accepted commissions with the 
understanding that they would command companies consisting of the men that they 
recruited, a policy that ensured most men in each company had some passing familiarity, 
and a method of building unit cohesion.  Lane’s insistence on white officers nearly cost 
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him the support of the Leavenworth black community when Lane initially refused to 
commission William D. Matthews as a company commander.        
     Lane’s maneuvering for support in Leavenworth prior to announcing black enrollment 
committed him to honoring an understanding with former Underground railroad 
conductors Earle and Matthews, in which Lane reputedly offered Matthews a 
commission.  When confronted, Lane offered Earle a commission to raise a company, but 
said that he could not commission black officers.   Perhaps not appreciating Matthews’ 
influence over the black community in Leavenworth, when Earle pressed Lane for a 
commission for Matthews, Lane demurred, offering a “situation” in the quartermaster or 
commissary departments, but finally relented when that offer too was declined.144 
Although Lane offered Matthews a commission, he may have done so knowing that the 
War Department would not honor it when the regiment mustered.  Regardless of Lane’s 
intent, Matthews commenced recruiting immediately, and within weeks parlayed his 
reputation in the black community into a company that he staffed with black Lieutenants.   
     Seeking to gain white support for the regiment, Lane and Blunt engaged in a speaking 
tour during which they explained the government’s recruiting policy across Kansas. 
General Blunt argued in favor of the recruitment of blacks, emphasizing that there were 
men enough in Kansas to form two regiments, and appealing to whites to consider the 
choice between being overrun with black contrabands or arming them for use as soldiers.  
He also emphasized the pay issue, reiterating that blacks would make less than whites, 
with any increase contingent on performance in battle. Disturbingly, he also declared if 
black men did not voluntarily enlist, they would be forced to serve, sentiments Lane also 
expressed in his speeches. Lane was no humanitarian, and forcefully reiterated that the 
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time for the black man had come to fight, “the Negroes are mistaken if they think white 
men can fight for them while they stay at home. We don’t threaten, but we have been 
saying you would fight, and if you won’t fight, we will make you.”   Lane also stated 
that, “If a white man can stop a bullet, you ought to stop two.   You shall try it...if not 
voluntarily, we will compel you to fight.”145  Lane’s rhetoric no longer sought to 
convince whites to permit blacks to enlist, instead it embodied strident threats if blacks 
sought to avoid military service.  Enlistment no longer a concept, but now a reality, Lane 
changed his emphasis to include identifying blacks as part of the shared resources of 
Kansas in its military struggle.   
     Black enlistment rose to national attention as Senator Lane and Governor Robinson 
fought over who would control the process and its legality.  Lane underestimated 
Governor Robinson’s resistance to his recruiting efforts, and Robinson challenged Lane 
over the right to appoint recruiting officers for the regiment, the Governor refusing to 
recognize Lane’s authority, commissions, and irregular recruiting practices. Telegraphing 
Secretary of War Stanton for clarification, Robinson tersely informed him that Lane was 
raising Negro regiments, and asked if he should commission the officers.  Lane also 
appealed directly to Stanton, who informed both Lane and Robinson that he favored 
issuing commissions if the governor did not. Lane also reacted to Robinson’s efforts to 
disband the regiment by directing General Blunt to issue General Orders Number 20 
commanding the arrest of any “encouraging desertion and preventing enlistment of 
soldiers.146 Accustomed to winning political contests, Secretary of War Stanton’s support 
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for Lane appeared to have settled the issue.  This was not the case; Lane’s biggest fight 
loomed on the horizon. 
       Accustomed to communicating directly with Secretary of War Stanton, Lane 
telegraphed his anticipation two regiments of blacks when he commenced recruiting, and 
asked if there was any objection to his recruiting blacks under the latest acts of Congress.  
In the interval between Lane’s telegram and Stanton’s reply, General Henry Halleck, the 
Commander of the Department of the Missouri, learned of Lane’s recruiting efforts and 
labeled them “without authority of law” due to lack of Presidential approval.  Halleck 
was not the last word however; recruiting continuing while Lane awaited Stanton’s reply.   
Confusing the issue, on 19 August, the Assistant Adjutant General’s office wired the 
Disbursing Officer at Fort Leavenworth informing him that recruits for Negro regiments 
were ineligible for enlistment bounties and premiums.  Given this telegram Stanton’s 
subsequent refusal to formally accept the regiment was unexpected, and with the 
encouragement of Lane’s enemies, printed in the September 4, 1862 Daily Times.147  
Senator Lane’s rash decision to enlist black men for military service ran directly counter 
to the wishes of President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton. 
      Although the reason for rejection most likely originated from attempts to keep the 
Border States within the Union, the President reportedly declared that emancipation and 
arming slaves would turn 50,000 Border State soldiers away from the Union. It is 
possible that President Lincoln’s rejection of Lane stemmed from concerns over Lane’s 
reputation and the Missourian complaints that Lane would turn the armed contrabands 
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against them, compounding theft with murder. Lane’s proposal was not the only one the 
Government received regarding black enlistment. President Lincoln declined a similar 
proposal from the Edward Salomon, Governor of Wisconsin, to raise a Negro or Indian 
regiment only a short period before he declined Lane’s.  The President was unwilling to 
grant Lane any political favors, and it is reasonable to hypothesize that having overlooked 
Lane’s Jayhawking and Indian enlistments, that President Lincoln did not believe the 
time was politically right for black enlistments.148  President Lincoln may have also 
harbored doubts about the fighting ability of black men.  Stanton understood the 
politically explosive impact that black enlistment could have on the Northern war effort.  
Historian Eric Foner pointed out Stanton’s reluctance to advertise authorizing General 
Rufus Saxton to recruit black soldiers, in a letter expressing that “This must never see 
daylight, because it is so much in advance of public opinion.”149  Lane however cared 
little for these concerns and continued with operations in Kansas, if with a reduced public 
presence; Kansas was a long way from Washington D.C. and Lane controlled Kansas.   
     Political opposition was one thing that Lane fought regularly, however, opposition 
from the black community in Leavenworth proved less malleable to his political skills 
and oratory.  Complicated by economics as well as concerns about rights as soldiers, 
black resistance to recruiting required the expertise of local black leaders to resolve.  
Some of the black opposition to enlistment originated with laborers that were benefiting 
from the wartime economy of Kansas.  Recognizing that the Kansas economy valued 
their skills and labor, and paid better wages than the Army offered black soldiers, many 
declined the opportunity to enlist.  There was no incentive to accept lower pay for what 
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appeared for all intents and purposes to be the same job, that of laborer and menial 
servant.  Opposition to enlistment could be overcome with time and assurance of support.  
Charles H. Langston encouraged black enlistment and understood that much of the black 
reluctance to enlist originated with concerns over the welfare of families.   Therefore to 
allay concerns, he urged the community to support the families of soldiers in their 
absence.  Many contraband blacks also feared abuse in military service and the possibility 
of capture and re-enslavement.150  Other individuals perceived opportunity for their race 
and willingly accepted the enlistment offer. 
     The debate in the black community over whether blacks would enlist as laborers or 
soldiers appeared a mute point for some black volunteers. Hinton cited one as ambivalent 
to his status as soldier or laborer; the opportunity to serve was a start toward equality. Pay 
disparity, lack of advantage and utilization as laborers seemed to matter less to 
contrabands who were slaves less than a year prior, than to freedmen who expected more 
than a certificate of freedom and less pay (and no bounties!) than their white counterparts 
to serve in the Union army.  The pay was not all as it appeared: despite advertisements 
offering $10 per month as soldiers, it was in actuality $7 per month, after uniform 
deduction, and barely on par with an unskilled laborer’s wages.  White soldiers earned at 
least $13 per month and a bounty.151  Some enlistees however were never afforded the 
opportunity to consider the effect on their families or whether or not they would be 
soldiers or laborers.   
 The Regiment Begins to Form 
                                                
150 Leavenworth Daily Conservative, September 4, 1862. 
151 OR: Series 1, Vol.13, 791-2.; Lorenzo Greene. Missouri’s Black Heritage  (Columbia, Missouri: 
University of Missouri Press, 1980), 78. White soldiers were offered between $100 and $300 bounty for 
enlistment, the equivalent of one to years’ pay, whereas no black soldiers received a bounty until late in the 
war. 
 
 
44 
 
      Captain James M. Williams established the first significant camp in northern Kansas, 
Camp Jim Lane, outside Leavenworth. Soon tents and wagons full of supplies entered the 
camp followed by black enlistees.  Several days later a large number of confiscated 
plantation slaves from Missouri marched to the regimental camp outside Leavenworth, as 
Colonel Burris returned from a raid along the Missouri border.  The next large group to 
arrive, Captain Matthews’ Leavenworth recruits arrived at Camp Lane on 16 August, 
closely followed by a contingent under Lieutenant George Martin from Atchison that 
marched into camp on 23 August to be enlisted into service.  Not to be outdone, Ethan 
Earle offered $100 bounty for fifty contrabands to join a company he was personally 
raising.   Some other “recruiting” efforts failed miserably.  The Missouri State Militia 
intercepted a detachment of Kansans after they seized twenty-five slaves from Missouri 
slave owners.  The captured men claimed that they operated under orders from Colonel 
Jennison to “recruit Negroes for Lane’s brigade.”152  Recruiting it seemed could be 
conducted both legally and illegally, but perhaps the most dangerous methods were those 
employed by the former Underground Railroad conductors who defied law and social 
convention to obtain recruits.  
     Utilizing his experience as a conductor, Earle conducted forays into Missouri to garner 
new recruits.  One expedition in late August brazenly “liberated” sixteen slaves, and 
Earle enlisted the men just prior to boarding a steamer.  The pursuing owner was 
powerless to stop him because Earle was on the river and carried proof of fresh 
enlistments.  Upon landing Earle marched the group straight into camp, a feat reported in 
the Daily Times.  On other occasions, Earle landed in Missouri where he met with 
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Clement Johnson, a Methodist slave preacher with whom Earle worked to liberate a large 
number of slaves to fill his company.  Earle entreated Johnson to hand out small slips of 
paper with the letter F on them to slaves seeking freedom in Kansas.  Those slaves were 
instructed to seek out and enlist in Earle’s company, Company F.153  The northern 
regiment’s commanders experienced success recruiting in Leavenworth and other areas 
north of the river, and within weeks the detachments grew large enough to be designated 
a regiment.  The recruiting efforts enraged Missourians, and concerned Kansans 
sympathetic to the plight of former slaves, but wary of retaliation by the aggrieved 
Missourian’s.  The Missourians, both suspected secessionist and Unionist slaveholder 
suffered losses from extralegal recruiting and sought relief from recruiting expeditions. 
      Lane’s hyperbole and Earle’s expeditions aside, opposition to the recruitment of black 
soldiers swiftly organized in Missouri where a group of prominent Missouri citizens 
representing Clay and Jackson Counties appealed to the President for protection from 
Lane’s illegal army of armed slaves.  Lane’s goal of striking terror into the hearts of 
secessionists appeared to have succeeded, and affected those counties where Missourians 
endured numerous Union raids in the past including those by Lane’s Brigade. The 
citizens appealed for an immediate disarming of the regiment, and an injunction against 
future attempts to recruit blacks.  Accompanied by a thinly veiled threat of “troubles” 
along the border if the regiment was not disbanded, the citizen’s letter concludes by 
darkly alluding that they understood that the President had decided against mustering 
armed slaves into the Union army.154  The complaint failed, perhaps because the 
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committee represented a region of Missouri known to be the favorite haunt of 
bushwhackers and guerrillas. 
     Many Kansans sympathized with the Missourians’ objection to a black regiment in 
Kansas, others agreed with Lane and maintained faith that the President would change his 
mind and accept the regiment into service.  E.B. Whitman in Lawrence evidenced little 
evidence of despair when he wrote that “the experiment of using the escaped slaves at 
least, not only at the spade but also the musket, will I am confident be tried here in 
Kansas under some form or other,” Kansans having organized, “nearly ten companies of 
‘contrabands’ and it is expected that two entire regiments will soon be in the field.”155  
The Lawrence-based Kansas State Journal responded to Lane’s truculence differently, 
urging black men to refrain from supporting Lane’s illegal and disgraceful efforts, and 
labeling Lane’s recruiting practices “grave deceptions,” that impoverished honest and 
hard-working blacks with lies about honorable service as soldiers.  The Journal also 
expressed fear that “hot-headed indiscreet men would invade Missouri with the 
[R]egiment...damaging the black cause and weakening the influence of their friends...”156   
Confronted by a Senator who would not obey the Governor, President, or military, 
Kansans faced a tough decision: do they support their charismatic Senator or the 
Government?  The abolitionists of Lawrence, the stronghold of abolitionism in Kansas, 
regarded Lane’s efforts with trepidation.  Lane threatened their attempts to free blacks 
from slavery by advocating measures  that had the potential to backfire disastrously on 
the abolitionist cause. If Lane’s efforts did result in indiscriminate attacks against 
Missourians without Federal approval, the potential for a mass defection to the 
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Confederacy could become a reality. Regiment continued to fill its ranks with 
contrabands and freedmen as Kansans argued their positions; meanwhile the regiment 
remained viable as long as Lane supported it and channeled supplies to sustain it. 
      Referred to variously as the Twelfth (colored) regiment, the First Zouaves, or simply 
Zouaves by the Kansas press, the regiment contained six full or partial companies within 
weeks of its organization.  As the companies at Leavenworth filled, the new recruits 
exchanged their civilian garments for blue jackets, gray pants and forage caps, and 
adjusted to strange social rules and expectations.  Political and social concerns were 
never far from the regiment, and political partisans intruded into the Regiment’s affairs 
daily.  Some in the Regiment, disturbed by Senator Lane’s remarks about blacks being 
servants and laborers, demanded to be armed as well as clothed. Williams as a result of 
these demands secured a lot of short, heavy Austrian rifles.  Test firing revealed that only 
twenty percent of the weapons functioned. Williams responded to the general 
dissatisfaction with the rifles, and assured the recruits that when the Regiment was 
completed and went south, it would be issued “new U.S. muskets,” presumably the same 
as other units armed with more modern Springfield rifles157 While Williams coped with 
inadequate weaponry and dissatisfaction amongst the ranks, the southern branch of the 
regiment also filled its ranks a hundred miles south of his location under the direction, 
albeit briefly, of Colonel Montgomery, Captain Seaman’s former Kansas Brigade 
commander. 
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      Based at Mound City, the southern recruiting effort reported over a hundred recruits 
in the first two weeks, and by the end of August over three hundred recruits were 
encamped at Wyandotte, with another three hundred at Lawrence.  Several companies 
already filled, the soldiers in the camps commenced training in drill, utilizing what 
Richard Hinton referred to as the “Orpheus C. Kerr manual of colored arms.”158  
Amongst the first recruits to arrive at Mound City was Company E, under the command 
of former First Sergeant Luther Thrasher, consisting of recruits from the middle of the 
state, near Topeka and Lawrence.  These recruits left Lawrence on 23 August and arrived 
in Mound City three days later after a seventy-five mile march. A month later Company 
E departed Mound City for Fort Lincoln, Kansas, where Seaman’s command performed 
post and prisoner guard duty.  While Williams fought against desertion, low morale and 
constant interference from all sides, Seaman and the southern recruits experienced their 
own tribulations. 
     White units opposed to the black recruits traveled the military road from Fort 
Leavenworth to Fort Scott regularly and when the two groups met, insults flew freely. 
Some of the white officers of those units openly declared the black soldiers a stain on the 
Union’s honor, believing that “it would be a disgrace to wear the uniform of an American 
soldier if the government was going to put it on the backs of a lot of niggers.” Despite 
this acrimonious relationship with Kansas white troops, Mound City’s civilian populace 
welcomed them, and Seaman’s troops numbering several hundred marched through 
Mound City singing “Old John Brown” at the tops of their voices, the mixture of 
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“contrabands, Cherokees, Missourians, and darkies from Arkansas” reported as strong 
and determined to go to war against secessionists.159  Singing John Brown’s Body while 
on the march was nothing particular to the black recruits, white Union soldiers also 
enjoyed singing the popular song.  The meaning of the song was decidedly different for 
the black men and their white officers, men who may have been aided by Brown to 
escape or compatriots on the Underground Railroad. 
     Recruiting men and retaining public support for recruiting black men became more 
difficult as opposition to Lane’s efforts intensified in late August, 1862. Senator Lane, in 
recognition that opposition to the regiment, and its close proximity to Leavenworth made 
it too high profile to simply ignore, issued General Order Number Seven designating new 
assembly areas for the recruits away from Leavenworth.  Political agitation from failed 
commission seekers generated acrimony to towards the Regiment, and hastened its 
removal from the political hothouse of Leavenworth. Ordered to train near Wyandotte 
bridge, units from Camp Jim Lane marched south, while Captain Seaman’s troops 
remained near Mound City.  Lane later admitted to Congress that he moved the regiment 
because prejudice against black troops was so intense that they had to be “drilled in 
seclusion.”160 Lane words sound inadequate in light of what Captain Williams reported in 
the Official Regimental History as formidable challenges to the integrity of his regiment. 
     Williams and his officers encountered significant opposition from civilian authorities 
while they attempted the simultaneous duties of deserter apprehension and recruiting.  
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Williams believed that the civilians that opposed him and the Regiment were of four 
types:  
 those [in] active sympathy with the rebellion; [those harboring] an intolerant  
 prejudice against the colored race which would deny them the honorable place  
 in society, to which every soldier is entitled; a few...who believed that this attempt  
 to enlist colored men would not be approved by the War Department and that  
 the real interests of the colored men should not be vainly spent in this effort; a  
 large class who believed that the Negro race did not possess necessary  
 qualifications to make efficient soldiers, and consequently the experiment would  
 result in defeat or disaster.161   
 
So perhaps it was difficult to drill, but more likely, the regiment was moved to an area far 
wherein the men could train, but also maintain a low profile.  It is of note that no attempt 
was made to prevent the regiment from leaving Leavenworth, or to disband it when the 
armed soldiers marched south.  The Army, although charged with maintaining order and 
fully capable of disbanding the regiment did nothing that indicates orders from Secretary 
of War Stanton to forcibly disband the regiment.  It appears that while the regiment 
enjoyed the military’s support, the regiment’s greatest threats originated with civilian 
authorities and desertion than from a military commission.    
     The first companies of the northern arm of the regiment to reach Wyandotte were 
Companies A through D, which arrived September 3; an incomplete Company F marched 
out of Leavenworth under a nine-striped U.S. flag sewn by the wives and friends of the 
company’s soldiers. Company G arrived on September 12. Located approximately thirty 
miles south of Leavenworth, the camp was situated in Wyandotte’s picnic area, a pasture 
in which the estimated six hundred soldiers lived in tents, the camp cited as a model of 
cleanliness and efficiency. The regiment’s progress was unsteady however, and training 
was continually interrupted by the dual cycles of desertions and acquisitions of recruits.  
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Recruiting continued as irregularly as in Leavenworth, some recruits arriving with the 
letter F in hand, others escaping from across the river in Missouri, and still others 
reportedly obtained through an arrangement between Williams and an unnamed man who 
operated a boat to bring escaped slaves across the river to the regimental camp, where 
Earle asserts men were purchased for $2.00 apiece.  Recruit buying was not restricted to 
Wyandotte; in late August an unnamed recruiter at Hiawatha, Kansas reportedly offered 
$2.00 per male slave brought from Missouri to his camp.162  
     The move to Wyandotte did not stop desertions or interference with the regimental 
affairs, Jennison and Hoyt were accused of indirectly attempting to destroy the Regiment 
with their interference.  Leavenworth Provost Marshal Stout attempted to break up the 
regiment with a detachment of twenty men, and failing the direct approach, issued 
regimental deserters Provost passes to their homes.  The passes extended over an 
unlimited period, and advised recruits them that they were not soldiers.  It is unknown 
how many illiterate former slaves believed Provost Marshal Stout, but the desertion rates 
were heavy as could be inferred by Williams’ constant efforts to capture and return 
deserters to the camp.  
     Lack of pay constituted the greatest challenge to the regiment, unpaid soldiers 
growing restless in the absence of remuneration for their efforts. Williams was charged 
with attempting to forestall desertions at one point by offering to collect gold from slave 
owners in Missouri to pay the money due the soldiers.163 Obviously this offer, if it had 
occurred, was one of desperation; Williams had no authorization for such raids and the 
retaliation from Missourians would have been severe.  No such raids ever occurred, but 
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the hint of pay doubtless forestalled many who would have deserted.  The regiment 
existed in large part due to discipline, but also owed its existence to soldiers who 
remained in the hope of being mustered into service.  Failure to muster threatened to 
invalidate their freedom certificates and render all their effort to free family for naught.  
     While at Wyandotte, the Regiment adhered to a rigorous training schedule in which 
the soldiers exhibited a natural aptitude for the manual of arms, and despite some initial 
setbacks in sentinel training, the regiment’s men were intent on mastering the intricacies 
of drill, each one vying with the other for perfection.  Drill was conducted in two daily 
sessions from 8:30 A.M. to 11 A.M. and 3 P.M. to 5:30 P.M., over five hours per day, the 
new soldiers standing parade daily. It may be that the Regiment’s drill proficiency 
impressed some white officers at Fort Leavenworth, but more likely was the fact that the 
regiment was available and as a result, soon received orders to provide companies for 
duty at Fort Leavenworth.  This however did not come to pass.  The Regiment with one 
major exception in September, did not participate in any military duties except for 
training.  Across the border in Missouri nervous white citizens watched anxiously for the 
impending black army, as their slaves fled for the safety of Kansas, and some to the 
regiment’s camp.164  
     The regiment’s deployment to Wyandotte elicited fresh complaints from Missouri and 
delegations solicited arms from Missouri Governor Gamble to fight what they regarded to 
be a terrifying invading slave army  they were defenseless to resist.   A mixture of guile 
and legitimate grievance, perhaps, especially given that regimental troops marched into 
Missouri in mid September. A small contingent of the regiment under the command of 
Lieutenant Edgerton and Sergeant Major Phillip Minor, served as scouts for Colonel 
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Burris’ Tenth Kansas regiment during a hunt for the notorious guerrilla William Quantrill 
in late September, consequently returning to Kansas with a train of 70 contrabands 
confiscated during the raid.165  The black troops of the Regiment faced formidable 
opposition from the inhabitants of western Missouri, many of which were slave owners 
and who suffered the confiscations of the Kansas Brigade in 1861.  Future expeditions 
into Missouri would contend with angry Missourians as well as any bushwhackers, 
Confederate soldiers and partisan rangers in the vicinity.  No unilateral operations 
appeared likely however, despite the use of regimental soldiers and officers in 
conjunction with white Kansas units. 
     Less than a month after their arrival in Wyandotte, Senator Lane reassigned the 
regiment to Fort Scott after he received orders that deployed all recruits regardless of 
race, and capable of bearing arms, to the border to defend against a potential Confederate 
invasion. The regiment departed Wyandotte on October 7, and marched south after giving 
three cheers for the loyal citizens of Wyandotte.  After a short period in Paola to be 
equipped with better muskets (type unknown), ammunition, greatcoats, and other 
materiel, the regiment proceeded to Fort Lincoln, where Lane ordered the approximately 
550 remaining soldiers from Wyandotte and a like number from Mound City, to 
consolidate into one regiment at Fort Lincoln.166   The numbers are telling: despite 
several months of recruiting, eleven hundred men remained in ranks for service. 
     The fall of 1862 proved an especially trying time for the regiment, a tempering period 
during which many volunteers departed, leaving few remaining recruits from the heady 
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Richard J. Hinton, “The Department of Kansas,” New York Times, October 18, 1862.; Lawrence 
Republican, October 16, 1862;  Earle, Journal, 23-24; Lane letter to Williams, October 9, 1862; Ira Berlin, 
et al. Freedom, 39.     
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days of August.  Despite a promising beginning and excitement over the recruiting 
process, the political and social realities in Kansas were such that various parties treated 
the regiment with suspicion, hostility and outright condemnation.  Kansas, the arch 
abolitionist state, appeared to have little appetite for black enlistment. The preliminary 
Emancipation Proclamation failed to bring any succor to the regiment.  Pay did not 
arrive, nor did recognition or muster occur.  Despite the landmark events of the summer, 
and the recruitment of the first Northern blacks for military service, the regiment 
remained in limbo, its men victims of Lane’s political gamesmanship and President 
Lincoln’s unwillingness to accept black troops for fear of losing the Border States.  The 
demoralizing effect of the regiment’s lack of Government recognition, combined with no 
pay and growing Kansan animosity, wore down the resolve of many of the black soldiers.  
The presence of white collaborators willing to suborn black desertion posed a constant 
threat to the black regiment that few white regiments experienced.  Black deserters often 
received community support, whereas encouraging and abetting the desertion of a white 
soldier bore steep penalties.         
      The remaining soldiers of the regiment stoically endured these challenges, the officers 
and men resisting a growing sense of despair that the regiment’s destiny was to serve as a 
labor pool and not a fighting formation.  October began inauspiciously; desertions 
increased as many soldiers disenchanted with the military after months of no pay and no 
combat, deserted to tend to their families. Soldiers fought daily against the temptation to 
desert: the choice between either remaining in a military formation unrecognized by the 
Secretary of War and the President, or the chance for a decent paying job in the Kansas 
 
 
55 
 
wartime economy posed little difficulty for many. Nothing short of combat or muster into 
service with pay would arrest the departure of the men.   
      The remaining recruits of the regiment garrisoned a miserable series of small camps 
in the vicinity of Fort Lincoln, dividing their time between drilling, guarding Confederate 
prisoners at the fort, repairing the earthworks at Fort Lincoln, and constructing new ones 
at Fish Creek. Fort Lincoln, a crudely constructed post situated on a floodplain near the 
Osage River, served as the regimental base of operations during fall of 1862.  Fort 
Lincoln consisted of several small wooden building surrounded by a packed earth 
embankment. One wag described Fort Lincoln as “nothing more than the work of an 
insane or idiotic brain…barely fit for the sheltering of livestock, let alone soldiers...the 
hole is calculated to be more of an enginery of destruction to human life than the 
battlefield itself.”167   Lack of pay, in conjunction with poor living conditions, isolation, 
and distance from family, created an environment in which desertion appeared not a 
matter of if, but when. 
     Captain Williams reported to Major Charles Henning at Fort Scott, who utilized the 
black recruits almost immediately. Williams was ordered to detail two companies to 
occupy Barnesville, and a third to Fish Creek as pickets on the Kansas-Missouri border, 
with all soldiers instructed to carefully respect the rights of Missourians. Cautioned to 
keep his troops “well in hand” so that guerrillas could not cut them off from other 
companies, Williams assigned them to camps close enough to concentrate quickly and 
                                                
167 Lawrence Kansas State Journal, November 27, 1862.  Although the authorship of the article of the 
column was attributed to S, I believe that it was Lieutenant William Smallwood given his practice of 
writing to Lawrence newspapers regarding the regiment’s affairs.  The vagueness of authorship is 
understandable given the possible penalties for the column’s tone, especially since the location was chosen 
and developed by Senator Lane. 
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efficiently.168 The remaining companies at Fort Lincoln endured service in a pestilential 
location chosen as much to hide the regiment’s men from ready observation, as to test 
them against the demoralizing dreariness of Fort Lincoln.  
      The uncertainty of muster, and repeated demands for pay and recognition continued 
unabated, taxing the spirit of the soldiers and officers alike. Short stints in Leavenworth 
or Lawrence searching for deserters or enrolling volunteers relieved boredom to a limited 
degree, but drill dominated the regiment’s daily schedule. Unlike the majority of the 
soldiers however, the many regimental officers shared experiences and acquaintances 
from pre-war times, some united by service in the Free State militia, while clandestine 
work as Underground Railroad conductors, social organizations such as the Masons, or 
religious affiliation linked many more together.  
Regimental backgrounds and motivations 
     A number of factors distinguished the regiment’s white officers from their 
contemporaries in white Kansas regiments.  Selected by Senator Lane for a variety of 
reasons, but primarily for their loyalty as “Lane Men,” the company commanders 
commissioned lieutenants of similar outlook for their companies.  Some exceptions 
existed however; Captains Ethan Earle and William D. Matthews accepted commissions 
despite initial acrimony over their anticipated positions in the regiment.  Matthews’ 
company reflected his local influence in Leavenworth, his Lieutenants known men of 
community prominence and learning.  In addition to their loyalty to Lane, the inner core 
of the regiment’s leadership also shared ties with John Brown of Harper’s Ferry renown, 
their pre-Civil War associations ranging from providing Brown monetary support, or 
accompanying him on slave raids, to the formation of a rescue squad to free Brown from 
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jail.  The regimental leaderships’ strong abolitionist character and faith in their cause 
provided another layer of shared identity, a potential bulwark against the mounting 
disapproval of the Kansa populace and military.   Abolitionist sentiment may have 
explained why the vast majority of the officers remained with the regiment despite being 
unpaid.  If the regiment disbanded, the potential for the soldiers to be conscripted as 
military labor seemed likely, and the effect upon the future of black military service dire. 
Many of the officers shared a deeper bond, their fealty to the memory of John Brown and 
his demand that slavery be destroyed to save America.  The regiment marched with 
Brown’s ghost, “John Brown’s Body,” as its regimental song. Unlike later regiments 
raised other parts of the Union, the First Kansas Colored contained a large number of 
John Brown’s men for whom slavery constituted an abomination before God and country. 
 
 
Table 2: Sources of Regimental Officer Affiliation. 
 
     An examination of a selection of regimental officers and their personal backgrounds is 
important for understanding their character and motivations.  The ages of the vast 
majority of the officers were in the early to mid 20s, but some were as old as 40.  Most 
were educated men, some like Lieutenants Minor and Copeland shared the same alma 
mater, in their case, Oberlin College in Ohio.  The First Kansas Colored’s officers 
Underground 
Railroad
John Brown 
Associate
Kansas 
Territorial 
Militia
Politician
Soldier in 
Lane's brigade
Abolitionist
James  Williams Yes Yes Yes Yes
Henry Seaman Possible Yes Yes Yes
John Bowles Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Richard Hinton Yes Yes Yes Journalist Yes
Eliab Macy Yes
Ezekiel Coleman Yes Yes Yes
William Matthews Yes Yes Yes
Henry Copeland Yes Yes Yes
Ethan Earle Yes Yes Yes
Joseph Gardner Yes Yes Yes Yes
Charles Coleman Yes Yes Yes
Ransom Harris Yes Yes
Luther Thrasher         Yes
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differed from white units because the soldiers did not elect them, as was the custom in 
many white units; Senator Lane dictated the command structure and officer selection.64  
The two co-commanders of the regiment, Captain Williams and Captain Seaman hailed 
from two of Kansas‘ largest towns, Leavenworth and Lawrence respectively.  Their 
appointments brought all of Kansas into Lane’s patronage system, the two men 
appointing additional officers as recruiting commissioners from their respective areas.  
     Captain James M. Williams arrived in Kansas from Wisconsin in 1856, and although 
trained as a lawyer, speculated in real estate and operated a stationary store in 
Leavenworth. Williams took an active role in the border warfare of Territorial Kansas, 
wherein he actively supported abolitionist activity.  Williams later served as commander 
of Company K of the Fifth Kansas Cavalry until his resignation in July of 1862 to recruit 
“Men of African Descent” for Senator Lane.169  A fellow officer of similar outlook, 
Captain Henry Seaman also from the Fifth Kansas Cavalry, joined Williams and 
Lieutenant John Bowles in recruiting for the regiment.  The three men rose to the 
attention of Kansans in1862, when they refused to return fugitive slaves to their former 
masters, a moral stand that resulted in their arrest.   Richard Hinton also claimed links 
between Williams, Bowles and Seaman with John Brown.  In addition, Seaman’s pre-war 
abolitionist activity linked him to James Montgomery. Originally from Kentucky, 
                                                
64 Letter War Department, Assistant Adjutant General C.W. Foster to Major General James G. Blunt, 
December 8, 1863, Negro in the Military Service, Roll IV, document 1800.  The practice of appointing 
white officers in Kansas regiments continued.  This document authorized Blunt to appoint officers for the 
new 11th Regiment USCT the same as officers were appointed for the 2nd Kansas Colored Volunteer 
Infantry Regiment.  Blunt would appoint them himself rather that the War Department examining them in 
Saint Louis. 
169 Lull Family Genealogical Sketch of James Monroe Williams, MS. Coll. 545, Williams, J.M.  Kansas 
State Historical Society;Sutherland’s Leavenworth City Directory, 1860-1861 (La Crosse, Wisconsin: 
Northern Micrographics, 1861), 155; Samuel J. Crawford. Kansas in the Sixties (Chicago: A.C. McClurg 
and Company, 1911), 165. During the late 1850s Williams’ anti-slavery sentiments surfaced when he and 
William T. Sherman (who was practicing law in Leavenworth at that time), rescued a fugitive slave from 
Missouri border ruffians. 
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Lieutenant John Bowles, served with Free State forces under John Brown in Lawrence, 
and served as one of the leading Underground Railroad conductors in Lawrence.170  
     Seaman in retrospect was an unusual choice given some of his actions while serving 
with Fifth Kansas Cavalry.  Seaman’s service records reveal a troubled man, one given to 
retaining and appropriating for his own use at least eighteen horses or colts, four mules, a 
wagon, two carriages, and a large quantity of dry goods.  He was also charged with 
threatening and shooting at one of the regiment’s men without provocation.171  Seaman’s 
deeds hardly appear the actions of an honorable man despite his abolitionist credentials.   
     Seaman’s service record is disturbing, but perhaps a reflection of the actions of the 
Third Kansas Volunteer Regiment as Lane’s Brigade ravaged western Missouri.  Missing 
from his records is any description of punishment for his thefts.  However, the records do 
contain a resignation letter from May of 1862 in which Seaman resigned his commission.  
His resignation letter’s passionate words denounced slavery as “a behavior that had to be 
crushed,” and because of that he enlisted under the command of Montgomery and Lane.  
He claimed remaining under the command of Colonel Clayton, the new regimental 
commander would “cause violence to his manhood.”  His resignation certified by Special 
Orders 176 of the Department of the Missouri, Seaman appeared to have severed his 
connection with the military.  There was a catch however, on May 21, 1862, both his and 
James M. Williams resignations were rescinded by Washington and both ordered to duty 
                                                
170 Richard Hinton. John Brown and His Men (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1894), 107.  Richard Hinton 
believed that their actions served as the inspiration for the United States Senate Military Committee’s bill 
forbidding the use of the army to capture or return fugitive slaves; Hinton, John Brown, 48. Bowles 
claimed to personally know of over three hundred fugitives that passed through Lawrence between 1855 
and 1859. 
171 Criminal Charges, 1861, Combined Military Service Records, 5th Kansas Cavalry, Henry Seaman, 
Captain Company D, Third Kansas Volunteers.  National Archives, Washington D.C.  These charges 
covered the period August to November 1861, the first charge in a two count case against Seaman.  The 
second charge  
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with their regiments.  A cryptic note at the bottom of the order requested that only the 
parties concerned be notified.172 Why did Washington see fit to get involved in their 
resignations, they were two amongst many that resigned, but received attention and 
revocation? The possibility that Senator Lane was responsible is one answer, but no 
record of any official reassignment is in either Seaman’s or Williams’ service files.   
     Perhaps Senator Lane was the cause, for soon afterwards Senator Lane commissioned 
the pair as recruiters for the new black regiment.  Did Lane see their resignation letters 
and decide to retain them for his purposes?  Williams makes mention of being detached 
for special duty beginning in June 1862, and was reported as a member of the Fifth 
Kansas Cavalry until September, 1862, but Seaman remains an enigma.173  The 
implication is that Lane knew both men from their service in his brigade and that they 
had made a favorable impression on the Senator.  Another man of Bleeding Kansas 
renown also received Lane’s attention, the newspaperman and abolitionist Richard 
Hinton. 
     Adjutant (Lieutenant) Richard Hinton arrived in New York from London in 1851, and 
then trained in surveying and topographic engineering.  Hinton developed journalistic and 
political affinity with abolitionists, and emmigrated to Kansas Territory in 1855, where 
he joined cause with the Territory’s abolitionists.  A close associate of John Brown and 
the Underground Railroad in the vicinity of Leavenworth, Hinton participated in an 
aborted attempt to free Brown from prison; among his companions the well-known 
abolitionists James Montgomery and Joseph Gardner.   Especially active as a reporter for 
                                                
172 Resignation letter, and ratifications  May 8,1862, May15, 1862. Combined Military Service Records, 5th 
Kansas Cavalry, Henry Seaman, Captain Company D, Third Kansas Volunteers.  National Archives, 
Washington D.C. 
173 RG 94: 79th USCT, Combined Military Service Records, James M. Williams.; James M. Williams, 
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numerous newspapers including the Leavenworth Daily Conservative, the New York 
Times, and Tribune, Chicago Tribune, Boston Commonwealth, Hinton’s Kansas social 
circle included noted radical abolitionist Daniel R. Anthony, Charles Henry Langston, 
and William D. Matthews.  Identified early as a supporter of contraband relief and black 
causes, Hinton accepted a commission in the First Kansas on August 4, 1862, one of the 
first officers of the regiment.174  Hinton later proved a controversial officer, his private 
views and public reporting at times suggesting Hinton sought personal advancement as 
much as the destruction of slavery. 
    Other abolitionists swelled the First Kansas’ officer corps, many of them former 
conductors for the Underground Railroad.  Captain Ethan Earle arrived in Kansas from 
Boston in 1857.  Earle claimed personal connections to both Senator Lane and General 
Blunt, as well as a close friendship with William D. Matthews.  When not dabbling in 
politics, Earle owned a shoe store on Delaware Street in Leavenworth from which he 
raided into Missouri, regularly conducting slaves to freedom in Kansas.175   A 
Lawrencian and acolyte of John Brown, Lieutenant Joseph Gardner gained notoriety for 
his role in the armed rescue of fellow conductor Reverend John Doy from Missouri in 
1859 and his involvement in the aborted rescue of John Brown. Gardner carried a grudge 
against slavery advocates, a fugitive slave in his care died at their hands when unknown 
assailants attacked Gardner’s house with a hail of gunfire.73 
                                                
174 Hinton Biography, 13 June 1893, MS 127 Thomas Wentworth Higginson Collection, Richard J. Hinton 
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     Several other Underground Railroad conductors with similar experiences to Gardner 
were the Colman family, who also suffered attacks from pro-slavery partisans, and 
Ransom Harris, who operated a small station just inside the Kansas state line.  Ezekiel 
Colman arrived from Boston, and settled in Lawrence where the outspoken abolitionist 
operated a station out of his farm, and received frequent visits from John Brown.176  A 
kindred New Englander, Ransom Harris arrived in Kansas from Vermont in 1860, and 
operated an Underground Railroad station at Pardee, Kansas, out of a small log cabin 
close to the border.  When the Civil War began, Harris enlisted in the Tenth Kansas, a 
regiment in which fellow Lieutenant Luther Thrasher served as a company First Sergeant, 
before accepting a commission in the First Kansas Colored.177  
     The First Kansas Colored’s trio of black officers constituted a unique experiment in 
black leadership, especially with black men commissioned as infantry officers in 1862.  
Few black men commanded combat units during the Civil War; most black officers were 
chaplains or served in non-combat arms positions.  William D. Matthews, born in 
Maryland, moved to Leavenworth in 1856, and opened the Waverly House with money 
earned as a seaman.  Williams operated the Waverly House as a boarding house, he and 
fellow abolitionist Daniel R. Anthony also employing it as a station on the Underground 
Railway.  Captain Williams secured a commission from Senator Lane after convincing 
                                                                                                                                            
1860, George L. Stearns Collection, no 507, items 90087 and 90596, Kansas State Historical Society; 
Richard. Cordley. A History of Lawrence, Kansas. (Lawrence, Kansas: E.F. Caldwell, 1895). Gardner 
participated in the attempt to free John Brown along with Hinton and Montgomery.  
176 Martha Parker.  Soil of Our Souls  (Overbrook, Kansas: Parker Laird Enterprises, 1980), 81-82. One of 
the slaves entrusted to the Colman family, Neely, while farming in the Colman fields, drew the attention of 
pro-slavery men, and Missouri slave catchers seized and transported him to Missouri.  In one of the chance 
meetings of war, in 1864 Ezekiel’s son Charles was reunited with Neely in Arkansas. 
177 Sheridan, Freedom’s Crucible, 90-95. 
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him of his ability and community standing, Williams aided by his prior experience as 
Leavenworth’s Commissioner of Contrabands.  The most prominent black businessman 
in Leavenworth, Matthews’ opinions mattered greatly in the freedman and contraband 
communities.  Matthews easily filled Company D with Leavenworth men; his efforts 
appealed to black men, and held out the promise of legitimacy and respect earned from 
military service.  Lane needed Matthews for recruiting to succeed in Leavenworth; 
Matthews’ commission and those of his Lieutenants Henry Copeland and Philip Minor 
constituted the price Lane paid for black support.178    
        Lieutenant Henry Copeland attended preparatory school in Oberlin, Ohio, and both 
Copeland and his brother, John A. Copeland, knew John Brown well.  Perhaps seeking a 
more active role in the fight against slavery, Copeland immigrated to Kansas, and settled 
in Lawrence in 1861.  His brother’s widow also moved to Kansas, and married Charles 
H. Langston, establishing a possible connection that brought Copeland to Matthews’ 
interest.179   Lieutenant Philip Minor, a Louisiana native, attended Oberlin College, and 
immigrated to Kansas in 1862.   A literate and highly educated man, Minor initially 
served as the Sergeant Major for the First Kansas Colored before being commissioned.180  
Although little more is known about the regiment’s black officers, their achievements 
resounded through the Kansan black community and proved that black men could serve 
well as officers despite white claims to the contrary.  The regiment’s abolitionist pedigree 
appeared unquestionable.  How that abolitionist character changed with time and 
circumstance is a matter for consideration, in part because the regiment formed earlier 
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than other Colored Regiments, and because of its long period of training and 
indoctrination before marching into battle in Indian Territory. 
          The backgrounds and experiences of the regiment’s soldiers varied widely, and 
while the majority were experienced laborers, while others practiced trades as carpenters, 
blacksmiths, and teamsters.  The stories of two regimental soldiers provide a brief 
overview of why black men decided to join and what motivated them to stay with the 
regiment.  George Washington escaped across the frozen Missouri River from a tobacco 
plantation in Parkville, Missouri, and found aid in Quindaro, Kansas.  In the summer of 
1862 Washington traveled to Leavenworth where he enlisted in Company B, in August 
1862.181   Youth, boredom, patriotism, and the need for a source of income may have 
motivated Washington and other black men, much as it motivated white recruits.  
However, coming so soon on the heels of his escape from Missouri, Washington may 
have been motivated most of all by the promised “freedom certificate” prominently 
featured in the recruiting broadsides.   
     Clement Johnson of Company F also enlisted in August of 1862.  Clement Johnson’s 
motivations originated from a desire to reunite his family, and find his wife and daughter 
in Tennessee.  Impressed by the Methodist preacher’s bearing and manners, Captain 
Earle, promised Johnson the highest-ranking enlisted position in the company, First 
Sergeant.  Johnson’s held the position until his discharge in May of 1865 for disability.  
Although illiterate at the time of his enlistment, Johnson learned to read and write by 
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spring of 1863.182  As Earle surmised, Clement Johnson’s motivation centered on 
redeeming his family from slavery, and although different from George Washington’s, 
both men shared a desire to serve as soldiers despite the risks of such service.  As Charles 
H. Langston expressed it, they were “willing to exchange one form of slavery for 
another,” and enlisted despite the uncertainty of the regiment’s prospects for success.183  
Many others that joined the regiment understood the risk enlistment entailed, the 
potential for capture or re-enslavement high, especially as Southern rhetoric against black 
enlistment increased following the issuance of the preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation.                       
     Many soldiers resisted the impulse to desert despite hardships, possibly because they 
believed that the privations were worth the price of freedom for themselves and their 
families.  Those soldiers not freedmen before the war grappled with the cruel legalities of 
the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.   Ostensibly free due to their military 
service, many soldiers’ families in border-states remained slaves because the 
Emancipation promised freedom to slaves in secessionist states, not loyal Border States 
such as Missouri.  Those fortunate enough to have family in a free state endured the 
mixed lot of a soldier, the potential for separation and death an emotional as well as 
financial loss to their families.184  Some soldiers enlisted to facilitate revenge for past 
mistreatment, retribution through killing justified “in the service of their cause,” their 
efforts part of the fight for “righteousness, equality and citizenship.”185 Enlistment didn’t 
expunge the experience of slavery; the opportunity to exact armed vengeance on 
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184 Berlin, Freedom, 656 - 657. 
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secessionists served soldiers as another motivator for their continued service in otherwise 
unbearable conditions.  
     Freedmen may have served for similar reasons, those recently arrived from Arkansas 
resentful of their expulsion from the state after draconian laws adopted in 1860 
threatened freedmen with enslavement if they remained within the states borders. In 
Indian Territory, pre-Civil War pressure from slave owners to expel or enslave freedmen, 
as well as increased incidents of kidnapping and enslavement by white Southerners 
compelled some freedmen to immigrate to Kansas.  Enlistment offered Union black 
Indians the opportunity to emancipate family members and revenge for their lost lands, 
herds, and family that died during the trek north into Kansas early in 1862.  The drive for 
respect rivaled revenge as a motivation for enlistment, freedmen seeking greater social 
status and rights, while newly liberated contrabands sought the respect that many whites 
accorded freedmen, the newly freed regarded by many, including freedmen as 
“backward” or “damaged” by the experience of slavery.  Northern white society 
frequently treated freedmen differently from former slaves.  Freedmen by merit of their 
pre-war free existence and mingling with the “civilizing” influence of whites were 
regarded as more enlightened, and therefore better equipped for the exercise of rights, 
due to their autonomy.      
       Northern freedmen believed that education and employment would improve white 
perceptions, but the presence of large numbers of contrabands in such towns as 
Leavenworth and Lawrence pressured freedmen to seek outlets for their numbers, and aid 
for their upkeep.  Service in the army offered one such outlet, especially after the series 
of new laws regarding black military labor and service passed prior to the Emancipation 
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Proclamation.  Substantial pressure to enlist may also have originated in the home as 
black women increasingly supported the recruitment of black men in the army, the war 
perceived as an opportunity to “prove black manhood and gain citizenship.”  However, 
the government’s failure to pay soldiers for their service compelled soldiers to desert and 
find other means to support their families.186 The key to reversing public disapproval, as 
contemporary newspaper accounts implied, hinged upon the soldiers mustering, and 
receiving pay (backdated!) for their service.  
    ********************** 
     The brief span between August and September 1862 tested the people of Kansas and 
their state government, and in the process forced citizens to take sides on the debate over 
the legitimacy of the regiment.  Nowhere in Kansas was the opposition to black recruiting 
more pronounced that Leavenworth.  The adversarial relationship between Leavenworth 
police and their combative mayor, and the regimental officers that sought deserters in the 
city, erupted into open contention.  In other areas, officers attempted to recruit the black 
Indians residing on the Sac and Fox Reserve in southern Kansas.  Lane’s shell game 
preserved the Regiment long enough for President Lincoln to issue the first part of the 
Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, 1862.  Although it did not end slavery, the 
proclamation announced that on January 1, 1863, the emancipation of all slaves in 
Confederate states that failed to seek reentry into the United States.   Although excluded 
from the proclamation’s specifications by its status as a Border State, the proclamation 
impacted Missouri indirectly.  Many slaves responded to Lincoln’s Proclamation much as 
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they did to Fremont’s in 1861, and migrated west.  The Emancipation Proclamation gave 
hope to the First Kansas Colored soldiers that they would soon be paid and legally 
acknowledged. 
      The regiment’s relocation to Fort Lincoln failed to resolve the significant issues 
confronting its personnel and officers.  No pay, low morale, high desertion rates, and the 
resentment of white Kansans plagued the regiment and eroded the men’s confidence in its 
viability.  Officers detailed to apprehend deserters encountered increasing levels of 
civilian resistance as the new Governor, Thomas Carney, succeeded the politically 
debilitated Charles Robinson. Governor Carney brought a new perspective to the issue, 
his efforts against the Regiment grounded less in personal animosity towards its founder 
than by a sincere desire to impose order and stability in Kansas.  In the towns and cities 
however, a clash between civil and military law would play out, and threaten the 
existence of the regiment before it could be mustered into the Union Army.  However, 
before that happened, the regiment faced its first trial by fire on a small farmstead in 
western Missouri.  
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Chapter 2: 
“The Bayonets Came In Bloody” 
 
     The most stalwart support for the First Kansas Colored during its early months did not 
come from the Kansas abolitionists that believed that black military service could cause 
backlash amongst the white citizens of the North.  Incredibly, or perhaps not given the 
personal sentiments of the Department of the Missouri’s highest ranking officer, the 
greatest source of support was the Union army.  Unlike many who opposed any form of 
black rights equal to those of whites, the army possessed motives that depended on 
manpower regardless of color, in a department where white manpower was fully utilized, 
and black men untapped as a military resource.   
     Although public support for the regiment fluctuated with the Union’s fortunes in 
battle, unofficial military support was more robust, especially from General Samuel 
Curtis.   Curtis communicated with Lane through the Chief of Staff of the Department of 
the Missouri, Colonel N. P. Chipman, and both men recognized the Regiment’s value as a 
fighting force in case of emergency. Chipman in response to Lane’s request that he do 
something about the regiment, recommended the organization’s move from Wyandotte to 
Fort Lincoln as one method by which to shield them from Missourians’ wrath.  Chipman 
also recommended that the regiment retain its arms and be retained for emergencies while 
digging trenches at Fort Lincoln. Although publicly the Government opposed the muster 
of the regiment from Washington D.C.; privately the government fed, equipped and 
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sustained the regiment in small camps such as Fort Lincoln, where training continued 
despite the War Department’s disapproval.187  
     Curtis’ behavior was not without precedent; Historian Carl Moneyhon asserted that 
Curtis initially employed freedmen in Arkansas as laborers, and then took the unusual 
measure of detailing an officer to recruit a black regiment at Helena, Arkansas.  Curtis’ 
efforts withered in Arkansas when he returned to St. Louis in September, 1862, but his 
experiences may have brought him into congruence with Lane’s. Given Curtis’ position 
in the military hierarchy, his involvement may have been more crucial for the regiment’s 
survival than Lane’s.  Curtis was the regiment’s quartermaster and protector while it 
trained and performed various duties in Kansas.80      
     The regiment, despite all signs to the contrary regarding mustering into service, 
existed not simply because of Senator Lane’s patronage and periodic pronouncements, 
but also because of the regiment’s value to the Army. The preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation issued in September gave hope that the regiment would be mustered on 
January 1, 1863 (when the final Emancipation Proclamation went into effect on New 
Year’s Day).  Accordingly, the army kept the regiment confined to the duties that chafed 
the men so badly; guard detail and fortification construction.   
                                                
187 Negro in the Military Service, Roll 2, Vol. 3, document 973, Chipman to Curtis, October 4, 1862. 
Regimental soldiers’ employment in military capacities such as prison guards and fortification 
improvement as well as newspaper articles referencing weapons, tents and equipment, and the absence of 
any reports reporting the confiscation of such equipment implies approval by military authorities even if the 
regiment was posted to a “mudhole” to remove it from the public eye.  Doubtless had the regiment 
remained at Wyandotte the pressure for disbandment would have been greater that at Fort Lincoln.  
Chipman was responding to Lane who told him that the President and Secretary of War had approved black 
enlistment stating, ‘go ahead only not involve them.’  A tenuous justification, but enough to interest Curtis 
and Chipman in supporting Lane. 
80 Carl H. Moneyhon. The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on Arkansas  (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana University Press, 1994), 138. 
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     Perhaps curious about the progress of the regiment, and seeking some idea of its 
performance and capabilities, Colonel Chipman at General Curtis’ behest visited Fort 
Lincoln on October 16, 1862.  Chipman’s report to General Curtis provided a sober 
assessment of Lane’s political maneuvering, and the resulting impact on the morale of the 
regiment. Although favorably impressed by the regiment’s proficiency (he singled out 
Company D and its all-black officers for special praise), Chipman reported Lane’s 
attempts to retain control of the regiment by denying it for labor at Fort Scott, despite the 
requests of General Blunt and Major Henning, Fort Scott’s commander.188 Lane’s 
interference and obfuscations were the origin of the Regiment’s uncertain fate, the 
senator shifting the regiment around according to whim and not the needs of the 
Department.  
     A significant portion of Chipman’s report also addressed the order for Captain 
Williams to consolidate his and Seaman’s regiments into a single one, General Blunt’s 
attempt to commandeer the regiment to build a military telegraph line from Fort Scott to 
Fort Leavenworth, and Lane’s intent to deploy the regiment to Baxter Springs.  The latter 
order reflects desperation by Lane to keep the regiment together, many of the regiment’s 
free black soldiers deserting to return to failing businesses or destitute families.  Chipman 
also ventured a hope that mustering would reinforce their desire to serve, especially if 
military labor could be replaced by combat service.189 Recognizing that muster authority 
lay with General Curtis, Chipman cynically noted that Lane’s “hobby” would not be 
mustered unless he convinced the President to authorize it.  In the meantime, the 
regiment’s families suffered, and it appeared that only by regimental muster would the 
                                                
188 Negro in the Military Service, Roll 2, Vol. 3, document 977-979, Colonel N.P. Chipman to General 
Samuel R. Curtis, October 18,  1862.  
189Negro in the Military Service, Roll 2, Vol. 3, 978. 
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men be paid so that they could support their families. The majority of the freedmen 
echoed this request, the load on their families and businesses increasing with each day 
that passed without receipt of pay.   Confronted with the failure of businesses and 
impoverishment of family, morale failed.190  The regiment possessed men of commitment 
and determination, but because the men were unpaid and unrecognized, the regiment 
faced imminent dissolution from desertions.   
Island Mound 
      Ten days after the review, events on the Kansas-Missouri border changed the 
situation; orders arrived from Major Henning on Sunday October 26, to break the 
regiment’s monotonous existence. Acting on recently obtained intelligence, Major 
Henning ordered Captain Ward and Captain Seaman to enter into Bates County, 
Missouri, to break up a suspected group of guerrillas based on Hog Island.  Captain 
Richard G. Ward, in Williams’ absence, led one hundred and sixty men and six officers 
from Camp Phillips to meet with Captain Seaman and another sixty-four from Fort 
Lincoln.  Accompanying the regiment was a contingent of a half-dozen mounted scouts 
from the Fifth Kansas Cavalry.  United under the command of Captain Seaman, the 
mixed regimental column marched behind the handmade, nine-striped national ensign of 
Company F, the men proud to be marching off to war in columns of four, instead of 
trudging to dig trenches.  The regiment traveled along the old military road to Mound 
City, crossing Mine Creek before making camp that night at intermittently manned Fort 
                                                
190 Colonel N.P. Chipman to General Samuel R. Curtis, 18 October 1862. RG 393, Part 1, C-104, C-46 
1862, Letters Received, ser. 2593, Department of the Missouri.  Chipman expressed dissatisfaction with 
several regimental shortcomings related to its logistical support, namely the Prussian and Austrian muskets, 
and the large number of soldiers clad in gray uniforms. Baxter Springs and its immediate area endured raids 
by both Confederate regular and irregular forces on Union supply trains, because of a dearth of Union 
soldiers for security.  Given that General Blunt’s forces required more of all the foregoing supplies, it may 
be that Lane issued the second order to raise morale, as well as forestall additional desertions. 
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Defiance, an outpost just inside the Kansas state line.  The next day, October 27, the 
regiment proceeded by way of the Butler Road to the ferry crossing located on the Osage 
River at Dickey’s Crossing.191  The question remains: did Curtis believe the men ready 
for action and thus engineer their orders, or was the regiment merely the largest body of 
men in the vicinity?  Although Federal manpower was thin in the region, the regiment 
would not have been the first choice for any who doubted their ability as soldiers, or 
moral fiber as former slaves.  Curtis was an ally. 
     The border region harbored many bushwhackers; some of the prisoners at Fort 
Lincoln under guard by First Kansas Colored soldiers were local men suspected of 
secessionist activity.  The few civilians encountered along the route reported a large 
guerrilla force at Hog, or Osage Island, as it was also known, numbers varying between 
seven and eight hundred.  The Union scouts that accompanied the regiment also reported 
horsemen shadowing the regiment, and when they attempted to question them, the riders 
rode in the direction of Hog Island.  As the men marched, the guerrillas continuously 
reported the regiment’s impending arrival to their commanders, the guerrilla chieftains 
Campbell, Hancock and Turman.192  Infantry often fought against cavalry in the border 
region, but given the slow rate of fire of their muskets, a cavalry dominated force would 
attempt to maximize their numbers and armament by maintaining contact with the 
infantry as it advanced into Missouri.   
     The appearance of guerrilla scouts, and reports of large numbers of enemy guerrillas  
                                                
191 OR: Series I, Volume 53, 455-456; Chris Tabor.  The Skirmish at Island Mound  (Independence, 
Missouri: The Blue and the Grey Book Shoppe, 2001), 10;, J.H. Stearns, “First Kansas Colored Inf’t,” Linn 
County Republic, January 31, 1902. 
192 Stearns, Linn County Republic, January 31, 1902. 
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sent a frisson of excitement through the ranks, the prospect of a battle looming large in 
the imaginations of the mostly inexperienced soldiers.  Although a very small portion of 
the regiment’s troops may have served in the Kansas Indian Home Guard regiments 
before this time and a number of the officers in Kansas regiments, the majority’s 
experience consisted of drill, guard mount, and excavation.193  Any clash with the 
guerrillas offered the chance to prove their mettle and perhaps, settle some old scores.  
The guerrilla scouts’ reports elicited a range of reactions from the veteran secessionist 
bands on Osage Island, many of whom recently participated in the recent battle of Lone 
Jack, Missouri in August.    
     Although many of the guerrillas undoubtedly knew of the hated black regiment from 
friends or relatives, the Union column of hundreds of musket-armed black infantry 
approaching Hog Island signaled a change in the conduct of the war.   No small Union 
cavalry or infantry force, the regiments’ hundreds of armed black soldiers led by white 
Union officers presented “the terrifying actuality of a force of armed black men,” which 
to some “seemed equivalent to a slave uprising launched by the federal government 
against the South.” 194   The arrival of the black troops created an opportunity to erase the 
lingering residue of past Union Kansans’ jayhawking raids and humiliations with the 
annihilation of “The Grim Lieutenant’s” project.   Leavening local guerrillas’ hate with 
professional military reason, Colonel Vard Cockrell of Johnson County agreed to join his 
mixed force of regulars and green recruits with local guerrilla chieftains Bill Truman and 
                                                
193 Joseph T. Wilson. The Black Phalanx  (Hartford, Connecticut: American Publishing Company, 1890), 
111;  Wilson asserts there were over 400 blacks in the Kansas Indian Regiments, according to Wiley 
Britton, the Indian regiments contained many black Cherokee and Creeks.     
194 Michael Carter.  First Kansas Colored Volunteers:  Contributions of Black Union Soldiers in the Trans-
Mississippi West. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College Thesis, (2004), 47; 
Faust, This Republic of Suffering, 44. 
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John Hancock.195  Perhaps assessing a battle with the black Kansans as a way to blood his 
new soldiers and build their morale with an easy victory, Cockrell also agreed to 
command the guerrilla force. 
     Undoubtedly aware of the increasing guerrilla presence by this point, and alert for any 
signs of the guerrillas massing for an attack, two miles after crossing the river the lead 
elements of the column reached the Toothman farm.  As Union scouts interrogated the 
only remaining farm inhabitants (Christiana and her daughters), about the whereabouts of 
the rest of the Toothman family, guerrilla scouts atop the nearby mounds in the area 
monitored the regiment’s approach.  The farm offered a good base for the regiment’s 
operations, the farmhouse a solid structure of double log construction that stood about 
fifteen feet high, its thick walls consisting of hewn logs arranged atop one another. The 
prairie grass stood high in the fields around the farmhouse, and encroached upon the 
fences that girded the farmyard and animal pens.    
     Soldiers quickly tore down the fences and hauled timber and brush to stack with the 
rails to create barricades around the farmyard, the national colors flying over a creation 
quickly dubbed “Fort Africa” by the soldiers. Fortunately, according to Captain Earle, the 
regiment’s men exchanged their despised Prussian or Austrian rifles for better models 
shortly before the expedition to Island Mound.  Pickets assumed their positions between 
the camp and the outer darkness as nightfall descended, and the regiment settled in for a 
tense standoff with large numbers of guerrilla cavalry gathering in the valley.196  The 
                                                
195 Bruce Nichols.  Guerrilla Warfare in Civil War Missouri, 1862. (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland 
and Company, Inc, 2004), 178. After the failure of the 29 October attack, Colonel Cockrell withdrew his 
recruits southward, away from the battlefield, before Union cavalry was drawn to the fighting. 
196 James M. Denny, “Early Southern Domestic Architecture in Missouri, 1810-184:  The 
“Georgianization” of the trans-Mississippi West,” PAST (Pioneer America Society Transactions, Annual 
Meeting for 1984) (1985); OR: Series I, Volume 53, Captain Ward’s After Action Report, 456; Tabor, 
Island Mound, 11 ; Earle, Journal, 23.  These muskets may have been the ones Lane ordered Williams to 
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atmosphere in the camp is not recorded, but one could imagine that the overwhelmingly 
green recruits of the First Kansas Colored slept little that night. 
     The next day, Tuesday October 28, pickets traded desultory shots with guerrillas.  
Despite the cartridges expended, no casualties resulted from the exchanges; the high 
winds and the distances between the opponents foiled any chance of casualties. 
Skirmishing fulfilled a number of needs for Civil War armies that included providing 
early warning of impending attack, the potential to inflict casualties without exposing 
large numbers of soldiers to fire, and the denial of accurate intelligence regarding force 
composition and dispositions.197 Captain Seaman, prompted by concern over increasing 
enemy numbers and aware of the critical state of his regiment’s logistics, sent out runners 
to seek reinforcements from a number of locations including Fort Lincoln, where Captain 
Williams and over two hundred and fifty of the regiment’s soldiers remained. Captain 
Seaman also requested cavalry to cut off the guerrillas at Burnett’s Ferry south of Osage 
Island, the regiment intending to skirmish with the guerrillas until reinforcements 
arrived.198  Although eager for a chance to prove themselves, no general engagement was 
sought.  
      The First Kansas Colored’s officer ranks may have felt a mixture of pride and 
apprehension at this time, the unspoken question of black resolve against Southern whites 
in open battle hung over the regiment. Across the prairie on Hog Island, the guerrilla 
                                                                                                                                            
requisition at Paola on  October 9; Stearns, “First Kansas...”; Joseph Lyon, Leavenworth Daily Times, 
November 4,1862.  Pickets served the role of skirmisher, advance guard and lookout for military units.  
197 Earl J. Hess.  The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat: Reality and Myth  (Lawrence, Kansas: University 
Press of Kansas, 2008), 170-174.  Although rifled muskets could theoretically hit targets 500 yards distant, 
most engagements featured exchanges of fire at much shorter ranges.  At Island Mound the ranges appeared 
to have varied from several hundred yards to point blank, 50 - 100 yards being the average. 
198 OR: Series I, Volume 53, 456; Hinton, “Affairs of the West - A Negro Regiment in Action,” The New 
York Times, November 19, 1862; William S. Smallwood, “Kansas Black Soldiers Battle!” Lawrence 
Republican, November 6, 1862. 
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chieftains resolved to draw out and annihilate a portion of the command as punishment 
for daring to enlist and fight against white men.199  Such a propaganda victory would 
have race’s emboldened the Confederate cause, and provided fodder to demonstrate the 
black inability to fight against white men.   
      Despite the dispatch of riders, Wednesday, October 29, 1862, dawned with no sign of 
Union reinforcements.  Unbeknownst to the soldiers at Fort Africa, the remaining soldiers 
of the regiment executed a force march through Tuesday night and into Wednesday in 
order to reach their fellow soldiers; the soldiers’ eagerness for battle drove them to set 
forth from camp with nearly empty cartridge cases that contained only three cartridges.  
The soldiers of the regiment were determined to win or die. While Williams’ men 
marched, conditions in Fort Africa deteriorated, and rations dwindled to beef and parched 
corn.  Captain Seaman ordered fifty-man a foraging expedition under Lieutenants 
Thrasher and Huddleston to search the area farms for corn and salt, and then covered its 
departure with a detachment of sixty men under Captain Armstrong.  Ordered to engage 
the attention of the enemy, Armstrong’s soldiers located a large force of guerrillas about 
two miles from the camp.  Armstrong deployed skirmishers under Orderly Sergeant 
Smithers of Company B, and immediately attacked the guerrilla scouts until Armstrong’s 
men were over four miles from camp.200  Recalled to camp after the return of the foraging 
party, Armstrong’s men avoided guerrilla attempts to disperse and destroy his 
detachment.  
                                                
199 L.D. Reddick, “The Negro Policy of the United States Army, 1775-1945,”  The Journal of Negro 
History, Volume 34, Number 1, (Jan., 1949): 16; Leavenworth Daily Conservative, November 9, 1862, 
Major Henning sent the Colonel of the 2d Ohio Cavalry, with one hundred and twenty mounted, and one 
hundred dismounted men, two guns and ammunition; Tabor, Island Mound, 11; Old Settlers‘ History of 
Bates County, Missouri (Amsterdam, Missouri: Tathwell and Maxey, 1897), 187-188.   
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     Several characteristics of the morning skirmish revealed that the guerrillas intended to 
attack Armstrong’s detachment in force.  Although during the chase the fire was 
predominately at long range, the guerrillas shouted at the men and taunted the officers as 
“Nigger stealers” in order to induce the dismounted infantry to follow.  The white 
officers attracted much attention from guerrillas armed with long-range rifles, an 
indication that the guerrillas deliberately tried to disorganize the black soldiers by killing 
their leaders.  The infantry at one point during the chase delivered a brisk volley that 
killed seven guerrillas.  Shortly thereafter the guerrillas near Fort Africa renewed their 
pressure on the camp, and advanced their pickets under the cover of the smoke from a 
raging a prairie fire.  Blinded by the smoke, the regiment created a firebreak around the 
camp in order to save their camp equipment.201  Flames did not pose the greatest danger 
to the camp; advancing guerrillas under cover of smoke attacked the regimental pickets 
and created morale-sapping confusion.  
      Suspecting that the guerrillas set the fire to cover preparations for an attack, and 
lacking mounted scouts sufficient to ascertain the guerrillas’ intentions, Captain Seaman 
sent out eight black Cherokee soldiers under their former master, Sergeant John Six 
Killer, to scout the area.  Ordered to stay within visual range of the camp, the Cherokee 
disobeyed orders and disappeared behind the mounds to the south.  Minutes later the 
Cherokee blacks exchanged fire with guerrilla skirmishers, and drove them back to the 
prairie by the river.  Anxious about the fate of the Cherokee detachment after hearing 
shots exchanged, Seaman ordered Lieutenant Gardner to take twenty men, find the 
                                                
201 R.J. Hinton, “The Negro Regiment has a Successful Engagement with Guerrillas,” Leavenworth Daily 
Conservative, November 4, 1862; White Cloud Kansas Chief, November 6,1862.  
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skirmishers, and return to camp.202  This action sent twenty men to join the other eight, 
the small group a tempting target for the bushwhackers’ cavalry.   
     Captain Pierson, the Cherokee commander, accompanied Gardner a short distance.  
Captain Crew and Lieutenant Huddleston, carrying rifles in addition to their officer’s 
armament, disobeyed orders to seize the opportunity for some skirmishing.  Gardner’s 
force caught up to the Cherokees, but Gardner, impulsive and aggressive by nature, chose 
to continue skirmishing with the guerrillas.   Distracted by the excitement of combat, the 
detachment followed the retreating guerrillas away from the camp and onward toward the 
river, where the group stopped to investigate a cabin in the lowlands about a half-mile 
from the southern edge of the mounds.   Obscured from the camp by the terrain, isolated 
by distance and vulnerable to cavalry due to their small number, the detachment teetered-
- blithely unaware--on the edge of disaster.  
     Uneasy with Gardner’s prolonged absence, Captain Ward placed Armstrong’s force of 
soldiers from Companies A, B, E, H and G under arms, in doing so he discovered Crew 
and Huddleston’s absence.  During the organization of Armstrong’s forces, sporadic 
firing from the south compelled Ward to order Armstrong immediately toward the noise.  
The discovery of a detachment of the enemy to the south of his position heightened 
Ward’s anxiety and devoid of information from the two missing groups, Ward sent 
Adjutant Hinton galloping to the southern mound to observe the location of Gardner’s 
party. 203  Hinton returned as Armstrong’s company formed up, and reported Gardner’s 
detachment returning from searching a log cabin eight hundred yards south of the last 
                                                
202 Hinton, The New York Times, November 19, 1862, OR: Series I, Vol. 53, 456.  Hinton reports 16 men 
went with Gardner, Ward, 20.   
203 OR: Series I, Volume 53, 456; “Battle of Island Mound” Ezekiel Huddleston letter to F.B. Adams, 
Secretary [Kansas] State Historical Society, 3 December 1882, Hist.Military.1861, file 7202, Kansas State 
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mound.  Sensing that the enemy would attempt to cut off the detachment, Ward sent 
Armstrong’s force through the draw to the southwest of camp to form the right flank of 
the regiment’s forces on the reverse slope of the mound.  At the same time, Ward sent a 
messenger to request Captain Seaman to prepare his men for battle.      
    Gardner’s detachment, in the prairie below the mounds, offered easy targets to the 
guerrilla force massing in the trees along the riverbank.  Unlike Armstrong’s detachment 
in the morning, Gardner’s proved an ideal target, its dismounted numbers half those of 
Armstrong’s detachment, and its members isolated by terrain and distance from the camp. 
Perhaps the first to comprehend their danger, Lieutenant Huddleston noted with alarm 
that a group of one hundred guerrilla cavalry broke from the trees in a flanking 
movement designed place the cavalry between the detachment and the camp.   Finally 
aware of the imminent danger of attack by overwhelming numbers, Lieutenant Gardner 
decided the detachment would try to make camp, or find a terrain feature that would 
protect against a cavalry charge. Lieutenant Huddleston turned the guerrillas’ fire tactics 
against the cavalry racing to cut off the detachment, and in an attempt to blind the enemy 
and screen the running soldiers, set fire to the prairie grass at two different points.        
     Huddleston knew the infantry would not beat the cavalry to the safety of the mounds. 
Monitoring the advance of the cavalry, the infantry continued to retreat to the base of the 
southern mound (the gray arrow on Map 1), but time ran out.  The guerrillas, confident of 
success, formed for a cavalry charge four hundred yards from the contingent and then 
emboldened by their numerical advantage and knowledge of the time required to reload 
their weapons under fire, charged the small cluster of infantry.   
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     The detachment stood no chance of opposing a cavalry charge.  Although their retreat 
brought them closer to the camp and Union troops, it was impossible to withstand the 
shock of over one hundred cavalry smashing into twenty-five infantrymen.  The 
detachment possessed neither the time nor the men to execute the standard infantry 
square defense against cavalry. Armed with short-range weapons such as pistols, 
shotguns and sabers, the guerrillas intended to employ shock to break the infantry, inflict 
casualties and demoralize the soldiers. Once individuals or small groups were isolated, 
the guerrillas stood a high likelihood of killing the entire group before Union troops 
arrived.  Lieutenant Smallwood later reported that Lieutenant Gardner’s detachment 
faced imminent annihilation unless they fought their way through the enemy.  Instead, the 
men fired one volley at the cavalry, dropping several, then fixed their long sword 
bayonets and prepared to receive the cavalry charge.204 The desperate measure worked 
long enough for the officers to attempt a degree of control while discharging their 
revolvers against the tightly packed cavalry.  A prairie fire added to the chaotic melee, 
and smoke from fires and musketry reduced combat ranges to a few feet.205   
     Casualties fell immediately, the white officers being lightning rods for the cavalry’s 
attacks.   Despite the choking clouds of smoke that filled the air, Lieutenant Gardner 
sustained  buckshot wounds to his hip and a pistol wound to the knee that immobilized 
him.  A cavalryman dismounted and administered an execution-style shot to Gardner’s 
head with the fallen officer’s gun.  The blow glanced off, however, and Gardner survived 
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because a nearby soldier shot the guerrilla.  Flames swept the area wherein he lay 
prostrate, but the bloody Gardner weathered the remainder of the attack in a burnt patch.  
Captain Crew kept one small group of soldiers moving toward Union lines until, 
surrounded and ordered to surrender, he was shot through the heart while exhorting his 
men not to surrender. Other men fought their own equally desperate battles against 
multiple attackers.  
     Expecting no quarter and asking none, the black soldiers of the detachment fought for 
their lives.  Sergeant Ed Lowry, wounded by a shotgun blast, faced three guerrillas who 
demanded his surrender.  Lowry’s knocked one rider from his horse with the butt of his 
musket, and then employed his bayonet as a sword until the bushwhackers disengaged 
and Lowry made it back to camp with three wounds sustained from the hand to hand 
combat.206  The close quarters combat was equally dire for the Cherokee soldiers, and 
leader of the black Cherokee, Sergeant Six Killer, fell after he sustained six wounds.  
Credited with shooting two men, bayoneting a third and bludgeoning a forth with the butt 
of his rifle, Six Killer died a “good death” his face turned to the enemy.  Although the 
odds appeared to weight against the isolated detachment, differences in weaponry gave 
the combatants both advantages and disadvantages. The close combat between the 
guerrillas and the black soldiers pitted bayonets against sabers, revolvers, and shotguns, 
some bushwhackers fighting with several pistols at close range as a firepower advantage 
against Union infantry.  The soldiers’ sword bayonets inflicted terrible slashing and 
stabbing wounds, and although few of Captain Gardner’s detachment somehow managed 
to reload their muskets during the melee, they wielded their bayonets to great effect. In 
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the close confines of the battle space the cavalry’s numbers offered one bleak 
consolidation to the beleaguered soldiers, the cavalry unable to apply their full force of 
numbers or weapons against the soldiers due to danger of fratricide.104  
     Maps 1 and 2: Island Mound 28-29 October 1862. 207 
 
                                                
104 R.J. Hinton, The New York Times, November 19, 186; Map 
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     Alerted by the fires started by Huddleston, and informed by Captain Pierson of the 
cavalry charge, Lieutenant Thrasher, an experienced infantry veteran, led his men at the 
double quick, the infantry running through the draw utilized by Armstrong’s men, and 
assumed a position on the left of Captain Armstrong’s soldiers. Lieutenants Minor and 
Dickerson led their soldiers into position between the two other companies and created a 
line prepared to repulse the bushwhackers’ attack.   While Minor and Dickerson brought 
up their soldiers, Captain Armstrong commanded his men to fix bayonets, then led his 
company up and over the mound, through the smoke and fire, into the swirling melee 
below.  Attempting to envelop Armstrong’s company, those guerrillas not engaged in 
combat with Gardner’s’ men split into two branches.  Unaware of the waiting soldiers on 
the north slope of the hill, the northern branch swept over the hillcrest and into the 
combined enfilade volleys of Thrasher, Minor and Dickerson’s men.   
     The southern branch soon withered under several volleys from Armstrong’s company, 
and retreated to the east.  Armstrong then decided the skirmish between Gardner’s men 
and the guerrillas by firing into the combined mass; a desperate action that drove the last 
of the guerrillas from the southern mound face.  Observing large numbers of guerrillas 
approaching from the east, Captain Seaman ordered Armstrong, Minor, Dickerson, and 
Thrasher to withdraw to the camp.  Thrasher swept the area where the guerrillas attacked 
Gardner and recovered all the wounded and most of the dead, then under pressure from 
returning guerrillas that fired the prairie grass in three places, fell back to the camp.105  
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     Smoke played a significant role during the critical moments of the battle, at one point 
shielding guerrilla and soldier from harm, at other times obscuring combatants from aid. 
Fire also separated the two foes at different parts of the battle, alternately serving as a 
screen for advancing guerrillas, and delaying the recovery of the Federal wounded and 
dead. Fire may also have contributed to higher casualties, incapacitated soldiers 
helplessly immobile before the advancing flames.  When recovery of the fallen resumed 
on October 30, the regiment’s men discovered the dead had been stripped of their Union 
uniforms and equipment, and then scalped.  The appropriation of uniforms and equipment 
entailed no disrespect to the dead and constituted a vital strategy for the guerrillas that 
enabled them to move in close to Union patrols or sympathizers before striking.  
However, tactics such as scalping and other forms of corpse mutilation reflected disdain 
for the dead, and their cause.   
      The reinforcements from Fort Lincoln arrived at Fort Africa in the afternoon, Captain 
Williams leading the remainder of the regiment onto a battlefield that stank of powder 
and smoke, black ash swirling in the wind as the last of the prairie fires fitfully gnawed 
the grass down slope from the camp. The arrival of Williams’ troops signaled the end of 
the battle, the guerrillas retiring from the battlefield after collecting their dead and 
wounded.   The guerrillas departed Hog Island that night and retreated east to Red Dirk 
and Pleasant Gap where they met up with William Quantrill’s men.106  The guerrillas did 
not renew their attacks despite Quantrill’s presence; the risk of a general engagement 
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reinforced Union infantry in a fortified position may have convinced the Confederates to 
withdraw. 
   Despite the mauling sustained by Gardner’s detachment, the regiment sustained few 
other casualties, and the regiment’s casualty toll amounted to nineteen out of the twenty-
five men of Gardner’s detachment, roughly ten percent of the regimental strength, and 
eighty percent of the detachment.  The guerrillas sustained approximately forty killed and 
wounded, also approximately ten percent of the total guerrilla manpower if low guerrilla 
number estimates are used.  The loss of ten percent manpower in an engagement with 
infantry proved high, and continuing the attack against the entrenching black infantry, 
offered the potential for higher casualties that the guerrillas could not afford.  The battle’s 
toll would climb as wounded men succumbed to wounds.     
     The soldiers sustained horrific wounds during the short, brutal battle. Captain Ethan 
Earle’s memoirs reveal that for at least one survivor, recovery would prove lengthy.    
Fourteen year-old Manuel Dobson of Co. F sustained three gunshot wounds and a 
shattered elbow in the exchange. His morale didn’t appear to suffer though, and the 
young soldier left the battle with his musket in hand, proudly proclaiming   “well Capt. 
they didn’t get my gun.”  Another man sustained a head wound, a bayonet thrust to the 
chest, and part of his hand carried away by a bushwhacker’s bullet.107  The uncertain 
status of the regiment’s black soldiers condemned them to additional pain and suffering 
in the aftermath of the battle, the regiment’s lack of recognition forced the regimental 
surgeon transport the wounded by wagon to Lawrence. Dr. Tenny, lacked ambulances 
and pain killing drugs to aid his men; medical aid at Fort Scott was out of the question. 
                                                
107 Earle, Journal,16.  Dobson enlisted illegally, an indicator that the First Kansas Colored’s recruiters were 
not very particular about their enlistees, only their desire to serve.  
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     Lawrence’s Doctor Hiatt proved able and willing to treat the wounded, and attended 
them in a hospital created specifically for their needs of the regiment in the town’s 
courthouse. Lieutenant Gardner also moved to Lawrence to convalesce at home, and he 
recovered enough to rejoin the regiment in January, 1863.  There are no reports of 
additional soldiers dying of wounds after the battle, a testimony to the doctors’ medical 
skill and soldiers will to live.  However, a burial detail under the supervision of 
Lieutenant Thrasher buried the seven dead soldiers north of the Toothman farm.  Capt. 
Crews’ remains traveled to Leavenworth in the company of Lieutenant Lyons, and his 
watch went to his sister while his remains went to friends in Leavenworth for burial.108 
 
Table 3: Island Mound Casualties.109 
 
                                                
108 William H. Smallwood, “Another Account of the Engagement Between the Blacks and the Guerrillas,” 
Leavenworth Daily Conservative  November 7, 1862; Lawrence Kansas State Journal  November 6, 1862, 
the letter from Southern Kansas was dated  November 1;“Battle of Island Mound” Ezekiel Huddleston 
letter to F.B. Adams, Secretary [Kansas] State Historical Society, 3 December 1882, Hist.Military.1861, 
file 7202, Kansas State Historical Society, 1-3; Leavenworth Daily Times, November 4, 1862. 
Lyons and Pierson later declined commissions and muster into service with the First Kansas Colored. 
109 Captain R.G. Ward to Williams,  “List of Killed and Wounded at the Battle of Toothman’s Mound”, 
October 28,1862; J.M. Williams to Leavenworth Daily Conservative, November 13, 1862. 
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     The following morning the combined command moved out toward the island, and 
confiscated a large number of government horses and mules, and cattle. Additional 
searches of local dwellings discovered the burial places of the dead guerrillas, and gained 
intelligence that the confirmed number killed as eighteen, with some twenty wounded. A 
gristly war trophy in form of a scalp reputed to be from a Union soldier hung on a nail 
one house.   Smoke smudged the Missouri sky after the regiment’s soldiers burned farms 
following the discovery of arms taken from dead soldiers.  After scouting around the 
vicinity for several more days, the command returned to Fort Lincoln.  Ever ready to 
promote the regiment in the press, Richard Hinton reported unexpected praise for the 
regiment from Colonel Bill Turman, one of the guerrilla leaders at Island Mound.  
Speaking to the residents Butler a few days after the battle Turman commented that “the 
black devils fought like tigers, and that the white officers had got them so trained that not 
one would surrender.”110  
The Aftermath of the Skirmish at Island Mound 
      A spate of reports in Kansas papers the first week of November presented Kansans 
with proof that black enlistment worked, that Lane’s “pets” fought fearlessly in the face 
of the enemy.  Utilizing sanguine imagery to describe the moral resolve and courage of 
the soldiers during their first battle, Hinton wrote “there was no flinching, no hesitation, 
no paling hearts or trembling hands among the men...Bayonets came in bloody, as did 
stocks of guns, and the last charge was found gone from cartridge boxes.”111  Despite the 
report of victory against the guerrillas, no plaudits awaited them.  Unlike the praise 
heaped on white units for their battle successes, Kansas papers remained largely devoid 
                                                
110 J.H. Stearns, Linn County Republic, January 31, 1862; Hinton, New York Times, November 19, 1862. 
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of praise for the black soldiers and their officers.   Perhaps to demonstrate that his pride 
in his soldiers’ accomplishment, two weeks after the battle, Captain Williams gave notice 
to Kansans of the regiment’s achievements by publishing General Orders Number 10.   
Williams spared no praise for the black soldiers, and pointedly recognized that Island 
Mound was a success for the regiment’s cause, “show[ing] to the country that the heart of 
our colored troops is fired with the same patriotic impulses, honorable ambition, and 
martial courage...of the classes who have in war filled the ranks of armies with 
courageous, loyal soldiers.”112 The casualty lists also legitimized the sacrifice of the 
regiment, and demonstrated that their victory at Island Mound did not constitute a fluke 
or bloodless exchange, but rather cemented the commitment of the officers to their men 
and the men to the cause of the Union.   
      Williams faced a tough challenge changing Kansans’ mindset, for although Kansans 
largely opposed slavery, Kansas was not an abolitionist state despite the presence of 
many abolitionists in its cities. One minor battle would not shift public opinion 
significantly.  Evidence of this appeared in the weeks following the battle as Kansas 
papers returned to coverage of political contests, and the Lawrence Kansas State Journal 
excoriated Senator Lane for employing the regiment in such a manner as to attract an 
enemy, while ignoring their pleas for pay.  The pages of the Leavenworth Weekly 
Inquirer continued to print anti-abolitionist stories, and several political candidates 
voiced sentiment against blacks; in one case, a wagon featured the motto, “Shall Niggers 
                                                
112 Leavenworth Daily Conservative  November 13, 1862. Conspicuously absent from the order is any 
mention of Seaman’s soldiers or their performance, although this omission may not indicate disdain for 
Seaman.  Regimental consolidation would not be complete until the end of November. 
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Arrest White Men?” as well as three black soldiers holding a white man under arrest.116  
In the aftermath of Island Mound this bit of political drama indicated the battle did little 
to change white attitudes.  It is unclear if this bandwagon protested black enlistment or 
the regiment’s soldiers guarding secessionist prisoners at Fort Lincoln, but it reveals that 
tolerance for black labor did not entail similar support for black rights or any usurpation 
of exclusively white authority such as law enforcement.   
      Hinton he appealed to Kansans to support black enlistment because the soldiers 
performed manfully and without complaint, and he chose to emphasize the concept of 
duty and the value of blacks to the Union war effort. Hinton believed “we held it to be 
our duty to exhaust not only the probabilities but the possibilities of the enterprise.  We 
all believe that the Union needs the services of the negro…,” and further stated “We had 
our duty to perform; we have done it....We are eager to march South.  Will not Gen. 
Curtis give us a chance?”  Hinton delivered a challenge to the military: “If the Union 
does not want brave and efficient soldiers, pay them and let them go home.  If it does, 
then muster and pay them, and let them go on.117 Hinton’s words cut straight through to 
the regiment’s greatest problem.  Mustering and paying the regiment would force the 
Union to acknowledge blacks as men, a step the Union proved unwilling to take despite 
the regiment’s performance.  The regiment’s actions did have wider impact as 
newspapers in the east reported the skirmish to their readers and intensified the debate 
over black enlistment.    
                                                
116 “The Negro Regiment,” Lawrence Kansas State Journal, November 13, 1862; Leavenworth Daily 
Conservative, November 1, 5, 1862; Leavenworth papers of the period among them the Daily Conservative 
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        The results of the skirmish at Island Mound eventually reached audiences in 
Chicago and New York due to Hinton’s reports, and he influenced the Chicago Tribune 
to report the “[uselessness] of talking any more of [N]egro courage,”  especially after 
black soldiers emerged from a battle in which they fought against odds five to one against 
them.118 Although little record exists of the black reaction to Island Mound in Kansas, 
there was adequate time for the wounded men of the regiment to tell their tale to the 
citizens of Lawrence and to share their sacrifice with fellow blacks as a living testimony 
of black courage and ability.  The sacrifice of the regiment’s black and white soldiers did 
not go unnoticed by those touched by their service. The black communities of Kansas had 
living proof that their race could stand in battle against experienced, well-armed foes in a 
contest of will and skill.   
Deserter Trouble in Leavenworth 
     Despite defeating secessionist guerrillas at Island Mound, the regiment continued to 
hemorrhage deserters to a thriving civilian wartime economy.  Deserter recovery 
constituted one of the fundamental duties of the regimental officers, and when Hinton 
attempted to perform this duty in Leavenworth, Provost Marshall Stout, attacked him.  
Hinton denied Stout’s authority to arrest him, and launched a counterattack in the 
Leavenworth papers in which he exposed Stout’s removal as Provost Marshal and 
implied a linkage between Stout and the marauding Kansas “Red Legs” that General 
Blunt confirmed several days later.119 Although Stout’s influence was banished by 
                                                
118 “The Negro Regiment has a Successful Engagement with Guerrillas, Bravery of the Black Soldiers.” 
Chicago Tribune, November 10, 1862; New York Times November 19,1862. 
119 Leavenworth Daily Times, November 11, 12, 1862; Wyandotte Commercial Gazette, November 8, 
1862. Stout cursed Hinton as a thief, subjected him to a tirade against Lane and the regiment, then arrested 
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Blunt’s General Order One and Hinton’s reporting, the regiment’s officers encountered a 
more formidable opponent in the person of the Mayor of Leavenworth, H.B. Denman.  
     Despite the presence of regimental officers in the city, and their deserter apprehension 
efforts of the preceding two months, two events occurred to polarized the community 
against the regiment.  Captain Matthews and a detail, on October 14, arrested several 
deserters at a church, an action characterized as “high handed” by local newspapers.  The 
Leavenworth Daily Conservative in response to Matthews’ arrests posed an open-ended 
question to the people of Leavenworth: “the Negroes are industrious and disposed to 
work.  The question is whether they shall do that or starve?”120  Resentment against 
deserter searches and arrests led to another clash between civilians and regimental 
officers when Captain Williams searched the store of a Leavenworth merchant without 
permission.  The man filed charges, and the police arrested Captains Williams and 
Matthews.  Exacerbating the situation, Leavenworth police arrested a soldier belonging to 
the regiment for carrying side arms while Williams and Matthews appeared before the 
city magistrate to post bond.121  Williams’ passion and fiery character flared into full fury 
as events developed in Leavenworth. 
      The next day, Williams appeared at the Mayor’s office accompanied by a Sergeant of 
the 3rd Wisconsin Cavalry and a squad of armed soldiers, and announced his intention to 
arrest the policemen who had arrested his soldier.  Mayor Denman and District Attorney 
Fenlon, protested Williams’ behavior to Colonel Burris at Fort Leavenworth, but Burris 
                                                                                                                                            
Red Legs maintained facilities for the storage and sale of loot garnered in Missouri in Lawrence where the 
facilities were destroyed in Quantrill’s Raid in 1863. 
120 Leavenworth Daily Conservative, November 15, 1862. 
121 Shall the Law be Obeyed,” Leavenworth Daily Times, November 19, 1862; “Military vs. Civil Law” 
Letter from Mayor H.B. Denman to Leavenworth Daily Times, 19 November 1862. Mr. Brant’s complaint 
alleged that “Capt. Williams with four or five armed Negroes, entered Brant’s store and “searched the store 
of Mr. Brant, against his continued and earnest remonstrance.” 
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referred the mayor to Major H.J. Weed, the Adjutant General of the District, and General 
Blunt’s representative.122 Burris was an ally of the regiment from its inception, the 
cavalry officer who had marched an entire group of contrabands into the regimental camp 
in August.  He could not openly defy Mayor Denman, but he could stymie his attempts 
by referring the matter to the military authorities. 
     Conversely, while Mayor Denman sought to arrest Williams, Williams and Matthews 
filed affidavits against Mayor Denman and the Leavenworth police that alleged a 
conspiracy to break up the regiment.  The pair alleged that Mayor Denman, while holding 
the men in custody, admitted a fear that if the regiment stayed together until the next 
meeting of Congress, that Lane would get it recognized and paid.  Faced with counter 
accusations and the potential for a political confrontation of major proportions, Major 
Weed queried General Blunt for guidance, and asked “[Should] Williams be given up to 
civil authorities for discharging his duties in arresting deserters from his camp?”123  
Deferring the question to Blunt demonstrated no hurry on Major Weed’s part, the letter 
took weeks to reach Blunt in Arkansas.  While Weed sought legal and policy guidance, 
Captain Williams tested the limits of his military authority by engineering a jailbreak. 
      Williams and a squad of soldiers compelled the city jailer at gunpoint to release the 
soldier from jail. Mayor Denman, in response requested assistance from Major General 
Stone for militia and issued a warrant for Williams’ arrest.  The next day, November 16, 
Mayor Denman demanded the Fort surrender Williams, but the City Marshal determined 
                                                
122 “Military vs. Civil Law”; Leavenworth Daily Conservative  November 18, 1862; Letter from Captain 
Williams to Brigadier General Blunt, November 24, 1862, Fort Scott, Kansas archives, Williams folder. 
This is the same Colonel Burris that deposited confiscated slaves in Williams’ camp in August. 
123 Williams Letter to Major Weed, Leavenworth Daily Conservative, November 16, 17, 1862; Captain 
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that he did not consider it “practicable” to arrest him. Put bluntly, the civil authority 
declined to challenge the military.  Williams remained under military protection until his 
departure the following day partially defused the situation.  Humiliated by the experience, 
Mayor Denman requested arms from Governor Robinson.  The Daily Conservative 
normally a supporter of the regiment, expressed the hope that the regiment would be 
disbanded because the clash grew out of conflict over blacks, and therefore endangered 
the regiment and the public.  Captain Williams disagreed, and a product of his training as 
a lawyer, countered that the mayor’s actions and those of his policemen were “in 
contempt of military laws and interrupted the proper discharge of his duty.”124  Violence 
narrowly averted, the incident confirmed the difficulty of apprehending deserters, and 
created a police and municipal government opposed to the presence of the regiment’s 
officers in the city.  
Mutiny 
      While Williams and Matthews fought the civil authorities, a seemingly unrelated 
event loomed over the state and the nation as the deadline for the Emancipation 
Proclamation approached.   The regiment appeared to some as an expensive and illegal 
“pet” of Senator lane, and some complained that although organized as “laborers” and 
“superintendents” were not engaged in construction projects. However, a major portion 
of the regiment assigned to Fort Henning performed construction duty. Captain Seaman 
commanded two additional companies at Fort Lincoln charged with guarding rebel 
prisoners.  One black recruit in a twist of fortune guarded his former master, “laughing 
                                                
124 Shall the Law be Obeyed,” Leavenworth Daily Times, November 19, 1862; “Military vs. Civil Law” 
Letter from Mayor H.B. Denman to Leavenworth Daily Times, 19 November 1862; Leavenworth Daily 
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over his new position, driving his former master and making him work.”  Deserter 
recovery work also carefully continued, and included newspaper advertisements that 
offered pardons for deserters.126 
     The soldiers and officers in addition to official duties also pursued other vital tasks.  
Captain Earle reported that under his direction soldiers from Company F built a school.  
Earle procured books and noted with satisfaction that the soldiers of the company, and 
many from other companies attended school after duty in camp.   Earle observed that the 
soldiers’ voracious thirst for learning accelerated the process of teaching soldiers to read 
and write, as one soldier learned his letters, he taught others.  By winter’s end “nearly all 
could read and some could write a letter,” resulting in “Company F suppl[ing] the 
regiment with men for the commissary and quartermaster departments because the 
soldiers could read and write, and men for Non-Commissioned officers in the 
company.”127 A notable achievement under any conditions, but all the more impressive 
given the recent trauma the regiment experienced when tempers, frayed threadbare by the 
marginal conditions of the camp, snapped in spectacular fashion. 
      Adjutant Hinton, Earle alleged, delighted in humiliating soldiers for minor violations 
of the regulations.  The Adjutant punishing soldiers by tying a board on which he wrote 
some degrading words about the soldiers or by placing a log of wood in their shoulders 
and forcing them to walk for hours back and forth and in front of his tent. Earle’s 
disapproval may have originated from resentment of Hinton’s power as Adjutant in the 
Regimental Commander’s absence, but it is more likely that Earle resented Hinton’s 
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violation of the relationship between officers and the soldiers with whom they developed 
relationships over time.  
      Officers in other black regiments formed after the First Kansas Colored mentioned 
the special need to treat black soldiers the same as their white counterparts.  The array of 
acceptable punishments included those that subjected offenders to ridicule and discomfort 
such as standing on barrels, bucking, and gagging; more serious offenses jail terms and 
fines.  However, as Thomas Wentworth Higginson observed, petty torments revived 
memories of slavery.208 Hinton’s alleged actions focused attention on the plight of 
individual soldiers, and in the highly charged climate of the regiment’s camp, gave cause 
for soldiers to attempt to reclaim their dignity and manhood by forcibly resisting his 
arbitrary punishment after attacking a member of the regiment.   
     The fateful incident that started the mutiny occurred when Hinton traded words, then 
blows with a soldier, and Hinton struck the soldier with his sword.  When Hinton ordered 
the soldier confined in the guardhouse, twenty soldiers of the man’s company marched to 
the guardhouse and took him back to the company, and then drove the company’s 
officers from the area.  Prepared to defend their fellow soldier against re-imprisonment, 
the mutinous company’s soldiers loaded their muskets, fixed bayonets, and announced 
their determination to keep the soldier and “fight their way out of the Regiment as long as 
they had a live man left.”209 Other companies, despite appeals to suppress the mutinous 
company, failed to challenge them for custody of the soldier; and many of the men of 
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Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 29. 
209 Earle, Journal, 29. 
 
 
97 
 
those companies expressed sympathy with the accused.210 Earle reported at this juncture 
that Major Ward, the acting commander in Williams’ absence, requested Company F to 
suppress the mutineers. 
      Earle responded to Ward’s request knowing that if the mutiny spread that the 
regiment would be disbanded in disgrace, a massive setback to black enlistment and a 
vindication of the racist claims of the regiment’s opponents.  Earle reported that after he 
addressed this company, they responded to his appeal with the deadly earnestness of 
professional soldiers.  The company dutifully loaded their muskets and fixed bayonets, 
and although outnumbered almost two to one by the mutineers, formed opposite the 
mutineers ready to execute orders to fire on their comrades.  Major Ward, as hammers 
clicked back on muskets, called on Earle to stay his men and the mutineers surrendered 
twenty of their number and the soldier they had rescued from the guardhouse.  The 
situation defused, the men returned to their tents. 211 Major Ward, to forestall any 
possibility of another incident, ordered Lieutenant Hinton not to return to the camp until 
ordered.  
     When Williams returned he assembled a drumhead court martial to try and sentence 
the offending soldiers, and the board meted out sentences for such crimes as riotous 
behavior, seditious behavior, and mutinous conduct.212 Although the regiment broke up 
                                                
210 Earle, Journal, 29. 
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the mutiny quickly and firmly, regimental officers and Major Henning, the Commander 
of Fort Scott covered up news of the mutiny and no Kansas papers carried stories of the 
dramatic confrontation.  The ramifications of the mutiny, if made public would have 
destroyed the First Kansas Colored.  The soldiers’ grievances remained, if only under 
control for the time being.   
     Several days after the suppression of the mutiny, news arrived that the War 
Department, approved General Rufus Saxton in South Carolina to arm and equip black 
men as a security force for plantations and settlements under United States protection in 
South Carolina.  An account in the New York Independent described the event  “[Saxton] 
pronounced them all free: they, their wives, children, fathers, mothers, brothers, and 
sisters...they were free, the Government had acknowledged their manhood.”  The 
Leavenworth Daily Conservative added “It strikes us that the precedent is now 
established, and that there should be no more delay in mustering the Kansas Colored 
regiment.”213 
      The greatest threats to the regiment remained unresolved as the New Year 
approached. The mustering of Saxton’s soldiers in South Carolina gave hope that 
following the final Emancipation Proclamation on January that the regiment stood a good 
chance of mustering into service, its men proven in battle and desperately needed in 
Indian Territory and Arkansas by the chronically manpower impoverished General Blunt.  
Acceptance for black soldiers would not come from a single event, despite the 
abolitionists’ rapture over the impending Emancipation Proclamation. The exhilarating 
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combat at Island Mound failed to transform white public opinion in favor of enlistment in 
Kansas, instead the externality of General Saxton compelled Kansan competitiveness, not 
humanitarian concern. The regiment survived battle, mutiny and desertions, whether or 
not it would survive continued neglect remained a grave concern. High hopes abounded 
for 1863, soldiers and officers alike waiting with bated breath for any sign of 
Government recognition.   
********************** 
  Detractors in Kansas continued their attack upon the regiment and its officers, and 
sought to destroy it before it could fully organize and muster into Federal service.  Battle 
lines were drawn across Kansas between supporters of black enlistment and those 
adamantly opposed to any change in the social order.  One of the first of those battlefields 
was the press, the written word demanding explanations and examining the First Kansas 
much in the way their eastern counterpart, the First South Carolina Colored Infantry was 
placed under intense scrutiny.  Former Kansan and abolitionist Colonel Samuel 
Wentworth Higginson of the First South Carolina described the experience of white 
societal evaluation with great accuracy, observing that, “[this] regiment was watched 
with microscopic scrutiny by friends and foes.  I felt sometimes as if we were a plant 
trying to take root, but constantly pulled up to see if we were growing…It was no 
pleasant thing to live under such constant surveillance; but it guaranteed the honesty of 
any success, while fearfully multiplying the penalties had there been failure.”214   
     The First Kansas Colored’s performance was essential to the nascent black racial 
identity developing across the Kansas public consciousness, their performance a new 
yardstick by which to measure other black men by extension.  Safely ensconced in a 
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military camp and under the watchful eye of white officers who could control the men’s 
behaviors, the military camp of the First Kansas Colored Regiment was as much prison 
as camp, a place where the curious could come to watch the former slaves transformed 
into soldiers.    
     White reaction to the impending Emancipation Proclamation varied widely across the 
Midwest and Kansas.  Historian Steven Ash asserted that political ideology and sectional 
attitudes influenced men’s reactions “Officers and men [running] the gamut from radical 
Republican to conservative Democrat; almost all were racist to some extent, but the 
Democrats were vehemently Negro-phobic and opposed to abolishing slavery…”215 
Kansans were part of this white reaction, despite their reputation as abolitionists and 
friends to contraband slaves.  Some Kansans like Samuel Reader regarded black military 
service as a positive and uplifting development, while other white Kansans resigned in 
disgust following the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, or decried its potential 
adverse effect on a verdant Kansas threatened by a “sickly ebony hue” from freed 
contraband slaves in Kansas.  Others believed that if the North didn’t recruit blacks, the 
South soon would.216 Heirs to Free Soil philosophies, Kansans did not want competing 
slave, or unwelcome free black labor to prevent white men from dominating political and 
social discourse in Kansas.  
      Midwestern men, especially Democrats and those men hailing from Border States 
such as Missouri, resented the Emancipation Proclamation because it changed the nature 
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of the war from a war to preserve the Union, to a war to free the slaves.  Slaves were 
property, and abolition presented a terrifying dual prospect of impoverishment and labor 
competition in such states; any change in the existing racial hierarchy was an anathema.  
Many resigned in protest, or as one Southern soldier in Arkansas reported “they willingly 
surrendered in order to be paroled rather than fight a war to end slavery.” Several extreme 
examples of Union soldiers favored shooting the blacks; others viewed them as 
scapegoats for the war.  Supporters looked upon the new black soldiers as a war-winning 
measure and black regiments as a potential source of commissions. Aside from the polar 
opposites of abolitionists and status quo Democrats, the vast body politic was indifferent, 
regarding the enlistment of blacks as “no disgrace,” with one soldier frankly welcoming 
them stating “if they can kill rebels I say arm them and set them to shooting.  I would use 
mules for the same purpose if possible.” 217  
     Kansans in the field also hotly debated the utility of black soldiers, and many 
considered emancipation as a foreboding portent for the Union. Kansan Wiley Britton 
highlighted the divided nature of Kansans on the issue of black enlistment, revealing that 
some Kansans thought that the Emancipation Proclamation would create problems for the 
Union, while others voiced objections against fighting to abolish slavery.  Others thought 
emancipation an opportunity to erase a national disgrace and to confirm their belief that 
all men should have the chance for “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”218  Gone 
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was the simple protest that black enlistment was illegal, that legal syllogism obviated by 
the Emancipation Proclamation.     
     Ironically concepts of black martial ability, and biological suitability to serve and 
survive in diseased southern climates, may have swayed white support in favor of black 
soldiers.  The black body was an alien one, with assumed physical and mental 
characteristics very different from white bodies. Howard Westwood pointed out this 
dichotomy of military service, with white men willing to let black men serve contingent 
upon employment in disease harboring swamps, while white men served in healthier 
locales.  Union Private Milton Bassett, favored employing black troops in Louisiana 
because it meant white men would escape “fever and ague,” because mosquitoes couldn’t 
pierce black men’s skin.219 The United States Navy also believed blacks superior to 
whites during the South’s “sickly season,” and encouraged black enlistment from 
amongst the ranks of escaped contraband slaves.220 President Lincoln sought to learn if 
employing black soldiers was justified by examining the French experience of utilizing 
black Sudanese troops from Nubia, in Mexico.  The United States State Department on 
January 9, 1863 reported that the French employed black troops in Vera Cruz due to their 
supposed immunity to yellow fever.221  Resistance to heat and disease, indefatigable 
endurance, and expendability appear to have been primary motivators for black 
enlistment, and black enlistment an acceptable casualty mitigating measure that sacrificed 
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black lives in lieu of white in a confused mélange of racial suppositions and 
expediencies.   
     The First Kansas Colored was a social laboratory for the renegotiation of the 
capabilities of the black race.   The abolitionist officers and their former slaves turned 
soldiers had proven that they could stand in battle against foes, but their true test would 
be against the many anonymous observers black and white who watched for signs of 
indiscipline or incompetence. Enlisting soldiers to work in unhealthy climates was a 
cynical motive, but in a time when black men could expect little support from their white 
counterparts, the ability to don the Union blue uniform signaled a shift in attitudes.  The 
grudging support of Kansan whites for the First Kansas Colored depended on results, and 
was in no way a sign of wholehearted approval.  The number of black regiments enlisting 
in early 1863 would be small, but the First Kansas Colored entered into its Union service 
with pride.  The celebrations of January 1, 1863 would not be dimmed by white 
ambivalence, and with time the promise of the regiment would become reality. 
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        Chapter 3:  
Emancipation and Exasperation 
 
 
     Despite white approbation, desertions and an uncertain future, the regiment continued 
to train new enlistees, building companies as increasing numbers of contraband blacks 
entered Kansas.  The regiment stood alone in the west, no other Colored Regiments were 
in existence in Kansas, and its only contemporaries were the First South Carolina and 
General Butler’s regiments in Louisiana. Despite shedding blood at Island Mound, the 
regiment’s men were still denied the last measure of manhood, the ability to provide for 
their kin by the sweat of their brow as mustered Union soldiers.  The New Year would 
bring formal recognition and the Union Army of the Frontier’s need for manpower would 
propel the black men of the regiment into battle against pitiless opponents sworn to 
upholding the southern cause. 
    Emancipation, despite the promise of freedom and muster into the Federal army 
resolved few of the regiment’s problems.  Respect would be earned every step of the 
way; for the officers and the soldiers of the regiment nothing would be easy, and 
advances would be hard-won. President Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, 
on January 1, 1863 declared forever free the slaves in the Confederacy, and opened the 
door for black enlistment.222  One hundred days had elapsed since the preliminary 
Emancipation Proclamation’s publication and in Kansas the regiment could finally 
muster as a legitimate military formation in the service of the Union.  The First Kansas 
Colored Volunteer Infantry Regiment, although not the first black regiment mustered for 
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service, was the first of the Colored Regiments mustered in the North.223  Lane’s “army” 
of former slaves could finally begin the process of liberation against slave-holding 
secessionists.   The First Kansas Colored greeted the change in national policy with a 
public celebration that featured speeches by regimental officers and civil dignitaries. 
     Soldiers and supporters of the First Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry Regiment 
commemorated the Emancipation Proclamation at Fort Scott in martial fashion, the day’s 
speeches preceded by a mass singing of the “Star Spangled Banner,” a fitting opening to 
the afternoon’s speeches.  Amongst the speakers were Captain Earle and Lieutenant 
Sholes of Company F followed by the commander of Fort Leavenworth.  Adding to the 
abolitionist rhetoric of the day, newly promoted Lieutenant Colonel Williams spoke next, 
emphasizing that the coming black military effort would be a “struggle for their own 
freedom, and disenthralment.” Adjutant Hinton then read the second paragraph of the 
Emancipation Proclamation, and paused to emphasize with a flourish to the Stars and 
Stripes that black soldiers were authorized to “hunt, shoot, and destroy” every rebel 
slaveholder in the land.  After the cheering died down, Captain Mathews spoke of black 
men and how “Our exertions and own muscle must make us men…If we fight we shall be 
respected.” These were particularly poignant words given that Mathews was the single 
black speaker of the many that spoke that day, he alone of the speakers knew what the 
day meant for a black soldier and its importance to his race.  Concluding the day’s events 
with song, the regiment sang “The John Brown song,” a favorite of the Regiment given 
the familiar bonds many of the Regiment’s officers once shared with Brown, and 
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Brown’s symbolic value to blacks as an emancipator.224  Brown was an important symbol 
for the regiment, the scourge of pre-war slavery advocates, liberator of slaves and 
uncompromising enemy of the slavery. The First Kansas was a regiment born as much 
from abolitionist fervor as political expediency, its existence buoyed during the fall of 
1862 by a steadfast belief in the necessity for emancipation, and the role of black men in 
that effort.    
     There were powerful compelling personal and group reasons for black enlistment that 
predated January 1, 1863.   The Emancipation Proclamation didn’t compel black 
enlistment in Kansas as much as personal and social pressures from the Kansas black 
community.  The passage of the Emancipation Proclamation meant legal recognition for 
the right of black men to serve, and charged those same men to represent their race with 
pride.  Army service initially offered escaped slaves protection from pursuing masters 
and steady pay in an uncertain employment market, but military service also presented an 
opportunity to prove manhood and gain citizenship, a “bridge to manhood” for men 
previously denied recognition as full men. The allure of enlistment for black men 
stemmed from a powerful cocktail of revenge, liberation, and need for a sense of 
community.225 Frederick Douglass encapsulated some of the reasons for why black men 
should serve in his speeches, appealing to his fellow blacks to serve for a myriad of 
reasons ranging from the requirements of manhood to the opportunity to gain citizenship 
and renegotiate race identity through military service. Douglass in particular understood 
that freedom gained without military service would be meaningless, as freedom earned 
by white men for black men would forever hold them in the debt of their liberators.  
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According to Douglass, black men must take part in the war.226  Service however would 
take place within a greater social context as newly liberated freedmen or contrabands 
entered states where blacks were initially few in number and generally discouraged by 
pre-war Black Laws.  Kansas offered the potential for black men to serve, but unlike the 
East where large numbers of freedmen lived before the war, in Kansas most of the 
potential soldiers were former slaves, and part of a swelling contraband population that 
by changing racial demographics was engendering white animosity. 
     A partial answer to black Kansan resistance to recruitment was achieved by recruiting 
those newly arrived from the liberated portions of Arkansas and the Indian Territory.  As 
the Regiment continued to drill and work on the fortifications around Fort Scott, General 
Blunt’s campaign in Northwest Arkansas around the vicinity of Van Buren, brought 
many black refugees into the federal lines.  Hinton recorded that over one hundred and 
fifty families arrived at Fort Scott as part of a refugee train in the winter of 1863, some of 
which soon enlisted in the First Kansas Colored.  These black refugees joined a large and 
growing mixed race refugee community of whites, Indians and blacks numbering about 
three thousand clustered around Fort Scott, a third of which were blacks. The supply 
trains sent down to the Union troops in Arkansas and Indian Territory returned as full as 
they left, materiel cargo exchanged for human cargo aware of the formation of the First 
Kansas Colored and eager to join its ranks.  Hinton reported that the Regiment mustered 
only six companies, but that in addition to companies forming in Lawrence, Wyandot and 
Fort Scott, the Regiment hoped to recruit additional soldiers in the field and on the 
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march.227  Hinton’s propaganda and rumors may have encouraged refugees to enlist to be 
part of a liberating army.   
     Enlistments depended on a ready supply of manpower, and as evidenced by the muster 
rolls of the regiment’s first complete companies, many soldiers enlisted and mustered 
into service at Fort Scott from amongst the refugee community.  The war destroyed the 
livelihoods of many refugees, and despite the availability of work, this didn’t translate 
into availability of housing.  The miserable existence of the majority was notable, 
perhaps an incentive for many to enlist, especially young men.  One prominent Kansan 
described the housing as shanties that gave way to tents constructed of bed covers with a 
few wood-burning stoves.228  Fort Scott’s population swelled with each new wagon train 
from the south, and every wagon train returning north to Fort Scott was inevitably loaded 
with refugees from the Indian Territory, from which they had been sent by Union troops 
and under Union escort.229  Therefore the transitory populace offered a rich recruiting 
source to the regiment that was continually renewed as wagons brought in refugees. 
       Another manpower source that proved amenable to enlisting in the First Kansas 
Colored were the refugee Indians at the Sac and Fox reservation, previous Federal 
recruiting efforts for the Indian Home Guard regiments furnishing troops for three 
regiments. Among the first heroes of the Regiment were the Cherokee of Sergeant Six 
Guns that fell at Island Mound. Captain Van Horn’s Company I recruited almost a third 
of its soldiers at the Sac and Fox Agency in Kansas and later, at Fort Gibson in the 
Cherokee Nation. Their pride in being soldiers was so great that when their rags were 
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replaced by Federal blue uniforms, Van Horn wrote that the soldiers of Company I were 
“as proud as little boy with a red wagon.”230   
      The origins of the soldiers that manned the Regiment’s companies is of interest 
because of where the soldiers enlisted, versus where soldiers would have been expected 
to sign up had the process been driven by abolitionists rather than military and political 
 
expediency.  Antebellum Kansas’ black manpower pool prior was reported by census as 
126 free black males.231  It is logical therefore to explore where the bulk of the 
Regiment’s manpower originated. Despite Kansas’ reputation as an abolitionist 
stronghold, the majority of the First Kansas’ soldiers enlisted in the three cities of Fort 
Scott, Wyandotte and Leavenworth.  These three cities served as the main points of entry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4: Regimental Manpower Origins, 4 August 1862 – July 1863232 
 
for newly liberated “contrabands,” and recruiting. The majority of enlistees, as Table 4 
demonstrates, were overwhelmingly from towns situated near the border with Missouri, 
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Fort Scott       182 
Wyandotte             177 
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Leavenworth     105  
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Iola      5  
 
The companies that served prior to 1 January 1863 account for the large number of unknown points of 
origin.  A sample of Regimental Military Service Records reveals Missouri as the overwhelming place of 
origin.        
 
 
110 
 
or destinations for refugees.  Kansas Freedmen felt little incentive to enlist, and refugees 
and former slaves may have enlisted to guarantee food, shelter, and protection, not 
because of the efforts of abolitionists. Kansas’ situation was not unique; other states in 
the Midwest were struggling with the issue of black enlistment with mixed results, in part 
due to white resistance to black recruitment. 
      The process of training and recruiting the First Kansas Colored after January 1, 1863 
occurred under such close scrutiny that any act of savagery or ill-discipline would have 
been reported as a sign of the race’s inferiority, and as Higginson wrote “A single 
mutiny-a single miniature Bull Run, a stampede of desertions, and it would have been all 
over for us; the party of distrust would have got the upper hand, and there might not have 
been, during the whole contest, another effort to arm the Negro.”233 Accordingly, news of 
the regiment’s muster was carried in several prominent Kansas Papers, among them the 
Atchison Freedom’s Champion, and the Wyandotte Gazette.234  This didn’t imply support 
for the Regiment, for while the regiment was recognized as mustered, the editor of the 
Atchison Freedom’s Champion demanded quite pointedly answers to a number of 
discomforting questions: how was the regiment subsisted, and the officers funded; why 
wasn’t it disbanded despite orders from the Secretary of War, and what became of the 
large numbers of livestock the regiment confiscated from Missourians?235 Scandal could 
still defeat enlistment efforts, and tainting the regiment’s achievements with the 
opprobrium of criminal actions could have proved fatal to the regiment.  
      Answering these questions could have created political careers and ended many 
others, General Curtis and Blunt likely targets of this inquiry, as well as Senator Lane and 
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Lieutenant Colonel Williams.  These men all knew the regiment was subsisted illegally, 
kept intact to serve the needs of the overstretched Union forces in eastern Kansas, and 
protected from prying eyes by a combination of distance and disinterest.  As for livestock 
confiscated from Missourians, many livestock sales occurred and the need for mules in 
the west was insatiable.  Horses changed hands rapidly, remounted cavalry and provided 
funds for unscrupulous pockets.  Problematic questions indeed, especially given the 
precariousness of the regiment’s muster - to be complete, the Regiment required all ten 
companies to be mustered, or it could be disbanded.   
     The implication, much less outright evidence of criminal activity by the Regiment and 
its officers had already besmirched the Regiment with the taint of illegitimacy amongst 
the white and black communities of Kansas.   It is perhaps fortunate that Captain Henry 
Seaman did not muster in with the regiment, instead preferring to go absent without leave 
after failing to muster with the regiment. Seaman disappeared from the record until 1864 
when he helped organize black militia for Kansas’s defense during the Price Raid.236 
Failing to cripple the regiment by legal means, the political foes of black military service 
changed their tactics.  In lieu of legal arguments against recruitment, the fulcrum of anti-
black enlistment would be embodied in a series of racial stereotypes, petty annoyances 
and challenges to black manhood.   The Emancipation Proclamation did not smooth the 
way for the Regiment, and as issues such as lack of pay and irregular operations from 
pre-muster days continued to dog the Regiment.  Emancipation brought out a range of 
white responses across the north raging from fury to elation. 
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     Much would weigh on the accomplishments of black soldiers and their officers, and in 
Kansas in January 1863, that weight fell squarely on their shoulders to bear for all black 
Kansans.  These attitudes were representative of Union soldiers’ ambivalent sentiments 
toward black soldiers early in the war, perceptions that required black soldiers to prove 
their fitness in combat. The white soldiers of the various units stationed at Fort Scott 
reacted in similar fashion toward the black men of the regiment, content to heckle them 
and insult them, resenting their threat to the place of white men in society.   There were 
consequences for such behaviors, and when threatened the regiment’s officers fought 
back. 
     Some thoughtless white soldiers chose to make their personal feelings about black 
soldiers publicly known, not the wisest of decisions considering the aggressive and 
reactive nature of the First Kansas Colored’s officers. Williams complained to Major 
Blair, the commander of Fort Scott that his soldiers were “frequently forced to receive 
insults, and after, often stones from other soldiers who seem to have no other 
employment than lounging around the many low grogeries of [Fort Scott].”237  This insult 
rankled especially deeply as the period of abuse coincided with the regiment’s work on 
the Fort Scott defenses.  Major Blair’s tepid response promised justice, but required 
Williams to garner names and witnesses to these deeds.238  Williams understood the value 
of confronting white soldiers over their resistance to racial change, having done so 
directly and indirectly since the regiment’s inception. 
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      Support for black enlistment derived less from a desire for racial equality or 
egalitarianism than a desire to end the war, the sooner the better. Despite white 
disapproval, especially from soldiers, outward displays of racism and hostility in Fort 
Scott toward black soldiers earned immediate punishment. Captain John Graton related 
that one white soldier’s disparaging remark about the black troops was punished with a 
stint in the guardhouse, and gagging for his loose tongue.  Colonel Williams personally 
responded to the man’s indiscretion, confronting him in a group with other white soldiers.  
Neither the soldiers of the First Kansas Colored, nor their commander tolerated 
disrespect.239  
     The military’s approval of black enlistment, pragmatic in nature and compelled by 
allegiance to the President and the Union, recognized that black manpower would be a 
welcome addition to the Union army along the Kansas-Missouri border.  The 
Commander of the District of the Missouri, Major General Curtis, formally recognized 
the utility of black soldiers (which he privately countenanced) on January 4, 1863, when 
he immediately directed the muster of the First Kansas in response to the War 
Department’s General Order Number One, which formally authorized black enlistment.  
Mustering the First Kansas Colored into service created a new infantry regiment that 
could be ordered to garrison Fort Scott, construct fortifications, or relieve white troops 
for duty elsewhere as the black soldiers assumed border picket and prison garrison duties.   
     Support for black military service and emancipation was a tacit approval of black 
military service as a war winning expedient, and less of an expression of support for 
racial equality. Some viewed black enlistment as a quarantine device, and as one Kansas 
newspaper expressed it, “The best way to keep blacks out of the north is to enlist them 
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and have them fight and free blacks in the south where they will voluntarily remain.”240 
Supporters of black enlistment, as well as opponents held a variety of beliefs regarding 
the capacity of blacks as soldiers.  Among many white supporters, black soldiers were 
regarded not as potential future Kansans, but as a sable spear point for the manpower 
starved Union forces in the Department of Kansas, temporary residents welcome to fight 
and die, but unwelcome as future neighbors.  
      However circumspect were their fellow white Kansans, the black communities in 
Kansans celebrated the First Kansas Colored’s muster.  Reverend John Turner, described 
the events in Leavenworth for readers of The Christian Recorder, admitting that one of 
the leading papers of Leavenworth, the Leavenworth Daily Conservative spoke in 
glowing terms about the First Kansas Colored, praising the patience and perseverance of 
the regiment under unfavorable conditions.  A parallel development to the Regiment’s 
muster took root in Leavenworth, when black men gathered together to secure voting 
rights in Kansas.  While some black Kansans were fighting for the right to be considered 
citizens with all the rights accruing to citizens, another group was working actively 
toward suffrage.  Black Kansans fought on several fronts to change white perceptions and 
to claim the rights of free men.241  The performance of the First Kansas Colored figured 
prominently in this effort as political power, social change and military prowess became 
linked in a larger struggle for legitimacy not tied to antebellum concepts of race.  The 
behavior of blacks in Kansas also affected enlistment, and some newly emancipated men 
                                                
240 War Department General Order No. 1, 2 January 1863, Major General Curtis to Major Weed, Telegrams 
Received, District of Kansas, January 4, 1863 Negro in the Military Service, Roll 2, Vol. 3, documents 
1062-1063; Castel, Civil War Kansas, 138; White Cloud Kansas Chief reprint of Chicago Tribune January 
8, 1863 “Where Will the Negroes Go?” 
241“Leavenworth City, Kansas, Reverend John Turner”; The Christian Recorder, January 24, 1863; 
Sheridan, Richard B.  “Charles Henry Langston and the African American Struggle in Kansas.” Kansas 
History (Winter 1999), 274. 
 
 
115 
 
chose to resist the call to service either in defiance of white social expectations, or in 
reaction to poor treatment by Kansan whites.  The regiment’s status during the fall of 
1862 did little to convince potential black enlistees to sign up for an interminable period 
of neglect and hardship. 
     Contemporary newspapers offer insight into black perceptions of Kansas and Kansans, 
and served to give voice to an otherwise powerless minority.  The Christian Recorder 
offered two separate incidents that illustrated how new black Kansans adjusted to their 
situations in Kansas, some seeking swift revenge, others preferring to silently persevere 
in their new lives.   Perhaps emboldened by their freedom and the perception of 
powerlessness on the part of Missourians, some black men joined the Jayhawking bands 
that raided Missouri for valuables.  In one case, three black men entered Missouri to steal 
cattle and horses, and were caught in the act.  This was foolish in the extreme as former 
slaves returning to steal property could be killed by citizens, bushwhackers, or taken into 
custody, especially of the slaves of a Union man.  Race relationships in Leavenworth, 
Kansas’ largest city were strained by spring of 1863, and one black resident angrily 
lamented the treatment of blacks in that city. The attitude of white Kansans in 
Leavenworth prompted the observer to write a letter to the Christian Recorder in which 
he decried a growing sentiment of contempt on the part of local businesses and citizens 
towards black refugees.  The prevailing attitude in the city was that contraband blacks 
should be granted nothing and slaves encouraged to remain with their masters. The 
absence of white aid compelled many refugees to remain insulated in their communities 
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and attempt to solve their problems by uniting against a civil society that looked with 
alarm on black attempts to improve their conditions.242 
     Kansas, at least in Leavenworth, as portrayed in this letter was decidedly not a place 
friendly to black needs despite the earlier tone of newspaper articles in 1862.  Blacks 
were left to fend for themselves as increasing numbers arrived from other states, and as 
white Kansans increasingly resented their presence. Kansans had not abandoned their free 
soil principles or their Midwestern mindsets about race, despite disapproving of slavery. 
Race remained a decisive factor in many whites’ beliefs about blacks, especially those of 
Southern whites.  The Confederacy’s response to emancipation and the possibility of 
black soldiers led by white Union officers was both direct and chilling. 
     The formal Confederate response to the Emancipation Proclamation occurred early in 
1863, with President Jefferson Davis’s address to the Confederate Congress on January 
12, 1863 in Richmond.  Renouncing the proclamation as a desperate measure that 
encourages “assassination of their masters,” Davis dictated that Union “officers [in 
command of such troops] may be dealt with in accordance with the laws of those states 
providing for the punishment of criminals engaged in exciting servile insurrection.”243 
The Confederate declaration of war against colored regiments and their officers created 
not a fracture, but a bond between these two groups that didn’t exist legally before this 
time.  Future Second Kansas Colored and Kansas Governor Samuel Crawford regarded 
the Confederacy’s declaration of “Black Flag,” or no quarters war as a godsend, a boon to 
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regiments as it dissuaded shirkers and office seekers with the very real possibility of 
execution for serving in a black regiment.244 
     The Confederacy’s willingness to deny white officers special treatment if captured 
while in command of black soldiers intertwined the fates of white and black soldiers 
together in the Colored Regiments; to lead black men as a white officer was no immunity 
from punishment. In addition, Southern officers threatened to execute black soldiers 
rather than take them prisoners.  This attitude was important because as the abolitionist 
Thomas Wentworth Higginson wrote in his journal, “Black prisoners of war had nowhere 
to hide, and they were exclusively at the mercy of the rebels,” knowing they [white 
officers] shared the same noose became “a position of pride and esprit de corps.”245 Both 
black and white faced the possibility of execution together on the battlefield. In the ranks 
of the First Kansas Colored, this was less electrifying than it may have first appeared to 
white audiences in the East.   
      The First Kansas Colored braved no-quarter bushwhacker attacks at Island Mound in 
late 1862, and the veteran soldiers knew that their white officers would stand with them 
against the enemy. Despite the arrival of many new officers to command companies in 
the regiment, a strong bond existed. Captain Crews’ death set the tone for this 
relationship between the long-serving black soldiers of the regiment and their white 
officers who shared the danger of the battlefield.  The circumstances of Crews’ death and 
his vehement refusal to abandon his men confounded the Confederate attempt to divide 
black troops and their officers.  The wounds of white officers and shared shed blood at 
                                                
244 Samuel J. Crawford. Kansas in the Sixties. (Chicago: A.C. McClurg and Co, 1911), 108. 
245 Britton,The Civil War on the Border, Volume II, 78; Michael Barton and Larry M. Logue.  The Civil 
War Soldier: A Historical Reader. (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 148, 243. 
 
 
118 
 
Island Mound united the officers and men in a way that untested Colored Regiments in 
other theaters could only achieve during their own baptisms of fire.  
Skeletal companies and commissioning  
     Regardless of the disapproval of many mid-western whites, the hatred of Southerners, 
and shifting political alliances in Kansas, black enlistment was a political reality.  What 
remained was for the regiments to be recruited and mustered for service, many believing 
that the black troops would, in the words of the Emancipation Proclamation, garrison 
forts and perform military construction. Williams was determined that the First Kansas 
Colored regiment would fight and forge a name as a combat unit, not as stevedores.  
Therefore it was essential that the Regiment be mustered as rapidly as possible to prevent 
it from being doled out in company-sized units to serve the construction manpower and 
garrison needs of the army in Kansas.  Such fragmentation threatened Lane’s philosophy 
of punishing slave owners, and his drive for poetic retribution for their slave owners’ pre-
war actions in Kansas and Southern treachery against the Union.   
      Williams, recognized the need to muster men to meet minimal manning requirements, 
and pushed Major Bowles hard to enlist men to form “skeleton companies” numbering a 
minimum of forty-two men, and an officer, that could then be mustered by Major Weed.  
Army muster regulations specified that a Regular Army officer conduct the muster 
process; this required Major Weed to travel from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Scott, 
therefore adequate manpower had to be available by the time that Major Weed arrived. 
Williams at one point pressed Weed to travel to Fort Scott to enlist two companies and 
despite lacking manpower, he remained confident that he could enlist enough before 
 
 
119 
 
Weed arrived at the fort.246   Army regulations dictated more than muster requirements, 
they also determined rank and controlled the addition of specialists to the regiment.  A 
regiment that met the minimal manning requirements and contained its complement of 
specialists could muster, and as with the First Kansas Colored, be ordered to join other 
regiments in the field.   
     Williams’ urgency was well founded considering the state of political affairs in 
Kansas in early 1863.  Senator Lane was locked in competition with Governor Carney to 
determine the officers of the First Kansas Colored, and until the regiment mustered, its 
commander could be determined by state appointment. Regulations determined that the 
recruiter of a regiment could be promoted to Lieutenant Colonel after four companies of 
at least seventy-five men were enlisted with a complement of non-commissioned officers.  
Thus, when Captain Seaman no longer commanded a separate regiment upon 
consolidation of the two commands of Seaman and Williams under Williams, the initial 
manpower requirement was met before muster 13 January 1863.  
     Regimental completion required the recruitment and staffing of additional companies 
until the full ten companies were mustered.  Knowing that the regulations required at 
least forty-two men and a First Lieutenant, Williams dictated the formation of skeletal 
companies that could be filled by company cadre upon company muster.  When the 
company reached its required complement of eighty-four soldiers, a Captain and Second 
Lieutenant could be commissioned. Surplus enlisted men organized in already mustered 
companies frustrated Williams’ goal, and compelled him to emphasize to recruiters that 
recruits be sent forward to Fort Scott as soon as possible.  When six companies 
                                                
246Williams to Bowles, January 29, February 1, 1863; Williams to Major Blair, February 18, 1863. RG 94 
Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, Book Records of Volunteer Union Organizations, 79th USCT 
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completed organization and muster, a Regimental Major could be mustered, a great help 
to the Regimental Commander, especially with the endless Army paperwork required of 
regimental staff.  Final muster of the regiment once ten companies formed 
(approximately nine hundred men and forty officers), brought a promotion for 
commander to Colonel, and a staff that included a chaplain, surgeon, assistant surgeons, 
quartermaster, and adjutant.247  This last requirement ensured that the regiment could 
operate in the field, especially if engaged on detached operations such as were very 
common in the Indian Territory.  While John Bowles attempted to enlist men as soldiers 
and served as interim regimental Major, Williams sought qualified and acceptable men to 
commission as officers. 
      Although Major Weed, the Adjutant General at Fort Leavenworth mustered in 
companies A through E of the regiment on January 13, 1863, the regiment itself lacked 
adequate commissioned officers to staff the ten companies required for a regimental 
muster.   The solution, it appeared, was close to home; Williams commissioned a number 
of veteran Kansan soldiers as officers for the newly formed or forming companies.  
Therefore, on January 13, 1863 as the enlisted soldiers of companies A through E were 
being mustered, a number of new officers were sworn in and commissioned, Privates and 
Corporals becoming officers in a single day. Unlike many white volunteer units wherein 
officers were voted their regimental ranks, the First Kansas and subsequent Colored 
Regiments would be staffed by white officers commissioned by either their state 
Governors or the War Department. The list is extensive, but grants a better understanding 
                                                
247 Edward Miller.  The Black Civil War Soldiers of Illinois. (Columbia, South Carolina: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1998), 13. 
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of how the First Kansas officer structure formed.248  The early formation of the First 
Kansas predated Federal guidelines on how officers for Colored regiments would be 
selected. Instead, Senator Lane commissioned officers in his capacity as Recruiting 
Commissioner, for Kansas, and then commissions issued by the War Department which 
supported Lane and overruled opposition by Governor Carney.  The Governor’s political 
patronage in this effort was muted by a combination of War Department manpower 
shortages and Senatorial influence. 
The new officers were for large part members of the Ninth Kansas Volunteers, 
and hailed predominately from the small towns of southeastern Kansas. These men could 
be relied upon to be staunch allies against the hostile governor in Leavenworth -  men of 
the same ideological bent as Williams, men chosen specifically for their lack of perceived 
political threat and yet, experienced militarily enough to be useful as trainers and leaders 
for the green companies that were forming.  None of these officers took boards or exams 
for command fitness as many officers for Colored Regiments were later required to do, 
but were commissioned by Williams and approved by Senator Lane, then mustered by 
Major Weed so that he could accelerate the process of recruiting and building a regiment 
as quickly as possible.249Company command devolved to experienced commanders who 
proved their worth through the fall of 1862, and were allocated commands accordingly.   
  
                                                
248 RG 94: Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, 79th USCT Regimental Order Book E112-115, PI-17, 
Vol 2 of 4, Regimental Letter and Order Book, 79th (New) United States Colored Troops, War Records 
Office, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Special Order No. 1, January 13, 1863 ; General Order No. 1, 
13 
249 1263, Negro in the US Army, War Department, General Orders No. 144, May 22, 1863.  The rules for 
examining applicants for commission in colored regiments also determined the level of the commission, an 
order of merit listing that sometimes produced surprising results, Privates becoming Lieutenants and 
Majors dropping to the rank of Captain.  Kansas was an exception, perhaps owing to its early and 
“irregular” organization. 
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Table 5: First Kansas Officers250 
 
Williams upon the occasion of the regiment’s muster, designated the battalion’s 
company command structure: Company A, Captain Ransom M. Ward; Company B, 
Captain George J. Martin; Company C, Captain John R. Graton; Company D, Captain A. 
J. Armstrong; Company E, First Lieutenant Ethan Earle, Company F.  Samuel Herrington 
provided essential medical support as the Regimental Surgeon. Conspicuously absent 
from the Regimental muster rolls were three men who greatly influenced black enlistment 
from the beginning efforts of the Regiment, the trio of Matthews, Minor and Copeland, 
the black officers of Company D.  Instead of the company mustering with experienced 
black men of proven mettle, as well as a common racial background and often-cited 
competence, the company command defaulted to white veterans Captain Armstrong, with 
Lieutenants McFarland and Lewis.  The bond between the black soldiers and their black 
officers was strong, but so was the bond between the black officers and their fellow 
officers.  Unusually for the period, the white officers of the regiment rallied around their 
                                                
250 Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Kansas, 1861-1865, Vol. 1. (Topeka: The Kansas State 
Printing Company, 1896), 574-597.  Jones and Thrasher hailed from Iola; Welch from Fort Scott, Gibbons 
from Mound City and Overdur from Trading Post; Armstrong from Emporia, Lewis from Elwood, 
Coleman and Hitchcock from Lawrence. 
Former Enlisted Rank    Commissioned Rank  
Corporal Benjamin Jones of Company F                  Second Lieutenant  
      Eighth Kansas Volunteers     
Sergeant Benjamin Welch, Company F              Second Lieutenant 
       Eighth Kansas Volunteers 
Private Andrew J. Armstrong, Company C,             Captain and Commander, 
      Ninth Kansas Volunteers        Company D 
            Private Granville Lewis                           Second Lieutenant  
Private Luther Thrasher                                            Captain and Commander,  
     Company E  
Sergeant John Overdur                      First Lieutenant 
Private W.C. Gibbons              Second Lieutenant 
Charles Coleman, Company C,                           Recruiting Officer 
      Ninth Kansas Volunteers  
Bethuel Hitchcock, Company C                           Recruiting Officer 
      Ninth Kansas Volunteers 
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black counterparts and furiously lobbied for their retention and commission.  The black 
officers refused to passively accept the muster rebuff; Captain William D. Matthews 
argued persuasively and passionately for his commission despite a refusal by the War 
Department to muster him.  
     Captain William D. Matthews, denied the opportunity to muster into service as an 
officer, wrote Senator Lane demanding that the Senator honor the recruiting commission 
issued him in August 18, 1862.  Matthews carefully pointed out that the Emancipation 
Proclamation did not prevent him from receiving a commission, and that Williams, Lane 
and Matthews agreed to officer E Company with black officers when recruiting began.  
The refusal to commission the black officers of Company D cut deeply, and when offered 
a recruiting commission in lieu of a military commission, Matthews rejected it, staunchly 
demanding to retain his commission as a captain and company commander.  The refusal 
to commission Matthews and the other black officers presented other problems aside 
from issues of fairness.  Perceiving white indifference and the possibility of resurrecting 
the specter of potential white abuse, some of the men felt that Matthews was  “selling 
them out, [which could] cause some men to be shot and the Regiment disgraced.” In 
short, the refusal to commission the regiment’s black officers had the potential to spark a 
mutiny like the one in December, 1862.  Deeply committed to serving as an officer in the 
First Kansas, in a final appeal to Lane’s honor Matthews called for justice, and invoked 
Masonic bonds as reason for support.251  Unfortunately for Copeland, Minor and 
Matthews, commissions were not offered, and the three men declined offers to muster as 
                                                
251 Williams D. Matthews to Hon. James H. Lane, 12 Jan. 1863, filed with K-138 1864, Letters Received, 
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Sergeants in the Regiment, instead moving back to Leavenworth as the rest of the 
Regiment continued to muster into service. 
     The white officers of the Regiment including Williams, in solidarity with their fellow 
black officers, petitioned both Senator Lane and the War Department to commission 
Matthews, Copeland and Minor, protesting War Department policy in a letter 
countersigned by twenty-one officers of the Regiment.  Matthews’ role in organizing and 
sustaining the regiment was prominently cited, the officers asserting “Mathews, among 
the most prominent, is due a large share of our [success] in maintaining this organization 
intact through the trials and difficulties of the last five months.”  Matthews “an excellent 
officer” and “among the most thorough and efficient officers in our organization; a 
soldier in every sense of the term, drilled, disciplines, and capable,” presented a 
formidable case for black commissioning, but it would take political influence to secure 
this explosively provocative measure.252  It would take all of Lane’s influence to gain 
approval for a commission; the possibility of a commissioned black officer having the 
authority to command white officers and men of junior rank presented a disruption to the 
accepted social order that few whites would countenance without a formal change of War 
Department policy. 
     Adjutant Hinton, a close associate of Matthews, aggressively pressed Lane to use his 
influence to secure a commission for Matthews, citing precedent in Louisiana where 
General Butler successfully commissioned black officers in the Louisiana Colored 
Regiments.  Perhaps recognizing the potential political ramifications for Lane if he 
supported a commission for the Regiment’s black officers, Hinton reminded Lane that 
                                                
252 Capt. J.M. Williams et al. to Gen. James H. Lane, 9 Jan 1863, filed with K-138 1864, Letters Received, 
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Matthews was the primary influence that held together the regiment, and that a 
commission and the implied social prominence of Matthews would not adversely affect 
Lane’s popularity.   
      Hinton’s tone changed markedly with the conclusion of the letter to Lane, angrily 
pointing out that Major Weed’s refusal to muster Matthews, even as a recruiting 
commissioner, would affect the Regiment’s chances to recruit additional blacks in 
Kansas, dismissing the whole refusal as “the whole thing amounts simply to the idea, that 
‘niggers’ should not be mustered as officers and not to any question of competency.” As 
Colonel Chipman observed in his report to Major General Curtis in December 1862, the 
best-led company of the regiment was Company D, a company exclusively staffed with 
black officers.253  Kansas and Kansans, while tolerant of abolitionists and amenable to 
abolition of slavery for economic and ethical reasons, were not prepared to embrace the 
idea of a black officer. However, as a sign of Matthews’ character, he remained a 
supporter of the regiment, and assisted for months afterward with recruiting until the 
entire Regiment was mustered and marched south.  His commission came in 1864, when 
he became a Lieutenant in the Independent Light Artillery Battery in Leavenworth, 
Kansas.  Despite his long service to the regiment and influence amongst the Kansas black 
community, in January 1863, he was fit only for enlisted service in the ranks.  
Enlisted duties and capacity for leadership  
      There were some positions of authority in the ranks of the enlisted, one of which 
Lieutenant Minor had performed while the Regiment was garnering recruits in 
                                                
253Richard J Hinton to General {James H. Lane}, 12 Jan 1863, filed with K-138 1864, Letters received, ser 
360, Colored Troops Division, RG 94 [B-91]  see also service record of William D. Matthews, Independent 
Battery, U.S. Colored artillery, carded records, volunteer organizations, Civil War, ser 519, RG 94 [N-9] 
in Berlin, Freedom A Documentary History of Emancipation 1861-1867, 336-337. 
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Wyandotte, Regimental Sergeant Major.  When the regiment mustered, key enlisted 
duties were allocated, Private Steven B. Smith promoted to Regimental Sergeant Major, 
Private Henry Clay as Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant, and Private R.W. Gibbons as 
Hospital Steward.    These three enlisted positions were significant both for their breadth 
of duties, but also the interaction with white military personnel required of soldiers in 
these positions.  The Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant worked directly for the 
Regimental Quartermaster on all Regimental logistical concerns: equipment for man and 
beast, rations and fodder requisitions, and acquisition of numerous categories of supplies 
ranging from gunpowder to protected goods such as sutler stores.  Although the 
Regimental Quartermaster Officer performed all regimental logistical functions, the 
Quartermaster Sergeant coordinated manpower at the level of teamsters, wagon drivers, 
and the successful loading and storage of supplies.  The Regimental Hospital Steward 
was the enlisted aide to the Regimental Surgeons, dispensing medicines in garrison, 
overseeing nursing details for sick soldiers, and in combat, coordinating the regimental 
ambulances and musicians who doubled as litter bearers for wounded personnel.254 
Significant challenges remained for the leadership of the regiment, especially those 
relating to black enlistees education. 
     Howard Westwood deftly explored the qualifications of black soldiers in Colored 
Regiments, especially their lack of literacy.  Black soldiers may have experienced 
trepidation about the abilities of their black non-commissioned officers, some reluctant to 
work with black sergeants because of lack of ability or experience.  Some white officers 
                                                
254 General Order No. 1, 13 January 1863; Letters from J.M. Williams to Thomas Moonlight, January 29, 
1863, Special Orders No. 4, Headquarters District of Kansas, February 4, 1863.  Regimental Letter and 
Order Book, 79th (New) United States Colored Troops, War Records Office, National Archives, 
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in other regiments reported their duties increased due to their Sergeants’ inability to 
perform their duties due to lack of experience or education. The Army responded to these 
perceptions by issuing a special drill manual United States Tactics for Colored Troops, 
which modified drill for black soldiers.255  Based on Captain Earle’s journal this was 
indeed initially the case for the First Kansas Colored, but extensive instruction on basic 
writing and reading appears to have eliminated this shortcoming as a major concern for 
the regiment. Experience in the trades provided some soldiers alternative duties, and 
soldiers provided skilled labor as blacksmiths, masons, carpenters and clerks for the 
regiment and the garrison at Fort Scott.  However, other skilled blacks and literate 
freedmen remained in the Kansas communities and hired out their services for rates that 
exceeded the meager pay of a soldier. 
     The low pay specified for black soldiers as compared to their white counterparts 
served as a prime disincentive for black military service.  Ten dollars (three of which 
were clothing) a month and one ration paled in comparison to the starting pay for white 
soldiers.256  Compounding the pay inequity was the fixed pay scale of black soldiers that 
dictated that all ranks receive the same pay.  Black soldiers received the ten dollars a 
month pay regardless of rank be they Private or Sergeant Major.  In addition, black 
soldiers were ineligible for bounties.  Confronted by a lack of pay, recruiting among the 
more highly educated freedmen remained sluggish.  Some states offered bounties, or 
family relief funds as incentives, amongst them Ohio.  Governor Tod of Ohio, in an 
attempt to increase recruitment and offer blacks with families a degree of security, 
solicited voluntary contributions for the support of the families of black soldiers. 
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(Southern Illinois University Press, Edwardsville, IL. 1992), 35-36. 
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Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, despite sympathies with black soldiers, provided little 
assurance for potential black soldiers.  Stanton offered up the potential of state 
contributions, while appealing to Congress’ sense of justice toward blacks, a stance that 
remained unfulfilled in 1863.257   The fact that black men enlisted in the First Kansas 
when incentives were not a positive factor serves as a sign of their commitment to their 
cause despite the cost of failure, low pay, disrespect, overwork, and separation from their 
community. 
     The potential of black troops to replace white soldiers was noted by many, and 
amongst those observers were men who recognized a potential escape from combat 
service by hiring newly freed men to serve as “substitutes” for them during state 
manpower drafts.  A legal arrangement by which one man could willingly serve out 
another’s military obligation in exchange for a cash payment, substitution was one way to 
serve while avoiding personal injury.  If a white man could not find another white man 
willing to take his place, why not a black one?  This loophole was closed quickly 
however, the Provost Marshal General’s Office quickly recognizing that difference 
between whites and “men of African Descent,” primarily financial in nature, necessitated 
black-black substitutions only.258  The attempt to exploit vulnerable black men did not 
end with substitution scams; states also competed for manpower because of the desire to 
meet manpower quotas with black instead of white men.  The Civil War rapidly became a 
war in which blacks would not only fight for their freedom, but one in which they would 
fight to keep from becoming a cynical tool in the hands of those who believed their death 
- and not that of a white man- the price for their freedom. 
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     Other political questions came to influence black recruiting as manpower grew short 
for combat units.  The Governor of Iowa applied to raise a black regiment for Federal 
service, seeking to utilize the soldiers to decrease his state’s draft quota.  Among the 
questions of the governor however were some telling indications of eagerness to recruit: 
“Will I appoint the officers? Will the troops be credited against future drafts? Will less 
than a full regiment be accepted?”259  The first question may have been influenced by the 
battle waging between Governors Robinson and Carney with Senator Lane; the third 
from increasing competition from Kansas and the mustering of the First and Second 
Kansas Colored.  Other inquiries regarding commissions for black officers met with 
immediate and unequivocal rejection.260  In shades of the rejection experienced by 
Captain Matthews and Lieutenants Minor and Copeland, many potential black officers 
were rejected due to an unwillingness of the War Department to commission black men 
to positions of command; second place was good enough.  Among the white officers of 
the regiment a secret schism developed while the majority openly supported black 
commissions. 
Schisms, mutinous actions, and desertions 
     Internal division within the regimental officer cadres impacted the regiment’s ability 
to function.  A cabal of regimental officers corresponded with Governor Carney 
throughout the month of March 1863, and secretly supported his appointee to command 
the First Kansas Colored, R.C. Anderson.  Asa Reynard, a Lieutenant from Company F, 
wrote R.C. Anderson March 10, 1863, warning him of the dangers he faced if he 
                                                
259 “Governor Samuel Kirkwood to Secretary of War Stanton,” July 24, 1863. Negro in the Military 
Service, documents1426-1427. 
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attempted to take command of the regiment.  Reynard reported that “the majority of the 
officers are…in favor of Williams and sware [sic] that no man shal [sic]command them 
but Williams, and that the [sic] will shoot him,” and that when the officers heard of 
Anderson’s impending arrival, “the[sic] loaded their revolvers and…said that no damned 
Carney man could come into camp.” Not content with arming themselves, the officers 
also commanded the guard to shoot the first man to attempt to pass in.261 Reynard also 
accused General Blunt and Senator Lane of sending Colonel Williams orders to refuse 
muster any man commissioned by Governor Carney. 262  Although Reynard wrote with 
the tone of a man alarmed by the actions of fellow officers more loyal to Senator Lane, 
Lieutenant Colonel Williams and General Blunt, than their state governor, his motives 
appear less lofty when considered in association with another disgruntled officer of the 
First Kansas: Lieutenant John Topping. 
      Governor Carney received a second letter from a First Kansas officer less than a week 
after Lieutenant Reynard’s, when Lieutenant John Topping wrote the governor from his 
tent at Fort Scott, Kansas.  Lieutenant Topping reported that Colonel Williams ordered 
him from the camp because he held a commission from Governor Carney.  Williams later 
explained that orders from the War Department prevented him from mustering any 
without appointment letters from Senator Lane.  Topping complained that he was denied 
the First Lieutenant’s commission he felt he deserved, rather than the Second 
Lieutenant’s commission he accepted in order to muster into the regiment.  More 
significantly, others were named as opposing Williams to command the regiment and his 
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authority to commission officers: George Martin, Commander Company B; Lieutenant 
Luther Dickerson, Company B; Captain Ethan Earle of Company F; Lieutenant Asa 
Reynard, Company F; Regimental Quartermaster Lieutenant Elijah Hughes.  Topping 
denounced the rest of the regiment’s officers as little better than outlaws, willing to kill 
any who entered the regiment through the order of the Governor.263   
     Having presented his case against Williams and the other officers of the regiment, 
Topping then disingenuously appealed for greater rank and authority for Captains Martin 
and Earle.  He threatened to resign if the Governor did not direct an immediate 
reorganization of the regiment.  Lieutenant Topping’s efforts proved the quality of his 
character, for he neither gained higher rank nor resigned when the regiment mustered in 
with Colonel Williams as its commander in May, 1863.  Such were some of his officers, 
men willing to seek advancement through political maneuvering while requesting that the 
Governor not mention their communications for fear “it would endanger their life.”264  
Despite their machinations, both Topping and Reynard’s appeals fell flat, the combined 
influence of Blunt and Lane being sufficient to counteract any attempts by Governor 
Carney to claim the regiment as his own political patronage organ. 
     While Carney and Lane wrestled for political dominance and control of the Kansas 
military, officers of the First Kansas were pursuing their political and military futures 
through a risky gamble.  Carney, as governor could appoint officers, but Lane could sway 
Federal commissioning and sought to commission his favorites. Therefore, Carney’s 
choice, Adjutant General R.C. Anderson was pitted against Colonel Williams as a 
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candidate to command the regiment.  Lane chose an audacious policy of filling the 
Regiment’s ranks by sending Williams blank commissions with instructions to fill them 
out and to muster no one who had been commissioned by the governor without Williams’ 
approval.  The War Department sided with Lane, and when Carney insisted on Anderson, 
Stanton issued the commission to Williams.  In fact, most of the regiment’s officers 
received their orders from the War Department.265 Internal divisions continued unabated 
despite Lane’s policy, and ambitious men sought to improve their standing by 
undercutting the men Williams recruited to command his regiment. 
     The regiment’s problems culminated in early April, when Williams made the dramatic 
decision to withdraw his men from the fortification work at Fort Scott, citing the lack of 
pay and “outside influence,” as precipitating “growing restlessness and insubordination, 
the men feeling sorely troubled and grieved by their pay [and a lack of enlistment 
bounty].”266  Williams’ letter openly addressed the potential for mutiny and military 
indiscipline if he didn’t relocate his regiment, and that desertions would continue due to 
“sources.” Williams may have feared a coup against his leadership or mutiny from the 
enlisted soldiers. 
     The potential for a mutiny remained high despite the regiment’s muster, and the 
actions of several soldiers in early January pointed to a general sense of discontentment 
and anger over their treatment by regimental officers.  Although Privates Benjamin 
Riggs, James Williams, Henry Bowles and Henry Egleston all received sentences for 
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mutinous behavior in December 1862, their punishment did not deter other soldiers from 
acting against the chain of command.  Private Harrison Miller and Isaac Harrison were 
charged with mutinous conduct within days of one another in January 1863.  The catalyst 
appears to be the actions of Adjutant Hinton in yet another set of confrontations with 
soldiers.  Private Miller’s charges involved a series of exchanges in which he responded 
to an order to return to camp with abusive language against the “damned nigger driver 
and a secessionist son of a bitch.” When Hinton attempted to bring Miller back by force, 
the soldier struck Hinton and threatened to kill him.  When confronted by Captain Ward, 
Miller struck Ward several times in the head.267  Harrison did not threaten violence, but 
refused to obey an order, an action that resulted in his charge of mutinous conduct.  
Miller served sixty days at Fort Lincoln and received his release on the request of 
Colonel Williams.   
     These two soldiers’ actions demonstrate several of the stresses on the command, 
namely the inability to receive passes and the provocative presence of Adjutant Hinton.  
The still relatively new nature of the command, ongoing discontent arising from lack of 
pay and little respect combined to create an environment that made discipline difficult.  
Although Williams did not specifically enumerate any additional charges against soldiers 
after late January, and the regimental record book lacks mention of mutiny, Williams 
may have witnessed signs from his men that the combination of heavy fatigue labor, 
perceptions of mistreatment, and low morale were creating conditions of dangerous 
instability in the ranks. Another expression of the low unit morale endured by the 
regiment is its desertion rate for early months of 1863. 
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     The high regimental desertion rates at Fort Scott threatened the full regimental muster 
that Williams pushed his commanders to achieve.  Some soldiers may have soured on the 
experience of soldiering, and while many left their encampments in search of better 
paying jobs – or simply pay, as the soldiers of the First Kansas had yet to be paid -  on the 
Kansas labor market, some perhaps unclear on the concept of a military enlistment 
contract, departed after a brief period of time. However the reason, deserters were 
pursued with vigor, the muster of the regiment dependent upon manpower numbers. 
     Desertion was, aside from disease, the single most critical impediment that prevented 
the regiment from filling its companies and completing its organization. Recognizing that 
the Regiment had legally mustered and was a legitimate military formation, Brigadier 
General Blunt specifically authorized Williams to recover deserters from Leavenworth 
where the populace actively aided deserters.268  There would be no threats of police or 
militia to oppose Williams as they had in previous months.  Now he could and did 
dispatch officers and men to bring back deserters.  
     The persistent question of the legality of enlistments predating the regiment’s muster 
continued to counter Williams’ efforts to recover deserters. Resistance against continued 
efforts to muster deserters occurred across Kansas from civilian quarters.  J.M. Wilkerson 
of Lawrence in February 1863, incensed by the presence of the Regiment’s deserter 
details, protested the regiment’s right to claim men who had joined the regiment before it 
was mustered.  The regiments’ harsh deserter recovery efforts angered both white and 
black Lawrencians, but as Wilkerson explained, the reaction was not based on cowardice.  
One black veteran wounded at Island Mound was reported as “anxious for another fight.”  
There did not appear to be a racial component to the protest, and the efforts of Lieutenant 
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Reynard to attend to the needs of his wounded and feverish men still convalescing in 
Lawrence from Island Mound were applauded.269  Care and consideration for soldiers 
strengthened their bond with the regiment’s officers, but indifference to their plight and 
commitment engendered resentment, and frustration.  The black soldiers and black 
community demanded respect and when denied respect, challenged the practices of the 
regiment. Black men wanted to be involved in the war, but they also wanted to be free of 
the hounding searches of deserter hunting squads determined to return men to harsh 
conditions and no pay.   
      The return of deserters was deemed so vital to the Regiment that, despite civilian 
opposition, details continued to search for deserters throughout the winter months and 
into the spring, Williams regularly issued orders for detachments to search towns across 
Kansas.  Officers went with specific instructions from Williams to “give least possible 
offense to loyal citizens,” and to consider that many military men expressed extreme 
prejudice against the Regiment.270  Williams recognized white Kansan opposition, but 
understood that he needed the assistance of white Kansas units to subsist his recruiting 
and deserter return parties; until completed organization and departed Kansas’s 
nettlesome mix of civil discontent and political intrigue, Williams was forced to work 
against a multitude of irritants.  
     Tact amongst white citizens while in pursuit of deserters must have been difficult to 
maintain, given the knowledge that many of these whites were harboring deserters for 
labor on their farms.  Captain John Graton expressed frustration over the desertion rates 
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in his company and the regiment, and claimed that the desertion losses were so high as to 
prevent companies from mustering, “I have had enough to more than make my Company 
full, some 15 or so I think.  The Reg[imen]t. Has lost by desertion some three hundred 
men or more. Almost enough to make us a full Regiment.”271  These numbers translate 
into nearly thirty percent manpower losses, a great impetus to order out company officers 
as deserter catchers, as well as press for immediate pay for the regiment.  
     Williams pursued extraordinary measures to muster men into the regiment.  One sign 
of the severity of regimental manpower shortages was Williams’ willingness release men 
from prison in order to muster into service. Four Privates responsible for mutiny in 
December were temporarily released from the Fort Scott brig for muster.272  The second 
major impact on regimental manpower was a more insidious enemy, one that could not 
be arrested or bullied into submission. Disease killed a company worth of soldiers In the 
period between 1 January 1863 and 1 July 1863. 
The “Seasoning period” 
      Camp Emancipation, the regiment’s cantonment area at Fort Scott, was a constantly 
changing epidemiological environment, where new soldiers mixed with old veterans.  
Although the health of soldiers was the responsibility of surgeons and commanders, 
command indifference was not the cause of the regiment’s disease casualties.  Factors 
inherent to army life such as fatigue duty exertions, cramped living conditions in tents, 
constant exposure to the elements, and dietary changes all influenced mortaility rates, as 
they did in white regiments. However, unlike many Colored Regiments raised later in the 
war, the First Kansas Colored began its military service with a competent medical staff, 
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listed a surgeon and an assistant surgeon on the muster rolls, two thirds of the medical 
complement allocated to a regiment.273 Racial suppositions about disease may have also 
played a significant role in death rates, black regarded to be more disease resistant than 
whites. 
     It was believed by many whites that those of the black race were immune both to the 
ravages of disease, in particular Yellow Fever, and that their physical capacity for work 
was inexhaustible.  Whites, perhaps unfamiliar with the black body, assumed that the 
experience of slavery made blacks insensitive to pain.274 The unfortunate reality of camp 
life and disease deaths for many black recruits derived in part from their lives prior to 
their muster into the military.  Margaret Humphreys discovered that malnutrition and lack 
of exposure to disease early in life rendered black recruits susceptible to diseases such as 
smallpox, pneumonia, dysentery, measles, and typhoid. Andrew Black echoed these 
sentiments, and postulated that exposure to the elements and previous pneumonia 
episodes may have made black soldiers vulnerable to infection in the cramped camps. 
The closest comparison to the health of black soldiers was that of white recruits from 
slums.275 Although soldiers were physically inspected before enlistment, cursory exams 
could not gauge resistance to disease or hidden pre-existing conditions.  In the era before 
lab tests and other screening procedures, knowledge of an individual soldier’s medical 
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history may have been sparse, and potentially compromised by fears of rejection for 
military service if recruits revealed a past history of illness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
            Table 6: Death Rates for Recruits, 1 January 1863 to 1 July 1863276 
 
The causes of death enumerated in Table 6 offer intriguing medical data, especially 
relative to pulmonary ailments such as pneumonia and consumption, more commonly 
known as tuberculosis.  The number of soldiers that continued service while infected with 
lung diseases is unknown, but it is highly likely that many cases of less severe nature 
went unreported. 
      The regimental record books do not indicate any significant change in operations or 
mass quarantines despite the loss of forty-three men from unspecified ailments or the 
enigmatic “death,” in addition to specific ailments noted in the rolls. Many 
communicable diseases could be prevented provided soldiers were inoculated against the 
disease or had prior exposure before entering military service.  For those soldiers with no 
previous exposure however, smallpox was deadly.277  The predominate killer of First 
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277 J.H. Graton, 29 March 1863, Graton Collection, Kansas State Historical Society. 
Cause of Death 
Died     16 
Disease    27 
Consumption     3 
Typhoid pneumonia   1 
Inflamed lungs   1 
Pneumonia    6 
Congestive fever           1 
Inflamed stomach         1 
Congestive chills   2 
Malarial fever               1 
 
Between 1 January 1863 and 1 July 1863 fifty-eight soldiers died, 
a loss of nearly 10% of the Regiment’s total manpower. 
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Kansas Colored recruits in the early spring of 1863 was a combination of ailments, the 
foremost of which was pneumonia, followed by typhoid and consumption (tuberculosis).  
     The regiment’s medical department’s response to disease was typical of the period.  
When soldiers fell ill, soldiers detailed as hospital stewards and orderlies provided 
nursing care. Companies also possessed another method by which to succor sick soldiers, 
an informal fund created by the sale of extra coffee rations. In a letter to his wife, Captain 
Graton explained how coffee sales enabled him to get “extras for the sick.”  Wiley 
Britton, mentioned a similar system in effect for his fellow white Kansans, civilians 
trading such items as butter, eggs, chickens, and dried fruits for coffee, tea, sugar and 
salt, the trade of such items authorized in order to obtain items for the company’s 
needs.278  These small gestures went quite far considering that soldiers’ families were not 
able to nurse them through their illness, and the restorative effect of nutrient rich foods 
such as eggs and fruits could bolster the health of sick soldiers.  
     Inadequate provision for clothing and equipment does not appear a factor in mortality 
rates.  The soldiers of the First Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry Regiment were 
equipped much as their white contemporaries, and received an issue of clothing and 
equipment upon enlistment that the soldier was expected to maintain throughout the term 
of their enlistment. Under Army regulations, infantry soldiers received “two caps and one 
hat, one overcoat, two dress coats, three pairs of trousers, three flannel shirts, three pairs 
of drawers, four pairs of stockings, four pairs of bootees, and one blanket.  This 
constituted a year’s issue of clothing.”  Sergeant Major Fleetwood of the Fourth United 
States Colored Troops received a similar uniform and equipment issue, and in addition 
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received “one knapsack; one canteen; one haversack; a case for carrying rations; one 
cartridge box; one cap pouch; and two blankets, one of wool, the other rubber.”279 
Soldiers were fined for lost equipment or weaponry, their pay impacted significantly by 
the initial issue of clothing, and although part of their meager ten dollars was three dollars 
in clothing each month, it barely seemed adequate when the nature of black soldier’s 
duties were taken into consideration, especially those related to manual labor. 
      While the regiment filled its ranks, it was bound to the vicinity of Fort Scott.  The 
fort’s needs took precedence over training, and worries of guerrilla raids on transport near 
the fort combined with too little Union cavalry.  The need to protect the supplies at Fort 
Scott resulted in the soldiers of the First Kansas Colored under direction of Engineer 
Captain William Hoelke, erecting four lunettes (small self-contained forts capable of area 
defense in case of attack) around of Fort Scott.280 Such labor was increasingly necessary 
as guerrillas preyed upon Federal supply columns as close as the marshalling area of 
Drywood, a mere twelve miles from Fort Scott.  Guerrilla and partisan ranger bands 
numbering in the hundreds also clashed on a near-daily basis with patrols from Fort 
Scott. The regiment’s soldiers accomplished impressive feats of fortification during this 
short period, and created formidable defenses that defended the fort until the end of the 
Civil War. 
     Lunettes Blair and Henning dominated Fort Scott’s defenses.  Lunettes Blair and 
Henning protected the southern approaches to Fort Scott, and Lunette Insley defended the 
northeast part of town.  The log and earth lunettes required more than six hundred men to 
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labor continuously for a period of over six months duration.281  In aggregate the lunettes 
constituted a major field fortification project, that involved shifting great amounts of 
earth and logs at each site, the work doubtless convincing some soldiers of the regiment 
that they were indeed laborers and not fighting soldiers as the days passed in digging and 
drill.  
      Fortress construction was not an easy detail, each day of labor brought the physical 
humiliation of laboring at a job that many never enlisted to perform, while subject to the 
jeers of indolent white soldiers.  Soldiers did have one consolation while they waited 
impatiently for their pay when whiskey rations were ordered issued to fortification 
workers by the officer in charge of the fatigue detail.282 However welcome the ration, men 
still suffered from fatigue at the end of their day, sharing the physical aches and pains of 
latter day construction workers without the sick leave or amenities of modern life 
available to today’s workers.  
     When not employed at construction tasks, the daily regimental schedule was 
structured around drill and details.  All soldiers drilled regularly to maintain proficiency 
in drill at company and regimental level, as well as to relieve boredom in the camps.  
Drill was essential in combat, the men requiring the skill to maneuver in a mass of men, 
knowledge of commands and their significance, and confidence in their ability to perform 
such basic tasks as loading and firing rifles, fixing bayonets, and maneuvering on a 
battlefield.  The officers were also learning during this period, the former Privates and 
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Sergeants learning their roles, and practicing various tactical evolutions until the 
Regiment moved as a single fluid formation through its tactical formations.   
Drill evolutions were absolutely necessary for infantry regiments to function during the 
stress and danger of battle.  Well-trained companies could react in minimal time to 
battlefield threats and if officers were killed, the Sergeants could perform their duties and 
expect the same from their men.  Training however boring or repetitious was the 
guarantee of battlefield success.  
      Daily routine also reinforced discipline standards for soldiers, especially those 
pertaining to hygiene and maintenance.  The dialy schedule in Table 7 required soldiers 
to maintain and clean equipment preparatory for inspections, and attention to camp police 
created a relatively hygienic camp environment.  Washing uniforms and bodies also 
ensured that soldiers could be assessed for physical readiness for combat as well as 
material readiness of uniforms and camp equipment.  Keeping the regiment prepared for 
combat entailed more than arms drill, but training consistency relied on a stable body of 
men that could build upon basic drill.   Isolating the regiment’s men from the temptations 
of Fort Scott by limiting pass access ensured a degree of insulation from the “groggeries” 
of the Fort Scott community.  Restricting men from carrying arms out of camp also 
preserved the peace in a community brimming with armed discontented whites.  The 
possibility of armed confrontations could prove too difficult for both sides to ignore 
given their acrimonious relationship. 
     The daily schedule had another benefit for the regiment’s soldiers.  Many of the 
recruits came from agricultural backgrounds in which the rhythms of the seasons and the 
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sun’s cycle determined the workday.  Training soldiers to recognize bugle calls and the 
division of the day into set work patterns accustomed men to duties that depended on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Regimental Schedule  - Fort Scott and Vicinity283  
 
 hourly periods rather than the demands of a particular job.  Training men with little 
formal background in time management gave them an appreciation for the military’s 
concept of structure and discipline. 
********************** 
     Williams, impatient to march the Regiment south and into battle, was constrained by 
factors other than personnel.  The environment constituted an obstacle to the Regiment’s 
deploying south, the lack of forage affecting the number of wagon teams that could move 
south into Indian Territory.  The importance of forage for wagon trains was highlighted 
by Captain Graton who in addition to describing the interminable fortification work in a 
letter to his wife, also cited a lack of forage for delaying the regiment’s progress:  “I do 
not think we will leave here before May...there is no forage in the country below and we 
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will have to want for grass.”284  Grass limited seasonal travel and as a result the wagon 
trains that supplied Federal troops at Fort Gibson traveled a schedule that emphasized 
logistics during periods of high grass.  Wagon trains were the lifeblood of the Federal 
forces in Indian Territory and as a result, suffered from numerous raids by Confederate 
forces.   
     The support requirements for wagon trains dictated much of the Union war effort 
between Fort Scott and Fort Gibson.  The number of wagons supporting military 
operations Fort Scott to the south was tremendous, the estimated three hundred and fifty 
wagons requiring over four hundred and fifty men: fourteen wagon masters to oversee the 
train operation, three hundred and fifty teamsters to drive the wagons, forty herders to 
tend to the mules, and forty laborers to load the wagons.  The raw power to pull the 
wagons was provided by 2,200 mules organized into six mule teams for each wagon.  
The fodder required to feed this quantity of mule flesh was affected by seasonal 
availability, but strictly dictated by regulations and set at fourteen pounds of hay and 
twelve pounds per day for horses and fourteen pounds of hay and nine pounds of corn per 
day per mule.  In aggregate this amounted to a daily requirement of 36,400 pounds of hay 
and 24,600 pounds of corn for horses and mules.285   
     Any wagon train moving south from Fort Scott or returning north from Fort Gibson 
required an immense supply of fodder and access to water. In addition, the heavily 
loaded, slow moving wagon trains deployed with an escort of soldiers, between a 
company and a regiment depending on the number of wagons and available intelligence 
regarding bushwhackers and Confederate regular forces. Wagon trains figured 
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prominently in the Union’s strategy in the Indian Territory. The dependency on wagon 
trains in the early months of 1863, and the supplies they brought to Union soldiers in the 
Indian Territory was as the Achilles heel of General Blunt’s strategy for the Indian 
Territory in 1863.  Union victories in Arkansas and Indian Territory in 1862 established a 
Union garrison at Fort Gibson (later renamed Fort Blunt) under Colonel William A. 
Phillips and manned by four regiments of Indian Home Guard soldiers.  Union control of 
the area was precarious however, and the Union Indians too recently returned to Indian 
Territory to be able to support the garrison, much less themselves with foodstuffs.   
     Although troubles with pay, enlistments and political interference may have 
influenced General Blunt’s decision to order the Regiment to Baxter Springs, perhaps the 
most compelling reason was Colonel Phillips’ steadily unraveling logistical and military 
situation in Indian Territory.  Overly reliant on the tenuous Fort Scott to Fort Gibson 
wagon trains for sustenance and materiel, Phillips wrote Blunt throughout the winter of 
1862 and spring of 1863 requesting additional wagons and supplies.  His forces were 
hindered by a lack of forage that limited the range and number of cavalry patrols, as well 
as by increasingly bold Confederate raids upon his supply lines.  Phillips appealed to 
Blunt for additional soldiers.   Phillips’ supply lines stretched one hundred sixty miles 
from Fort Scott to Fort Gibson, and the distance wore down his cavalry and their mounts 
as they guarded against raids by Confederate forces such as those of Partisan Ranger 
Thomas Livingston, who operated in the vicinity of Baxter Springs.286  Additional threats 
arose from the need to protect civilian Indian refugees against retaliatory raids by 
guerrillas and Confederate Indian forces.  Phillips’ logistical situation was the key to 
holding his regiments together, and retaining hold of Fort Blunt.  
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     Phillips faced a threefold challenge with his logistics: he was expected to supply his 
soldiers with food; refugees required food to make it through the winter until they could 
successfully raise a crop; and former Confederate Indians defecting to the Union 
expected rations.  As a result Phillips requested a combination of supplies from Fort Scott 
including ammunition, seeds, rations for refugees, soldiers and the Choctaw and Creek 
Indians formerly under McIntosh’s Confederate forces. In February Phillips reported 
raids upon the wagon trains he used to supply the estimated one thousand destitute 
women and children around his camp.287  Phillips’ desperation grew as the demands of the 
refugees and the Confederate raids combined to stretch his logistics to the breaking point.   
     As a consequence of his logistical difficulties, Phillips requested in May 1863 that the 
First Kansas Colored be ordered to support his command.  Blunt agreed with Phillips and 
informed Major General Curtis that he ordered the First Kansas Colored south to support 
Colonel Phillips, the only white troops available being the Ninth Kansas cavalry, the 
remaining troops available in the District of the Frontier consisting of “Negroes and 
Indians.” Concurrently, Colonel Williams received orders to march south to Baxter 
Springs.288The First Kansas Colored represented the largest and best-trained force 
available to Blunt and he ordered them to support Phillips without reservation.   The 
regiment’s first destination was Baxter Springs, an area that included strong pro-
Confederate Missourians as well as hard-pressed Union stalwarts.   
     The First Kansas assembled at Fort Scott, and drew together its companies for the 
sixty-mile march south.   Companies I and K completed their muster on May 3, and the 
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regiment was joined by Company D after it was relieved of its duties as the Fort Lincoln 
prison garrison, the duty passing to a detachment of the Second Kansas.  Pay and muster 
rolls were also forwarded to Washington D.C., for Companies B, E, and F Companies of 
the First Kansas Colored.289  Williams ordered a detachment to remain at Fort Scott under 
Lieutenant Colonel Bowles to attend to the needs of sick soldiers left behind, and 
specified the creation of a detachment to apprehend deserters to be sent forward to the 
regiment. Completing the regimental staff was the return of the Assistant Regimental 
Surgeon to the Regiment.290 However, the regimental staff required a new adjutant when 
Lieutenant Hinton, received orders to report to Senator Lane to assist in the recruiting 
effort for the Second Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry Regiment.291 The regiment’s 
orders to Baxter Springs required Williams to protect the line of supplies and mail as a 
halfway station between Fort Gibson and Fort Scott. 
   The Regiment didn’t go alone; a section of Captain E.A. Smith’s Second Kansas 
Battery accompanied the infantry to provide firepower.  There was a telling lack of 
cavalry, a glaring omission given the wide spaces the Regiment was expected to defend 
against guerrillas and Confederate forces from the south, while keeping open a line of 
communication with Fayetteville, Arkansas. The regiment finally had the chance to 
justify their existence and their right to serve as soldiers against those that discounted 
their previous combat at Island Mound.  Credible service under fire would disprove the 
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belief that black men could not fight.292  Williams had sought a chance to fight, and the 
regiment would shed blood while stationed at Baxter Springs.   
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Chapter Four 
“True Soldierly Spirit” 
 
     Regimental muster and fortification work accomplished little to raise the value of 
black soldiers in the eyes of white observers.  To a large degree, the reasons were not 
grounded in race. Largely untried soldiers elicited little respect from the veteran white 
soldiers of Fort Scott, many of whom regarded themselves superior not only because of 
race but also because they stood the test of battle and proved their manhood.  Soldiers in 
the ranks weathered disease and desertions, and their leadership continually changed 
because of frequent inter-regimental transfers of officers and sergeants as the regiment’s 
company commanders transferred veteran Lieutenants and Sergeants to the less 
experienced companies.   During the early months of 1863 the soldiers of the First 
Kansas Colored Regiments chafed at their roles as diggers and laborers, but drilled for 
war and, according to their officers, reached a high level of competence and 
professionalism.  The regiment’s men would need such leadership in a region where 
combat action against bushwhackers was certain. Now the First had been provided a 
chance to win recognition of their manhood from an ambivalent white Kansas citizenry.   
      The black troops and their white officers felt pressure to justify their existence, for 
their right to serve as soldiers had been questioned by those who discounted their 
previous combat performance at Island Mound as a fluke. Credible behavior under fire 
offered the chance to disprove the belief that black men could not fight, and, one observer 
claimed, would “do much to disarm many people of the prejudice they entertained against 
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enlisting colored men for soldiers in the war.”293  Kansans wrestled with the ramifications 
of the Emancipation Proclamation, especially the changing social status of slaves; black 
enlistment inspired some officers to resign commissions in protest.   However, attitudes 
toward slavery changed in parallel with laws of the land, and many whites were happy  
that a black soldier could serve in lieu of a white recruit.294  The First Kansas Colored 
carried the hopes of many fellow blacks and abolitionists on their shoulders, and much 
was expected of them.  Kansas’s whites also watched them, looking for a demonstration 
of martial prowess that could conclusively resolve the debate over black suitability for 
soldiering. 
     The First Kansas Colored received orders to depart Fort Scott at the end of April. 
Companies K and I completed their muster on May 3, and Company D rejoined the 
regiment after it relinquished its duties at Fort Lincoln to a detachment of the Second 
Kansas.295   Events in Indian Territory significantly impacted General Blunt’s decision to 
mobilize the First Kansas.  Recognizing his manpower limitations, he assessed the 
regiment as ready, and, on April 30, 1863 ordered the regiment to support Colonel 
Phillips at Fort Gibson.  The regiment, ordered to bivouac at Baxter Springs to safeguard 
the trains and Colonel Phillips’s lines of communication, were to challenge Confederate 
guerrillas’ raiding of the military road between Drywood and Baxter Springs.   Blunt  
lacked significant reserves to send any other unit to Phillips’s aid with the bulk  of his 
command posted to Missouri or in the process of mustering into service.  Claiming that 
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the regiment contained 1,000 effectives, Blunt left their disposition to Phillips’s 
discretion.296    
     Manpower shortages regularly beset Blunt, and his efforts to raise a second Kansas 
black infantry regiment required that he detail officers from the First Kansas Colored to 
assist in recruiting the new regiment. Hence Lieutenant Hinton’s order to report to 
Senator Lane to assist in the recruiting effort for the Second Kansas Colored Volunteer 
Infantry Regiment.297  A second black infantry regiment could take on garrison and 
fortification duties and offered increased combat power against the predominantly 
cavalry-based Confederate forces in Indian Territory.    Deploying both regiments south 
would also ease social pressures in Kansas:  the sight of black men marching south to 
fight for the Union, rather than competing with white men for work in the Kansas war 
time boom economy would be a relief to many Kansan whites.    
Guerrilla warfare and retribution 
     The Regiment’s departure from Fort Scott broke the demoralizing monotony of 
garrison life and finally distanced it from the “sources” that encouraged desertions and 
insubordination. Charged with establishing a direct line of communications with Colonel 
Phillips’ forces at Fort Blunt, the regiment departed Fort Scott on May 4, 1863 
accompanied by a section of Captain E.A. Smith’s Second Kansas Battery. While at 
Baxter Springs, thirty-five soldiers detailed from across the Regiment and commanded by 
Captain Armstrong of Company D, would man two twelve-pound howitzers from the 
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battery.298  Additional soldiers joined the regiment during May and June, some as 
recovered convalescents from Lieutenant Colonel Bowles detachment at Fort Scott, 
others deserters that details recovered and forwarded to the regiment.299    
This strong composite artillery and infantry force provided the manpower and 
firepower to quell Livingston’s constant depredations and to protect the vulnerable 
supply trains as they passed south from Fort Scott through Baxter Springs. A lack of 
cavalry would limit the regiment’s mobility against guerrillas and Confederate forces 
operating from the south.  Their anticipated foe, Major Livingston, commanded an 
experienced and well-mounted guerrilla force.  
     Livingston posed a dangerous threat to Union forces and Indian refugees in southwest 
Missouri and Indian Territory.  Colonel Phillips and his Indian Home Guard Regiments 
skirmished constantly with bushwhackers, especially along their line of communication, 
the old military road from Fort Scott to Fort Blunt in Indian Territory.   Phillips’s thinly 
spread forces provided for the defense of the military road, as well as the protection of 
Indian refugee families.  His success in securing regular supplies influenced Indian 
loyalty, and by subsisting refugees around Fort Blunt, also encouraged desertions from 
Confederate Indian forces.300  As a result, guerrillas - amongst them men from 
Livingston’s band - continually attacked Phillips’s foraging trains, thus necessitating 
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Phillips to detach companies to protect the road and refugees.301  The incessant demand 
for cavalry escorts wore down man and beast to the point that Phillips despaired of 
defending the trains while also contesting control of the territory around Fort Blunt. The 
First Kansas Colored deployed to protect these routes, and by interdicting Livingston 
assisted Phillips to conserve his manpower while decreasing his command’s exposure to 
the small unit actions favored by guerrilla bands. 
     Although Confederate forces knew of the existence of the First Kansas Colored, they 
had yet to take the measure of the regiment. Colonel Williams wasted little time pitting 
his men against the bushwhackers.  Two days into the regiment’s march, Lieutenant 
M.M. Ehle of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry discovered a guerrilla camp on an island in 
the Spring River, but he realized that guerrillas outnumbered his command by a factor of 
four to one.  Ehle appealed to Colonel Williams for additional troops, and Williams 
detailed a force of one hundred men and an artillery piece under Captains Armstrong and 
Welch to aid Ehle’s cavalry in the assault on the camp.  Scout Hugh Thompson reported 
the guerrillas routed and a large number of horses, mules and guns captured.302 Flushed 
with success, the regiment prepared to conduct operations against secessionists and 
bushwhackers in the vicinity of Baxter Springs.  Success against Livingston created 
confidence in the men’s abilities, and gave newer recruits valuable experience.  
Livingston would not underestimate the regiment after this raid. 
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     Although his regiment’s involvement in the attack on Livingston’s encampment was 
not in question, Williams sent a letter to Major Livingston, taunting him to take action.  
Williams’ letter invited Livingston to assemble all bushwhackers of the region at a point 
of their choosing for battle. Failure to do so, he proclaimed, would result in Livingston’s 
men being considered “thieves and robbers who lurk in secret places, dishonorable 
murderers unworthy of the fate of chivalrous soldiers engaged in honorable warfare.”303  
Williams’ language was deliberately provocative and his threat of punishment an 
invitation to test his men against Livingston’s.  Ignorant of Livingston’s operational 
reach, Williams failed to perform a thorough reconnaissance of the region.  As a result, 
the regimental encampment at Baxter Springs, Camp Joe Hooker, was established on 
May 6, in close proximity to Cow Creek.304  Unknown to Williams it was also located 
within easy striking distance of Livingston’s forces.  Indeed,, the guerrillas leader’s camp  
literally sat at Livingston’s doorstep in Shoal Gulch, less than five miles from the 
encampment.305  
     Livingston possessed significant advantages over the First Kansas Colored including 
mobility, familiarity with the region, and regularly updated intelligence from his 
Confederate commanders and local sympathizers.  Livingston also received regular 
intelligence about the regiment’s movements from the women of the area, and in 
particular from Mrs. Fountain, who lived within half of a mile of Livingston’s camp in 
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Shoal Gulch.  Ostensibly a non-combatant, she was Livingston’s choice of intermediary 
between his command and the First Kansas Colored.306 
 
Map 3: Baxter Springs, Sherwood and Cabin Creek 
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     Livingston’s spies provided early intelligence that confirmed the regiment’s lack of 
cavalry support, and he tailored his attacks accordingly, forcing the regiment to react to 
his ambushes and raids on his terms. Perhaps in recognition of his regiment’s 
shortcomings, and the potential for attack with little notice, Williams required all soldiers 
and officers to fall out at general call with full equipment and arms ready for action.  
Williams also imposed noise restrictions and threatened stiff penalties for any not found 
in their quarters or talking after tattoo.307  Doubtless these measures increased Williams’s 
command readiness for immediate action, and eased the duty of the camp pickets who 
listened for activity from the darkness beyond the camp’s perimeter.  However, 
Livingston continued to keep the initiative against the regiment, and planned his attacks 
carefully. 
      The regiment wasted no time in raiding the surrounding communities and 
Livingston’s secessionist supporters, and by mid-May the regiment guarded a large 
number of prisoners, both civilian secessionists and guerrillas. Williams held the 
secessionist civilians as hostages for the safe treatment of his soldiers as a contingency 
“should any fall into rebel hands.”308 The uncertain fate of his soldiers if captured 
weighed heavily on Williams’s correspondence with Livingston, and forced Williams to 
adopt harsh measures to reduce the effectiveness of Livingston’s guerrilla band. 
     Williams’s earliest raids set the tone for his relationship with any suspected of 
providing aid to Livingston or the south.   In one raid, a detachment of a hundred men 
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under Major Ward and Captain Graton arrived at Grand Falls on Shoal Creek and 
confiscated farm machinery, mules and horses from the vicinity.  Soon afterwards, after 
two women rode into their lines, Ward detained them after they brazenly claimed that 
they were there to count the soldiers for Livingston.  Ward confiscated their horses and 
calmly informed them their horses would be withheld from them, then released the 
women to return to their homes after giving his troop numbers at three times their actual 
count.  When the detachment prepared to leave, he told the women they could claim 
saddles and animals at Baxter Springs.309 Colonel Williams also reacted harshly towards 
secessionist sympathizers, and after an elderly man of pro-slavery sentiments attempted 
to reclaim his wagon and ox team from the regimental camp at Baxter Springs, Williams 
threatened to shoot him unless he left his camp.310  The regiment’s harsh treatment of 
civilians infuriated Livingston; Ward and Williams raided his flour mill, checked his 
intelligence gathering efforts, abused women and the elderly, and challenged his 
authority in the region.  
     After receiving intelligence on the regiment’s latest raid, Livingston assembled his 
forces for a clash of arms.  The report he forwarded to his Confederate superiors 
confirmed all the Confederates suspected and feared from black soldiers.  In response to 
Williams’s raids, Livingston waited for a chance to reassert his control of the region and 
kill the hated black soldiers.  The opportunity occurred when Livingston’s spies observed 
a detail of forty black and white soldiers of the First Kansas Colored under the command 
of Captains Ward and Armstrong, engaged in foraging at Mrs. Rador’s farm on Centre 
Creek Prairie near Sherwood, Missouri. Livingston ordered sixty-seven of his best raiders 
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assembled to destroy the foraging party. The foraging party’s inexperience played into 
Livingston’s attack plan, and when the officers separated to post pickets, the conditions 
were set for an ambush. Ignorant of any danger as Livingston’s men gathered for an 
attack, Lieutenant Edgerton of the First Kansas Colored ordered a wagon driven into the 
farmyard, and arms stacked.  Twenty unarmed and unsuspecting men commenced 
foraging and threw corn out the windows.311 Thus distracted and unaware of their 
surroundings, and more critically, separated from their weapons, the men in the house 
offered little resistance to Livingston’s attack as his riders emerged from the timber line a 
few hundred yards from the detail.   
   The survivors of the detachment reported the shameful events to Colonel Williams; 
Captain Graton, in a letter to his wife dated May 22, 1863 conveyed a sense of the 
confusion that swept over the foraging party.  Graton wrote, “A party of our boys got 
badly whipped on the afternoon of the 18th,” as the attack commenced, “the white officers 
and mounted artillerymen fled on horses while the dismounted black infantry, separated 
from their arms and on foot, were killed.”312 The fate of the dismounted soldiers decided 
almost from the start of the engagement, Livingston’s men slaughtered them as they 
scattered in the hope of escaping his hard riding guerrillas. 
      Livingston pressed his attack successfully against the divided soldiers of the 
detachment, and then pursued the remnants for eight miles to the Spring River crossing.  
The regiments’ losses consisted of twenty-three black and seven white soldiers killed, 
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and the complete loss of the detachment’s mules and wagons, as well as the seizure of 
weapons and a large amount of ammunition.  It is irrefutable that the detachment, denied 
the leadership of the fleeing officers and separated from their weapons, offered little 
resistance.   Instead of standing and dying in common cause with their soldiers, the flight 
of the white officers set off a panic amongst the dismounted majority.  Abolitionist 
sentiments evaporated in the face of imminent annihilation. Perhaps the only factor that 
saved the detachment from complete destruction was the division of the party into two 
groups, which allowed some of each to escape while Livingston’s men pursued 
individuals tenaciously, stopping to execute those soldiers they encountered.  
Livingston’s men responded in the manner of southern men against the abomination of 
armed slaves in uprising against their masters, and stealing the property of a good 
secessionist woman: no quarter was offered.  As the regimental survivors straggled back 
into camp, the First Kansas Colored responded swiftly, and mobilized immediately for 
retaliation. 
     The regiment set out at dusk with five companies of infantry and some cavalry from 
the train escort to determine the fate of the soldiers at Sherwood.  After marching through 
the night the regiment arrived at Sherwood at daybreak.  Although discovering the 
stripped body of a white artilleryman on the roadside leading to Sherwood, the fate of the 
black soldiers remained unclear.  Unspoken doubts about the treatment of black soldiers 
and their status as potential prisoners resolved when the regiment spotted the thirteen 
mutilated bodies of the black soldiers who lay unburied where they fell.  The hastily 
abandoned Radnor home became a holding area for the dead. As a detail placed the 
bodies inside the Radnor home, the cavalry brought in an old man named John Bishop, a 
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bushwhacker who was recognized as being a paroled prisoner from Fort Lincoln. 
Bishop’s appearance left little question of involvement for many of the observers from 
the First Kansas; a bloody shirt and government boots marked his complicity.  Colonel 
Williams directed the prisoner be marched into the Radnor house, and executed for his 
involvement in the murder of the black troops.  The house was then burned.313  Williams’ 
revenge did not halt with Bishop’s execution, the town of Sherwood also paid a frightful 
price for its complicity in past guerrilla raids. 
     The regiment’s soldiers combed the surrounding area for homes and burned a dozen 
homes after permitting the inhabitants to evacuate. Upon return to Baxter Springs and for 
several days afterward, black soldiers rejoined their comrades, some having escaped by 
hiding in the brush overnight. Captain Graton reported expedition’s loss as “thirteen men 
black men killed, three prisoners, five or six horses lost, about twenty-three mules and 
harness lost, five wagons, about twenty-three guns & equipment, mostly the result of the 
want of foresight.”314  He also understood the significance of the event and its location; 
the savage exchange occurred in a remote area where news of the massacre and its 
aftermath would not soon be revealed to other border area inhabitants. The skirmish at 
Sherwood proved Williams burned for revenge, and demanded respect for his men.  Any 
violations merited immediate and overwhelming retaliation.  A more circumspect Graton 
privately refuted the official May monthly report of a heroic stand during which the men 
fought well before being overwhelmed, and that the fallen soldiers were buried, not 
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cremated.315  The town of Sherwood would no longer harbor Livingston’s band, for it no 
longer existed. 
     Livingston reported all contacts with the regiment to his Confederate chain of 
command, and characterized First Kansas Colored’s response as brutal. Livingston’s 
report contained all the elements of the archetypical “savage slave” stereotype: murder, 
robbery, and cruel, seemingly uncontrolled acts of unspeakable vileness. Livingston’s 
report filtered the events through Southern racial constructs, but confirmed Williams’s 
willingness to engage in battle, and if denied that opportunity, his readiness to punish 
those that supported the secessionist cause. The black soldiers also violated the accepted 
conventions of warfare by murdering Bishop, a civilian, and then immolating his body 
with those of the dead black soldiers in Mrs. Radnor’s home. 316 Burning Bishop with the 
black soldiers represented a dire insult, as did the regiment’s threats against a Southern 
white woman.  To Confederate officers and sympathizers, the black abolitionist regiment 
constituted a dangerous threat imbued with a powerful thirst for vengeance. 
     The fate of Williams’s men at Sherwood convinced him of the merits of taking white 
secessionist prisoners. Livingston’s attack at Sherwood demonstrated his ability to 
counter Williams’s expeditions, and when informed of the execution of Bishop and his 
cremation in Mrs. Rador’s house, Livingston warned Williams that his barbaric actions 
invited retribution.  However, he also shared his possession of prisoners, white and black, 
and offered to exchange the white soldiers, but not the black.  According to Livingston, “I 
cannot recognize them as Soljers and as consequence I will hav to hold them as 
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contraband of ware.”317  Livingston was acting in accordance with Confederate war policy 
toward black soldiers and offered no exchange or parole.  The First Kansas Colored 
soldiers would not be treated as soldiers, a declaration that infuriated Williams and 
invited an escalation in invective that Williams’ expressed in his reply to Livingston 
“Bishop was executed for shooting a bound and helpless soldier. Conversely, his soldiers 
had been beaten to death after surrender or capture, ‘club bruised and brain bespattered, 
and their bodies mutilated,’” and as a result Williams acted as he saw fit.318 Williams 
threatened retribution against the Confederate prisoners in his control if his soldiers were 
not returned unharmed.  If twenty days elapsed between the letter and no return of his 
men, Williams stated, “I shall assume them murdered or sent to the slave pens of the 
south, and considered dead.”319  Williams declared war on Livingston, and prepared for a 
contest that recognized no quarter for Livingston’s men if none extended to his.  
Williams firmly asserted his soldiers rights as lawful combatants and demanded treatment 
as such.  Williams took stock of his unit, their morale, and ordered the regiment to move 
to a more defensible location. 
     Recognizing the regiment’s exposed position at Camp Joe Hooker, the regiment chose 
a camp location in the timber near Baxter Springs.   Williams named the camp “Camp 
Ben Butler,” the encampment described as “slightly fortified from the head of one ravine 
to the head of another facing to the prairie to the southwest; the timber was felled around 
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the bluffs,” and Hinton claimed that the regiment’s soldiers constructed a blockhouse to 
augment the regiment’s tents.320 Despite this new location, Livingston’s bushwhackers 
attacked a small detachment of twenty-five men and some wagons under Captains Macy 
and Welch en route from Fort Scott at Brush Creek. Williams’ timely reaction and a 
spirited defense saved the train from destruction and a repeat of Sherwood.321 
Livingston’s intermediary delivered a mocking letter to Williams that in addition to 
informing him of his dishonorable actions being reported to Confederate authorities, that 
the hard pressed train did not fight against Livingston’s men: if his men had attacked the 
train, it would have been destroyed, “a sure thing.”322 Livingston demonstrated to 
Williams he could strike with impunity at the camp’s patrols and supply trains, and 
further impressed Williams with the need for constant alertness. 
     Williams continued to demand Livingston accord his men the same treatment as white 
prisoners, and further clarified his position by issuing a threat to Livingston and his 
supporters in clear, unambiguous terms.  If Livingston would not stand and fight, 
Williams would turn his attentions to depriving him of support, and drive out Confederate 
sympathizers regardless of sex.  Williams also hanged a prisoner in retaliation for the 
murder of one of his men.323 
     Williams threatened the supporters of Livingston’s band because the guerrilla leader 
proved elusive, and refused to meet Williams on his terms.  Striking against civilians in 
lieu of military targets bore the stamp of the abolitionists of “Bleeding Kansas,” and 
                                                
320 Hugh Thompson, Baxter Springs as a Military Post, 20; Richard Hinton, “The War in the Far West,” 
May 27, 1863, The New York Times.   
321 Hugh Thompson, Baxter Springs as a Military Post, 20. 
322 Letter Livingston to Williams to, Camp Diamond Grove, Missouri, 27 May, 1863, RG 94: AGO, 
Record Book, 79th USCT, Vol  2 
323 Williams to Livingston, Camp Ben Butler, May 26, 1863; Williams to Livingston, June 8, 1863,  RG 94: 
AGO, Record Book, 79th USCT, Vol  2. 
 
 
164 
 
offered Williams one method by which to bring the war to the secessionists by evicting 
them and burning their homes. He also reiterated his intent to arrest and hold prominent 
rebel sympathizers as hostages to guarantee the safety of his men.324 
     Livingston rejected Williams’ terms and questioned Williams’ personal honor and 
manhood, as well as that of his officers, labeling them “a lot of low down thieving white 
men of Such honer and laurels as that I as not wish to be the gainer of,” and the proposal 
to fight the regiment on even terms as beneath contempt, “I would suppose that men of 
your stripe would call it honorable for white men and jentalmen to eaquillize themselves 
to com out hand to hand against a lot of eatheuoppieons.”325  Both men were passionate 
believers in their causes, and the feud between Williams and Livingston foreshadowed 
future interactions with Confederate forces. 
     Williams considered Livingston a criminal.  The treatment accorded his men at 
Sherwood ample evidence of Livingston’s own lawless and savage nature, and the 
perverse racial views of Southerners.  Williams asserted his men enlisted in the service of 
the United States, and that the Government would punish those who violated honorable 
warfare with acts of massacre.  His personal response was to threaten to meet Livingston 
“hand for hand,” and that he would “trump” any action of Livingston with harsher 
measures.326 While Livingston and Williams fought their private war, knowledge of their 
skirmishes filtered down to the white Union and Confederate soldiers around Fort 
Gibson. 
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     Colonel Phillips regularly sent couriers to Williams, as early as May 15, Phillips 
directed Williams to send men to escort the supply train from Fort Scott, the supplies 
more necessary than ever for Fort Gibson. Phillips claimed that his men despite laboring 
hard on fortifications around Fort Gibson subsisted on little more than two ounces of 
flour per day.327  Despite Phillips’s orders for Williams to hasten his regiment’s 
movement south, Williams remained at Baxter Springs, and his escalating confrontations 
with Livingston threatened to immobilize Williams’s command as he negotiated for 
prisoners and sought retribution.  White prisoner exchanges continued despite a lack of 
similar treatment for black soldiers.  Williams’s obligations extended to black and white 
soldiers, and he faced censure, if not worse, if he failed to exchange his white prisoners 
for those of Livingston. Williams remained in order to reclaim his white artillerymen and 
Unionist white farmers, while powerless to prevent the execution of his black soldiers, a 
distinction that rankled with Williams.   
     Union soldiers at Fort Gibson knew of the guerrilla’s attacks on the First Kansas 
Colored and expected that when Livingston offered no quarter to black prisoners, that he 
could not expect any different treatment for his own captured men.  Soldiers expected 
that either side would take no prisoners, and that “the enemy may be inventing the means 
of his own destruction.”328 Confederate forces in Indian Territory also knew about the 
regiment before it began its march south, in large part due to Livingston’s reports.  An 
escaped slave made his way back into Union lines at Fort Gibson, and reported 
Confederate indignation that the Union employed armed former slaves against them. 
Wiley Britton observed that many southern officers threatened no quarter should black 
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prisoners fall into their hands. Conversely, Britton looked forward to the regiment’s 
arrival in Indian Territory, and he expressed the desire to witness ebony soldiers in blue 
uniforms with fixed bayonets engage the enemy, and “prick his tender white skin.”329  
Their arrival was much anticipated by Union and Confederate forces alike, the novelty of 
a black regiment and the challenge it presented to white authority almost irresistible. 
      Despite Phillips’s claims to the contrary, Williams attempted to move his command 
south and fought with Fort Scott to obtain wagon transport for supplies and equipment. 
Williams repeatedly requested additional wagons from the Quartermaster at Fort Scott, 
suggesting that a train be made available for his regiment. Williams claimed over 10,000 
pounds of ordnance and 15,000 pounds of supplies required transport, but was informed 
that his regulation five wagons were all that could be spared.330 The loss of five wagons at 
Sherwood effectively crippled Williams’s logistical situation until they were replaced. 
Although the Regiment was authorized six wagons, in actuality only five were available 
to transport cargo, one being reserved by the Regimental Surgeon for the exclusive 
transport of medical stores and equipment. Colonel Williams’ frustration is therefore 
understandable considering that he estimated that he needed to transport at least 30,000 
pounds of stores, but with his allotted wagons possessed capacity to transport only 18,650 
pounds; each wagon team could carry 2,800 pounds if using a four-horse team, and 3,730 
pounds if equipped with a six-mule team.  In addition to cargo, the wagons also carried 
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five to ten day’s grain for the teams if forage was unavailable.331While Williams fought 
for transportation, Phillips waited, his supply situation growing steadily more desperate 
with each passing day.   
      Blunt assuaged Phillips’s fears by ordering a train south from Fort Scott.  Blunt 
assured Phillips that a train was en route with an escort of sixteen hundred troops 
including the First Kansas Colored.  Blunt believed that dispatching the First Kansas 
Colored would also inspire confidence in Phillips and his soldiers while Union forces 
prepared for a renewal of hostilities in Indian Territory.332  The delay was not intentional 
on Williams’ part; his lack of transport halted the regiment’s departure, and therefore 
Williams waited until the train arrived at Neosho before moving south.   The fifty miles 
between Baxter Springs and Cabin Creek would be traversed in company of the wagon 
train. 
      Livingston continued his attacks, brazenly attacking the camp while the majority of 
the regiment was in the vicinity of Turkey Creek seeking Livingston’s forces.  Williams 
in a letter to Major Blair, the commanding officer at Fort Scott, expressed Williams’s 
quandary: search for Livingston, or react to the anticipated attack of over a thousand 
Confederates from the south. Williams’ lack of cavalry complicated this conflict. 
Livingston gloated about the ease of the attack and bragged that he would strike again 
with equal ease.333 Livingston’s attacks delayed Williams, and created uncertainty about 
the whereabouts of the Confederate forces Colonel Phillips advised him were heading 
north to attack the wagon train heading south from Fort Scott.  
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Cabin Creek 
     Williams increasingly expressed frustration in his letters that Livingston’s attacks and 
the demands to march south placed him in a difficult situation.  Abandoning supplies was 
not an acceptable alternative, but relief soon came from an unforeseen quarter, and after 
receiving orders to meet a train coming from Fort Scott, Williams prepared to move his 
command.  On 24 June he reported his readiness to march and explained that 
transportation slowed his command, not personal intransigence.334 Although Major 
General Blunt specifically ordered Williams on June 16, 1863 to refrain from uniting the 
First Kansas Colored with the Second Colorado to escort the wagon train south from 
Baxter Springs, Williams chose to ignore that order, because it was  “intended to prevent 
the uniting of colored troops with white, and an officer of colored troops to command 
white troops.”335 Perhaps, but joining the wagon train also increased Union numbers and 
potentially saved Williams from piecemeal annihilation by the large Confederate forces 
reported to be in the vicinity. Despite safety in numbers, there was also danger, as a 
wagon train on the march spread out to find forage for its animals; it in doing so became 
vulnerable to attack.336  The size of the command and the large number of wagons took 
four days to cover the fifty miles from Baxter Springs to Cabin Creek, a rate of a little 
over twelve miles per day.  The train, if ambushed while in transit, offered a vulnerable 
and highly lucrative target.  The shortage of alternative roads clearly designated the 
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wagon train’s route to all combatants, the old military road to Fort Gibson and the ford at 
Cabin Creek. 
     The military situation at Fort Gibson depended on re-supply from Fort Scott, and by 
June Federal forces endured constant Confederate raids on Colonel Phillips’s stock and 
horse herds, which in turn diminished his ability to mount a defense of the vicinity of the 
fort, despite stout fortifications. Defending the wagon train stretched Phillips’s resources 
to the limits.  Colonel Phillips forces subsisted on short rations, and an outbreak of 
cholera circulated amongst the refugees and soldiers of the fort.  The survival of 
Phillips’s command depended on the arrival of the wagon train.337 The train’s arrival 
meant sustenance and its capture by Confederates, ruin.  Therefore, on June 20, desperate 
to find and safely escort the train to Fort Gibson, Phillips sent out Major Foreman’s 
column.  
     Contrary to Phillips’s belief, the vital wagon train from Fort Scott marched in 
company with a significant number of escorts; General Blunt increased the Fort Scott 
escort to six partially mounted companies of the Second Colorado Infantry under Colonel 
Dodd, and a section of the Second Kansas battery. In addition, Company B, Third 
Wisconsin Cavalry, Company C, Ninth Kansas Cavalry, and Company B, Fourteenth 
Kansas Cavalry, under the command of Captain John Stewart, Company C, Ninth Kansas 
Cavalry completed the escort’s cavalry element.  Blunt took seriously the reports of a 
thousand-man guerrilla band under Livingston and Coffee.338 The train proceeded south, 
and joined with Major Foreman and his Third Indian Regiment at Neosho.  The First 
Kansas Colored overtook the train on 26 June, and Colonel Williams offered his 
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regiment’s assistance.339  He also assumed command of the train escort as the ranking 
officer in direct defiance of General Blunt’s orders not to unite the commands. 
     The union of the separate elements into a single train escort increased its offensive 
capability.  By adding additional artillery and infantry, there was created a formation that 
Lieutenant Benjamin Van Horn described the escort as the odds and ends of everything, 
noting that “there were two companies of the Kansas 2nd, 3 co[mpanies], Col[orado], 2nd, 
4 co[mpanies], of the 3rd Indian under command of Major Forman.  We put everything in 
site into the ranks, and the First Nigger, 900 strong…when our men were all counted we 
had 2300, with four 12-pounders, two of them rifled, and two howitzers”340The combined 
force possessed infantry, cavalry, and artillery enough to defend the wagon train and fight 
through the Confederate forces moving north to ambush it in the vicinity of Cabin Creek.  
Livingston reported the First Kansas Colored’s departure to his superiors, therefore the 
Confederates expected the black regiment, but not the mounted Colorado troops or 
artillery.        
      Suffering from a severe shortage of rations and subsisting off foraged foodstuffs, 
Confederate forces viewed Federal wagon trains as both welcome sources of supply and 
important military targets, the denial of their loads contributing to weakening the ability 
of Federal forces to pursue operations against Confederate forces.  When General Samuel 
Cooper received report of the departure of the wagon train from Fort Scott to Fort Gibson 
in June, he dispatched Colonel Stand Watie and his regiment to command the crossing at 
Cabin Creek.  Joining Watie’s forces would be a second column of 1,500 men and three 
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artillery pieces under General William Cabell.341 Brigadier Generals Cabell and Cooper 
were ordered to meet at the Grand Saline and capture the train before the estimated 2,000 
men (including the First Kansas Colored) under General Blunt at Baxter Springs could 
march south.  However, Confederate commanders acted from the belief that the train 
would not start south before 29 June due to poor roads.342  Thus constituted, the 
Confederates deployed their forces in the belief that time and a compliant environment 
would support this plan. 
     Although delayed at Hudson’s Ford on the Neosho River from June 26 to June 29 by 
high water, the train’s progress to Fort Gibson was unopposed until Lieutenant Luke F. 
Parsons of Major Foreman’s Third Indian Regiment encountered rebel scouts under 
Stand Watie in the vicinity of Timbered Hill, about ten miles from Cabin Creek.  In a 
brief skirmish between twenty Cherokees under Lieutenant Parsons, and approximately 
thirty of Stand Watie’s picket, the Confederates suffered four dead and three prisoners, 
and the Third Indian Regiment confirmed that the crossing at Cabin Creek was under 
Confederate control.343  However, two Confederate forces in the vicinity of Cabin Creek 
remained separated; General Cabell with 1,500 cavalry waited on the east side of Grand 
River, restrained by the high water from the recent rains.  Colonel Stand Watie’s force on 
the west side of Grand River consisted of the First Cherokee Mounted Rifles, First Creek 
Mounted Volunteers, a detachment of the Twenty-Ninth Texas Cavalry, and a 
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detachment of Martin’s Partisan Rangers. The swollen rivers and recent rains separated 
Watie’s forces from their artillery that sat trapped on the opposite bank of the Grand 
River.  Lieutenant Van Horn believed that the heavy rains that fell after the train crossed 
the Neosho River prevented Confederate pursuit, and prevented Confederate forces under 
General Cabell from uniting with Watie’s command.344  The odds between the opposing 
commands changed in favor of the Federals, the Confederate forces prevented from 
uniting, and the Union wagon train escort unexpectedly increased by the addition of the 
First Kansas Colored and Major Foreman’s cavalry. Both groups expected combat, but 
the overflowing rivers disrupted timetables, and knowledge of their fall compelled the 
Federal forces to advance as fast as possible to avoid being caught in a two-part 
Confederate attack from the front and rear of the train. 
     The fear of being caught with the command trapped against Cabin Creek, and under 
attack from two directions shaped Williams’s tactical plan.  Lieutenant Van Horn 
observed, “Cabin Creek was the only stream before us that we had any fears of and we 
knew that it would commence to fall before we got to it.  We made all speed possible in 
the water and mud and reached Cabin Creek late in the afternoon.  It had run down 
considerable, but was still so high that we thought it doubtful about it being safe to 
attempt to cross.”345 The water constituted the Confederate’s first line of defense, but the 
southern bank of the creek also held unseen dangers. 
     The Confederates prepared well chosen defenses, a series of rifle pits constructed of 
felled trees of piled stones, and dug into the thickly covered southern bank of Cabin 
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Creek, amongst timber that stretched for about a mile on the southern bank.  
Camouflaged by the thick brushwood that extended down to the water, and commanding 
a series of thinned rifle lanes in the brush, the fifteen hundred Indian and Texan troops 
under General Stand Watie prepared to stop any attempt to cross the sixty yard-wide 
Cabin Creek.  Arrayed in the brush and concealed from observation, Confederate cavalry 
could wield their short-range shotguns and muskets to good effect if the unsuspecting 
train escort chose to attack piecemeal.  Situated further in the brush abatis and pits 
completed the defenses.346   
     The opening action commenced around noon on July 1, 1863 when soldiers under the 
Third Indian Home Guard skirmished with Confederate pickets, killing three and 
capturing three, and forcing the rest to retreat across the creek. After an exchange of 
small arms fire against the well-camouflaged Confederates concealed by the thick brush 
that extended to the banks of the creek. Williams ordered one of his twelve-pound 
howitzers and both of Major Foreman’s mountain howitzers to shell the opposite banks 
of the creek to support an advance by the Third Wisconsin Cavalry.  Hinton claimed that 
the commander of Company B, a man he claimed was a “Pro-Southern Democrat,” 
protested that “d-d niggers or Injuns” should conduct the advance, but ultimately 
followed Williams’s orders.  After enemy fire repulsed the Wisconsin cavalry, Colonel 
Williams rashly declared “he could find men to make the attempt,” and led five 
companies of the First Kansas Colored into the creek.  The infantry quickly discovered 
that despite their willingness to swim the distance, the water stymied their attempt, and 
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returned to the northern bank.347 Undoubtedly Hinton, who was not a present at Cabin 
Creek, may have embellished his report.  However, his reporting did confirm that the 
river and not any tactical incompetence on the part of the First Kansas Colored prevented 
the Federal forces from achieving a successful crossing.   
      Unable to cross while the water remained high, the Federal forces reformed and 
picketed the north bank with companies of the First Kansas Colored against the return of 
Confederate scouts.  While the Union commanders debated the next course of action, the 
fighting denigrated into skirmishing across the creek.348 The first day’s action ended with 
the Union forces withdrawing to a point about two miles from the ford, where the 
Lieutenant Van Horn established a wagon laager about with approximately half of the 
command as security, while the remainder guarded the ford during the night. Later that 
evening Williams, Dodd and Foreman conducted a careful reconnaissance of the opposite 
bank and then held a council to determined how to assault the opposite bank the next 
day.349  
     Realizing the vital importance of suppressing the southern bank’s defenders, Williams 
dictated a plan of attack that utilized his artillery advantage.  On the morning of the 
second assault, Williams ordered Lieutenant Wilson of the Third Kansas Battery to 
deploy his two six pounders to a point to the extreme left and below the ford, Captain 
Armstrong of the First Kansas Colored sited one twelve pounder howitzer and one 
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mountain howitzer in the center of the line, not more than 200 yards from the enemy, at 
extreme range from the defending Confederates mix of shotguns and muskets, and 
Foreman’s additional twelve pounder assumed a firing position on the right.  Thus 
positioned to dominate the ford site, the guns provided supporting fire for the assault by 
firing a combination of canister and grape shot.350   Another essential element to consider 
for a successful crossing, the bottomland near the ford lay partially submerged, and the 
mix of water and scrub posed an additional check to cavalry maneuver. Although the 
creek depth had dropped about three and a half feet, the water exceeded the axles of the 
wagons, and threatened to ruin the cargoes if the command attempted a high water 
crossing.  Van Horn captured the complexity of the tactical dilemma, and the impact of 
the terrain on tactics each side would employ “on the south side it is bottom land densely 
covered with small timber and brush, and a mile and half further south there is a bayou 
puts into the Grand River, …there was only a narrow wagon road cut through the brush 
on the other side, it was just like a lane.351  The Confederates concentrated their forces in 
the brush at the river’s edge and unless they were routed, the attack could falter mid-
stream.  However, if the Federal forces gained the southern bank, they could force 
Watie’s men into the bottomland, and trap them against the river to their rear.   
     The following morning, after reorganizing the command’s forces, the Federals 
attempted a second attack on the ford, well aware that failure to seize the crossing could 
place the train in danger of being captured by a united Confederate army if the waters 
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continued to fall.  Day two of the battle commenced with a larger assault element 
attempting to seize the ford.  Williams, as overall commander of the Union forces at 
Cabin Creek, configured the Union forces with one company of the Third Indian Home 
Guards under Major Foreman in the lead, followed by an infantry-heavy element led by 
Lieutenant Colonel Bowles and five companies of the First Kansas Colored along with 
the mounted elements of the Third Battalion of the Second Colorado Infantry.  Three 
companies of cavalry, including one company of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry followed the 
infantry to exploit any breakthrough, and the rest of the Third Indian Home Guards 
secured the river above and below the ford.352  Artillery fire opened the attack with shell 
and canister beginning at 8 A.M.; a forty-minute barrage intended to rout the enemy from 
their defensive rifle pits in the brush along the southern bank.   Major Foreman led the 
first element into the creek, but was met with fierce small arms fire that struck Foreman 
in the back and neck and repulsed his cavalry. Williams halted the infantry at the waters 
edge and diverted three companies to the right where they commenced with musketry 
against the opposite bank, and were soon joined by another twenty minutes of artillery 
fire against the entrenched Confederates.  Company C of the Ninth Kansas followed the 
First Kansas into the creek. Williams led two companies of infantry at the double quick to 
the water; the infantry assaulted with fixed bayonets and held their cartridge boxes held 
high above the chest-high water of the creek.  Advancing resolutely under supporting 
small arms and artillery fire, the infantry successfully crossed under fire and after 
mounting the southern bank, routed Watie’s Confederates from the brush.353  
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Exploiting the hole made by the infantry, Captain Stewart and two companies of the 
Ninth Kansas maneuvered to the right of the First Kansas Colored, and encountered 
heavy fire from the enemy situated in the timber at the edge of the prairie.  Stewart 
ordered a charge against the tree line and concurrently, Lieutenant Philbrick’s C 
Company of the Ninth Kansas and Companies E, G and I of the 2nd Colorado charged the 
enemy line that was attempting to form four hundred yards from the ford, breaking it and 
precipitating a rout. All the Union cavalry joined in the pursuit, and the Confederates in 
their haste to escape became trapped at the mouth of the bayou where many bogged down 
their horses in the water and mud.  Union cavalry pursued the enemy over five miles, 
killing and dispersing Watie’s forces in all directions.  In the ensuing panic, some of 
Watie’s command attempted to swim the river and quickly found that the rocks and cliffs 
on the far side made escape very difficult.  So many men and horses died that Van Horn 
reported “a dead man or horse occasionally floated down past Fort Gibson for several 
days.”354   The Confederate forces defeated, and the Federal escort in possession of the 
crossing, the command quickly consolidated and crossed the wagons to the southern bank 
with no further opposition. 
     Federal losses for the battle amounted to less than twenty killed and fifty wounded.  
Major Foreman reported a loss is 3 killed and 30 wounded, and Williams estimated 
Federal losses at 1 killed, about 20 wounded, and Major Foreman severely wounded, and 
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Captain Earle slightly wounded in the head.  Although Williams’s attack column 
consisted of approximately 900 men packed into a very narrow frontage, his command 
mitigated their losses through artillery cannonades and accurate small arms fire.355 
      Prisoners reported the Confederate force as between 1,600 and 1,800, consisting of 
Colonel Watie and McIntosh’s Cherokee and Creek regiments, 600 men from the Fifth 
partisan rangers and Twenty-Ninth Regiment. After the battle Williams estimated 
Confederate losses at fifty killed, an unknown number of wounded, and nine prisoners.  
Confederate soldiers reported different losses, Sergeant Major Ross of the First Creek 
Mounted Volunteers tallied twenty-five killed and between thirty and forty taken 
prisoner, and Colonel Stand Watie of the First Cherokee Mounted Rifles put his losses at 
four killed with an aggregate loss of less than fifteen.  Private John Howard of the Fifth 
Texas Partisan Rangers believed that his unit lost a third of its men.  Hinton reported 
forty Confederates buried on the battlefield, and three wagons of wounded men 
evacuated the night of July 1.356 Confederate forces sustained a large number of 
casualties, the exact number difficult to estimate despite official reports, due to numbers 
lost through drowning in the Confederate retreat. 
     Comparing casualties on the basis of numbers alone belies the importance of this 
battle.  As the first battle fought by a combined force of Union white, black and Indian 
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soldiers, it served notice to the Confederates in Indian Territory that the Union was 
drawing on increasing manpower numbers, and more significantly that these racially 
disparate soldiers could fight well together against Confederate forces in Indian Territory.   
The performance of the black troops is especially worthy of comment because of their 
competency and fearlessness under fire.  The First Kansas Colored’s conduct shattered 
preconceptions of questionable worth or servile tendencies.  The First Kansas Colored 
was a fighting regiment that sought to close with and destroy the enemy. 
     Confederate dispatches failed to recognize the Union’s victory as due to fighting 
ability, and overplayed the impact of the high water in the Grand Saline River.  
Casualties tell a different tale, despite the assertion that defeat was due to failure of 
Cabell and Cooper to unite at Cabin Creek.  Watie’s force, intended to hold the train at 
Cabin Creek until it could be destroyed by an attack by Cabell from the rear, failed its 
mission.357 The setback to Confederate morale and the loss of the train constituted a 
greater loss to the Confederates than their manpower losses.  The Confederates expected 
their black and Indian foes to engage in an orgy of atrocities, but when none materialized, 
the battle became a Union propaganda victory, as well as a military one.  
     In the battle’s aftermath Captain Earle observed that the Confederates had abandoned 
their dead and wounded to the victorious Federals, a clear sign of defeat.  Despite the 
“severe” action at Cabin Creek, the First Kansas Colored did not engage in “the hellish 
passions of their race.” The Union soldiers behaved with compassion, contrary to 
Confederate expectations; Earle reported Union ambulances bringing in the wounded 
Confederates for treatment. Thomas McDaniel, a captured Confederate soldier reported 
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that after capture by soldiers of the First Kansas Colored, he received compassionate care 
from a Lieutenant of the First Kansas Colored who carried him back to camp where 
medical aid was administered.358  
     These accounts are interesting as much for the report of humane treatment, as it is for 
the absence of any mention of inhumane treatment of Confederates by the black Kansas 
soldiers.  Neither Hugh Thompson’s memoirs or Colonel Stand Watie’s report mention 
incidents of atrocities or poor treatment of Confederates by the black Kansan troops.  
Black soldiers did not become “savage” or uncontrollable in battle.  Instead, they 
demonstrated courage, compassion and competency in the face of a determined enemy.  
The soldiers of the First Kansas Colored also impressed their white and Indian 
counterparts with their steadiness courage under fire.   
     Williams received criticism from General Blunt and Colonel Phillips for his failure to 
destroy Watie’s Confederates. The failure to completely destroy or capture the 
Confederate force derived from Williams’s two conflicting imperatives, protection for the 
desperately needed wagon train or a complete enemy rout by pursuit and capture.  
Williams claimed that the wagon train escort duty prevented him from capturing the 
whole enemy force, the priority being the safe conduct of the train to Fort Gibson. Blunt 
and Phillips criticized Williams’s choice, and with the benefit of intelligence that 
revealed that Colonel Watie barely escaped and a report to General Cabell that his force 
was broken by the successful attack.  Grudgingly he acknowledged the First Kansas 
Colored’s performance, and credited them with fighting well.  Phillips and Blunt craved a 
decisive battle in which the Confederate forces in Indian Territory could be destroyed.  
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Cabin Creek failed to meet this level of effect, but carnage of the battle proved evident 
from the numbers of dead men and horses reported floating past fort Gibson in the 
following days.359  Williams chose the more prudent course of action.  The potential for a 
Confederate rout was weighed against a number of factors including increased casualties 
during the pursuit, a scattered escort command that would require time to assemble, and 
vulnerable wagons that still required multiple water crossings before they could advance 
to Fort Gibson. Time and the knowledge of additional Confederate forces in the area 
influenced Williams’s decision to hasten the train’s arrival at Fort Gibson.  Had Williams 
opted for a complete military victory, he would have imperiled the entire command, and 
offered Confederate forces on the east bank of the Grand River another opportunity to 
strike at his command. 
     A number of factors contributed to the Confederate defeat: underestimating the wagon 
train escort size, an overly complex plan that involved multiple water crossings and the 
unexpectedly high waters of all the region’s rivers, and a Confederate lack of artillery 
with which to challenge the Federal attack.360 The effect of the multiple cannonades on 
the Confederate defenders constituted a major factor in their defeat.  Watie’s 
Confederates possessed no counter-battery capability.  Historian Whit Edwards in his 
excellent volume, The Prairie was on Fire, captured this inequity and its shocking effect 
on the defenders: one howitzer reportedly fired eighty rounds during the engagement, 
while Confederate men under fire related that the artillery fired from less than one 
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hundred yards distant, so close guns hissed while being swabbed.  The thick foliage saved 
many from death by the artillery.361  Although the infantry charge broke the lines, and the 
cavalry ensured victory by preventing the Confederates from reforming their lines, it 
appears that artillery won the day.  
     The First Kansas Colored earned their victor’s laurels at Cabin Creek, and while the 
regiment marched south, additional black soldiers trained at Fort Scott.   The Second 
Kansas Colored constituted one of General Blunt’s attempts to increase his manpower 
reserves from the numbers of contraband slaves and freedmen in Kansas.  Despite his 
proved reputation as an abolitionist, Blunt also subscribed to the mores of a realist.  Black 
manpower existed in abundance in kansas, and despite the tempting high wages for black 
labor in Kansas, many blacks enlisted with alacrity.362  Although the muster of a second 
Kansas colored regiment was not guaranteed, by July, the performance of the First 
Kansas Colored served as proof that black men could fight and contribute to the Union 
cause in the West.  More disturbingly, Hinton reported that the value of Indian Regiments 
was questionable, the Indian Regiments regarded as poor fighters despite sustaining the 
Union cause in Indian Territory. General Blunt sought and received early in 1863, 
authority to raise a second colored regiment in Kansas.  Confronted with a dearth of 
white manpower and seeking additional infantry to escort wagon trains – it took over two 
hundred to escort a single wagon train to and from Fort Scott - and garrison fortifications, 
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Blunt commenced with mustering the Eighth (Colored) Kansas (soon re-designated 
Second Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry Regiment). Hinton later accepted a company 
command in the Second Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry Regiment.363  Unlike the 
tenuous early start of the First Kansas Colored, the Second Kansas Colored began with 
political and military support as part of greater Union recruiting effort across the north.  
     With the value of black soldiers demonstrated in battle against a tough and tenacious 
foe, recruiting for the new regiment reached new heights.  The demand for black soldiery 
created competition for recruits between Generals Blunt and General Ewing in Missouri.  
Ewing sought exclusive recruiting rights in Missouri, the source of the majority of the 
First Kansas Colored’s recruits and the recruiting ground for the Second Kansas.  
Ewing’s motives encompassed pacifying the bruised feelings of Missouri slave owners, 
as well as the more politically motivated desire for credit for recruits against troop levies, 
in his words, “It is desirable that the freedmen in Missouri get into the service… It will 
contribute to the peace of the district to have them recruited in Missouri rather than 
Kansas.”364 Despite his appeals, many former slaves continued to vote with their feet and 
chose Kansas.   
     The battle at Cabin Creek transcended the rivalries and bickering of Union 
commanders.  Colonel Williams recognized the performance of the racially mixed 
command in his report to Colonel Phillips with a ringing endorsement of their efforts. 
Williams proudly pointed out that the battle was fought by white and black troops and 
that “[Colonel Dodd’s men] allowed no prejudice on account of color to interfere in the 
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discharge of their duty in the face of an enemy to both races…the regiment [1st Kansas] 
evinced a coolness and true soldierly spirit,” which engendered “confidence which 
subsequent battle scenes satisfactorily proved was not unfounded.”365 The First Kansas 
Colored proved to white Union witnesses that despite Livingston’s guerrilla warfare, and 
expectations of poor performance by white compatriots that the First Kansas Colored was 
a courageous and skilled regiment.  Their following battles continued to demonstrate that 
combat performance created acceptance amongst white Union regiments, and the 
regiment’s soldiers proved their dedication to the Union through their blood, sweat and 
unflagging service.   
     The First Kansas Colored proved its worth in battle.  The months of desertions and 
privation yielded to the stinging tang of gunpowder and the visceral grip of combat.  The 
Emancipation Proclamation freed them from their bonds, but donning the Union blue 
uniform made them men.  Their officers proved their dedication as well, uncertainty 
giving way to faith in their soldiers, and their common desire to defeat the slaveholding 
Confederate armies. However, success in one full-fledged battle did not guarantee that 
blacks would be treated as equals, and as such many potential black recruits continued to 
decline enlistment. The regiment’s bitter experience in Kansas lingered in black Kansans’ 
memories, and rather than join the established regiment, most new recruits flocked to the 
Second Kansas Colored Infantry. 
     The long road from social experiment to soldier left many blacks wary of military 
service for the efforts of black soldiers continued to be ignored in contrast to their white 
contemporaries.  The First Kansas Colored experienced the gamut of white hatred 
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starting with unconcealed disgust and opposition, even from Kansan abolitionists, and 
bore the scars of Southern opposition on the regiment’s muster rolls.  The names of 
deceased black soldiers who fell in battle or from disease populated the regiment’s rolls, 
and served as silent testimony to their willingness to seize the opportunity to strike off the 
bonds of slavery despite few guarantees of success.  The First Kansas entered Indian 
Territory as the vanguard of Kansas Colored regiments, and as the regiment marched 
south to Fort Gibson, its place in the Union order of battle appeared secure.  The next 
several months of campaigning in Indian Territory would test the regiment against new 
enemies and gain for it additional laurels 
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Chapter Five 
“Bravery and Coolness Unsurpassed” 
 
     The Union victory at Cabin Creek and the successful entry of the wagon train into 
Fort Gibson heralded a new phase to the Union war effort in Indian Territory.  Arrival of 
the escort significantly increased the manpower, especially infantry, available to the 
Union command at Fort Gibson.  The two-day battle at Cabin Creek had tested the 
regiment against a variety of opponents: Colonel Stand Watie’s Indian troops, white 
Union soldiers’ prejudices, and any unspoken doubts First Kansas Colored soldiers and 
officers harbored about their own ability.  Cabin Creek demonstrated that the First 
Kansas Colored’s time spent in drill and extensive arms practice paid dividends in battle.  
Perhaps the best compliment paid to the regiment came from the lips of a white 
cavalryman belonging to a regiment to which Senator Lane once had offered black men 
as servants for the failed Indian Expedition of 1862.  An officer of the veteran Third 
Wisconsin Cavalry commented in his official report, “I never believed in niggers before, 
but by Jasus [sp], they are hell for fighting.”366  The regiment proved its worth in such a 
manner that naysayers could no longer with complete confidence deride the ability of 
black soldiers in battle.  Although critics attributed success to the regiment’s white 
officers, the regiment could no longer be regarded as a social experiment of dubious 
value.   
     The battle of Cabin Creek welded the soldiers and officers of the regiment into a 
coherent unit.  Leadership in battle required officers to demonstrate courage and to 
                                                
366 Dudley T. Cornish, The Sable Arm: Black Troops in the Union Army, 1861-1865 (Lawrence, Kansas: 
University Press of Kansas, 1987), 147. 
 
 
187 
 
inspire their men to greater exertions on the field of battle.  Colonel Williams did so 
twice during the battle, and exhibited bravery bordering on fanaticism when he attempted 
to ford Cabin Creek after the repulsed Union cavalry failed to reach the southern bank.  
Williams’s concern for his men had been made clear prior to this battle, but combat 
served as the ultimate test of commitment.  Other officers exhibited bravery as well. 
Captain Earle of Company F, leading from the front, suffered a head wound.  Captain 
Armstrong and his artillery crew performed skillfully, receiving recognition for their 
bravery during the battle.  In sum, the regiment earned a reputation for gallantry and 
determination from the white units that fought alongside it in battle. 
     The wagon train brought essential supplies to Fort Gibson, but the most noticeable 
aspect was the arrival blue uniformed black soldiers of the First Kansas Colored.  The 
regiment’s soldiers went into camp inside the fortifications, and immediately created a 
stir amongst the refugees and white garrison, with each group noting different 
characteristics of the black infantrymen.  White observers marked the soaring morale of 
the regiment’s soldiers and their high level of proficiency in drill. Wiley Britton 
approached some of the regiment’s soldiers and after several conversations reported that 
the black infantry seemed eager for further combat against their Confederate foes.  They 
held no illusions about combat, however; Britton recalled that the black soldiers with 
whom he spoke reacted stoically to the Confederate desire to punish the blacks that 
entered Union service, declaring that as much white as black blood would be shed. The 
soldiers impressed Britton with their skill at drill and soldierly appearance. Britton 
postulated that their predominantly Missouri upbringings made them superior to 
plantation slaves in intelligence, traits that translated well to performance in battle.  Their 
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arms appeared equally formidable, an improved model of musket with which most 
possessed great proficiency.367  The First Kansas Colored presented the appearance and 
mannerisms of a veteran regiment prepared for war. 
     Britton, as did other contemporary white observers, shared many of the prevailing 
suppositions about black physiognomy.  Characterized as “strongly built and equal to 
whites in size,” Britton concluded black soldiers would bear up better under climactic 
conditions encountered in the south climates than would white soldiers. He emphasized 
the value of their physical endurance and greater resistance to disease to the Union cause.  
What made blacks good slaves, Britton asserted, would make them great soldiers.368  His 
knowledge of the recent victory at Cabin Creek may have influenced these observations.   
The First Kansas Colored also inspired black refugees, and within a week of its 
arrival, recruits from the refugee population began to fill the regiment’s ranks.   Although 
Company I already listed fourteen soldiers originating from Fort Gibson on the company 
rolls, between June 27, 1863 and July 12, 1863 the regiment recruited an additional 
fifteen soldiers from Fort Gibson.369  The regiment eagerly welcomed the new recruits, for 
they replaced deserters and wounded personnel. 
      The regiment arrived at Fort Gibson at a time when Union and Confederate fortunes 
in the theater hinged on securing the loyalty of the local Indian nations and achieving 
logistical dominance.  The situation at Fort Gibson impressed itself deeply on 
contemporary witnesses, who reported huge numbers of refugees – Indian and black - 
congregating in the vicinity of the fort.  Colonel Phillips fed the refugees from his 
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military rations, and his cavalry endeavored to protect them against Confederate raids. 
Earlier in the war the fort had played host to many blacks and Confederate soldiers, so 
many that Rachel Ward, a contemporary slave observer, noted that slaves were 
everywhere living in shelters built from cloth scraps or in riverbank burrows.   Food was 
scarce, shelter almost non-existent, and security tenuous at all times. Fort Gibson, a one 
and a half square mile area, supported an estimated three thousand soldiers and six 
thousand refugees.370  The failed policies and promises by both the Union and 
Confederacy subjected many refugees to horrible conditions.  The fort’s dense population 
arose from refugees’ inability to farm or establish homes without constant attacks from 
Confederate partisans. 
     Large numbers of pro-Union Indians occupied the immediate vicinity of Fort Gibson.  
These unfortunate refugees were suffering because of Federal efforts to repatriate the 
Indian tribes before Union forces could guarantee their safety.  As a result of guerrilla 
raids, many sought the safety of the fort despite its unhealthy climate. Among refugee 
black groups, family ties may have ameliorated the situation at Fort Gibson.  Historian 
Clarissa Confer has cited the narratives of former slaves as evidence that former refugees 
serving in the First Kansas Colored [may have] shared their rations with their families at 
Fort Gibson.   The additional calories provided by ration sharing raised immune systems 
enough for family members to weather the disease outbreaks that swept through the 
unhygienic and densely packed camps of the refugees.371 Black refugees possessed few 
alternatives to the meager shelter of Fort Gibson.  Many had been brought to the fort by 
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Union forces in the fall of 1862, and then left to fend for themselves through the winter 
and spring.  Their options were few.  Returning to former masters after Union liberation 
appeared a far worse alternative than patiently waiting for conditions to improve as a 
result of ultimate Union victory.   
     The First Kansas Colored’s arrival with the Union wagon train on July 5, 1863 
occurred just a week before the arrival of General Blunt on July 11 with the remainder of 
his Army of the Frontier.  Blunt left Kansas on July 6, 1863 accompanied by companies 
of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry Regiment, Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry Regiment, Third 
Wisconsin Cavalry Regiment and the Second Kansas Battery.  Recognizing the danger 
inherent in the gathering Confederate forces south of Fort Gibson, and the need for 
offensive action to break up the commands of Confederate Generals Cooper, Cabell and 
Steele, Blunt swung into action.        
      Blunt pugnaciously sought to attack his enemy’s weak points, and developed a 
strategy to defeat his enemies in detail before they could mass forces against Fort Gibson.  
Assembly of the Army of the Frontier signaled his intent to crush the Confederates in 
Indian Territory and, if possible, achieve the occupation of Fort Smith in Arkansas.  
Therefore Blunt’s first priority before attempting the capture of the strategically located 
Fort Smith would be to defeat the separate commands composing General William 
Steele’s army before they could unite and gain an advantage in numbers and weaponry 
that could force him into defensive operations.  His operations highly constrained by 
logistics and the availability of fodder, Blunt may have believed that the Confederates 
would attempt to gather forces from across Indian Territory and western Arkansas and 
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attack him early in the summer campaign season before grass and water curtailed cavalry 
movements.  His instinct to attack first proved correct.   
General William Steele was alarmed by the change in military affairs in Indian 
Territory, and on July 10, he wrote Major Francis Blair, the Assistant Adjutant General of 
the Confederate District of Arkansas to convey alarm concerning Blunt’s arrival in Indian 
Territory.  Steele feared that the weakened state of his command and their lack of artillery 
made it vulnerable to Federal attack. Steele also wrote Texan Brigadier General Smith 
Bankhead for aid and emphasized the high stakes involved if a Federal army should 
defeat his forces: “ The instant Indian country is overrun most of the tribes now friendly 
will be against us… They are, most of them, little value as soldiers, but they are better as 
friends than enemies.”372  Indian defections and the destruction of the buffer zone 
between Fort Gibson and Texas constituted the main prizes of the 1863 summer 
campaigns in Indian Territory. 
     Before Blunt could force his foes to battle, he needed to reorganize his forces and 
affect a successful crossing of the heavily defended Arkansas River ford sites.  Blunt 
immediately ordered the construction of three ferries to support a river crossing, and on 
the basis of intelligence reported by his spies, mobilized his entire command at Fort Blunt 
to attack Confederate forces south of the Arkansas River.  The First Kansas Colored, 
along with the Indian Home Guard Regiments and Second Colorado Infantry, fell under 
the command of Colonel William R. Judson of the First Brigade of General Blunt’s Army 
of the Frontier.373 The First Kansas Colored went into battle as part of a multi-racial, ad 
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hoc brigade that with the exception of the Second Colorado Infantry, comprised a force 
of groups considered previously by whites as racially inferior.   
     General Blunt’s Army consisted of a cavalry-heavy collection of regiments estimated 
to total nearly three thousand soldiers.  Amongst the regiments of his command Blunt 
numbered the three Indian Home Guard regiments from Fort Gibson, two Kansas artillery 
batteries – commanded by Smith and Hopkins--the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, the First 
Kansas Colored and Second Colorado regiments.  Against them Blunt faced Confederate 
regiments under the command of General Douglas Cooper, a force composed of veteran 
Cherokee, Creek and Choctaw Indian regiments and Texas cavalry, with one artillery 
battery in support.   While Blunt prepared his command, Cooper concentrated his forces 
around the supply depot at Honey Springs.  Their defensive strategy rested on the 
anticipated arrival of General Cabell from Arkansas with a force sufficient to defeat 
Blunt.   
     General Blunt refused to surrender the initiative to the Confederate forces and in 
typically aggressive decision marched his units from Fort Blunt with the intent of forcing 
battle before Cabell’s forces from Arkansas could join with Cooper’s army. Blunt 
identified the Confederate depot at Honey Springs as his first objective Defeating the 
Confederate forces piecemeal provided Blunt with the ability to use his smaller numbers 
against a numerically superior but logistically less strong foe before the Confederates 
could concentrate against his army at Fort Blunt.   
The depot at Honey Springs contained armaments, supplies and forage that could 
sustain a Confederate drive north; therefore, Blunt’s strategy encompassed several 
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objectives.374  Blunt sought to destroy Cooper’s army, scatter his Indian troops, and break 
their resolve to support the Confederacy, and deny General Steele the advantage of 
numbers.  Blunt also sought to force Steele’s raiders away from the Union supply line 
along the Texas Road from Fort Scott.  If successful, Blunt would ensure a secure route 
for supplies and reinforcements to further his conquest of Indian Territory.  
     Blunt began his expedition with a lightning fast series of movements by scouts 
followed by a crossing of the Arkansas River.  The period between July 11, 1863 and 
July 15, 1863 gave Blunt time to provision his troops and prepare them for battle.  After 
Blunt’s advance scout of two hundred and fifty cavalry and four pieces of artillery drove 
back Cooper’s pickets from their Arkansas River rifle pits, the remainder of the Army of 
the Frontier crossed the Grand River.  By late evening July 16, 1863, the army, composed 
mostly of his Indian regiments and the First Kansas Colored, was on the south bank of 
the Grand River.  Key to his plans for the campaign against the Confederate forces was 
bringing along the artillery batteries in the river crossing The Union army crossed Elk 
Creek on the night of July 16, and commenced a punishing night march.  The river 
crossings were not without incident, for the Second Indian Home guards lost three men 
drowned in the crossing and Private Henry Pippins, a teamster of the First Kansas 
Colored, died while attempting to cross his wagon over Elk Creek.375  Blunt’s timetable 
brooked no pauses, and his command pushed onward toward the Confederate depot at 
Honey Spring.  
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     Blunt’s cavalry probed the Confederate lines and drove off Confederate advance 
pickets on the morning of July 17, forcing them to the timbered south bank of Elk Creek 
where the main body of Cooper’s army awaited the Union forces.  In preparation for the 
coming battle, Blunt conducted a reconnaissance of the Confederate lines that revealed 
concealed defensive positions of approximately one and a half miles in length on the 
south bank of Elk River. Unsure of the location of the Confederate artillery, and taking 
fire from Confederate infantry, Blunt terminated his reconnaissance and ordered his 
command to halt behind a ridge located about a half mile from the Confederate lines.  
During the two-hour pause, his weary soldiers took advantage of this halt to rest and eat 
from their haversacks. Captain Earle, Company F, First Kansas Colored’s commander, 
had recovered from his wound at Cabin Creek and in his memoirs offered useful 
observations at this point in the Army of the Frontier’s timeline.  The First Kansas 
Colored departed Fort Blunt at 4:00 P.M. on July 16, 1863, and the men marched until 
midnight.  After a short four-hour rest, the march continued in severe rain for another 
four hours.  All told the regiment marched for nearly twelve hours, crossed two water 
barriers, and arrived at the battlefield of Honey Springs at 9:00 A.M on July 17. 376   This 
impressive night march occurred in conjunction with multiple unit movements, and 
Blunt’s insistence on speed ensured his force would not be divided by rivers as had been 
the Confederate forces at Cabin Creek.  Arriving with a united combined arms force at 
Honey Springs ensured Blunt possessed maximum combat power for the battle ahead. 
     While Blunt paused briefly to conduct a reconnaissance of the battlefield and to read 
the terrain upon which his Army would fight, the First Kansas Colored took advantage of 
the lull to rest and eat, anticipating rations from their regimental trains.  Instead, Earle 
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discovered the wagons containing rations and much of the ammunition became lost 
during the river crossing.  The soldiers of the First Kansas Colored breakfasted on one 
hardtack cracker per man; the Regiment would fight hungry.  However, the weather 
favored battle, as the rain stopped and the skies cleared.  Assembled in line of battle by 
10:00 A.M. the regiment stood ready to engage their Confederate foes in battle.377  The 
rain, fatigue, hunger, and anticipation of battle did little to dull the Regiment’s ardor, and 
it occupied a place of honor near the center of General Blunt’s lines. 
      Union dispositions before the battle reflected Blunt’s confidence in the First Kansas 
Colored’s ability to withstand the full fury of pitched battle against an experienced and 
determined foe. Before the battle, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Moonlight, General 
Blunt’s Chief of Staff, climbed atop a farmhouse roof to scan the Confederate lines.  His 
reconnaissance revealed a brush-choked battlefield that favored both sides, for while 
initially hiding the Confederates; it also prevented them from spotting the advancing 
columns before they closed the distance between the two armies to one hundred yards.378  
The First Kansas Colored maneuvered to the right center of the Union line to provide 
support for Captain Smith’s artillery, directly opposite the Confederate battery. Blunt 
posted the Second Indian Home Guard in columns to the rear of the regiment.  Colonel 
Williams rose to the challenge and offered the soldiers of the regiment a martial pep talk, 
enjoining the soldiers to “keep cool and not fire until given the command.  In all cases 
aim deliberately and below the waist.”379   These words carried an underlying command 
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to the regiment to remain disciplined in battle, and resist the temptation to break ranks, or 
in the excitement of battle to fire wildly at the enemy.  The individual soldiers’ cartridge  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Map 4: The Battle of Honey Springs380 
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 boxes regiment’s contained the only ammunition available –about forty rounds - and 
they would be fighting an experienced enemy that outnumbered Union forces almost two 
to one.  Every shot must count. 
   The battle began with a cannonade from the Union guns; Blunt sought to locate the 
Confederate batteries and break Confederate morale before ordering his infantry into 
combat.  While the regiment’s soldiers watched the enemy, ten minutes elapsed while 
Union artillery shelled the Confederate lines, guns thundering away as Union troops 
monitored their opposite number.  General Blunt, as prelude to the infantry attack, 
personally ordered Williams to take the Confederate guns at bayonet point if opportunity 
presented. Williams in turn grimly ordered his men through clenched teeth to fix 
bayonets, as “there was work to do.”  The regiment moved to the right of a two-howitzer 
section of Captain Smith’s guns, three hundred yards from the Confederates.  A number 
of rounds of canister and shell raked the Confederate positions in the brush, and under 
covering fire, the regiment advanced to within fifty-two yards of the enemy, the point in 
the battlefield where Colonel Moonlight recalls seeing a rail fence.381  
     While the Second Colorado engaged Confederates on their left, Williams commanded 
his men to fire upon the Confederates to their front at the same time the enemy delivered 
their own volley.  Williams intended the regiment to take the Confederate battery, but 
before he could communicate his (and Blunt’s) intent to his command, Williams 
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sustained wounds in the chest, face and hands.382  Unaware of Williams’ intent, at this 
time Bowles lost the opportunity to order, “charge bayonet,” and take the Confederate 
guns.  Concurrently, skirmishers from the Second Indian Home Guard entered the timber 
and in doing so, passed between the First Kansas and the Twentieth and Twenty Ninth 
Texas, forcing a temporary halt while Bowles ordered the Indians to fall back.  Perhaps 
confused, the Twenty-Ninth Texas advanced upon what they perceived to be a retreating 
First Kansas Colored, and their ranks shuddered when the regiment loosed a volley of 
buck and ball from a distance of twenty-five yards.  The wounding of the Texans’ 
regimental commander, Colonel DeMorse precipitated a collapse of the Confederate 
lines, and the First Kansas Colored pressed forward.  Seeing the Twentieth Texas rally 
behind its colors, Bowles ordered a second volley that dropped the colors and routed the 
Confederates.383  Their colors abandoned, and their lines routed, the Confederates fled to 
the safety of a cornfield and the Confederate lines beyond. 
     Bowles learned of Williams’s wounding several minutes after the start of the action, 
and assumed command of the regiment as Williams left the field.  Under his command, 
the First Kansas Colored pressed forward and at one point of the battle part of the 
regiment rescued a company of the Second Colorado that the Confederates “gobbled up” 
or captured.  Grateful for the rescue and the regiment’s strong support during the battle, 
after the battle the Second Colorado Infantry’s soldiers changed their opinion of the First 
Kansas Colored, and despite treating the First Kansas with contempt at Fort Scott, 
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insisted after Honey Spring “If we are going into a fight give us the niggers.”384  The First 
Kansas continued its attack and pursued the routed enemy to a cornfield.  Stymied by the 
“nature of the ground,” Bowles ordered the First Kansas back to the Union lines.385 The 
Regiment temporarily occupied in regrouping, the dismounted Second Indian Home 
Guard regiment swept across the First Kansas Colored’s front. 
     Impatient to carry the battle to the enemy, and perhaps claim honors for his regiment, 
the Second Indian Home Guard repeatedly entered the First Kansas Colored’s battle 
space.  Lieutenant Colonel Schuarte of the Second Indian Home Guard sent word to 
Bowles that he would pass forward with his regiment, and in doing so his soldiers 
claimed the colors of the Twenty-Ninth Texas.  Feeling cheated by this act, officers and 
men from the First Kansas Colored shouted and criticized the Second Indian, and asked 
permission to break ranks to retrieve the colors.  Permission denied, Bowles demurred 
and after receiving orders from Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Moonlight, Blunt’s Chief of 
Staff, resumed the advance for another three miles, skirmishing occasionally with the 
retreating enemy.  The First Kansas Colored terminated combat operations when ordered 
into bivouac near the ford on Elk Creek at 7:00 P.M.386 The day concluded with the 
regiment victorious and the Army of the Frontier in possession of the battlefield.  
     Bowles offered a recapitulation of the Regiment’s manpower at the start and end of 
the battle: the Regiment entered with five hundred men and lost two killed and thirty 
wounded.  Company C sustained two killed, and the wounded represented almost all 
companies of the regiment, Company A sustaining three wounded, D and F one wounded 
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apiece, E suffered eleven wounded, Company H two wounded, J eight wounded, K three, 
and unassigned troops sustained two.  Many of the severely wounded soldiers sustained 
head, thigh, and chest wounds.  No back wounds were reported. Lieutenant Colonel 
Bowles bestowed effusive praise upon his soldiers and officers, characterizing their 
performance as “noble” and the men “cool as veterans, vying with one another in the 
performance of their duty.”387  Once again the soldiers of the First Kansas Colored fought 
like men, fighting and dying with their face to the enemy, and in defiance of Confederate 
racial beliefs.  The First Kansas successfully broke the Twenty-Ninth Texas on the field 
of battle, and despite the Second Indian Home Guard seizing the Confederate colors, 
claimed victory in a battle in which the Union forces entered outnumbered by an enemy 
that fought from prepared ground.   
     As the sounds of battle faded away, and the victorious Federal forces returned from 
their pursuit to police the battlefield, Colonel Williams endured treatment under the 
regimental surgeon, Samuel Harrington.  General Blunt visited Williams in the field 
hospital, and according to Wiley Britton, Williams immediately asked Blunt, “How did 
my regiment fight?”  The General is reported to have responded, “Like veterans, most 
gallantly.”  Williams then reportedly added, “I am ready to die then.”388  Williams did not 
die, but his wounds required time to heal.  Command of the regiment devolved to 
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Lieutenant Colonel John Bowles.  In short order Colonel Williams’s wounded joined him 
in the hospital for treatment, and the Colonel received validation that his once-despised, 
and poorly regarded, soldiers proved themselves again in battle.   
     Press reports after the battle generously heaped laurels on Blunt’s command.  The 
New York Times emphasized the Confederate position as “very strong,” and the 
impressive spoils of the battle.  Despite Confederate efforts to deny the contents of their 
storehouses to Blunt’s army, the army of the frontier captured four hundred stand of 
arms, quantities of foodstuffs, and an ambulance.  The Times article estimated the Union 
loss at twelve killed and thirty-six wounded, and the Confederate losses at between one 
hundred twenty-five and two hundred killed, seventy-five wounded and one hundred 
prisoners.  Blunt reported different tolls from the battle.  His forces sustained seventeen  
killed and sixty wounded; the enemy sustained one hundred and fifty killed and buried on 
the battlefield, four hundred wounded, and seventy-seven prisoners.  The Confederate 
loss in materiel consisted of the Twenty-Ninth Texas cavalry’s colors, a piece of artillery, 
two hundred stand of arms, and fifteen wagons.389 Confederate figures also differed and 
offered a much higher estimate of Federal losses, perhaps in compensation for Cooper’s 
poor performance.  
     Following his defeat, Brigadier General Cooper differed from Blunt in his casualty 
figures and counted his as one hundred thirty-four killed and forty- seven prisoners, while 
estimating Federal losses at two hundred.390  The Confederate army under Cooper, despite 
its low casualties, suffered defeat at the hands of a composite Federal force that included 
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black soldiers.  Although many escaped injury in battle, many white southern soldiers did 
not forget their defeat at the hands of former slaves, a much greater victory for the men of 
the First Kansas Colored. 
          Casualties from the battle offer one measure of Federal performance at the 
regimental level.  The First Kansas Colored sustained the greatest casualties on the Union 
side, a testament to the fierce close-range fighting that brought down both side’s 
regimental commanders.  The First Kansas Colored fought with bravery and skill, and its 
performance at Honey Springs earned the undying enmity of the Twenty-Ninth Texas, 
and the praise of the Army of the Frontier’s commander, General Blunt.  Blunt 
shepherded the regiment from its beginning in Kansas and its performance vindicated his 
faith in their utility to the Union cause.  Blunt proved unstinting in his praise, and his 
report commended the regiment as unsurpassed, their bravery and coolness evident 
during the “hottest part of the fight,” the regiment routing twice its number in 
Confederate troops.  Blunt declared it “invidious to make particular mention of any one 
where all did their duty so well.”391 Blunt did not single out individual men, but his pride 
in the First Kansas Colored’s performance rang out clearly. 
     Colonel Williams also demonstrated pride in his regiment.  In a report written shortly 
after the battle Williams expressed his sentiments in harsh terms.  Williams believed that 
the Confederates “received a lesson, which in my opinion taught them not to despise on 
the battlefield, a race they had long tyrannized over as having no rights which a white 
man was bound to respect…this race had a right to kill traitors and this day proved their 
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capacity.”392 The regiment took forty prisoners, and a stand of colors, vindication in 
Williams’s eyes of the regiment’s training and martial spirit.  It is a testimony Williams’s 
character that when wounded the first words he spoke to General Blunt concerned his 
men and their performance. 
      Despite the regiment’s outstanding performance in battle, some white Kansans 
retained their belief that black soldiers could in no way excel white soldiers in battle.  
The Fort Scott Union Monitor carried the opinion that although General Blunt believed 
black soldiers made the best soldiers under his command, such soldiers could never 
surpass white Kansans.  The Monitor held forth that blacks could be better machines than 
whites, easily trained and disciplined.393  Rather than admit black élan and skill, the paper 
made them into machines, and thus neutralized their humanity to explain their superior 
performances.  Mindless black automatons defeated their Confederate foes, not black 
men capable of independent thought and action.  This opinion fails to account for the 
additional challenges facing black soldiers and their officers, namely the threat of 
annihilation if defeated, and the effect on black Kansan if their regiment suffered in 
battle.  The battle constituted as much a victory for black communities across Kansas as a 
victory for the Army of the Frontier. 
     The First Kansas Colored fought against an enemy committed to destroying the 
regiment.  Confederate General Kirby Smith and others supported a policy that opposed 
taking black soldiers prisoners, and the Confederate Congress on January 12, 1863 made 
it clear that black soldiers and their officers could expect no quarter.394 A slave of a 
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Twenty-Ninth Texas officer claimed that few “Southern officers believed that colored 
soldiers would fight and could be captured simply by marching up to the men.”395  This 
supposition proved very wrong, and to the credit of the soldiers of the First Kansas 
Colored, despite discovering five hundred pairs of shackles intended for the regiment’s 
black soldiers, after the battle no mistreatment of Confederate prisoners or wounded 
occurred.  Colonel Moonlight claimed that the black soldiers, “grinned ear to ear when 
sighting their old companions, the shackles.”396  Black humanity defied Confederate 
inhumanity and the empty shackles proved the soldiers of the First Kansas Colored would 
not surrender against those that denied their place as soldiers and men.  Rather than admit 
a quality difference between the two opponents, Confederate apologists offered up 
differing reasons for their defeat, among them inadequacies in armaments and the three to 
one advantage in Union artillery. 
     One reason for the Confederate line’s collapse may have been the poor quality 
gunpowder available for their weapons, and the fouling caused by rain.  General Cooper 
believed his Choctaw Indians retreated because of the ineffectiveness of their firearms 
and worthless ammunition, and demoralized, fled across the Canadian River.  
Conversely, according to Captain George West of the Second Colorado, at least some of 
the Confederates fought the battle armed with 1862 pattern Enfield rifles.397 Abel does not 
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address the disparity of firearm quality between the two forces, but it played a significant 
role nonetheless.  Federal Springfield rifles and carbines shot farther and more accurately 
than Confederate shotguns and older models of muskets, despite Enfield rifles being in 
evidence.398 However the ultimate measure of combat effectiveness can be measured in 
the soldiers’ performance at close quarters. 
     Armaments aside, the extremely short engagement distance offers another, more 
conclusive reason for the Confederate collapse.  The Twenty-Ninth Texas advanced 
precipitously, and the First Kansas’s resolve in the face of the Confederate attack proved 
the winning factor. The mixed Confederate cavalry armaments were unsuitable for 
bayonets, and the bayonet charge of the First Kansas Colored presented the Texans with 
cold steel, precipitating a rout because the Confederate forces possessed no similar arm, 
or reserves of either manpower or morale.  The First Kansas Colored’s soldiers fought 
with fury knowing their foes sought not merely to defeat them, but also intended to take 
no prisoners. Additional signs of the regiment’s professionalism can be discerned from 
their adherence to orders despite other Federal regiments crossing their lines, and the 
regiment’s steadfastness in their pursuit of the enemy.  After the battle the soldiers of the 
First Kansas Colored reaped rewards of a humble variety, taking solace in rations and 
rest. 
      The Regiment found additional rewards amongst the Confederate stores, quickly 
sated their hunger on captured meat and bread, then returned to the battlefield where it 
camped for the night.  On the following day, details buried over a hundred Confederates 
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before the order to return to Fort Blunt recalled the Union forces.  Hampered by short 
rations and low ammunition, the Army of the Frontier stayed at Honey Springs briefly, 
the last units to leave the battlefield the field hospitals where wounded rested before 
transport back to Fort Gibson.399 The threat of General Cabell’s newly arrived Arkansas 
Confederate army, although not cited as a significant factor in the New York Times 
article, may have also compelled Blunt to retire to Fort Blunt.  Fighting a second 
Confederate army with short ammunition doubtless appealed little to Blunt.  Although the 
Federal regiments all fought well, The Times’ correspondent praised the Second Colorado 
and First Kansas Colored in particular, and then pressed for a movement toward the Red 
River where it was hypothesized numbers of colored regiments could be recruited.400  The 
Union victory maintained the Union army’s initiative in Indian Territory and opened the 
door to Fort Smith, Arkansas. 
     Confederate General William Steele attempted to downplay the defeat at Honey 
Springs, reporting Cooper’s losses in killed, wounded or missing at less than two 
hundred.401  Steele comprehended the magnitude of the morale defeat at Honey Springs, 
and appreciated that two successive defeats of Indian troops by Blunt’s forces affected 
their resolve.   However, he still possessed significant non-Indian resources with which to 
oppose Blunt.  The Union victory at Honey Springs did not in itself constitute cause for 
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despair, but when coupled with Confederate defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the 
South appeared on the verge of defeat in the west.  One Texan wrote of the fears of slave 
insurrection and worse treatment “A deplorable future is in state for us…woes, arrests, 
wretchedness…rape, rapine and disgrace…every crime ever perpetrated on earth will 
soon be the fate of the Lone Star State.”402  Union victory in Indian Territory exposed 
Texas to invasion from the north, and losing control of Indian Territory threatened Texas 
with a two-pronged Union invasion from the north (Kansas) and south (Louisiana).403  
Civilians feared Union victory and expected the worst from their slaves and blue-coated 
black Union soldiers.  Many slave owners moved their slaves to Texas when Union 
forces occupied Little Rock, Arkansas, and their “property” now appeared on the verge of 
liberation. 
     General Blunt’s designs on Indian Territory and northern Texas did encompass the 
possibility of tapping into Texas’ large numbers of slaves.  Blunt believed that manpower 
for a black army could be readily recruited in Texas, and by July 1863 possessed two 
Colored Regiments to buttress his beliefs. Besides the First Kansas Colored, the Second 
Kansas Colored, recruiting in Kansas, grew to five companies by July, 1863, and Richard 
Hinton postulated before the battle of Honey Springs that manpower to complete the 
regiment could be provided by a successful raid south of Fort Gibson.  Hinton 
relentlessly reiterated this belief in successive stories throughout July, and after Honey 
Springs Blunt’s desire for a black army, and the fall of Fort Smith both appeared viable.404 
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Unlike many of the political officers of the District of the Missouri and the District of 
Kansas, Hinton and Blunt shared a legacy that reached back to John Brown.  A decisive 
victory by Blunt could resurrect Brown’s dream of a black army to liberate their brethren 
in the secessionist states.  When General Blunt retired back to Fort Gibson to plan his 
next move, in part motivated by illness, Hinton exhorted him to take the field again.  
Hinton believed that if Blunt remained at Fort Gibson that the general would lose the 
initiative and be forced to fight at a disadvantage or surrender.405  Hinton’s manic 
excitement over the victory at Honey Springs failed to take into account many factors that 
forced Blunt into action, and a month elapsed before the general again pursued his 
Confederate foes.   
     The Union victory at Honey Springs constituted a great military and morale victory 
for the Union, and proved the value of the black infantry of the First Kansas Colored.  
The regiment, with the exception of some of the wounded that remained at Honey 
Springs with the field hospital, returned to Fort Gibson on July 19, 1863.  Fort Gibson 
could not support the regiment in conjunction with the rest of the Army of the Frontier, 
so the First Kansas Colored took up quarters at Fort Davis, a former Confederate fort 
located south of the Arkansas River near the junction with Grand River. 
     The army of the frontier granted the First Kansas Colored no time to refit its 
companies, or assess its fitness.  As a battle-proven infantry unit its soldiers soon 
received orders to detach nearly half of the regiment, Companies B, E, G and I, to 
positions on the Verdigris River eight miles northwest of Fort Blunt.406  The detachment 
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provided Blunt with pickets that could be relied upon to watch for any river crossing 
attempts by Colonel Stand Watie’s guerrillas, or incursions by Missouri-based guerrilla 
bands such as those officered by Livingston and Coffee.  Blunt’s employment of the 
regiment as pickets instead of working as laborers on static defenses reflected growing 
recognition of the regiment as a fighting regiment that sought battle and scorned manual 
labor.  The infantry permitted Blunt to rest his sorely tested cavalry, and especially the 
campaign ravaged horses.  The requirements for wagon train escorts demanded cavalry, 
as did scouting operations against Confederate forces, and exhausted horses could not fill 
those roles without adequate rest.   
     The First Kansas Colored constituted a valuable resource for Blunt’s recruiting efforts 
and the general wasted little time detailing officers and men as recruiters for the Second 
Kansas Colored Infantry Regiment.  Less than a week after Honey Springs, Second 
Lieutenant Topping of Company F, and Second Lieutenant Johnson of Company I 
received orders to raise companies for the Second Kansas Colored.  Soldiers also 
received orders to assist the recruiting process, Private Curtiss and Private Louis Moore 
of Company F accompanying Lieutenant Topping and Lieutenant Johnson respectively.  
Lieutenant Overdear followed shortly, ordered to repeat to Fort Scott for the purpose of 
arresting deserters.  As officers departed the regiment, the regimental headquarters 
received a Regimental Hospital Steward, Robert Gibbons.407 The detailing of officers did 
not significantly interfere with regimental operations, and the troops at Camp Davis 
experienced a significant increase in regulation for their daily lives. 
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     Garrison life soon presented soldiers and their non-commissioned officers with the 
dual challenges and opportunities of a stable environment.  Discipline became Lieutenant 
Colonel Bowles’s focus for the regiment, and by the end of July two Sergeants of the 
regiment returned to the ranks as Privates after being reduced for disobedience, 
incompetence, gambling, and conduct unbecoming a soldier.  Private Charles Whittaker 
of Company B endured the shaving of half of his head and a humiliating march before the 
battalion dress parade, as well as ten days hard labor for stealing.408  Garrison life required 
structure and Bowles ordered drill for every day except Saturday and Sunday, Company 
drill commenced at 9:00 A.M. and continued to 11:00 A.M., then Battalion drill filled the 
hours between 2:00 P.M. and 4:00 P.M.  Colonel William further modified these 
instructions by requiring companies to fall out under arms and conduct roll call at 
reveille. Officers also received specific instruction regarding the training of soldiers as 
sentinels and saluting.409  Garrison life and field required different behaviors from 
soldiers, and much as Colonel Williams spent several weeks attending to the discipline of 
his soldiers at Fort Scott, so did Lieutenant Colonel Bowles at Camp Davis. 
     The First Kansas Colored drilled and reestablished discipline for several weeks, then 
traveled marched south on August 22, 1863 as part of General Blunt’s campaign against 
the Confederate forces of Generals Steele and Cabell at Perryville in the Choctaw Nation, 
and Fort Smith in Arkansas. The soldiers marched with minimal equipment, their 
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knapsacks loaded with ten day’s rations and no more shelter than a blanket and a rubber 
sheet.  Captain Earle described the expedition as a “forced march,” of over two hundred 
and twenty miles, and eight days with little combat exposure bar the brief cannonading of 
less than a company of the regiment’s soldiers. The regiment then marched back to Fort 
Gibson, arriving on August 31, 1863.  Their former regimental camp at Fort Davis 
occupied by other Union troops, the regiment set up Camp Williams not far from Fort 
Davis.410  The regiment’s absence from Fort Gibson delayed news of a horrendous deed 
that deeply affected all Kansans, and injected an element of fear into lives largely 
insulated from the ravages of guerrilla warfare along the border.   
Quantrill’s Raid on Lawrence  
     Tragedy struck Kansas in the wake of the Union victory in Indian Territory, the 
abolitionist stronghold and home of many of the regiment’s soldiers and officers, 
Lawrence, sacked by the guerrilla leader William C.  Quantrill.   The Kansas border 
proved a porous place despite Federal and militia units remaining to garrison the state’s 
border with Missouri.  Quantrill’s raid on August 21, 1863 brought personal loss to the 
regiment, and several of the officers lost homes and property, amongst them Captain 
Graton who lost his gun shop in the ensuing blaze.  Manpower losses to the regiment 
proved minimal, but the morale effect struck deeply.  The regiment included in its ranks 
at least fifty soldiers that enlisted at Lawrence; Company G’s ranks constituted at least 
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half this number.  One soldier, Private George Pope of Company I detached on recruiting 
duty, also died in the raid. 
      Quantrill’s raid on Lawrence targeted a number of influential Lawrencians, amongst 
them Senator Lane and many of his fellow citizens regarded to be the abolitionist 
agitators and Jayhawkers responsible for their family’s misfortunes in Missouri.  At the 
start of the raid, Quantrill’s men targeted the Captain Samuel Snyder’s Second Kansas 
Colored’s recruiting camp on Massachusetts Street, and savagely attacked its men 
without mercy.  John McCorkle, one of Quantrill’s men, reported when the black recruits 
and their white officers rushed out of the tents, “many of them sought shelter in the 
direction of the river.  The command was given to break ranks, scatter, and follow them.  
A few of the [N]egroes reached the river, plunging into it, but none succeeded in reaching 
the opposite shore.” Official reports later listed the Second Kansas Colored’s losses at 
twenty men.411  The losses however reflected that the whites and blacks of Lawrence at 
least shared tragedy, despite any other differences they may have felt. 
     The hated black soldiers and their abolitionist officers, and the black residents of 
Lawrence, may have suspected Quantrill would attempt an attack, Hinton implied as 
much when he described the raid to New York Times readers.  The black community 
sustained loss as well as the white, twenty-two of its residents killed by Quantrill’s men.  
However many Lawrencian blacks appear to have escaped the slaughter Quantrill’s band 
inflicted on the town. Quantrill’s forces clashed with black troops again in October 1863 
at Baxter Springs where Quantrill’s band destroyed an escort conveying General Blunt to 
Fort Smith, and inflicted significant casualties on a company of the Second Kansas 
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Colored.  Many of the wounded sustained fatal gunshot wounds to the head after falling 
from other injuries-- a sign of Quantrill’s absolute refusal to grant quarter to black 
soldiers.412 Quantrill may have harbored resentment for the black infantrymen’s 
successful defense of the outpost at Baxter Springs, the location where Quantrill’s forces 
sustained their greatest losses in one battle against Union troops. 
Untended Consequences of Battle 
     While the soldiers of the regiment absorbed the news of Quantrill’s raid, the regiment 
came under assault from higher headquarters as the regiment immediately suffered from a 
loss of command and control, numerous officers again received instructions for detached 
duty.  Collateral duties and detached service affected many of the regiment’s companies, 
and extended to the highest levels of the regiment.  The Army of the Frontier ordered 
Lieutenant Colonel Bowles and Chaplain Hutchinson in mid-August to detached service, 
the former for Court Martial duty, the latter to apprehend and escort deserters back to the 
regiment.  Officers also tendered resignations, and Lieutenant Dickerson received a 
disability discharge.  Lieutenant Colonel Bowles also tendered his resignation; a step he 
later argued was undertaken under duress.  Although Special Orders Number 30 
authorized Bowles a leave of absence, and Bowles received a surgeon’s certificate of 
disability, his service record from mid-August to December 1863 reflects a confusing and 
contradictory series of absences without leave.413  The regiment operated without Bowles 
for the remainder of his service in the Civil War.  Major Ward assumed Bowles’s 
position during his and Williams’s absences.  
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     Other officers proved highly problematic for the regiment, with two company 
commanders arrested and a third absent without leave.  George Martin, the commander of 
Company B was reported in the regimental rolls as absent without leave from June 25, 
1863 to October 9, 1863.  Captain Andrew Armstrong of Company D was arrested on 
charges of murder, charges outstanding since April 1863, and held at Fort Gibson from 
September 17, 1863 to February 24, 1864, although later acquitted by a court martial. 
Captain Thrasher of Company E also endured arrest on charges preferred by Colonel 
Williams, and despite a week of release at Colonel Williams’ request, Thrasher returned 
to confinement at Fort Gibson and remained there until February 1, 1864.  Unlike 
Armstrong, Thrasher was sentenced to six months suspended pay for an unspecified 
offense.414 The regimental officers’ scheming and maneuvering for power in early 1863 
appeared to have resurfaced while the regiment garrisoned Fort Gibson.  However, this 
time the reasons for their disloyalty appeared to be based in allegations of criminal 
misconduct by Colonel Williams and at least one officer’s belief that Williams betrayed 
his duties as an officer.  
       The seriousness of the charges against two company commanders may be explained 
by a journal entry by Captain Earle in December in which he mentions a second attempt 
by company commanders to bring charges against Williams for “Every crime which 
could disgrace an officer and render him unfit and unworthy of holding an office in the 
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Army.”415  If a first attempt resulted in charges resurfacing against Armstrong, and other 
unspecified charges against Thrasher, it appears that Earle may have revealed a 
Byzantine attempt by a cabal of officers to unseat Williams while absent from his 
command.  No charges are in Williams’s file and in their absence, several things may be 
considered: Williams preferred charges against Thrasher as the representative of a group 
attempting to subvert Williams’s leadership; Armstrong finally stood Court Martial for 
offenses that he may have avoided in Fort Scott and which could have been suppressed; 
Bowles may have been connected with the attempt to replace Williams, hence his 
resignation under duress.  The possibilities are fascinating to consider, especially given 
Earle’s earlier maneuvers to replace Williams at Fort Scott during the formation of the 
regiment. Regardless of the facts in the case, Williams retained regimental command. 
     Despite the upheaval in the regimental officer ranks, the regiment continued to train 
and access new recruits. But, errors occurred during the haste of the regiment’s initial 
efforts to muster the regiment, and resulted in several discharges at the direction of Major 
General Blunt, namely those of underage Privates Naro and Elias Hardridge.416 Company 
C and Company H along with Assistant Surgeon Eberle Macy, on September 3 reported 
for garrison duty at Fort Gibson.   The remaining companies foraged for food and 
building materials, but the supply situation at Fort Gibson reached the point where 
foraging deprived loyal Union families of both corn meal and their scarce fence rails 
which were used as fuel for soldier’ fires.  Houses also fell victim to scavenging 
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companies seeking materials to build huts.417  The hard campaigning of the summer 
showed in the physical condition of the unit’s equipment and clothing, its men fighting 
shoeless in sun-bleached uniforms that had seen better days.  Despite these material 
shortcomings, deployment orders arrived for an “easy march” to Fort Smith on 
September 14, 1863 and the regiment left Fort Gibson on September 22, 1863.418  Captain 
Welch of Company K remained at Camp Williams to command a small number of sick in 
the hospital at camp Williams, and retained the regiment’s camp equipage for later 
transport to Fort Smith. Assistant Surgeon Macy also received orders to rejoin his 
regiment after serving detached duty at the general hospital at Tahlequah, Cherokee 
Nation.419 Their deployment to Fort Smith appeared to give the regiment a new mission 
commensurate with their reputation. 
Fort Smith and the Army of the Frontier’s refugee problem 
     The First Kansas Colored arrived in Fort Smith as Union forces sought to consolidate 
their hold on the area.  Fort Smith’s importance to Blunt’s strategy and the necessity for 
infantry to garrison the towns and plantations of the region made their deployment to Fort 
Smith imperative.  Fort Gibson continued to rely on its cavalry, but Fort Smith would 
play host to two black infantry regiments.  Recruiting for the Second Kansas Colored 
completed, the new regiment marched directly to Arkansas.  The Second Kansas 
Colored’s arrival at Fort Smith provoked anger and recriminations against Colonel 
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Williams.  His officers and men helped to raise a regiment that now served alongside the 
First Kansas Colored clothed in new uniforms, equipped with good arms and first-rate 
camp and garrison equipage.  Captain Earle’s journal entry expresses the disenchantment 
of the First Kansas Colored’s men and officers, and many were angry that the new, un-
blooded regiment arrived well equipped while the First Kansas Colored’s soldiers wore 
shabby clothing and many lacked shoes or proper tents.  The regiment’s officers 
immediately queried Williams as to the disparity between the two regiments, and 
requisitions for new clothing and equipment flooded the regimental quartermaster.  The 
regiment quickly made up for their equipment shortcomings.420  Two Colored Regiments 
established the fact that black men understood the impact of their contribution, a 
development reflected by events elsewhere in the region. 
     The long process of recruiting black regiments gathered momentum in 1863, and by 
late summer, black military service appeared an established and appreciated reality for 
the Union army.  Many changes occurred in the month of August.  Black recruiting 
received increased support in Missouri, western Arkansas and Kansas.  Potential recruits 
in the military District of the Border in Missouri marched under escort from Missouri to 
Kansas for military duty. General McNeil, who later assumed command of the Army of 
the Frontier from Blunt, received orders to raise as many black regiments as possible.421  
Black military service no longer existed as a “pet project” of rogue senators, it now 
constituted Union policy, and the impact of black soldiers on Union operations proved 
significant.  
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     The summer campaigns of 1863 gave way to a battle of a different sort as the mass of 
refugees around Fort Gibson proved an enormous draw upon Federal logistics, and a 
recurring source of disease for the combat units of the Army of the Frontier.  Although  
 Conditions varied between Fort Gibson and Fort Smith, “at Fort Smith women and 
children received half rations from the Federals.  The usual attitude was that Union 
refugees merely got in the way and consequently many were sent to Kansas.”422  Kansas 
served as the overflow for refugees and despite the growing apprehension about 
additional refugees flooding Kansas, many continued to accompany Federal wagon trains 
north from Indian Territory. 
     Military leaders understood the impact of civilian refugees on their ability to wage 
war.  Repeated attempts to remove refugees from the vicinity of Fort Blunt and Fort 
Smith arose from the increasing numbers of destitute refugees around the forts, their 
disease incubating unhygienic conditions, and humanitarian urges to remove them to 
safer places in other regions.  Acting from the need to thin their numbers, in September 
Lieutenant Colonel Schuarte of the Second Indian Home Guard Regiment issued general 
orders Number Three, which commanded all non-governmental workers to leave Fort 
Gibson under threat of forcible expulsion. Although Colonel John Ritchie, the First 
Brigade Commander, revoked Schuarte’s order as “ oppos[ing] the principles of 
humanity,” he may also have understood that expelling refugees could cause ripple 
effects amongst the black and Indian regiments stationed at that post.423 Schuarte’s 
impulsive command exposed the Federal forces at Fort Blunt to the potential of forcing 
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disaffected refugees to seek succor behind Confederate lines, an action that threatened to 
undo the Indian defections of the summer and fall.  Expelling non-essential refugees also 
threatened the familial bonds of black soldiers and risked inspiring a mutiny or mass 
desertions.       
     Fort Smith possessed a large population of white and black refugees as well as a 
civilian town and Unionist farms around the fort.  Colonel Williams jealously fought to 
preserve his regiment’s reputation by reining excesses before soldiers earned the hatred 
of the surrounding community.  The first disciplinary infractions occurred less then a 
week after the regiment’s arrival and occupation of Camp Judson outside Fort Smith. 
Colonel Williams reduced a sergeant and two corporals of Company F to the ranks for 
“marauding and molesting citizens without orders.”  Their actions compelled Williams to 
stringently outline the conditions for foraging, and reiterated that foraging authority 
rested with him, not individuals.  Williams instituted two measures to re-impose 
discipline on his soldiers, stringently limiting passes, and reinstating drill periods for 
company and battalion drill.424 Despite Williams’ regulation of his soldiers’ time and 
freedom of movement, foraging and its attendant potential for criminal abuse remained a 
pressing issue for the troops around Fort Smith.  Temptations and malfeasance aside, the 
regiment grew during its tenure at Fort Smith, despite losses to desertion and disease.  
Members of the black community enlisted in nearly all companies of the regiment, a sign 
that the regiment offered a fitting chance for proving one’s manhood as well as a steady 
paycheck (almost) and meals. 
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     Developments in Kansas and Arkansas contributed to the ranks of the regiment at Fort 
Smith, some due to returning deserters, others due to the steadily worsening guerrilla 
problem in western Arkansas.  While detached to apprehend deserters in Kansas, 
Chaplain Hutchinson successfully negotiated the release of seven soldiers held in 
confinement at Fort Scott for desertion.  The soldiers then returned to the regiment 
through a circuitous arrangement that first placed them under the control of the Second 
Kansas Colored at Fort Gibson, and then transport to Fort Smith.425  The regiment also 
recruited new members at Fort Smith, and during the period October 2, 1863 through 
December 5, 1863 thirty recruits enlisted at Fort Smith, and the regiment achieved 
notable success recruiting eight men on a single day, October 8.  Three additional recruits 
came in from Little Rock and Ozark in October.426   
          The regiment’s dispositions changed in late October and Camp Judson gave way to 
Fort Smith.  First among the regiment’s companies to enter Fort Smith, Company D 
reported for detached service as the garrison prison guard.  The remainder of the regiment 
selected quarters.  Life at Fort Smith proved less than ideal for disciplinary purposes and 
Colonel Williams ordered increased vigilance on the part of officers and non-
commissioned officers.  The need for constant supervision demanded draconian measures 
and Williams ordered the arrest of any non-commissioned officer found more than one 
hundred yards from their company quarters without a pass, the only exception being to 
bathe or draw water from the river.  Loitering also constituted grounds for arrest.  The 
standard pattern of drill continued unabated, company drill in the morning and battalion 
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drill in the afternoon.427 The new measures beg the question of why movement became so 
restricted. Several scenarios suggest themselves: ease of desertion, need to continually 
maintain accountability for deployment purposes, and the threat of conflict between the 
various units stationed at Fort Smith.  The latter two alternatives do not prove out in the 
regimental or company records, although detachments did receive regular marching 
orders.  Desertion deserves a closer look because of the close proximity to a constantly 
changing refugee community.   
Non-combat threats to the regiment 
     When considering all manpower losses for the period at Fort Smith, the three main 
sources of loss of appreciable number are combat losses, desertion losses, and deaths due 
to disease. Manpower losses from combat-related causes were minimal for the regiment, 
and only four men appear to have died as the direct result of wounds sustained in battle, 
despite the number of wounded reported from Cabin Creek and Honey Springs.  The 
greatest single source of manpower losses was disease, followed by desertions.   
Desertions correlated closely with the time the regiment spent at Fort Gibson and Fort 
Smith, and Company B sustained the largest single day rash of desertions on December 5, 
1863.  Surprisingly, the month of December posted the greatest losses, despite the cold of 
winter and multiple detachments to towns around Fort Smith.  
     The existence of a black refugee community at Fort Smith offered deserters potential 
shelter, but another competitor may have been a reason for soldiers deserting the 
regiment at this time.  Four soldiers of the First Kansas Colored deserted from their 
regiment to join the Second Kansas Colored, and Colonel Crawford received orders to 
                                                
427 Special Orders 56, Headquarters Troops in the Field, October 22, 1863, Special Orders 8, First Kansas 
Colored, October 25, 1863, RG 94: Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, Book Records of Volunteer 
Union Organizations, 79th USCT Infantry, Regimental order Book, E112-115, PI-17, Vol 2 of 4. 
 
 
222 
 
return them to Colonel Williams.  Despite the soldiers’ individual motivations for 
deserting, on December 11, four different deserters voluntarily reported back to their 
regiment, one of which had been absent without leave since September.  Deserter  
 
   Chart 1: Regimental Desertion rates July 3, 1864 – March 31, 1864.428 
 
catchers sought out fugitive men  - the $30.00 reward incentive for the successful capture 
of deserters – among them Private Benjamin Taylor who cost the Quartermaster at Fort 
Leavenworth the usual fee when turned over to military custody.429 No single event 
appears to have precipitated desertions, but the imminent departure of the regiment for 
Roseville may have spurred deserters to reconsider their actions.  
    However problematic the desertion rate suffered by the regiment appears, Historian 
Dudley Cornish determined the desertion rate of white Kansas regiments was almost 
twice that of the First and Second Kansas Colored.  The white Kansas desertion rate of 
117.54 per thousand eclipsed the black rate of 62.20 per thousand.430  The obvious answer 
is that black troops deserting in Indian Territory or Arkansas immediately entered an 
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environment imminently hostile to them, white guerrillas, white refugees and Indian 
guerrillas all seeking their death.  This obviates the influence of black refugee 
communities into which former soldiers could attempt to vanish unless the regiment 
occupied a place adjacent their communities.  A third option may be that the 
predominately young recruits suffered from “recruit’s remorse” when the military life 
didn’t appeal to their thirst for adventure.  Camp life varied from the excitement of 
preparation for marches, to the dull routine of drill or guard duty. 
     The quality of camp life  varied by season and diet. Monotony was broken by an 
October payday and the occasional raid by guerrillas.  Parades and drill established a 
routine, and combat duties varied it, but when soldiers lacked food, pay, or basic 
comforts, they voted with their feet and often deserted.  Food went beyond sustenance 
despite the claims of the military quartermasters. The quality of rations also affected 
health, especially when access to fresh foods became difficult due to areas becoming 
over-foraged, or no longer in season. 
     Federal rations offered a variety of foodstuffs to sustain the Union armies in the field, 
but when in garrison troops expected to subsist on better fare than in the field. When 
available, rations took the form of regulated measures and types of foodstuffs available to 
individuals and companies.  Individual soldiers could expect dried or salt meat, bread or 
hardtack, sugar, coffee and when available potatoes and soap.  These regulated supplies 
often depended on the whim of military exigency, and fresh foods competed with military 
cargoes and even fodder for space in transport.431  The Army of the Frontier utilized 
primarily wagons for transporting supplies, and shortages also resulted when the river 
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dropped below navigable levels for riverboats.  Ingenious solutions presented themselves, 
and an attempt was made to alleviate dietary diseases such as scurvy by the creation of 
the much-despised “Desiccated Mixed Vegetables.” Confederate Colonel Stand Watie’s 
soldiers captured a supply of these rations and reported a disgusting mixture of dried 
vegetables along with the hind legs of bullfrogs, snails, and screwworms.  The dried 
cakes proved difficult to prepare in communal messes also, the brick-like cakes swelling 
to enormous size when cooked.432  Such sumptuous fare doubtless contributed to dietary 
deficiencies.   
      The ration situation at Fort Gibson and Fort Smith reached crisis levels in fall of 
1863.  The official correspondence of the First Kansas Colored’s Regimental 
Quartermaster offers one story of why troops suffered from a shortage of rations. Rations, 
according to the Commissary General of Subsistence, would be issued in fulfillment of 
the Government’s obligations, but when full rations existed in short supply, an equivalent 
value in some other food would be provided.433  The provision of rations as part of the 
black soldiers’ pay depended on local availability, and therefore any supply shortage 
demanded local substitutes. Considering that refugee relief demanded many of the rations 
that reached Fort Gibson or Fort Smith, soldiers faced two choices: half rations or rations 
supplemented by foraging in the vicinity of the forts.  Food shortages combined with 
crowded conditions proved deadly for some regimental soldiers. 
     The First Kansas Colored’s record for the July 1863 – March 1864 time frame reflects 
forty-five soldiers lost to disease. Regimental disease losses indicate that the most 
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soldiers died when the regiment was billeted with other regiments, or served on the 
garrisons of Fort Gibson or Fort Smith.  During August, and again in December, the 
regiment experienced spikes in mortality, but when detailed into detachments the 
mortality rates dropped.  The correlation between garrison duty and mortality rates 
appears well founded, and when the types of disease are considered, the connection 
becomes clearer.  Despite food shortages and dwindling supplies of food to be foraged, 
no direct dietary connection can be discerned from the disease deaths amongst the 
regiment’s ranks, no reports of scurvy surfacing at this time.  
     The disease information in Tables 3 and 4 indicate a seasonal correlation between 
disease and mortality, and although unit records reflect a number of deaths from 
unknown causes, the main diseases identified in the summer are of diarrheal or intestinal 
nature, and in winter, close confines appear correlated to deaths due to smallpox, typhoid 
fever and various fevers.  In August the crowded environs of Fort Gibson may have 
contributed to intestinal ailments, but December’s mortality spike is difficult to explain 
due to incomplete records.  The most likely causative agent for unknown deaths may 
have been the ubiquitous “camp fever” that killed new recruits during their seasoning 
period 
      Although the mortality rates do not overtly reflect a better standard of care for black 
soldiers, Fort Smith did possess a general hospital with a colored ward, and the soldiers 
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          Chart 2: Regimental Disease Losses by Location and Time  
 
 
          Chart 3: Regimental Disease Losses by Type and Time434 
 
of the First Kansas Colored could expect care from Assistant Regimental Surgeon Abijah 
Tenny.  The hospital’s chief complaints during this period appear to cluster around 
pneumonia and smallpox cases.435 The potential for disease transmission between military 
and civilian populations remained high at the hospital as it treated military and civilian 
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patients alike, and despite suppositions that pneumonia spread amongst soldiers due to 
“tender lungs” in the cold, the simple fact remains that crowded populations that 
exchanged diseases spread by contact or discharge.  Cold, miserable, inadequate housing 
also lowered immunity, as did poor diets and reduced rations.  Mixed in with this recipe 
for illness, the civilian refugee population constituted a reservoir of potential diseases that 
varied with time and season, the winter offering pulmonary and skin diseases, and the 
summer a variety of mosquito-borne illnesses.  In both scenarios disease harbored 
amongst new recruits accessed from refugee populations quickly spread through the 
ranks and incapacitated or killed soldiers that remained in a garrison environment for 
long periods.436 
     The preventative medicine methods available to commanders could be divided into 
three classes: isolation in regimental hospitals; careful husbanding of manpower through 
judicious camp selection; and the administration of medicines such as quinine. 
Prophylactic methods for controlling disease relied on the prevailing understanding of 
how disease spread, namely the miasmic disease theory that postulated that keeping 
soldiers from swamps and marshes, and noxious night air, would prevent disease such as 
malaria.  Once soldiers contracted malaria, the disease stayed with them throughout their 
service, quinine holding parasites in check, but not killing them. Victims exhibited 
classical malaria symptoms: chills, nausea, headaches, and a fever cycle that varied in 
duration from twenty-four to seventy-two hours.  Quotidian malaria occurred every 
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twenty-four hours, tertian fever every forty-eight, and quartan every seventy-two hours.437 
The military implications for such a disease are clear and constituted one of the 
compelling reasons for supporting black soldiers for the South’s “sickly season.”  
Amongst veteran formations soldiers suffered series of malaria episodes, and when 
subjected to hard campaigning and fatigue, many of them experienced outbreaks.  
     Two of the most prevailing diseases that afflicted soldiers of all races took the form of 
diarrhea and dysentery.  These diseases coupled with the predominately agrarian 
background of many of the regiment’s recruits ensured that the regiment continually lost 
soldiers to diseases to which they may not have been exposed to in their childhood years.  
These diarrheal diseases were so prevalent that unless soldiers suffered to a debilitating 
degree, few reported it.438 These diseases may have their origin in communal messes in 
which small groups of soldiers shared cooking duties and billeting, or in the prevailing 
use of sinks, or toilets that often concentrated fecal matter into areas which could 
contaminate ground water.  Garrison duties and camp occupation for extended periods 
exposed soldiers to greater concentrations of the sick, and casualty rates reflect this 
reality.  Relief from garrison life at Fort Smith occurred in part due to the Army of the 
Frontier’s decrepit cavalry force, and on November 14, 1863, the First Kansas Colored 
marched forth to Waldron, Arkansas.  
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     The Army of the Frontier at Fort Smith fought a continual defensive war against 
guerrillas and Confederate regulars under Generals Steele and Cooper. General McNeil, 
despite possessing a number of cavalry regiments, lacked the horseflesh to pursue his 
Confederate foes.  Therefore, he employed infantry to bar the Confederates from key 
logistical nodes such Waldron, Arkansas (located 40 miles south of Fort Smith), where 
abundant stocks of wheat and corn existed.  The regiment’s selection may have occurred 
as the result of General McNeil’s review of the troops at Fort Smith in early November.  
McNeil singled out the First Kansas Colored as “a triumph of drill and discipline...Few 
volunteer regiments that I have seen make a better appearance.  I regard them as first-rate 
infantry.”439 Apparently so did potential recruits, and seven new recruits joined the 
regiment when it garrisoned Waldron.  Three weeks later on December 11, 1863, the 
regiment marched again, this time to the town of Roseville on the Arkansas River, over 
forty miles south of Fort Smith.  The regiment’s orders directed it to “collect subsistence 
and forage, seize all contraband cotton and stock, and clean the country of guerrillas.”440 
The regiment formed an integral part of the battle to keep Fort Smith supplied through 
the winter until supplies could come up from Little Rock became the regiment’s primary 
focus for the next three months. 
    ********************** 
     Many changes occurred in Indian Territory and western Arkansas between July 3, 
1863 and December 10, 1863.  Additional changes in attitude and employment marked 
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the acceptance of the First Kansas Colored as a full and trusted unit of the Army of the 
Frontier.  Outstanding combat performance at Honey Springs and yeoman’s work at Fort 
Gibson validated the training and effort exerted in enlisting and mustering the First 
Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry.  The men of the First Kansas Colored no longer 
stood as an experiment of questionable value, but as trailblazers for the black regiments 
that would be raised in Kansas and Arkansas.  New regiments would form in the 
footsteps of the First Kansas Colored as the Second Kansas Colored Infantry, Eleventh 
Colored Infantry and the Fifty-Fourth United States Colored Troops entered the Union 
army’s order of battle in the west in 1864.   
     The First Kansas Colored weathered its crucial period of testing, having proved that 
black men could fight as the equals of whites on the field of battle.  The next test of the 
regiment would not be in pitched battle against Confederate field armies, but in 
garrisoning western Arkansas against guerrillas while imposing a semblance of order on a 
series of small towns along the Arkansas River and the Army of the Frontier’s exposed 
supply lines. The supply war and preparation for the campaigns of 1864 occupied the 
regiment’s personnel, and the veterans of the regiment welcomed new recruits from 
Arkansas into ranks formerly dominated by former slaves recruited from Missouri 
contrabands under trying conditions.  The regiment’s operations around Fort Smith 
featured new aspects of the war in the west as cotton confiscation and mill operation 
replaced lines of battle.  However, the regiment would shed blood over the winter and 
with the spring of 1864 emerge ready for renewed hostilities against Confederate armies. 
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Chapter Six 
Conspiracies 
            
      Union dispositions in Western Arkansas in the fall of 1863 defied Confederate efforts 
to maintain dominance of Indian Territory as a buffer state between Kansas and Texas.  
The Confederates anticipated that 1864 would witness new Union efforts to take the war 
into southern Arkansas and Texas, and their thin lines in Indian Territory fought a 
defensive strategy against the poorly supplied Union forces astride the Texas Road at 
Fort Gibson and Fort Smith on the Arkansas River.  Federal forces controlled Little Rock 
to the east, and elsewhere Confederate defeats at Vicksburg and Gettysburg signaled a 
change from offensive to defensive warfare across the Confederacy.  In the west 
Confederate efforts centered around rebuilding disheartened Indian alliances, and filling 
the depleted ranks of Confederate regiments with which to contest the expected Union 
invasions.  In Indian Territory and Arkansas guerrillas conducted raids to contain Federal 
forces, reassure secessionist supporters, and deprive Federal forces of the crucial 
rebuilding period necessary to prepare armies for renewed campaigning. The First Kansas 
Colored experienced guerrilla war at Baxter Springs, but in western Arkansas around Fort 
Smith, the war proved to be much marching interspersed with little shooting. 
     General McNeil’s weak supply situation drove many of the First Kansas Colored’s 
deployments beginning in November 1863 and continuing into 1864 until his 
replacement by General Thayer, and the start of the Red River campaign.  McNeil’s 
supply situation remained subject to the whims of nature and the constant raids of 
Confederate guerrillas and the small, but effective number of Indian troops under Stand 
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Watie.  The distances between Union outposts reveal part of the weaknesses in theater 
logistics, the distance from Fort Scott (his largest and southernmost Kansas supply base)  
to Baxter Springs stretched fifty-eight miles, and from Baxter Springs to Fort Gibson 
another one hundred and five miles.  The crossing at Cabin Creek lay fifty miles from 
Baxter Springs and continually offered a tempting target to guerrillas.  McNeil’s solution 
to this extremely long and vulnerable supply line depended on the Arkansas River to  
bring supplies to Fort Smith, the overland route no longer viable after frost killed off the 
last of the meager forage available for southbound trains from Fort Scott.441  When both 
supply trains and riverboat traffic failed, the local foraging constituted the Army of the 
Frontier’s only recourse.   
     The regiments of the Army of the Frontier provided essential support to the army’s 
policy of confiscations and foraging, and protected trains while also guarding and 
exploiting civilian resources to sustain the Federal forces. The orders of the First Kansas 
Colored contained a variety of instructions ranging from confiscations of crops and 
economic goods, to securing key towns, road junctions and ferry crossings against 
Confederate guerrillas in western Arkansas. Most of the short periods that the First 
Kansas Colored spent in Arkansas towns involved foodstuffs production – milling or 
grinding - or collection destined to sustain Fort Smith, especially flour.442  The Union 
army’s foraging stripped the region’s available food supplies, and although guerrillas 
sought to weaken the Fort Smith garrison by raiding supply lines, the greatest threat to 
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the Army of the Frontier may have internal disputes between Union Generals for control 
of the theater’s scarce military and logistical resources.   
     Confederate guerrilla forces continued to harass the Union army at Fort Smith 
throughout the fall and winter of 1863, and targeted not only military, but also civilian 
targets to weaken support for the Federal forces.  Guerrillas did not concede any territory 
to the Union, and launched raids that drove up almost to the gates of Fort Gibson and Fort 
Smith. Future military operations in 1864 would depend on amassing supplies and 
confirming local loyalties. Guerrilla warfare carried the fight to the Union army and 
eroded confidence in its ability to protect those who looked for protection to the Army of 
the Frontier.  Skirmishes between regimental companies and bushwhackers resulted in 
several deaths, and amidst these raids the Confederate rhetoric concerning prisoners 
suffered its first setback. 
     The fortunes of war sometimes offered surprises, and the appearance of a black soldier 
from the First Kansas Colored feared dead, presented observers with an unprecedented 
tale of the fate of captured black soldiers.  Private Jacob Hall, captured near Schullyville 
in the fall of 1863, shared the story of his confinement by Confederates, first passing 
through Fort Washita, and then to Bonham, Texas, from which he escaped.443 Captured 
blacks it seemed would be taken prisoner, and despite the rhetoric of the Confederate 
Government, instant execution did not appear the automatic consequence of black 
military service. However, imprisonment and return to bondage did occur, and Private 
Hall’s experience foreshadowed the fate of other black First Kansas Colored soldiers 
taken prisoner. The war in western Arkansas also followed different rules from the war in 
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Indian Territory, and small unit actions seemed to occur when guerrillas tested the 
resolve of Federal troops, rather than concerted attempts at mass capture or annihilation. 
     The regiment fought a different sort of war while assigned to Roseville, Arkansas.  No 
large Confederate units concentrated in western Arkansas, the Federal Army of the 
Frontier possessed too many men and guns to openly challenge.  Instead, guerrillas struck 
at vulnerable points in the Union lines, eroding local Arkansans’ ability to provide for 
themselves by destroying mills, food supplies, and capturing stock.  Guerrillas provided a 
constant reminder that although their cause sustained some grievous wounds in 1863, it 
maintained a presence that could only be ignored at the Federals’ peril. General McNeil 
tried to consolidate his control on western Arkansas while seeking supplies for his 
logistically isolated army, despite his fight against General Blunt for control of the army 
of the Frontier at Fort Smith.  Requiring foraging expeditions more than garrison troops 
at Fort Smith, McNeil ordered the First Kansas Colored on December 11 to march for 
Roseville.  The regiment’s orders charged Colonel Williams with “collect[ing] and 
stor[ing] subsistence and forage, seiz[ing] contraband cotton and stock, and clean[ing] the 
country of guerrillas.”444  The last stipulation required the regiment to support a number 
of Federal initiatives including defeating guerrilla recruiting attempts, denying them 
subsistence and remounts, and ensuring that guerrillas did not establish camps from 
which their bands could raid with impunity.  The civilian government in western 
Arkansas no longer functioned; therefore the military performed the role of government, 
including the functions of the judiciary and tax collection in the form of confiscations. 
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      Although winter closed the campaigning season in Indian Territory and western 
Arkansas, for the First Kansas Colored, it created opportunity for recruitment, and many 
recruits chose military service as their route to freedom from the large refugee population 
of Fort Smith.  Other benefits accrued to the regiment as it left Fort Smith, among them a 
change of rations and the increase in the variety and availability of food the further the 
regiment’s soldiers went from the environs of Fort Smith.  Rations would not be 
restricted to those arriving by wagon train, and interference from headquarters would 
decrease the further the regiment went from the fort. Distance did not necessarily equate 
to isolation; entrepreneurial souls found opportunity in the regiment’s departure, some of 
them seeking to aid the regiment through unexpected means.   
     Further surprises awaited Colonel Williams, and Kansas’s politics reentered the 
regiment’s affairs in the form of Champion Vaughan, an influential Leavenworth citizen, 
journalist and part owner of the Leavenworth Times.   Richard Hinton no longer fed the 
regional newspapers and the New York Times with a first-hand stream of information 
from the First Kansas Colored.  Hinton’s time away from the regiment as a recruiter 
created a news void that Vaughan sought to fill to his advantage.  While the regiment 
prepared to leave Fort Smith, Vaughan promised fellow Leavenworth resident Colonel 
Williams that if Williams sent reports of his regiment’s affairs to his paper, he would 
ensure that “the whole state and country shall know the truth in regard to you” and that 
“unless my hand becomes palsied no regiment shall go upon record in the state archives 
with a prouder name than yours.”  Vaughan’s promises proved a powerful incentive for 
cooperation, his connections with Kansas’s politicians and generals at Leavenworth a 
gain for the regiment and its reputation.  Although a highly political town, Leavenworth 
 
 
237 
 
did not evidence a particularly strong sentiment of support for blacks in general.  
However, if Williams could secure Vaughan’s support, his chances to erase animosities 
from the initial recruiting phase of the regiment could be healed, and Williams’ own 
name recognition and reputation could potentially increase.445  Williams appears to have 
taken the offer, and stories of the regiment’s deeds circulated throughout Kansas in 1864.  
The stories proved useful propaganda for the recruiting effort also, and the regiment 
experienced a flush of new recruits in early 1864 despite competing with the Second 
Kansas colored for manpower. 
     Among the fifty-two new recruits, the largest number went to Company F with 
fourteen entering its ranks from a variety of locations.  Companies C and E reported no 
new enlistments or musters during this period. The locations or residence reported by 
recruits from this period reflects an influx of recruits from Arkansas.  These locations 
include some garrisoned or temporarily occupied by companies, but also the degree to 
which the regiment attracted soldiers from the refugee populations of various locations.     
     Fort Smith and Fort Gibson combined represent almost three quarters of the new 
recruits, and the remaining locations reflect the transient communities’ input.  Specific 
locations such as Roseville and Ozark did not sustain large refugee populations; therefore 
it is reasonable to interpret their numbers as coming from resident slave populations. The 
large selection of individuals from newly occupied regions represented a new manpower 
base for the regiment.  After December 1863 the regiment’s manpower replacements 
derived from Arkansas sources.  This new demographic represented a group of men that  
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Chart 4: Enlistments and Musters 1 December 1863– 30 March 1864 
 
 
Chart 5: Recruit Numbers by Origin446 
 
were not combat veterans of the earlier battles in Indian Territory, or the guerrilla 
campaigns in Kansas and Missouri.  Their membership in the regiment’s ranks is an 
indication that the First Kansas Colored continued to recruit in the field as well as the 
garrison and that these volunteers eagerly sought employment as soldiers, bounties and 
other inducements unavailable to them at this time.  In addition, the new recruits added to 
                                                
446 Tables 11-12 composed from unit data as reported in the Report of the Adjutant General of the State of 
Kansas, 1861-’65, Volume I, 572-597. 
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the ranks at a time when disease, desertions, and disability discharges removed over 
thirty soldiers from the regimental rolls.  Disability discharges derived from a number of 
sources primarily combat injuries, and illnesses such as tuberculosis and persistent 
digestive disorders.  One special discharge case serves as another example of the undue 
haste in recruiting the regiment’s soldiers. Company H recruiters enlisted Private William 
Clark for service despite the albino’s inability to distinguish targets at a distance of thirty 
yards.447  The new Arkansas recruits ameliorated some of the hasty recruitments of the 
regiment’s initial muster, but the enlistment of physically unfit individuals serves as 
evidence for the less than fastidious recruiting practices pursued to fill the regiment in 
order to justify muster.   
     The town of Roseville did not support a population large enough to provide significant 
numbers of recruits.  Despite ten soldiers enlisting or mustering from Roseville, they 
most likely composed a group of farm slaves from the large plantation that did not flee 
when the Union army occupied the town.  Roseville was a key point in the army of the 
Frontier’s provisioning and confiscation plan despite being over forty miles from Fort 
Smith.  The town’s location near the Arkansas River and proved ideal for all the 
regiments’ missions, especially if riverboats could navigate the river.  The regiment’s 
personnel knew Roseville from a brief posting in November, but descriptions of the town 
convey a picture of its size and capacity to support the Army of the Frontier.  Roseville 
comprised about a dozen houses, only five of which contained occupants.  Rich fields of 
corn and cotton stood ready for harvest around the town, over two hundred acres and 
cotton to feed the needs of Fort Smith.  More importantly, the town contained a working 
                                                
447 William Clark.  RG 94: 79th USCT (New), Combined Military Service Records, Clark was enlisted 
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240 
 
cotton gin and a corn mill, as well as large stores of farming implements and tools.448   
Food and confiscated cotton could be processed in one consolidated agrarian location, 
and then shipped to Fort Smith by either land or water.  The existing homes and shacks 
proved bonuses for the regimental personnel, especially the officers that appropriated a 
well-furnished house that contained enough rooms for the officers to live comfortably 
two to a room.  Soldiers occupied the slave quarters, a welcome change from tents in the 
open air.449  Roseville offered a pleasant contrast to the crowding and filth of the forts, 
and may have positively influenced the survival chances for newer regimental members 
by removing them from the large refugee communities that served as reservoirs for 
diseases, especially malaria and respiratory disorders. The greatest advantage in the 
Roseville posting appeared to be more prosaic, access to food stocks without refugee 
competition. 
     Roseville offered the First Kansas Colored’s soldiers advantages over their fellow 
soldiers in Fort Smith and Fort Gibson.  Roseville’s fields and storehouses held large 
food stores, and diets improved almost immediately as fresh pork and beef, 
complemented by butter and sweet potatoes, became available to soldiers.  Corn meal 
supplanted regimental hardtack in soldier diets.  Captain John Graton of Company C, a 
prolific letter writer, chronicled his time at Roseville in letters to his wife in Kansas, 
describing in greater detail what Van Horn later recalled.  The cornfields of Roseville 
provided over 20,000 bushels of corn from what Graton estimated were nearly five 
continuous miles of cornfields in the vicinity.  Fort Smith’s quartermasters recognized 
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this bounty and requisitioned massive quantities of food and fodder for garrison needs 
throughout the winter.450   These two supplies constituted the most pressing needs of the 
Fort Smith garrison, corn meal sustaining humans, corn and fodder the military animals 
required for supply trains, and cavalry units. 
     The federal garrisons at Fort Blunt and Fort Smith voraciously devoured quantities of 
corn and fodder far in excess of re-supply through military trains or riverboats.  The latter 
transportation offered greater carrying capacity, but in times of low water, riverboats 
remained downriver at Little Rock.451   The solution adopted by the Army of the Frontier, 
and particular by the First Kansas Colored, consisted of vigorous foraging operations in 
Arkansas and Indian Territory. Foraging supplies from Indian Nations went far further 
than obtaining food and fodder, foraging also devastated local economies and 
impoverished Indian communities.  Foraging punished the tribes that supported the 
Confederates, and in a cruel irony forced the same Indians to seek Federal aid to 
compensate for lost stock and seed.   
     Foraging proved a godsend for black soldiers, an opportunity to improve diets and 
obtain familiar foods outside the usual military ration.  Military rations provided calories, 
but rarely the type of nutrients that soldiers required to resist or avoid disease.  Dietary 
deficiencies contributed to mortality and morbidity rates as soldiers suffered through an 
epidemiological cocktail of environmental threats such as malaria and diarrhea, and 
dietary ailments typified by scurvy.  Specific types of foodstuffs possessed impact 
                                                
450 Graton letter, Roseville Ark, Jan 27, 1864, John K. Graton Correspondence Collection, MS 9113.02.  
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451 Graton letter, Roseville Ark, Jan 27, 1864, John K. Graton Correspondence Collection, MS 9113.02.  
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outweighing their gustatory value.  Potatoes, as Historian Mary Gillette pointed out, 
helped to prevent scurvy; the humble tuber provided vitamin C to otherwise limited diets.  
Around military camps potatoes commended dear prices due to short supply.  Military 
requirements required many commanders to allocate their transportation assets to hauling 
materiel or ammunition, and not bulky consumables.452  Access to vegetables and local 
rations constituted one of the least of concerns for military quartermasters in the Army of 
the Frontier, their scarce wagon and riverboat space required to move more enduring 
dried military rations and war materiel.  
     Foraging allowed the First Kansas Colored’s soldiers to obtain a portion of the larger 
total of forage foodstuffs for their personal use, and in doing so soldiers consumed 
calories and nutrients unavailable in garrison.  Black soldiers also enjoyed a more 
traditional diet as a result of their foraging, salt beef and hardtack replaced at least 
temporarily by more familiar pork and cornbread rations that in historian Ira Berlin’s 
opinion ameliorated dietary and digestive conditions.453  Medical records do not reflect a 
great incidence of diarrheal disease while the regiment posted Roseville, but that could 
have been predicated on less crowded conditions, better water, and improved diet.   What 
can be inferred from the mortality rates is that unlike garrison life where foodstuffs 
commanded premium prices, black soldiers supplemented their diets regularly from the 
food supplies that existed away from the fort.  Soldiers at Fort Smith possessed little 
purchasing power, their meager $7.00 per month falling far short for purchasing 
delicacies that white soldiers with greater salaries could obtain.  Food became a weapon 
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in the hands of those that possessed it, and a driving goal for those that needed it to 
sustain military operations.  Roseville, despite shelter and food stocks could not sustain 
the military effort required to evict guerrilla bands from the region.  This required that the 
regiment divide its companies into details to safeguard the few mills and plantations 
within a twenty-mile radius of Roseville.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 5: Roseville and Ozark454 
 
     One of the regiment’s first details concerned the occupation of a series of mills to  
ensure a constant flow of meal and flour to Fort Smith. Companies A and E under 
Captain Huddleston secured Boyd’s mill, an important site for several reasons. Control of 
mills and other resources became paramount as guerrillas, both Union and Confederate 
destroyed mills to deny them to their enemies.   Mills constituted a resource that supplied 
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military requirements beyond food production.  Michael Hughes in his studies of 
economic warfare in western Arkansas asserted, “Mills in addition to grinding corn, 
wheat and rye, also provided the capacity to card wool, gin cotton and saw timber.”455  
Such capacity provided food, valuable cotton for Union customs inspectors, and timber 
for military requirements such as fortification construction and barracks. Detachments 
that secured mills denied their use to guerrillas and forced guerrillas to forage amongst 
the civilian populace, thus engendering ill will and resentment.  Huddleston’s orders 
ensured that the production of the mill made its way back to the army, bread and meal 
serving as a valuable staple for soldiers and civilian refugees alike.456  This last matter 
cannot be stressed enough, for by January the garrison at Fort Smith experienced severe 
supply shortages.  Soldiers subsisted on half rations of bread, and the mills operated by 
the detachments around Fort Smith provided the only flour and meal for the fort.457  The 
mill operations performed by the First Kansas Colored and other Union regiments 
sustained Fort Smith while higher command echelons worked out another solution to the 
fort’s supply woes.  
     Huddleston’s detail served as a blueprint for detached operations while the regiment 
garrisoned Roseville.  Companies marched forth to surrounding communities with orders 
to forage, collect stock and clean the country of guerrillas.  Huddleston’s company 
marched first, but two weeks later Captain Ransom Ward led Company H to an 
encampment south of the town of Ozark, a town that dwarfed Roseville by comparison.  
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Ozark controlled access to the north bank of the Arkansas River and a road network that 
could hasten the company’s mission.  Captain Ward’s orders differed little from 
Huddleston’s, but when Major Ward led Companies B, D, G and I to garrison the 
Titsworth farm about one mile south of Roseville, he completed a web of outposts that 
continued the Union policy of confiscation, cotton ginning, and security outposts along 
the roads south of the Arkansas River.458  
      In conjunction with military efforts to quell guerrilla violence in western Arkansas, 
the army organized elections for pro-Union representatives to reenter the Union.  Earle 
served at the forefront of this effort, and in his role as Franklin County Provost Marshal 
he required oaths of allegiance from Arkansans that sought protection from the 
regiment’s soldiers.  Preparations for Arkansas elections, and the election of state officers 
presented Earle with a series of interesting encounters with local Arkansans, especially 
the wives and daughters of secessionists off fighting for the Confederacy, the women 
drawn to his office by copious supplies of free coffee. His observations about the local 
population reveal the deep divide between Arkansans.  Earle’s administration of loyalty 
oaths to local citizens, both men and women, required him to record the men’s’ locations 
during the war.  Despite the oaths, Earle believed the only loyal men in the county had 
fled to Magazine Mountain where they hid until the arrival of the Union army.  The war 
took a heavy toll, and many of the women that took the oath at Earle’s officer were 
widows.459  Western Arkansas hosted guerrillas of the Confederate and Union persuasion, 
and their internecine battles tore apart communities.  The Union army presented the best 
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chance for stability, and however onerous their presence, Union soldiers enforced martial 
law on a civilian populace that depended on their presence to defend them from 
guerrillas. 
     Loyalty oaths demanded a high price from those Arkansans willing to declare their 
cause bound to that of the Union.  Those Arkansans that renounced the Confederacy 
faced retribution from their neighbors.  Guerrillas brutally murdered men for their 
involvement with the election registrations, one man hung after having his throat cut, 
another cut down in Roseville at night by an unknown assailant.460  Earle also believed 
more insidious enemies operated behind Union lines, men of larcenous intent that 
claimed Federal purview over their questionable business practices. 
      Captain Earle’s duties as Provost Marshal encompassed a number of tasks including 
accounting for property seizure or confiscation; arrest and confinement of soldiers found 
outside of post limits without a pass; the creation of a parole and police guard; and the 
punishment of violators.  The strict wording of the orders dictated that Earle countersign 
all passes and by doing so placed the responsibility for military movement in Earle’s 
hands.  He didn’t operate without restraints on military personnel though, soldiers found 
more than 400 yards from their quarters could be arrested, and Earle’s parole guard could 
arrest military and civilian pass violators to be punished at Earle’s discretion.  Additional 
orders barred the destruction of property and expressly forbid entering homes except in 
pursuance of duty requirements.461  Restraining soldiers from random acts of intimidation 
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or larceny could only increase Federal legitimacy, especially when the seizure of 
lucrative cotton stocks appeared to many Arkansan observers as theft. 
     An addition to the regiment’s military post duties at Roseville, the regiment entered 
the cotton business, and while there collected, ginned and guarded cotton until it traveled 
north with wagon trains departing for Fort Scott.  In short order one hundred and fifty 
bales of cotton valued at thousands of dollars each fell under Union control.462 Earle, 
despite being the Provost Marshal of Roseville, did not act alone; the Regimental 
Chaplain George Hutchinson became the government cotton collection agent.  Little of 
Hutchinson’s prior service indicated skill or knowledge of cotton; the chaplain’s prior 
duties consisted of detached service at Fort Emancipation, a stint as a recruiter, and a 
detail as a deserter catcher. Unlike Earle, Hutchinson never commanded a company, or 
possessed special skills germane to cotton management aside from basic literacy.   
     The position of the Chaplain within a regiment often carried with it collateral duties 
such as assisting with casualties, regimental post master, and additional staff officer with 
duties as assigned.463  Chaplain George Hutchinson did not command troops, and much 
like the regimental adjutant or quartermaster, constituted part of the regimental staff that 
the regimental commander could assign as needed to meet contingencies. Earle spared no 
love for Chaplain Hutchinson, and felt him to be a fraud in his duties. The temptation of 
cotton trading appeared to undermine the Chaplain’s commitment to his soldiers, and he 
confessed to feeling a “fool for spending time with these Negroes when I could make 
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much more money in something else here.”464 Earle’s suspicions deepened after he 
observed a questionable partnership between the Chaplain and a sutler after the Chaplain 
obtained custody of the cotton collected by the regiment. 
     Hutchinson directly oversaw the collection of cotton, unlike Earle who regarded it as 
an immense fraud perpetrated by high-ranking criminals.  Hutchinson therefore 
controlled the cotton production and storage of the regiment’s confiscated cotton, an 
operation that employed five cotton gins to bale cotton gathered by the regiment’s 
soldiers.465 Hutchinson received the seed cotton from the soldiers, but employed civilians 
to run the gins.  After the cotton was baled, soldiers remained to guard it against theft.466 
The chaplain served as the link between Earle and the regiment, and the authorities at 
Fort Smith who determined where the cotton went after collection. 
     Earle did not question the cotton confiscation in isolation, other more influential men 
also acted as witnesses to this activity, among them Lieutenant Colonel Campbell of the 
Sixth Kansas Cavalry. The Sixth Kansas joined the First Kansas Colored at Roseville in 
late January, the cavalry sent to assist the thinly stretched infantry in guarding roads and 
the wagons and riverboats that provided Fort Smith with its supplies.467 Collecting and 
transporting cotton required special equipment, and when cotton bales left Roseville, they 
attracted attention from military men.  Lieutenant Colonel Campbell chose to operate 
through direct channels to General Schofield, and alerted him of his suspicions in a letter 
to the general on November 24, 1863, elaborating on the extensive logistical support 
provided to cotton transport.  Campbell, like Earle, believed highly placed military 
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persons and their agents defrauded the government and farmers alike.  The fluid nature of 
Arkansan economics and the easy access to water facilitated the process, but military 
escorts guarded the cotton as it traveled north in trains to Fort Scott.  Sutler goods entered 
the military district, and cotton exited the Fort Smith region in specially modified 
transports pulled by over a hundred two-mule or four horse teams.  The November train 
carried one hundred and fifty bales bound for Fort Scott.468  The extravagant allocation of 
scarce wagons and teams to cotton transport beggars the mind when the same teams 
could pull corn or other loads in lieu of cotton.  The assignment of the Twelfth Kansas 
Cavalry to escort the train also deprived the district of cavalry to interdict guerrillas.  
     Cotton speculation and reports of fraud reached the highest levels of command. 
Informers, including Champion Vaughan, reported to General Schofield that attempts to 
link Major General Blunt and others to a cotton ring proved tenuous, but local sentiment 
held that Blunt supported sutlers in cotton speculation.469  The historian Lary Rampp 
believes that Blunt and Senator Lane engaged in speculation in cotton and cattle through 
the contracting firm of McDonald and Fuller of Fort Smith.470  Speculation may have 
driven orders to the First Kansas Colored’s companies collect contraband cattle and 
cotton as they deployed to various outposts in Indian Territory and western Arkansas.  If 
so, this illegal trade may have undermined local support at a time when guerrilla warfare 
functioned as a proxy for regular Confederate operations in the region.   
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     After Earle left fifty men and the Chaplain with the cotton when the regiment fought 
the Red River Campaign, he returned to find all of the cotton gone along with the 
Chaplain.471 While the provost Marshal at Roseville, Earle claimed to have in his 
possession over $50,000 in cotton stored in a cotton shed under private guard.472 
Earle’s suspicions appear sound when taken out of context, but he didn’t consider that 
while the regiment fought on the Red River Valley Campaign, Roseville was attacked 
and much of the cotton destroyed by Confederate guerrillas during the defense of the 
town.  The leader of the guerrillas that attacked Roseville knew the town well.  The 
cotton gin and storage sheds belonged to Titsworth, and his men destroyed over one 
hundred and thirty bales of cotton in their raid.473  Guerrilla raids required continual 
vigilance, and the regiment’s absence presented Titsworth with a near perfect target upon 
which to vent his wrath. 
     The link between military operations and cotton speculation may appear weak at first 
glance, but the First Kansas Colored’s personnel participated in the collection, ginning, 
and escorting of confiscated cotton for at least four months between November 1863 and 
March 1864.  The value of cotton to the Union war effort is self-evident as a revenue 
source, the point of contention that Captain Earle mentions is in the potential involvement 
of Colonel Williams in the supposed “cotton ring.” What Earle may not have understood 
is that while cotton bales traveled north, they also traveled south in territory controlled by 
the Confederacy.  Cotton secured shipments of weapons and medicine for Confederate 
traders, and in doing so enabled the South to continue the war.  Cotton served as currency 
and gathering it ensured that either side of the conflict could not use it as a revenue 
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source.  Guerrillas could not transport cotton, so they burned it.  The Union could 
transport it and did so by train and water.  When cotton resided in collection barns, or 
arrived at military posts, it represented a form of bank. 
      Earle believed that a second attempt to bring charges brought against Williams at 
Roseville received no notice because of his involvement in securing and guarding cotton 
with his regiment’s personnel. In addition, Earle eyed speculators warily, guardedly 
observing many men that visited Roseville to grade and mark its cotton.  When 
requisitions for cotton arrived from Fort Smith, Earle believed the confiscated cotton 
traveled to Memphis for disposal by conspirators in the “cotton ring.”474  It is a 
fascinating aspect of the war that the black soldiers of the First Kansas Colored engaged 
in cotton collection, and guarded the ginned bales, while also attempting to protect food 
stores and mills against guerrillas.  This aspect of the war troubled Earle, but he faced 
other suspicious transactions involving stock while Provost Marshal at Roseville. 
      Earle’s Provost Marshal duties included collecting livestock, and ensuring its proper 
disposition.  Earle’s orders regarding stock appeared as clear as those concerning cotton: 
the military controlled collection and trade in stock, and Earle’s orders commanded him 
to apprehend persons trading in stock without express written permission from Colonel 
Williams.  Therefore Earle could reasonably assume Williams’ implication when the he 
claimed to have learned of a stock ring while at Roseville.475  Again however, Earle’s 
journal fails to explain that stock confiscation and shipment provided beef for soldiers, 
and confiscated cattle deprived guerrillas of necessary foodstuffs.  Stray animals and 
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confiscated stock often fell prey to foraging soldiers and Williams’ order may have 
helped curb marauding soldiers from obtaining and selling horses and cattle.  Regardless 
of Earle’s suspicion, cattle and cotton demanded much of the regiment’s time and 
manpower at Roseville, and orders to confiscate these commodities did not originate with 
Williams, but the Army of the Frontier.  Earle observed the confiscations with the 
knowledge of a Captain, not that of an army commander. 
       Colonel Williams did not delegate all his duties to Earle, rather he delegated the most 
time consuming tasks while he concentrated on his stewardship over the civilian 
populations in the towns and farms around Roseville. Military regimes employed pass 
systems to control the mobility of populations, and by doing so ensured quick 
identification of travelers and bands of soldiers through pass privileges.  Pass issue 
facilitated the identification of guerrillas and their sympathizers, and when passes 
impinged upon civilian social institutions, Williams arbitrated petitions.  When Colonel 
Williams received a request from the Masonic Fraternity of Ozark Lodge of Free Masons 
to authorize travel passes in order that Masons could meet and transact business.  
Williams proved amenable, believing that Masonic meetings could help restore stability 
to the region, but restricted pass privileges to loyal men that swore allegiance to the 
Union.476  Colonel Williams understood that community organizations helped to reinforce 
stability, and thus helped him to fulfill his mission.  However, he also understood that 
passes could be used to assist the passage of men of suspect loyalties and potential 
intelligence collection.  Caution guided his policies as much as military expediency. 
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     Williams proved prescient when he appealed to his supervisors for authorization to 
organize refugees to cultivate the cornfields and pastures that provided the bounty that 
graced Fort Smith’s logistics trains.  Crop yields could not be sustained without 
organizing the labor necessary to plant and till those resources.  Williams offered up five 
thousand acres for consideration, the lands of Confederate sympathizers and rebels that 
abandoned them in their haste to escape Federal troops.  The farms around Roseville 
could absorb refugee populations as workers, and Williams felt confident that the offer of 
permanent future land ownership by purchase or shares could be arranged.  Colonel 
Williams urged settlement before the end of February so that crops could be cultivated 
under a skilled southern Unionist superintendent.477 Guerrilla raids, although episodic and 
incapable of forcing a military decision, did terrorize many of the black refugees around 
Fort Smith to the point that they sought passage north in lieu of the opportunity to farm 
locally due to the bushwhacker threat.478  Until stability could be achieved, no refugee 
farmers could provide for themselves, reduce the Federal logistics requirement, or create 
a pocket of stability from which civil government could be restored. No further entries 
reflect the success of this suggestion, but the Freedman’s Bureau did establish colonies 
across Arkansas in Union-controlled areas, amongst them the farm colonies at Pine Bluff 
and outside Little Rock.  
     Events in Fort Smith and planning for the summer campaigns changed Williams’ 
plans.  Little time remained for Williams in Roseville; on February 12, 1864, Williams 
received orders from the new commander of the Army of the Frontier, Brigadier General 
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Thayer to report to Fort Scott to gather and return deserters to his command.479  Williams 
departed Roseville and from Arkansas traveled along the Texas Road back into Indian 
Territory and Fort Gibson.   
     Colonel Williams left no correspondence of note concerning his travels north to 
Kansas, but he could not have failed to note the welfare of the refugee community at Fort 
Gibson where some of his soldiers’ families lived.  The supply situation in Fort Gibson 
differed in degree and kind from that of Fort Smith for several important reasons.  The 
refugee community at Fort Gibson, unlike Fort Smith, consisted of few white and many 
Indian and black refugees.  Captain Graton described a key difference between the black 
and Indian refugees around Fort Gibson; the Federal government tied to Indian welfare 
by their employment of Indian Home Guard Regiments and pre-war treaty obligations.  
The refugees lived in a motley collection of shacks and tents; the latter supplied to 
Indians as well as government furnished provisions.  Indians received more assistance 
from the government than blacks, and Graton noticed that this inequity compelled many 
black men to enlist.  In addition, all refugees suffered from shortages of clothing.480 The 
meager salary of black soldiers sustained their families at a level of subsistence barely 
above that of starvation.  Threats from Confederate forces and bushwhackers compelled 
many refugees to gravitate to the Federal forts, but the safety of Union lines proved 
illusory.  
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      The presence of the First Kansas Colored, Second Kansas Colored and Eleventh 
Regiment United States Colored Infantry in Fort Smith did little to change racial 
perceptions despite their solid service. The same state appeared to apply to Fort Gibson 
as well; the lives of black refugees did not markedly improve despite proximity to Union 
garrisons.  Although young male black freedmen may have sought the military 
communities of Fort Gibson and Fort Smith in order to enlist or observe black soldiers in 
action, black women sought the camps for the safety they represented for their families, 
and the desire to be close to their men.  The camps proved cold comfort for the non-
combatants; necessities such as food, shelter, and clothing existed in scarce quantity, and 
diseases such as pneumonia, typhoid, measles, smallpox and diarrhea ran rampant 
through the camps.481   A contemporary Arkansan of southern sentiment wryly wrote that 
in Van Buren and Fort Smith the black communities lived in crowded penury in 
“miserable houses,” enjoying their new “freedom.”482  Freedom demanded a heavy price 
from refugees, developed enforced dependency for basic essentials, and made them the 
object of hatred of many displaced whites and Indians from Indian Territory. 
      Refugee conditions worsened throughout the winter as Federal rations dwindled in 
quantity and quality, and as a result, the food aid provided refugees also suffered as their 
food was drawn from military rations.  Foraging trains from Fort Gibson subsisted the 
military garrisons and outposts at that installation to such an extent that by February 
1864, the foraging expeditions caused local resentment and resulted in civilian 
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casualties.483  The refugee communities possessed little capacity for protest aside from 
military service.  Refugee numbers grew at Fort Smith as the war progressed and Federal 
fortunes waned during the Red River Campaign, and then waxed again after the defeat of 
General Sterling Price’s 1864 Campaign. Fort Gibson offers a different picture for 
observers, in consequence of its access to forage and foodstuffs severely limited by 
heavily depleted stocks of Indian herds and crops.  
     The refugee communities of Fort Gibson fared little better than those of Fort Smith.  
In summer of 1863 an attempt to expel the refugees from Fort Gibson failed, but in 
February 1864, Colonel Phillips, commander of the first Brigade of the Army of the 
Frontier, appealed to Governor Carney of Kansas for assistance in settling black refugees 
in Kansas.  Phillips sought to resettle refugees in places where they stood a chance of 
starting life afresh in welcoming communities.  Rather than load refugees onto military 
wagons for a trip north to an unknown destination, Phillips wanted a certainty of fair 
treatment.  The refugees in question cost Phillips’ command at Fort Gibson too much in 
rations and manpower devoted to security details, but they could not be cavalierly 
discarded.  Many of the refugees Phillips sought to send north retained strong 
connections to soldiers in the Union army: they were the wives and children of First and 
Second Kansas Colored soldiers.484  Poor treatment of these refugees invited desertions 
from the First and Second Kansas Colored, and therefore could not be chanced.  Phillips’ 
appeals fell on deaf ears; the refugee columns from Fort Gibson in early 1864 arrived in 
Kansas to increasingly strident opposition. 
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     Williams’s return to Leavenworth after a year’s absence permitted him to share his 
pride in the First Kansas Colored’s (his “Iron-clads”) achievements.  Colonel Crawford 
of the Second Kansas Colored also figured in the news, Hinton reporting that his new 
commander as Post Commandant of Fort Smith faced down the objections of officers 
who objected to an “officer of niggers,” giving them orders.485  Racial perceptions cannot 
be blindly ascribed to ignorance of black soldiers and their abilities.  Ironically when 
queried about the effect of mixed blood in black soldiers, Hinton later testified that 
although superior soldiers, black soldiers varied in quality, the best being the dark-
skinned that made the best campaign soldiers, unlike the more intelligent, but less reliable 
mulattoes.486  This condescending assessment by an abolitionist and friend to blacks is not 
exceptional, but the Hinton’s experience with black men is given his background. Hinton 
served with two separate Colored Regiments, associated with the pre-war Kansas black 
community, and worked as an Underground Railroad conductor.  Hinton’s statements 
reveal a paternalistic attitude toward blacks, one that appears to have been reinforced by 
his wartime experience.  His comments, while rating black soldiers high in effectiveness 
as soldiers, also reflect contemporary theories of race.   Military service did not erase his 
racial attitudes, but for Hinton service appears to have sharpened the differences within 
the black race.  The Union Army also suffered from an institutional bias against black 
soldiers, and denied many the opportunity to serve as combat soldiers.  The preferred 
policy was to utilize them as poorly paid labor.  Race determined more than civil rights, 
and for the Union Army race justified pay inequities. 
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     The continual pay issues of the Colored Troops finally received official attention in 
January 1864.  Using the First Kansas Colored as an example of the pay inequity, 
although the regiment mustered for pay in October and November 1863, the pay for the 
enlisted soldiers remained $7.00 regardless of rank.487 The First Kansas Colored, a 
veteran regiment that observed established procedure and tight discipline, experienced no 
mutinies during this time period unlike the earlier period at Fort Scott, and unlike the 
Fifty-Fourth Massachusetts, the First Kansas did not refuse pay.  However, much like 
many other black soldiers, the men of the First Kansas Colored may have harbored 
resentment over pay inequities and absence of bounties.  An officer of the First Alabama 
Infantry (African Descent) complained to Brigadier General Lorenzo Thomas that his 
men were growing restless from pay of seven dollars per month, despite heavy labor.488   
     The First Kansas Colored’s employment as field soldiers may have impacted their 
reaction, as black soldiers engaged in fortification labor or other manual labor 
experienced little direct involvement with fighting against the enemy. Brigadier General 
Ullmann at Port Hudson believed employment as laborers and poor equipment generated 
resentment.  More pointedly Ullmann stated the pay inequalities were resented, as were 
the lower quality weapons issued to the black soldiers.  The effects on black soldiers’ 
morale were in Ullman’s opinion pervasive, and pay issues a constant subject of 
discussion.489  Ullmann understood the inequities, but unlike Colonel Williams, 
commanded troops that performed labor in lieu of combat.  The First Kansas Colored 
enjoyed continual and meaningful employment as soldiers, and when laboring on onerous 
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duties Williams rewarded the men with a whiskey ration.490  Although not remotely as 
satisfying as equal pay, the ration indicated that Williams knew his men resented cotton 
and fortification labor.  Williams could pay soldiers whiskey, but he could not increase 
their pay.  
     Secretary of War Edwin Stanton’s annual summary of military operations echoed 
Ullmann’s pleas, and served in part as validation for the work performed in the Colored 
Regiments of the Union Army.  Congress approved pay scales and bounties, with the 
occasional state offering its own bounties for recruits.  Stanton’s compelling rationale 
originated from the obligation the government owed black refugees and soldiers, the 
former reliant on relief, the latter resentful of the completely inadequate and arbitrary pay 
scales.  When a Private and a Sergeant earn the same pay, little incentive exists for 
advancement.  Stanton recommended, “authorizing the same pay and bounty as white 
troops…Soldiers of the Union, fighting under its banner, and exposing their live in battle 
to uphold the Government, colored troops are entitled to enjoy its justness and 
beneficence.”491  Black soldiers in Colored Regiments throughout 1863, proved their 
utility and bravery in combat, suffering casualties at the battles of Milliken’s Bend, 
Honey Springs, and Fort Wagner, and fought by the Ninth Louisiana, the First Kansas 
Colored at, and the Fifty-Fourth Massachusetts at Fort Wagner. 
Discipline and desertion  
     Desertion rates for the regiment between January and March 1864 did not reflect any 
significant disciplinary or morale problem amongst the soldiers, but in the officer ranks 
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change occurred almost weekly.  A number of key regimental personnel resigned during 
the January to March 1864 time period, citing a number of reasons, mainly medical or 
personal.  Captain Van Horn of Company I resigned in January after claiming that 
Colonel Williams refused him a furlough to attend to “deranged financial conditions” and 
to visit with his four orphaned children in Kansas.492   Family matters compelled Captain 
George Martin to resign so he could look after his “sick family and urgent business 
matters,” in March 1864.  His four-month AWOL period from June to October 1863 may 
also have factored into his resignation, although a board of his fellow regimental officers 
cleared him of malfeasance.493 The loss of two experienced company commanders at this 
time created new openings for other men to command, but did so at a time when the 
Army of the Frontier prepared for the new campaign season. 
     The departure of Van Horn and Martin elevated Lieutenants to the command of their 
companies, but as the records of Van Horn and Martin allege, the officers no longer 
wished to serve and the service no longer felt their retention desirable. One additional 
officer left the regiment in February, Second Lieutenant Albert Saviers, who was 
discharged for disability due to wounds.  Saviers served honorably, but his post-military 
experiences reflect poorly on him; while on sick furlough after his resignation Saviers 
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spent time incarcerated in Missouri charged after being charged with horse theft.494 The 
final officer to depart the regiment by resignation, Regimental Surgeon Samuel 
Harrington resigned in February citing chronic diarrhea that plagued him since July 
1863.495 The regimental surgeon was the first to receive a discharge for illness, but more 
would follow in 1864.  Some officers did not seek an honorable route to discharge, and 
committed the same offenses for which soldiers suffered court martial and imprisonment. 
     Soldiers and officers of the Civil War frequently responded to disenchantment with 
their military service by walking away from their obligations or malingering, “Old 
Soldier’s Sickness” claiming many for whom the glamour of war no longer appealed.  
Although officers could and did resign for reasons that other inspecting officers verified, 
some simply took absence without leave.  Second Lieutenant Ezekiel Coleman, the oldest 
of the regimental lieutenants at forty-eight years of age, went AWOL in August 1863 and 
failed to return to his company.  His discharge from the service occurred as part of the 
Union Army’s renewed efforts to compel the return of many officers absent from their 
units.496  A former Underground Railroad conductor, Coleman’s departure tempts one to 
question his motives for walking away from his company.  Coleman’s age and the 
concurrent service of his son in Company H are two factors that could be accepted as 
influencing his decision. 
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      The final missing officer from the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel John Bowles, 
remained in Kansas.  His inability to report his whereabouts, then attempts to exonerate 
him kept Bowles away from the regiment for months at end.  Bowles stayed away from 
the regiment; in February 1864, he reported for Court Martial duty at Fort 
Leavenworth.497  Bowles’ reluctance to return to his regiment refutes the hagiographical 
concept of the committed Underground Railroad conductor doing his utmost regardless 
of personal peril to lead slaves to freedom.  Instead, Bowles appears, perhaps like 
Coleman, to have lost his taste for armed conflict. 
     Two regimental officers under sentence of General Court Martial returned to their 
companies chastened by their Court martial experience.  Captain Armstrong returned to 
the regiment in February after a five-month arrest and confinement at Fort Smith where 
soldiers of the regiment testified during his trial, and subsequent acquittal.498  Captain 
Luther Thrasher also returned after receiving a sentence of six months suspended pay.  
Thrasher suffered the indignity of his muster date reverting to January 24, 1864, another 
victim of the regiment’s “irregular practices,” his company having failed to possess 
adequate numbers to justify muster.499 Thrasher’s military service with the First Kansas 
Colored dated back to duty as a recruiting officer and service at Island Mound.  
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     Resignations, desertions and discharges reduce the cohesion of any unit, and the 
morale of the First Kansas Colored suffered.  Strict orders, the monotony of meal and 
flour production, cotton ginning and baling, and absence from family and friends 
heightened the feeling of frustration amongst regimental officers.  While Colonel 
Williams traveled to collect deserters, other officers remained in Arkansas.  Although 
Captain Graton’s letters confirm regular mail service, always a morale builder, they 
reveal a man torn between family and duty.  Graton continually complained to his wife of 
the difficulty obtaining a furlough, even a leave of absence for sickness.  His hopes for 
visiting home hinged on a Confederate defeat, there appearing no other recourse to obtain 
time with his family.  Graton also mentioned two possible courses of action for the 
regiment in the spring: fortification work at Fort Smith or a new series of military 
campaigns.500 Faced with the possibility of renewed campaigning or another stint as 
garrison troops, Graton appears to have given up the idea of returning home for furlough, 
unlike the officers of white units that took furloughs when time and locale permitted. 
     New company and regimental moves in March denied any chance for a furlough.  The 
Army of the Frontier, now designated as the First, or Frontier Division of the Seventh 
Army under General Thayer, required all soldiers on detached duty and otherwise not 
with their regiments to consolidate in early March.  Thayer’s Army of the Frontier 
received orders to form the northern column of General Steele’s army for a campaign 
designed to push Union columns into Texas. Steele’s army, although designated as the 
supporting effort for General Banks’ Red River campaign, required its own significant 
efforts to unite the commands of Steele and Thayer. Steele’s forces would push south and 
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west into Confederate Arkansas, while Banks’ fought the main effort of the campaign 
with the town of Shreveport the point of rendezvous for the two armies.501 
     As Union Generals planned the Red River Campaign, the regiment’s companies 
continued their duties as outposts and foraging parties for the Frontier Army.   
Throughout February, the regiment’s companies remained close to Roseville, Companies 
B, D, and I posted at the Titsworth farm a mile south of Roseville, Company G at Ivey’s 
Ford six miles south of Roseville, and Company H at Ozark. Colonel Williams, who had 
returned from Kansas, ordered all companies back to Roseville with the exception of one 
company remained at Fort Smith to garrison a “contraband camp” to assist with 
apprehending black deserters and stragglers for return to their respective regiments. 502  
Reuniting the regiment served a number of purposes, among them assessing fitness for 
campaigning, assessing supplies and equipment, and training new and old soldiers alike 
on matters of drill and discipline.  When assembled for campaign, the under strength First 
Kansas Colored numbered less than six hundred men of all ranks, down significantly 
from its full regimental strength approximately eight hundred.  
     The First Kansas Colored’s sister regiment, the Second Kansas Colored, joined the 
First in Colonel Adams’ Second Brigade of the Frontier Division.  Colonel Adams 
appeared a logical choice to lead the brigade, his sentiments regarding slavery established 
early in the war during a raid into Missouri in November 1862, that ended with Adams 
preferring arrest and court martial to expelling confiscated slaves from his camp when 
threatened by superior officers to return them to their masters in Missouri.503 Adams 
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Brigade kept the First and Second Kansas Colored Regiments under one command, a way 
to ensure that the experienced First could inspire and perhaps provide the example in 
battle for the untried Second Kansas Colored.  
     The Second Kansas Colored under Colonel Samuel Crawford garrisoned Fort Smith 
while the First Kansas Colored conducted its duties at Roseville.  In contrast to the First 
Kansas Colored the Second Kansas Colored’s ranks swelled to nearly nine hundred.  
Crawford proved a stern disciplinarian and under his tutelage the Second Kansas Colored 
developed into a first-rate infantry regiment, a fitting counterpart to the First Kansas 
Colored.  Although untested by battle aside from the occasional guerrilla skirmish, the 
Second Kansas Colored’s soldiers shared the First’s sense of mission and destiny, and 
served under officers commissioned from many of the white regiments around Fort 
Smith.504  Unlike the First Kansas Colored, the Second entered Camden Campaign in 
good condition, its ranks possessed of high morale and eager to test themselves against 
Confederate foes and prove themselves the equal of the First Kansas Colored. 
     While other regiments of the Army of the Frontier prepared for movement, the First 
Kansas Colored completed its mission at Roseville.  Before the regiment could march 
Lieutenant Hughes, the regimental quartermaster turned over regimental commissary 
equipment, and stock under Captain Earle’s control to the cavalry garrison at Roseville.505  
The infantry required time to call in their detachments and assemble their stores, and as 
Earle related, the confiscated cotton at Roseville demanded accounting before departure.  
As part of the vanguard for his army, Thayer’s cavalry moved first to Booneville to 
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conduct route security, while the infantry followed several days later accompanied by 
artillery.506  Sending his cavalry forward bought Thayer time to provision and consolidate 
his widely spread command, but given the short preparation period, accomplished except 
to delay his junction with Steele’s forces.   
     The Frontier Army, unlike General Steele’s much larger and better-supplied forces 
entered the Red River Campaign with a depleted and arguably weaker force than could 
have been fielded if given more time to prepare. Although the Frontier Army’s units 
received orders to depart in mid-March, the Colonel Adams’ Second Brigade’s brigade, 
like all others in the Frontier Army, did so ill-prepared for the rigors of the campaign 
ahead, especially considering the crushing impact of logistics on their ranks and mobility.  
The weather affected a number of preparations for the campaign, especially the amassing 
of the necessary stockpiles necessary for campaigning, ice blocking riverboats and rain 
slowing wagon trains in the muddy morass of swamp-like roads.  Supply difficulties 
during the winter prevented adequate food supplies from being stored, and as late as mid-
March Thayer’s army possessed only five days worth of field rations.   
     Thayer’s logistical headache did not abate despite the expectations of better and more 
plentiful supplies the closer the army got to Steele’s main force.  Although observers 
reported Thayer’s army arriving with over three hundred wagons at Arkadelphia, some 
regiments with an estimated twenty-two per regiment, on the eve of departure scattered 
foraging teams labored to remedy shortages of rations and fodder. Further problems 
along the route of march appeared likely, for almost sixty miles south of Fort Smith the 
country offered little forage, Confederate rebels having cleared the area south of Fort 
Smith of fodder and foodstuffs.  Therefore Thayer’s quartermaster requisitioned 
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additional wagons, including a foraging train of ninety wagons under General Blunt’s 
command, for hauling forage instead of other cargoes. Consequently, although the 
soldiers of the Army of the Frontier took little in the way of field gear or tentage, they did 
so under orders to march in light order with little in the way of rations; orders dictated 
foraging for food along the route south.  General Thayer’s provision plan assumed Little 
Rock would supply his army’s needs.507  The Frontier Army marched into desolation on 
roads of questionable quality, and suffering from constraints arising from poor supply 
and preparation. 
********************** 
     The regiment’s war resumed its campaigning phase when the First Kansas Colored 
completed transferring its duties.  After consolidation, the regiment commenced 
movement, First Kansas Colored departing Roseville on March 25, 1864, at the rear of 
Thayer’s army. The majority of General Thayer’s command departed Fort Smith on 
March 21, but moved south slowly, over twenty-eight hundred of its personnel composed 
of infantry.  The fast marching First Kansas Colored met the remainder of the nearly four 
thousand-man strong division at the Little Missouri River, then after a brief delay while 
waiting to cross the swollen river, continued its long slog southward.  A week later the 
regiment camped on the south of the Fourche la Fave Mountains, seventy-four miles 
south of Roseville, en route for General Steele’s army at Arkadelphia.508  The Camden 
phase of the Red River campaign ended one part of the regiment’s experiences, the long 
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508 Janet B. Hewitt, Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies: Part II – 
Record of Events, Volume 78, Serial Number 90, 614, 619-621; OR: Series I, Volume XXXIV, Part I: 
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period of muster and combat that began in Kansas reaching its culmination outside 
Camden in April 1864. 
     The First Kansas Colored’s regimental colors bore the names of Island Mound, 
Sherwood, Cabin Creek, and Honey Springs.  The Camden campaign added others, and 
tested the regiment to its very core in combat that nearly destroyed the regiment.  The 
campaign pitted the experienced black infantry against its most fervent enemies, Texas 
cavalry and bitter Confederate Indian regiments that burned for revenge for earlier 
defeats in Indian Territory.  Picket duty and confiscation proved poor training exercises 
for the regiment, but the lessons of the regiment’s earlier battles of 1863 did not fail its 
soldiers.  The First Kansas Colored’s officers and men compiled an enviable record at 
Cabin Creek and Honey Springs and conclusively demonstrated that black men could 
fight with skill and humanity against foes that denied them recognition.   
     Race and ability appeared linked in January of 1863, white men of all walks of society 
unsure of the wisdom of president Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and the 
admission of black men into the Union Army.  Few Kansas papers celebrated the First 
Kansas Colored before it proved its mettle in battle, but in April 1864 the regiment served 
the Union to its utmost ability and earned recognition for its sacrifices.   The historian 
Joseph Glatthaar wrote that Colored Regiments earned their place in the Union Army, 
their record “forged in battle,” and paid for with blood shed in the service of the Union.  
The First Kansas Colored left Fort Smith as a cohesive unit; its men united by the threat 
of Confederate retaliation and shared service in battle.  The abolitionist Kansans made 
good on their dedication to the emancipation of the black race through combat, and their 
men seized manhood despite the inherent risks of service.  Colonel Williams commanded 
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a regiment confident in its leadership and indeed, forged in battle and quenched in the 
blood and sweat of its soldiers.  The regiment’s reputation and existence derived from its 
unflinching performance in battle.  The Camden Campaign offered new potential for 
glory, but also unforeseen sacrifices from its men.    
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Chapter 7 
Brave and Heroic 
     The 1864 Camden Campaign created an opportunity for the Union forces in Arkansas.  
Operating in support of General Banks’ army from Louisiana, the Army of the Frontier 
was poised to break the last vestiges of Confederate military power in Arkansas.  The 
Union armies intended to meet at Shreveport, Louisiana for a push into the Red River 
Valley of Texas.  That region offered tempting spoils for the Union: cotton to be 
confiscated and slaves to be conscripted into newly-organized Colored Regiments.  If the 
Union armies defeated their foes, the campaign would also deprive Confederate forces in 
Indian Territory of logistical support from Texas and potentially nullify the weak 
logistical situation at Fort Smith by providing new water supply routes for the Union 
forces.   
     The Camden Campaign presented the Union’s Colored Regiments with an opportunity 
to continue their struggle against Confederate oppressors of their brethren, a test of black 
manhood for the Second Kansas Colored, and an opportunity for new glories for the First 
Kansas Colored.  The twin Colored Regiments formed a strong infantry force for 
Thayer’s Frontier Division, and their combined numbers made them a formidable 
adversary for the largely cavalry-based Confederate Arkansans.  What appeared to offer 
such promise ended in failure.  The campaign also consumed large amounts of men and 
materiel with little to demonstrate for the hardships and harrowing experiences of the 
soldiers.  
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     The First Kansas Colored’s departure from Roseville on March 25, 1864 began an 
intense period of privation and loss that transformed the regiment.   The previous six 
months of picket duty and harsh conditions did little to prepare the command for the 
rigors of campaigning.  Under strength and poorly supplied (as Confederate spies 
reported to General Cooper), the First Kansas Colored required several days to prepare 
their force, and as a consequence left Roseville to join the army from Fort Smith while en 
route.  It soon joined with the rear of General Thayer’s command.509  The army then 
embarked on a trying march that tested men and animals against the Arkansas wilderness. 
      The Frontier Division’s route took them one hundred and seventy miles from Fort 
Smith to Arkadelphia, through desolate country and over roads of questionable value.  A 
severe dearth of forage complicated the Frontier Division’s passage; Confederate 
guerrillas had burned all available forage for at least sixty miles south of Fort Smith. A 
lack of forage near Waldron forced Thayer’s army to take a slow, circuitous route 
through the Caddo Gap and Hot Springs in search of corn for men and beasts.510  Thayer 
held little hope for relief, and expected the countryside would not supply his needs, 
despite orders from General Steele that his command march with the smallest amount of 
rations possible.  These, a mere five days’ supply, were not significantly supplemented 
along the route.511  Although deprived of forage and rations, Thayer’s command marched 
with eighty rounds for each soldier, and his artillery possessed a substantial supply of 
                                                
509 Earle, Journal, 51; BG Maxey report, February 7, 1864, OR: Series I, Vol 53: Supplement, Serial No 
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remained and no new crops had been sown.  The Army of the Frontier began its march with starvation at its 
back and uncertain fortunes to its front. 
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Kirby Smith to Major General Price, March 27, 1864, OR: Series I, Volume 34, Part II: Correspondence 
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ammunition. Steele’s priorities for the campaign were clear, combat first, then 
provisioning.   
      General Steele allotted General Thayer’s army fifteen days to accomplish the march 
and expected Thayer’s composite force to reach Arkadelphia on April 1.  A fundamental 
misunderstanding existed between the two commanders: General Steele expected 
Thayer’s poorly supplied force to adhere to a strict timetable; Thayer assumed that Steele 
would re-supply his troops when they arrived at Arkadelphia.  General Steele’s haste and 
Thayer’s lack of preparedness in combination signaled disaster, for the Army of the 
Frontier began the campaign inferior in materiel and the rations necessary to sustain an 
army marching through hostile territory.  This was a curious development, for General 
Steele was a West Point graduate and doubtless schooled in the history of Napoleon’s 
campaigns.  Neglecting supply was out of character for a professionally trained veteran of 
the Mexican War, and may have been due to a lack of preparedness by General Steele’s 
staff and quartermaster department.  Although Thayer’s men marched with full cartridge 
cases, their haversacks were empty and, as Napoleon once said, “An army marches on its 
stomach.”  The Army of the Frontier’s instructions emphasizing speed proved debilitating 
for its men and animals, and in an effort to pare down all but the essentials, the Frontier 
Army’s regiments left behind most of their regimental equipment.512  These shortcomings 
were to haunt Thayer’s command through the Camden campaign.  Failure to anticipate 
logistical challenges proved disastrous for the First Kansas Colored 
     The tortuous slog along from Fort Smith occurred along roads that regularly 
necessitated emplacing log corduroy.  The backbreaking labor required many men to 
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participate in timber cutting and emplacing operations while on the march.  Thayer’s  
mules and horses dropped from exhaustion while attempting to pull loads, and soldiers 
had to step in to muscle the wagons along the miserable track.  When men collapsed in 
turn, the exhausted trace mules reentered service as unwilling mounts.  In addition, 
soldiers suffered from a rude diet of corn meal with little fat or meat to provide energy 
for their labors.513  The exhausted army, as a result of the abysmal roads and the 
exhaustion of its men and animals, fell behind on the precious timetable.    
     The Army reached the advance elements of Steele’s army on April 7, but paused at the 
Little Missouri River.   Heavy rains raised the river by several feet and delayed a crossing 
until a pontoon bridge could be emplaced.514  Along the route the Army of the Frontier 
traced the passing of Steele’s army “Broken fences and horse corpses marking the route 
and white hospital flags the hospitals of both sides, wrote one participant.”515 The Army 
of the Frontier’s march south from Fort Smith ended with a junction of the two armies on 
April 10 after a successful river crossing.  The delay of ten days proved a sore point for 
Steele.  General Steele in his report to Major General Henry Halleck laid blame at 
Thayer’s feet. Thayer’s late arrival combined with Confederate attacks on Steele’s 
column rankled because Steele’s troops consuming precious rations while waiting for 
Thayer.  Thayer’s late arrival should not have come as a surprise given that Thayer 
informed Steele via correspondence that his army would not have an easy march, but 
                                                
513 Lonnie J. White (ed.) “A Bluecoat’s Account of the Camden Expedition,” Arkansas Historical 
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would try to adhere to the timetable.  Steele created part of his campaign woes through 
his failure to supply Fort Smith through the winter of 1863-1864.516    
     The appearance of the Army of the Frontier at Arkadelphia elicited much commentary 
as to the condition of its equipment and men being noticeably inferior to the better-fed  
force under General Steele.  Curious white soldiers turned out in large numbers to 
observe Thayer’s army, the ranks of which seemed to include “all types of humanity,” a 
bedraggled mob that appeared unfit for war.  The true novelty for many white soldiers 
were the Colored Regiments, the arrival of which white Federal soldiers awaited “eager 
as children to see their first elephant.”517  Although Steele’s Army of Arkansas contained 
other Colored Regiments, Thayer’s division employed the only black combat troops in 
the Camden Campaign. The remaining black participants in Steele’s army were 
teamsters, a few recruits assigned to the engineers, and refugees collected along the route.  
The First Kansas Colored’s reputation preceded it, and its presence, along with the 
Second Kansas Colored, represented a notable departure from the stereotypical black 
garrison troops and contrabands in Steele’s district.518 Thayer employed his Colored 
regiments as integral parts of his army, and their race mattered little compared to their 
utility as combat soldiers. 
As the united army crawled along from Arkadelphia, foraging parties scoured the 
countryside for miles to obtain provisions -mainly parched corn -for the army.  Soldiers 
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slowed Steele’s advance by frequent departures from the line of march, the orders from 
their stomachs trumping Steele’s orders against unauthorized foraging from Arkansas 
farms.  Confederate cavalry shadowed Steele’s advance southward, and they slowed the 
Federals by destroying the fodder and corn supplies that his men sought.  Through a 
series of small unit cavalry actions, they gnawed away at Steele’s force.519 Steele’s army 
found it hard going along the primitive roads and the constant pinprick attacks by 
Confederate cavalry forced the army to periodically deploy to chase off the Confederate 
cavalry.  Battle soon appeared in the offing however, for Confederate forces grew 
stronger and bolder as Steele neared Washington, the Confederacy’s Arkansas capital. 
      Confederate troops made a stand on April 10 on a ridge near Prairie D’Ane, an open 
swathe of land east of Washington. Confederate artillery drew General Frederick 
Solomon’s Second Brigade into a series of cavalry skirmishes, and the Federal army 
deployed along the edge of the prairie as darkness fell. Confederate cavalry under 
General Shelby probed the Union lines during the night, necessitating the Union soldiers 
to remain in ranks until midnight.  When daylight broke across the prairie, the Union 
army arose after a night of sleeping on their arms to confront a series of Confederate 
earthworks at the southwest edge of the prairie.  General Sterling Price’s forces had 
erected formidable defenses including rifle pits, breastworks and an extensive abatis 
during the night. While contemplating the Confederate defenses, Steele held his forces in 
readiness until April 12 while he developed an assault plan.  Then, with Thayer’s Frontier 
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Division in reserve, Steele’s soldiers drove back Confederate General Price’s 
skirmishers.520  However, Price refused a general engagement and pulled his command 
back to Washington, leaving the Union troops to enter deserted works. 
     The desultory affair at Prairie D’Ane , however inconclusive, did result in temporary 
advantage to Steele.  His supply situation could no be ignored.  As a result, the Union 
general chose to march for Camden, while Price’s forces remained concentrated near 
Washington in anticipation of an impending attack.   Steele turned his command east 
toward Camden and with a head start on Price’s army, made for the crossing at Terre 
Rouge Creek, and the approaches to Camden.  Alarmed by the change in dispositions, 
Price sent his cavalry under Generals Maxey and James Fagan to attack Thayer’s division 
at Moscow, Arkansas on the south side of Prairie D’Ane.  Thayer’s Division held off the 
Confederates while Steele’s main body slowly crossed the Cyprus Bayou’s treacle thick 
morass. Shortly after 5 P.M., the Confederate units broke contact after a four-hour battle 
and left Thayer in control of the field.521 During the battle, The First Kansas Colored’s 
infantry fought almost continually, and successfully repelled several attempts to drive 
back the Federal rearguard into the Terre Rouge bottomlands.    
     The Frontier Division’s stand bought Steele time while his advance guard struggled to 
repair bridges and haul guns through Cypress Bayou. The Army of the Frontier 
conducted a nighttime march toward Camden along a route that traversed muddy troughs, 
swamps and streams.  The atrocious roads demanded log corduroy roads for wagons and 
artillery, a time-consuming expedient that exhausted men and animals.  The Confederate 
army contributed to Steele’s army’s misery, leaving animal carcasses to foul water, and 
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destroying food and fodder supplies in the path of Steele’s army.522  Steele kept the 
initiative, but just barely, his hungry army desperately committed to seeking a place 
where supplies could be obtained. 
     The Army of Arkansas achieved a notable victory by successfully defeating 
Confederate General John Marmaduke’s cavalry and opening the way to Camden. 
Confederate cavalry continued to launch attacks against Steele’s flanks and rear, but 
Union forces occupied Camden on April 15.  Meanwhile, Thayer’s Army of the Frontier 
struggled through the morass and arrived at Camden the following day.523  General Steele  
anticipated additional attacks, but the fortified defenses of Camden offered a respite from 
endless marching and the need for constant vigilance against cavalry raids. Camden’s 
formidable defenses amounted for little however, if Steele could not rest, refit, and 
reorganize his army to renew its campaign. 
     Steele’s successful capture of Camden failed to ameliorate his supply situation.  The 
Union army, a thirteen thousand thousand-man fighting column that also possessed nine 
thousand horses and mules, found little of substance in and around Camden.524  There was 
cause for hope: the Washita River could support steamboat traffic and while Steele 
awaited news of Banks’ campaign to the south, he requested a quarter of a million rations 
to reinvigorate his Union army. Steele’s army could not sustain operations on their 
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remaining field stores, which consisted of low quality corn, animal feed that men ate in 
lieu of more nutritious fare.525   
     The army’s quartermaster understood the supply quandary and marshaled resources to 
obtain enough food for the army while the trains from Pine Bluff traveled westward to 
Camden. The Federal supply woes encompassed the needs of the Camden residents who 
contrary to expectations could not supply the Union army. Historian Ira Richards cited a 
report of the Federal army doling out food to starving Camden residents.526 The supply of 
hardtack was exhausted by April 15, and soldiers resorted to grinding their much-reduced 
corn rations by hand mills. Thayer’s surplus of wagons and mules, initially regarded as a 
nuisance of little value, in this dire situation was put to good use.527  The quartermaster’s 
scouts discovered a sizeable supply of corn at Poison Spring during the Federal advance. 
Foraged corn could subsist the command, but time was of the essence as Confederate 
patrols unquestionably would destroy it if the army did not send out a train immediately. 
      Thayer’s Frontier Division, despite their recent arrival at Camden, received orders to 
prepare a forging train to seize the corn at Poison Springs.  Captain Luther Thrasher who 
was detailed from the First Kansas Colored as the an Assistant Adjutant General for 
Steele’s army, issued the order to General Thayer to prepare the train. Thayer in turn 
assigned the task to the First Kansas Colored.  Thayer’s decision recognized the high 
                                                
525 Robert L. Kerby, Kirby Smith’s Confederacy: The Trans-Mississippi South, 1863-1865 (New York: 
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esteem in which Thayer held the regiment and its commander; Steele cautioned Thayer to 
send a good officer to command the train, and Thayer selected one.  The First Kansas 
Colored, Thayer’s best infantry unit, would escort the train together with cavalry and 
artillery to a point fifteen miles from Camden the following morning at 5 a.m.  Additional 
reinforcements would join the regiment the following day to ensure enough concentrated 
firepower to repel any anticipated attacks.  Williams could place cavalry pickets to alert 
him of any enemy force, and the distance from Camden could be covered in a short time 
ad in distance of additional aid if required.  The train as initially configured would 
contain 177 wagons assembled from across the Army of Arkansas, sufficient to bring 
back enough corn for the army.528   Later additions increased the train to 198 wagons, a 
huge foraging train, on par with the supply trains sent to Fort Gibson from Fort Scott, a 
target that stretched over a mile over poor roads, and drawn by weak animals.   
Poison Springs 
     Colonel Williams led the regiment out from Union lines on the morning of April 17, 
despite the fact that Union forces south of Camden captured the Confederate steamboat 
Homer containing 3,000 bushels of corn the night before.529 Perhaps Steele insisted on the 
train in order to ensure enough rations until the supply trains arrived from Pine Bluff.  
Possessing a food reserve could give Steele more flexibility and perhaps sustain his 
cavalry enough to resume active patrols against their Confederate counterparts.  The half-
starved infantry possessed experience with foraging trains and its ranks contained reliable 
veteran troops that could be relied upon to accomplish the foraging expedition efficiently.  
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The foraging train was a calculated gamble: a twenty-four hour foraging expedition could 
expect reasonable success and perhaps dissuade attack Confederate cavalry attacks so 
close to Camden.  General Thayer may have chosen the First Kansas Colored for these 
reasons, the veteran infantry the best of his command.    
     The expedition did not proceed blindly onto the western roads, but according to 
Captain Earle, appealed for additional troops.  The officers of the First Kansas Colored 
understood that they were marching rebel-held territory, and recommended that the train 
be forestalled until a larger escort could be formed. Captain Earle’s persistent requests for 
a larger escort angered Major Ward, and reportedly threatened to arrest Earle if any more 
requests for reinforcements came his way.530 Earle and his fellow officers knew that 
although the Army of Arkansas held Camden, the Confederates controlled the 
countryside with their excellent and numerous cavalry.  
      Williams’ one hundred and ninety-eight wagon-long train stretched over a mile as it 
departed Camden, the wagons accompanied by a composite escort of five hundred First 
Kansas Colored infantry under Major Ward, fifty cavalrymen of the Sixth Kansas 
cavalry, seventy-five of the Second Kansas Cavalry, seventy horse soldiers of the 
Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry, and a two-gun section of the Second Indiana Battery.  The 
escort, in total, sallied forth with six hundred and ninety-five men and two guns into 
hostile territory.531  The train’s departure immediately came under surveillance by 
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Confederate scouts, and General Marmaduke before nightfall on April 17, received an 
accurate report of the number of wagons and their escort force.532  The Confederates 
determined to trap the train in an ambush, and deprive Steele of the precious wagons and 
their cargo of corn before the train could return to Union lines. 
     The infantry escorts proved barely equate to defend the train when it traveled along 
the narrow Washington road, and became less so after Williams established a camp for 
the night approximately eighteen miles from Camden.  Earlier in the day, while 
Williams’ column marched, Confederate cavalry destroyed almost 2,500 bushels of corn, 
and complicated the foraging plan by forcing Williams to dispatch over a hundred 
wagons to a point six miles away where corn could be collected in quantity.  The time 
and effort required to forage exhausted Williams’ command, and Ward’s troops did not 
return until after midnight with corn-laden wagons.  The next day at sunrise, the regiment 
began its slow return to Camden, its movements delayed by unnecessary halts along the 
route to collect small quantities of corn.533  
      The reinforcements promised by Thayer arrived at Cross Roads four miles into the 
return march, and brought welcome manpower and firepower to the escort.  A force of 
four hundred sixty-five men and two mountain howitzers joined Williams’ command: 
three hundred seventy-five men from the Eighteenth Iowa Infantry, twenty five cavalry 
from the Sixth Kansas Cavalry; forty-five men of the Second Kansas Cavalry; twenty 
men of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry; and two mountain howitzers from the Sixth 
Kansas cavalry.  The reinforcements brought Williams’ escort up to eight hundred 
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seventy five infantry, and two hundred eighty five cavalry.  The numbers meant less then 
could be expected, for over one hundred exhausted and hungry men, nearly twenty 
percent of the First Kansas Colored soldiers, were declared unfit for duty. Kansas 
cavalrymen also straggled until Williams possessed fewer than a thousand effective 
soldiers in his column.534  The return march promised to be arduous regardless of 
Confederate intentions. 
     The Confederates knew about the reinforcements and planned accordingly. During the 
night,  Marmaduke assembled a force of twelve guns and almost 4,000 men to ambush 
the train at Poison Springs. Although several roads met at Poison Springs, there was only 
one road back to Camden through the swampy bottomlands and thick forests. The choke 
point appealed to General Marmaduke, and although Brigadier General Maxey would 
command the majority of the troops, Marmaduke’s division formed on the right.  General 
Cabell’s Arkansans occupied the center, and Maxey’s mixed force of Texans and 
Choctaws assumed positions on the Confederate left.  The former two divisions would 
face west against the Federal front and Maxey’s men would cover the Federal right. 535 
The ambush would pit roughly three times the number of Confederates against their 
Federal foe, and three times the number of guns.  The Confederates also possessed 
superior knowledge of the terrain and the assistance of Arkansan farmers eager to avenge 
their foraging losses against the Union escort. 
         The battle of Poison Springs began about 10 a.m. on April 18, when Colonel 
Williams found his road blocked by Confederate skirmishers just a mile after the junction 
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at Cross Roads.   The battle of Poison Spring entered its first phase at this point, when 
rebel skirmishers forced Williams to deploy his infantry to develop the situation.  Seeking 
to defend the train and its desperately needed cargo of corn, Williams rushed the First 
Kansas Colored under the command of Major Ward to the front of the column, where 
they formed an L-shaped line to protect the head and south side of the supply train.  Ward 
immediately deployed skirmishers to keep back their opposite number from the 
Confederate lines.  The First Kansas Colored troops straddled the road at the top of the 
hill, while the remainder of the train struggled to consolidate behind their line.  The 
Union position offered advantages, with the regiment’s right flank overlooking a field of 
some thirty or forty acres, and the center able to adjust to threats from the thick pine trees 
a short distance away from the road.536   Uncertain of the exact numbers facing them, the 
main Federal line formed in readiness while skirmishers exchanged shots with the enemy. 
       Williams needed to know if the Confederates possessed artillery support, their 
approximate numbers.   Williams’s artillery moved forward to engage the enemy line in 
order to draw any supporting artillery fire the Confederates could muster.  The sound and 
type of the enemy force could be ascertained by artillery, and if none met his guns’ fire 
Williams could develop a better concept of the enemy’s troops while also signaling 
Camden that the enemy had engaged the train.   Williams could not push through the 
enemy forces at this point until his cavalry scouted the enemy lines and his scattered 
foraging parties rejoined the main body of the train. Williams ordered the Eighteenth 
Iowa Infantry to position its pair of howitzers and accompanying cavalry to cover the rear 
while the Fourteenth Kansas cavalry detachment assumed positions on the extreme left of 
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Williams’s line.  Williams depended on the cavalry to give notice of any enemy attack on 
the flanks, the whole of the area covered in thick brush.  The only open ground near 
Williams’ command lay to his front; the Lee plantation’s open fields could become a 
killing ground if his command entered it unaware of a hidden enemy.537      
      Williams received valuable intelligence at this uncertain point of the battle when a 
wayward messenger entered Williams’ lines seeking Colonel DeMorse of the Twenty-
Ninth Texas Cavalry.  The regiment’s nemesis from Honey Spring appeared likely to 
give battle at Poison Springs, and the quick-thinking messenger under duress informed 
Williams (incorrectly) that General Price and an army of 10,000 men opposed Williams’ 
command. Shortly after the messenger’s appearance, the Federal cavalry recoiled from a 
sudden Confederate assault during which many lost their mounts.538  Warned by the fire 
and the messenger, Williams ordered the Eighteenth Iowa to send more troops to the fore 
of the column, only to find that the Iowans could not support him due to an impending 
Confederate attack on the rear of the train. During the battle, Williams delegated 
command and control for his regiment to his adjutant, Lieutenant William C. Gibbons, 
and Major Richard Ward, his second-in-command.  While Williams attempted to 
coordinate the actions of the entire column, Major Ward immediately ordered the 
regiment’s companies to assume their positions in an arc to cover the train north and 
south of the road. 
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Maps 6-8: Battle of Poison Spring, Phases I-III539 
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     Unaware of the enemy’s exact locations, Ward positioned Companies A, B, E, G and 
H, at approximately 11:30 A.M. facing south and flanking his two rifled parrot guns.  
Companies D and F occupied positions on the extreme left of his line south side of the 
road facing east.  The Sixth Kansas Cavalry screened Ward’s right flank along with a 
detachment from the Second Kansas Cavalry.  Gibbons and Companies C and I 
completed the regiment’s dispositions on the north side of the road facing east.540 
     The second phase of the battle of Poison Spring commenced just after 11:30 with 
heavy Confederate shelling on Williams’ lines by several batteries of artillery firing a 
deadly cross-fire of shot and shell as cover for an infantry assault on the front and right 
flank of Williams’ line.  Major Ward ordered the men to lay down behind the hill crest to 
mask the regiment’s soldiers and protect them from shelling.   Williams meanwhile 
spotted Confederate movement and ordered the line to readiness.  When the Confederates 
broke through the timber thirty minutes later and launched their assault, Ward’s men rose 
and delivered a quick succession of volleys at the Confederate line from a distance of one 
hundred yards.  Lashed by buck and ball for fifteen minutes, the Confederate assault fell 
back.541  Captain Topping of Company B fell during this first exchange, but his company 
held their positions. The reprieve proved temporary however, and the Confederates 
quickly reorganized and launched a second assault against the First Kansas Colored’s 
lines. 
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      The Confederates threw two new regiments into the fray, the butternut soldiers 
charging with a cry that drowned out the incessant thunder of musketry.  Although still 
suffering from the accurate Confederate artillery crossfire, and unsure of the fight in his 
column’s rear, the Kansans hurled back a second charge after another fifteen minute 
exchange that threatened to become a hand-to-hand fight.542   Lieutenants Coleman and 
Samuels of Company H fell at this phase of the battle, two companies now threatened by 
their loss of their officers.  Pressed by the Confederate assault, Lieutenant Macy’s 
skirmishers of Company C also fell back on the left and filled the line between 
Companies G and B.  The forces knew each other’s identity by this point in the battle, 
and Wiley Britton asserted that the Colonel DeMorse’s Twenty-Ninth Texas called out to 
the black infantry “You First Nigger, now buck to the Twenty-Ninth Texas.”543 The 
Federal situation on the left appeared equally desperate when Companies C and I were 
threatened with envelopment by Confederate regiments forming to the north of the road. 
     The Union troops on the left flank fought at a disadvantage following the first charge. 
After Rabb’ s battery, fell back to the left flank’s rear to obtain more ammunition, their 
solid shot of dubious value against infantry at close range. Unable to see Ward’s 
companies when the fighting commenced, but suspecting a Confederate attack on his 
lines, Gibbons nevertheless understood that the heavy volume of fire signaled a general 
engagement, and not a skirmish.   While gunpowder smoke shrouded the battlefield, 
heavy artillery fire scourged Gibbons’ companies.  Lacking adequate shelter from the 
enemy shot, Gibbons’ directed Companies C and I to fall back opposite the lead wagon 
and prepare for the enemy’s assault.  The Federal companies temporarily held fire when 
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approximately one hundred blue coated cavalry and infantry crossed Gibbons’ front, a 
ruse to confuse their identity until additional gray uniformed infantry and a large of four 
to five hundred cavalry crossed the road to their Federal front.  Companies C and I 
opened a sustained fire on the Confederates for several minutes until forced to reposition 
another sixty yards to the rear to avoid being flanked by cavalry.544  The Confederates 
turned the left and right Federal wings at this point in the battle, the Fourteenth Kansas 
Cavalry reportedly surrounded by an enemy that outnumbered the cavalrymen by a factor 
of nine.  A brief attempt to form a line faltered when Confederate troops drove in the 
flanks, and the Fourteenth abandoned the field in retreat.545  The center of the line after 
repelling three charges could no longer effectively contest the enemy, after Confederate 
small arms and artillery tore holes in the thin Federal line. 
      The third phase of the battle of Poison Spring commenced with the sobering 
knowledge that the Federals faced a determined enemy supported with abundant and 
accurate artillery, and an overwhelming number of troops. Colonel Williams, seeing for 
the first time the enemy’s numbers after the second charge, resolved to defend the train in 
the hope that Federal reinforcements could reach him from Camden.  The Federals paid a 
steep butcher’s bill while repulsing two successive charges: almost half its number were 
dead or wounded, and three of Williams First Kansas Colored’s companies lacked 
officers, the men killed or wounded in the exchange.  Ammunition shortages compelled 
officers and men to take the cartridges from the bodies of the dead, nearly all ammunition 
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expended after nearly two hours of continuous combat.546 Williams ordered Major Ward 
to hold the line until he could reposition the Eighteenth Iowa to cover the First Kansas 
Colored’s retreat.  Unhorsed at this critical juncture, Williams was unable to order the 
line’s dispositions changed, and lost precious time searching for a remount.547   His 
subordinate officers knew their trade, however, and determinedly held against the 
Confederates.  The white officers and black soldiers faced the same dishonorable fate if 
forced to surrender.  It was better to be killed than face execution. 
      Sensing victory, General Maxey aggressively ordered additional troops against the 
First Kansas Colored’s lines, and forced the cavalry on the wings of the escort back and 
the main line against the wagons. The First Kansas Colored endured a third Confederate 
charge, and although Lieutenant Haines’ guns faltered in their support to the Union line, 
due to greatly reduced gun crews, one gun slashed into Cabell’s Arkansans with a 
discharge of double canister- before retiring to the rear.548   Pressed in the north, south, 
and center, the Federal neared collapse.   Major Ward ordered a retreat of the line at 
approximately 1 p.m.; the Federal center would pull back in stages to the wagons under 
covering fire from the Eighteenth Iowa Infantry.  The well-drilled soldiers, with the 
exception of a small number that fled in disorder, kept up a continual fire against the 
Confederate foe, and unleashed two volleys while Colonel Williams formed another line 
to their rear with several companies of the First Kansas Colored and the Eighteenth Iowa 
Infantry.549 
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      Gibbons’ companies on the left flank grimly held on until the right flank retreated.  
The left flank followed the right’s soldiers through the wagons and established a new line 
along a fence that surrounded Lee’s plantation about two hundred yards to their rear. 
Gibbons, along with Captains Graton and Armstrong, and Lieutenant Harris assembled 
one hundred men from Companies C and I to contest the Confederate cavalry forming 
opposite them. The encouragement and steadfastness of First Sergeant Berry of Company 
I stiffened the resolve of the exhausted soldiers, the veteran appealing to the cause of 
freedom to inspire to deliver a volley into the attacking Confederate cavalry.550 
     During the First Kansas Colored’s combat at the front of the train, the Eighteenth Iowa 
protected the rear.  The Commander of the Eighteenth Iowa, Captain Duncan, deployed 
his command with his two howitzers on the left, and two companies of skirmishers on the 
front and right flank of the regiment.  When the Sixth Kansas Cavalry was driven back, it 
augmented Duncan’s right flank.  Duncan’s companies reformed in the orchard to the 
south of the road after the first two charges on the front of the column, and received 
increasing volumes of fire as the First Kansas Colored’s companies retreated to the 
northwest.  The Eighteenth Iowa covered the First Kansas Colored’s retreat by reforming 
north of the road and shepherded the withdrawing Federal artillery from attack.   Holding 
their line at northern edge of the Lee plantation, the Eighteenth, by Duncan’s account 
formed seven times in the estimated ninety minutes of combat.551  
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      While the right flank poured past in retreat and the Eighteenth Iowa shielded the 
retreating Federals, The First Kansas Colored’s Companies C and I received orders to 
scatter with the hope of joining the Eighteenth Iowa, and successfully followed the 
Eighteenth into a ravine after its defense at the edge of Lee’s plantation. Gibbons retained 
the use of his mount and turning to observe his pursuers, witnessed the pursuing rebels 
shooting the First Kansas Colored’s wounded and fatigued soldiers.   Undaunted by this 
scene, Gibbons remained on the hillside and directed soldiers to safety, then joined the 
Eighteenth Iowa in retreat to Camden.552  The last effective Federal resistance fell to the 
remaining Union cavalrymen of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, a thin barrier to the exultant 
Confederate pursuers who howled and cheered as they chased the retreating soldiers from 
the field. 
     Williams ordered Lieutenant Phillips’ Sixth Kansas Cavalry to cover the retreat of his 
infantry, as the only avenue of escape appeared to be the swamp to his command’s front. 
The regiment’s surviving troops sought the safety of the trees, but having exhausted their 
ammunition and cut off from reinforcement, they could not reform to effectively bar their 
Confederate pursuers.  Some of the First Kansas Colored’s soldiers fled for the trees and 
swamps dragging their rifles along with them while Confederate pursuers hunted them.553 
The infantry melted back, men when possible, but forced to abandon the badly wounded 
to the enemy as the remnants of the escort retreated to Camden. 
     Escaping the battlefield did not guarantee safety.  The lost Union command required a 
quick and concealed route back to Camden and soldiers of the Eighteenth Iowa coerced 
                                                
552 Report Number 32, Lieutenant William C. Gibbons, First Kansas Colored Infantry, of engagement at 
Poison Spring, OR: Series I, Volume 34, Part I: Reports, 755-756; Wiley Britton, The Civil War On The 
Border, 288. Haines spiked his guns in the ravine. 
553 Mark Christ, Rugged and Sublime, 116.   
 
 
292 
 
an unwilling guide to take them through the swamp.  Other Union soldiers however fared 
poorly when they struck the upper Washington road.  Men of the Confederate Second 
Arkansas manned a roadblock and after a short engagement “reported at least eighty 
[bluecoats] killed and thirty-five captured.”554  The Confederate pursuit of the broken 
escort ceased when Confederate General Maxey called off the pursuit perhaps concerned 
about losing control of his army during the pursuit.  The battle of Poison Springs ended 
for many at this juncture, but for those remaining on the battlefield, the struggle 
continued. 
       The battle of Poison Spring ended at around 2 p.m., after a two-mile pursuit by 
Confederate cavalry. General Maxey’s recall orders effectively concluded the action.  
During the pursuit the infantry maintained their discipline, and those still possessing 
ammunition fired several volleys to keep the cavalry at a distance.  The failure of the 
Union army at Camden to relieve his command consigned Williams’ men to a harrowing 
retreat, and most of them would not see safety until later that evening when they entered 
Federal lines, Williams entering about 11 P.M. that night.555  The remaining soldiers on 
the field at Poison Springs did not escape notice, for a new phase of the battle, the fourth 
and most horrific began when the Federals abandoned their wounded and the train to the 
victorious Confederate army.  The Confederate ranks held a score of men that burned for 
revenge, and they indulged their appetites for slaughter.  
      When the First Kansas Colored fled the battlefield, they abandoned their wounded to 
the Confederates.  The men remaining on the battlefield suffered great outrages: Williams 
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received witness reports that alleged his wounded suffered instant executions where they 
fell. The worst abuses may have been committed by Texan troops that sought revenge for 
their defeat at Honey Springs, and the loss of the Twenty-Ninth Regiment’s colors to a 
band of armed slaves in insurrection under abolitionist officers.  However, some 
survivors played dead and listened to the sounds of the battle and its aftermath. One 
soldier survived to tell of Texans shooting the wounded, taunting the fallen men with a 
sing-song rhyme, “Where is the First Nigger now?...’All Cut to pieces and gone to hell by 
bad management.’”556 Revenge for Honey Springs and the desperate need of southern 
men to purge the idea of black military competence appear to be prime motivations for 
the actions of the victorious Texans.  A small number escaped death when they crawled 
away from the battlefield under cover of darkness.  Nightfall was not a panacea. The 
wounded men fortunate enough to escape pursuit received no painkilling medications or 
rest, and endured a pain-wracked trek through swamps, wherein many suffered 
snakebites amongst the swamp grasses when they stopped to rest.557  
The Significance of Race and Combat 
     The battle of Poison Springs featured another aspect of Arkansas race relations as 
former masters fought against their blue-coated slaves.  One Confederate combatant 
witnessed the death of First Kansas Colored soldiers that he knew from personal 
experience, writing in a letter home that “Among the killed was Dr. Rowland’s Clabe and 
Kyles Berry and old man Edwards’ boy was captured…” Historian Mark Christ believes 
these men were Corporal Jacob Edwards of A Company, Private Silas Newberry of C Co, 
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and First Sergeant Alfred Berry of Co I.558 This shocking degree of familiarity between 
Confederate Arkansas troops and their opponents may have fueled their rage in battle, the 
dichotomy of white master versus black slave playing out in a small corner of Arkansas.  
When Union regiments marched, contraband slaves joined them.  Union Colored 
Regiments doubtless welcomed these opportunities and forcefully liberated a number of 
slaves along the route according to Confederate witnesses.  Gregory Irwin explored the 
reasons for Confederate Arkansans’ virulent hatred and believes racial motives were the 
most compelling.  John Eakin, the Editor of the Confederate newspaper the Washington 
Telegraph, expressed his opinions with a mixture of paternalism and outrage, “It is far 
better for the deluded victims, as for us, that the fate which may be considered inevitable, 
should come upon them in hot blood, and the excitement of the battlefield.”559  Better 
death and execution befall black soldiers than liberation and loss of white control. 
     The ferocity of the battle extended to the pursuit of the broken regiment, Confederate 
infantry pursuing the command for about three miles, then cavalry resuming the chase, in 
an eerie reversal of fortunes between combatants at Honey Springs.  The number killed 
impressed Confederate participants, one estimating “ten negroes killed to one white Fed.”  
However, the treatment of wounded and captured black soldiers expressed the true nature 
of the battle.  Major Ward’s reports address the execution of prisoners directly, “wounded 
negroes were shot dead as the Confederates passed, and no negro prisoners taken, “ while 
Captain Earle believed “All the Colored men in our Regiment wounded and left on the 
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field were killed by the Rebels.”560  The number of dead First Kansas Colored soldiers 
astounded the Confederate victors and figure prominently in their reports.   Missouri 
General Sterling Price was careful to point out the majority of Federal dead as black, and 
Arkansan General Cabell put the numbers of black soldiers at Poison Spring at 1,500, 
with so many black soldiers killed that “You could track our troops by the dead bodies 
lying on the ground.  I estimated his loss as 450 [N]egroes killed, 7 Indians, 30 white 
troops…” During the retreat a number of the regiment’s soldiers appear to have been 
felled east of the battlefield by Morgan’s Regiment of Arkansans, at least eighty black 
soldiers killed and four captured.  The ferocity of Confederate response could hardly be 
explained by their losses: sixteen killed and eighty-eight wounded.561  The annihilation of 
the First Kansas Colored clearly stood at the forefront of many Confederate leaders and 
soldiers’ minds, the First Kansas Colored a symbol of Yankee perfidy and the abolitionist 
threat to the southern way of life. 
     Another rationale for the harsh treatment meted out to the soldiers of the First Kansas 
Colored is the charge of theft from defenseless citizens.  Foraging constituted part of 
legitimate military operations, but Colonel Charles DeMorse of the Twenty-Ninth Texas 
Cavalry offered up a description of the federal train’s contents guaranteed to stir a loyal 
southerner’s soul.  The unscrupulous Federals stole from defenseless Arkansans, seizing 
more than food and forage in their intense greed.  “The enemy’s train of 200 wagons, 
laden with corn, bacon, stolen bed-quilts, women’s and children’s clothing, hogs, geese, 
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and all the unscrupulous plunder was found standing in the road…”562 The presence of the 
First Kansas Colored as part of the train’s escort justified severe measures as punishment 
for the theft of personal possessions of no military value.  The image of wanton plunder 
is clearly transmitted through DeMorse’s outraged words.   
     The objections of Confederates is disingenuous however, especially when instances of 
similar behavior by Confederates against Union sympathizing Arkansans is considered.  
The memoirs of a German settler family reveal similar treatment by Confederates.  
“Hogs, ducks, and chickens were killed…They searched the house from roof to 
cellar…and took everything they wanted. Some of the things taken were rugs, bedclothes, 
sleeping gowns, even some clothes for a child.”563  The enumeration of foraged items 
appealed to those seeking proof of depraved behavior, and the theft of items of personal 
value with little military utility reinforced the behaviors expected of Yankees and their 
savage black soldiers.  
     Although official reports fail to detail the execution of prisoners or wounded black 
soldiers, period newspapers delved deeply into the visual imagery and symbolic nature of 
the battle’s aftermath.  Victorious Confederates expunged past defeats and revenged 
themselves on the broken remnants of the First Kansas Colored’s regiment long after the 
survivors escaped through the swamp to Camden.  Confederate Arkansans reputedly vied 
with Choctaw soldiers for most heinous mutilation and desecration of the dead.  One 
Confederate newspaper, the Washington Telegraph reported Choctaws stripping and 
scalping fallen soldiers, and desecrating them in gruesomely inventive manners: the 
                                                
562 Report 76, Colonel Charles DeMorse, 29th Texas Cavalry, OR: Series I, Volume 34, Part I: Reports, 
846-848. 
563 Clarence Evans and Karl Friedrich Hermann, “Memoirs, Letters, and Diary Entries of German Settlers 
in Northwest Arkansas, 1853-1863,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Autumn, 1947), 243.   
 
 
297 
 
Choctaws, after the battle, “buried a Yankee in an ordinary grave.  For a headstone they 
put up a stiff [N]egro buried to the waist.  For a footstone another [N]egro reversed out 
from the waist to the heels,” Arkansas troops “Vied to see if [they] could crush the most 
‘nigger heads’ under his wagon wheels.”564 The Washington Telegraph, a virulently anti-
abolitionist opponent of black soldiers, appeared to revel in the barbaric treatment of the 
defeated black soldiers.  Although most newspapers traded in sensational accounts, the 
casual manner in which the dead were desecrated after the battle reveals a sinister, almost 
hysterical reaction to the threat posed by black enlistment. 
     General Kirby Smith seemed untroubled by these reports and visited the battlefield, 
reporting only two black prisoners to his wife, but estimating the number of dead at six 
hundred “principally negroes who neither gave nor received quarter.”565  Smith forcefully 
advocated a policy of taking as few black prisoners as possible, and doubtless liked what 
he witnessed at Poison Springs.  His banal declaration that the black soldiers neither gave 
nor received quarter strains credulity; the First Kansas Colored’s troops did not execute 
Confederate prisoners in earlier battles, a fact attested to by Confederate survivors 
through firsthand testimony.  As for asking quarter, the Confederate policy for black 
soldiers and their officers brooked no deviation, especially from Smith, and Colored 
Regiment troops expected no quarter.  The concept of asking for mercy when none could 
be expected seems pointless.  Kirby Smith’s statement served his ends as a rationale to 
justify the execution of black prisoners and officers from Colored regiments. 
      The victorious Choctaws revenged plundering of their nation by Fort Smith foraging 
columns at Poison Springs, and Arkansans killed former slaves that challenged the 
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supremacy of whites.  The defeat of the First Kansas Colored’s troops erased the shame 
of the battle of Honey Springs, and encouraged the Choctaws to reassert themselves in 
support of the Confederacy.566  Colonel Tandy Walker, the commander of the Choctaw 
Brigade, justified his men’s actions on grounds that the First Kansas Colored murdered 
Choctaw families.  The Choctaw regarded the First Kansas Colored as “the ravagers of 
their country, the despoilers of their homes, and the murderers of their women and 
children…” a “despised enemy” to be destroyed.567  General Maxey approved of the 
Choctaw’s actions and elaborated upon Colonel Walker’s descriptions by adding: “The 
Choctaw brigade fought the very army that had destroyed their once happy homes, 
insulted their women, and driven them with their children destitute upon the world, and 
many an avenging blow was struck,” and in addition  “the Texas brigade did its whole 
duty gloriously, fighting as Texans know how to fight.”568  No mention of scalping, 
mutilations, head crushing or executions appeared in the official reports.   
      Execution squads and vendettas aside, the Confederates took some prisoners. 
Observers noted between one hundred to one hundred and fifty white prisoners, and four 
black were taken after the battle.  Colonel Williams however assumed that the 
Confederates would take no prisoners, and assumed his missing men dead. 569  One 
exception, Private Montgomery Ridings of Company D, although wounded in the left 
thigh and shoulder, was not killed, but became a prisoner of war, and was later moved to 
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Princeton, Arkansas in mid-June, 1864.570   Although the circumstances of Ridings’ 
capture and imprisonment are unclear, he serves as the rare example of a survivor of 
Poison Spring.  Captain Armstrong of the First Kansas Colored avoided execution 
through subterfuge, and throughout his captivity at Tyler, Texas claimed to be a Private 
in the Thirty-Sixth Iowa Infantry.571  Armstrong knew that white officers of Colored 
Regiments could expect no mercy.  Rather than share the fate of his men following his 
capture by proudly verifying his regimental affiliation Armstrong denied it.  Lieutenant 
Hitchcock also went to Tyler, Texas, but experienced a period of confinement different 
from other white officers.  Hitchcock, as an officer of in a Colored Regiment merited 
treatment as a felon, and did not qualify for prisoner exchange.572  Officers in Colored 
Regiments could survive capture, but as the examples of Armstrong and Hitchcock 
demonstrate, treatment for Colored Regiment officers differed from that of regular white 
officers in degree and severity.  Captured white officers of Colored Regiments became 
felons, not prisoners of war, a clear distinction that the south defined black service as 
insurrection and white leadership as encouraging servile insurrection. 
The Aftermath of Poison Springs   
      After the battle of Poison Springs, Williams sought to explain why his column 
suffered defeat, and conceded that the terrain and the length of the train prevented him 
form effectively employing more than half of his command for the majority of the battle.  
The same applied for his artillery, their range advantage muted by the close brush and 
timber.  Williams believed that his command faced the wrath of the entire Confederate 
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army, 10,000 men and twelve guns arrayed against his thousand effectives.  His front and 
right flank fought against an estimated five regiments of infantry and another of cavalry, 
while the rear faced equally daunting odds.573 
   The white Federal units involved sustained nowhere near the number of casualties or 
endured the same duration of combat as the First Kansas Colored.  Despite this inequity 
of arms, his men withstood three charges, then executed a fighting retreat that enabled his  
command to escape with a significant portion of their manpower, sans all of its artillery. 
Table 8: Poison Springs Union Casualties574 
The battle lasted four hours, but at no time did reinforcements leave Camden to aid the 
beleaguered train.  The duration of the battle and sound of artillery signaled to listeners 
that the fighting exceeded that of a skirmish, and more aptly described a battle in which a 
large force engaged in prolonged combat.   General Thayer is reported to have heard the 
sounds and repeatedly asked permission to send out a relief party from his division, but  
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Steele denied each request.  Captain Earle believed that Steele resigned himself to losing 
a portion of his command rather than risk a general engagement.575  The train escort 
received no aid because it, and not the army, was expendable at this advanced stage of the 
campaign. 
     The reports filed by Confederate and Union commanders offer striking testimony to 
the ferocity of the battle.  Colonel Williams overestimated his enemy’s numbers, but so 
did the Confederates.  One Confederate soldier thought the Federal escort contained 
between two and four thousand men, while Confederate leaders offered estimates of 
varying accuracy. 576 The distortions in numbers may have stemmed from the determined 
resistance of the First Kansas Colored, which unlike white Union Regiments, expected 
little mercy from their Confederate opponents.  Surrender simply didn’t exist as an 
option, the previous battle of Honey Springs proved that Confederate regiments did not 
intend to treat their black opponents with the same treatment accorded to white troops 
defeated in battle.  Those taken alive could expect re-enslavement, or worse.  Their 
officers could expect no fair treatment either, for as officers in a Colored regiment, they 
fought under threat of execution if captured.  
     Other equally valid reasons for the column’s defeat could be read from Williams’ and 
Wards’ assessment of the men.  Dozens of fatigued soldiers could not be counted upon to 
effectively oppose an enemy attack.577 The First Kansas Colored’s performance at Poison 
Springs has been ascribed to a number of factors, among them panic amongst the ranks or 
the skill and aggressiveness of the Confederate regiments opposing the First Kansas 
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Colored.  It may be that these were factors, but more important than these may have been 
the sheer exhaustion and lack of strength in the First Kansas Colored ranks.  Major Ward 
asserted, “the loss in arms and clothing is quite serious; but from the exhausted state of 
the men, it is strange that as many of them brought in their arms and accoutrements as 
did.  Out of seventy-eight hours preceding the action, sixty-three hours were spent by the 
entire command on duty, besides a heavy picket-guard having been furnished for the 
remaining fifteen hours…rations were of necessity exceedingly short for more than a 
week previous to the battle.”578  The soldiers that fought for the Union at Poison Spring 
did so as half-starved, exhausted, and isolated troops without recourse to the manpower 
reserves enjoyed by the Confederates.  It is tempting to hypothesize the battle’s outcome 
if the forces involved fought with equal numbers, rather than the three to one odds faced 
by the First Kansas Colored and its fellow Federal units. 
     Regimental losses for the battle of Poison Springs were incredibly high.  The regiment 
went into battle with about four hundred and fifty enlisted men, and thirteen officers.  Of 
the thirteen officers, seven were killed or wounded.  In addition, prior to the battle 
Surgeon Eliab Macy sustained injuries to such an extent when thrown from his horse that 
he later resigned due to his injuries at Prairie D’Ane.  Five of the officers were reported 
killed in action: Captain Armstrong, Company D, Lieutenant Hitchcock Company G, 
Lieutenant Coleman, who was commanding Company H fell in the second charge.  
Lieutenant Samuels from Company H also fell, and Lieutenant Topping of Company B 
was killed in the first enemy charge.  Captain Welch of Company K and Lieutenant Macy 
of Company C were also wounded. Major Ward amended the official report to include 
the notification that Captain Armstrong and Lieutenant Hitchcock did not die, but taken 
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prisoner or war.579 Losses among the enlisted men proved an inverse relationship between 
killed and wounded and in a rarity in engagements more men were killed than wounded.  
One hundred twelve men were killed and sixty-three wounded.580  The death of a quarter 
of the First Kansas Colored escort, and wounding of an additional sixty-three constituted 
an astounding forty-two percent loss to the regiment.   
      The casualty totals from Poison Springs fail to truly explain the effect of the 
casualties upon the command, for the leadership losses represented the loss of critical 
skills and experience.  Officer ranks suffered fifty-four percent losses, with Companies B, 
D, G, and H losing officers during the battle. Non-commissioned officers Corporal and 
above sustained almost twenty percent of the total regimental losses; twenty-one Non-
Commissioned Officers including the First Sergeants of Company A, I and K fell in 
battle. The numbers of personnel in leadership positions killed or wounded serves as a 
reliable indicator of the intensity of the combat at Poison Springs.  Confederate General 
McCulloch paid unintentional tribute to the regiment’s mettle when he wrote that “the 
negro portion of the enemy’s force fought with considerable obstinacy, while the white or 
true Yankee portion ran like whipped curs when charged.”581 The regiment’s losses 
directly impacted the regiment’s ability to fight beyond the battle of Poison Spring; the 
loss of ninety-four privates significantly impacted all companies.  In addition the 
regiment lost large quantities of arms, clothing and equipment. 
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enlisted man, Samuels had not yet been mustered and commissioned when he went into battle at Poison 
Springs. 
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     The damage sustained by the regiment went much deeper, the loss of so many 
experienced veterans impacted the regiment’s ability to fight, the steadying influence of 
veterans on newer soldiers no longer reinforcing the orders of the officers and non-
commissioned officers in battle.  The complex maneuvers required of fighting regiments 
and the instinctual actions of veteran soldiers no longer appeared possible.  When the 
number of experienced soldiers killed at Poison Springs with enlistments dating back to 
1862 is factored in, the regiment’s losses are greater than the sum of manpower lost.  
Forty-eight soldiers with enlistments dating back to 1862 fell at Poison Springs, a ten 
percent loss of veterans, but another forty-two soldiers with enlistments predating Cabin 
Creek in 1863 also fell, bringing the total of experienced combat veterans to ninety.  The 
loss of so many veteran soldiers skewed regimental demographics as well, seventy 
soldiers from Kansas enlistment origins died, and only fourteen from Arkansas. The 
Kansas-Missouri origins of the regiment gave way to more Arkansas influence as the 
regiment continued operations into 1865 in Arkansas. The regiment also recruited on the 
move as it marched from Roseville to Camden and throughout the campaign, Company D 
enlisted three men at Rome, Arkansas, and Company A recruited another six at Camden 
on April 16.  One of Company D’s new enlistees, Private Crayson McMurtry of Rome 
Ark, enlisted on April 8, 1864, but never mustered before his death at Poison Springs.582  
This soldier’s death hints that the regiment departed on the foraging expedition with all 
available personnel including its newest recruits despite the potential for combat.  
     The regiment suffered grievous wounds, but despite this, thirty soldiers rated severely 
wounded or mortally wounded found its way back to Camden.  The severity of soldiers’ 
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injuries demonstrates that the men possessed endurance and willpower despite being 
overwhelmed by the superior numbers and firepower of the Confederate army.  Wounds  
that would necessitate medical evacuation in contemporary conflicts were borne through 
the regiment’s retreat to Camden, an amazing feat considering that a number of the 
wounds were sustained to the lower extremities, and in one case a soldier sustained a 
wound through both legs. The soldiers of the First Kansas Colored saved many of their 
wounded, and in doing so preserved the equivalent of almost a company to fight again. 583   
     The location of wounds may also be used to analyze how the men fought.  A desperate 
rout would have exposed men to additional wounds to the back, but of the wound type 
reported, only eleven are to the back and side.  Men wounded in the pursuit could be 
expected to suffer back wounds if they fled in disarray, but it appears that most wounds 
were sustained during the initial fighting and in the successive defensive lines during 
retreat. It is also safe to assume a number of the soldiers suffered from shock, heat 
injuries, and the concussive effect of Confederate shelling. 
     White Union regiments later offered up praise for the First Kansas Colored’s efforts 
despite the defeat at Poison Springs.  The regiment’s refusal to surrender did much to 
prove its worth to white audiences unfamiliar with the fighting qualities of black soldiers. 
Lieutenant Colonel Adolph Dengler of the Forty-Third Illinois described the First Kansas 
Colored’s efforts as “brave and heroic,” and Kansas newspaper accounts seconded this 
praise in the aftermath of the battle, describing the regiment’s stand in glowing terms, the 
image of grim fighting and a futile stand against great odds a valiant image of soldiers 
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fighting to the last cartridge, and the last man.584  Fellow soldiers of the Second Kansas 
Colored also noted the performance of the First Kansas Colored, but took away very 
different lessons from the battle.  
     Colonel Crawford of the Second Kansas Colored closely gauged the treatment 
afforded the First Kansas Colored by their Confederate foes.  Crawford, like Williams, 
understood that surrender equated massacre and enslavement for Colored Troops 
regiments.  Crawford and his officers believed that the Confederate “Black Flag order 
was a godsend to the colored regiments.  Every officer and every soldier knew that it 
meant the bayonet, with no quarter, whenever and wherever they met the enemy.”  The 
large number of killed First Kansas Colored soldiers indicated to Crawford that the 
First’s men died as a result of the Confederate order to take no prisoners.  Crawford, in 
response to the debacle at Poison Springs, called a leadership council in which it was 
resolved “No prisoners as long as Rebels murder our men; wounded Confederates would 
be left where they fell…”585 The execution threat against black soldiers and their officers 
no longer rhetoric, the war took on a new character for black Kansan regiments.  The 
news of the massacres of blacks at Poison Springs and Fort Pillow hardened the resolve 
of black soldiers and their officers against their Confederate foes, and ensured that the 
war would be conducted with no quarter for either side.  However, for the First Kansas 
Colored, the war continued and the regiment immediately set about inventorying its 
manpower and materiel status. 
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     The next day’s events, April 19, 1864 reflect Colonel Williams’s hard-nosed 
pragmatism.  As survivors continued to filter back to the regiment through Union lines, a 
process that would take three days, Williams ordered a board of survey to meet to survey 
the ordnance and ordnance stores of Company A and B.  Both companies lost their 
commanders at the battle of Poison Springs and their shattered companies required 
reorganization and accountability so that Williams knew the state of his command.   
Confederate Arkansans watched the much-reduced First Kansas Colored’s soldiers as 
well, observing them gathering to recount the story of their defeat at Poison Springs.  The 
Federal army appeared destined for defeat and Arkansas liberated from Federal control 
by a resurgent Confederate army.586  Worse news followed closely on the heels of the 
battle of Poison Springs. 
     The losses sustained by the First Kansas Colored and his worsening supply situation 
forced Steele to adopt a defensive posture while he waited for news of his supply wagons.  
Steele received news of General Banks’ defeat from spies shortly after he occupied 
Camden.  However, his plans to remain at Camden hinged on a second supply train that 
he sent out with a powerful thousand-man escort to obtain additional supplies from Pine 
Bluff and Little Rock.   Steele ordered a train of 211 wagons under a strong escort of over 
fourteen hundred men under command of Colonel Francis Drake to depart Camden on 
April 22, en route to Pine Bluff.  Two days later a cavalry reinforcement of one hundred 
fifty men joined the train.  The command, accompanied by large numbers of civilians and 
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three hundred former slaves, immediately attracted Confederate attention.587  The train 
fell prey to a large force of Confederate cavalry under Fagan and Shelby at Marks’ Mills 
on April 25, and nearly the entire escort quickly surrendered.  A worse fate than 
surrender awaited black refugees accompanying the train. 
     The battle of Marks Mills witnessed terrible atrocities against blacks in the Union 
army, for Confederate wrath focused upon black refugees and teamsters.  The 
commander of the train Colonel Francis Drake reported that his servant was killed before 
his eyes and that the dead numbered large numbers of “negroes and Arkansas 
refugees.”588  A Union prisoner captured at Marks’ Mills, Lieutenant Benjamin Pearson of 
the Thirty-Sixth Iowa Infantry, was permitted to survey the battlefield.   Confederate 
soldiers showed him “a point in the woods where they told me they had killed eighty odd 
negroes man women & children this is their report to me…I fully believe they are 
hartless enough to do any act that wicked men or devils could conceive.”589  Given the 
level of racial hostility that existed by 1864, slaughter of military-age non-combatant men 
was justified on both sides, albeit hesitantly, as a military necessity; but killing women 
and children offers powerful evidence of how fears of black emancipation had intensified 
the campaign against black soldiers and free blacks seeking to escape Confederate 
control.  The Confederate racial hierarchy could not permit slaves to escape or black men 
to bear arms, either as soldiers or as teamsters in the employ of the Union.  Other Union 
survivors of the battle recorded in early May that a Confederate surgeon had confirmed 
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that it was “a settled rule of action of the Confederates to show no quarter to colored men 
in our military service.”590  Taken in isolation, this report could be interpreted as biased, a 
piece of propaganda, but Confederate witnesses told a similar tale of bloodshed and 
mayhem. 
      The execution of black refugees and teamsters occurred without the provocation of 
black soldiers in Colonel Drake’s command.  The Confederate forces tore into the Union 
ranks, and after the surrender of the white troops, proceeded to slaughter systematically 
all the blacks they encountered.  Confederate Major John N. Edwards of Shelby’s 
Brigade wrote in 1867 that the scenes following the battle were sickening to behold.   
“No orders, threats or commands could restrain the men from vengeance on the negroes,” 
Edwards commented, “and they were piled in great heaps about the wagons, in the 
tangled brushwood, and upon the muddy and trampled road.”591 The massacre at Marks’ 
Mills matched the significance of Poison Springs, and served as a object lesson in terror, 
designed to intimidate blacks and ensure white supremacy through senseless violence.  
     The murder of these non-combatants offered a further signal as to how blacks serving 
in the Union army would be treated if captured.  White and black units alike 
acknowledged the savage turn of events that first had been manifested at Poison Springs 
and then at Marks’ Mills.  One Union soldier, Corporal Charles Musser of the Twenty-
Ninth Iowa Infantry swore, “If they raise the black flag, we can fight under it…I say give 
the rebels no quarter, and the feeling is the same throughout the army in the west.  We 
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will retaliate.”592 Colonel Crawford’s Second Kansas Colored shared these sentiments and 
made known that no prisoners would be taken.593  What had become a war of annihilation 
led Union and Confederate forces into increasingly savage battles and cycles of reprisals.  
White Union soldiers could look askance at the rage of their black counterparts, but few 
could appreciate the high price of failure should a black unit surrender. 
     Unlike the aftermath of Poison Spring, few whites fell after the escort surrendered en 
masse, their numbers muted by a piecemeal defense and poor leadership.  Perhaps 
lacking the same imperative to fight to the last that motivated black units and 
demoralized by the viciousness of the Confederate attacks, the white regiments saw 
surrender as an honorable alternative to destruction.  Prisoner exchanges or paroles could 
also be expected from their white Confederate enemies.  The blacks accompanying the 
train suffered immensely.  The ferocity of Confederate treatment of black refugees and 
servants sickened one Confederate at marks’ Mills, Major John Edwards recounting “No 
threats, no orders or commands could restrain the men from vengeance on negroes, and 
they piled up in great heaps around the wagons.”594 
     The slaughter at Marks’ Mills and the loss of a second train destroyed Steele’s final 
hope to re-supply his starving command.  Deprived of over four hundred wagons and 
eight pieces of artillery, escort troops, and vital logistical capacity, Steele could no longer 
remain at Camden.  If he tarried at Camden, resurgent Confederate forces would mass to 
destroy his Army of Arkansas, and despite Camden’s strong defenses, he reported to 
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Major General Halleck, “the country is well nigh exhausted of supplies. And the people 
threatened with starvation.”595  His army’s long supply lines offered Steele his only 
reliable source of sustenance and materiel, and with the twin losses at Poison Spring and 
Marks’ Mills, the lowering of the waters in the Ouachita River, and Banks’ defeat, Steele 
possessed no other viable alternative to retreat other than battle.  Steele ruled out the last 
option: the army would march east.596 Major General Steele could not hold Camden long 
if his supplies failed him, his spent army faced starvation and capitulation if he could not 
sustain it. 
      The scene in Camden on April 20 could only be interpreted as the preparations of a 
demoralized army to withdraw from a rapidly closing trap.  Confronted by increasing 
numbers of starving animals and unable to subsist thousands of mules and horses at 
Camden, General Steele ordered the destruction of surplus wagons. Ethan Earle detailed 
this chapter of the campaign in his journal with some detail.   While the army reduced its 
subsistence requirements, its soldiers reduced their loads to the bare minimum.  Soldiers 
kept muskets, cartridge boxes and ammunition, and the officers the clothing on their 
backs.  The Army’s regiments retained one wagon each for their needs, and the army 
consigned wagonloads of ammunition, cannons, and rations to the river’s waters.597  The 
destruction of Union property continued well into the night and the next day. 
     While Steele’s quartermaster supervised the burning of wagons and regiments 
prepared for movement, the fate of many of the Federal wounded lay in doubt.  Having 
retained its ambulance train, Steele’s army could transport less severely wounded.  The 
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most severely wounded occupied spaces in a house near Camden that became a field 
hospital. When the Federal army departed, the wounded became prisoners of war.  First 
Sergeant James Morgan of Company H, as well as other wounded personnel, came under 
Confederate control April 26. Morgan’s treatment directly contradicted reports of 
Confederates executing all wounded black Federals, and proved a rare example of 
wounded black soldiers receiving humane care from their Confederate captors.598  The 
difference in treatment appears to be related to what Confederate units captured the 
Union soldiers.  Soldiers captured by Maxey’s Choctaws or Texans suffered gruesome 
indignities.  The First Kansas Colored experienced Confederate hospitality at Poison 
Spring, and the companies determined to prepare themselves to resist future treatment by 
reorganizing and refitting almost immediately after the battle. 
********************** 
     The First Kansas Colored prepared for the Army of Arkansas’ departure by 
consolidating its ranks and transferring weapons between companies to equip those in 
which soldiers lacked rifles and the necessary accoutrements.  Company F turned over 
twenty-three arms to Company A, and fifteen to Company B, Companies A, C, F and K 
also received new ordnance supplies.599   When the army marched, the First Kansas 
Colored would do so prepared for additional combat with its reduced compliment.  The 
Army of Arkansas would depart Camden not as victors, but as men driven to escape a 
victorious Confederate army.  The First and Second Kansas also marched under the 
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shadow of racial retaliation and retribution, cognizant of the massacre of their fellow 
soldiers at Fort Pillow by Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest, and the equally 
savage treatment of black refugees accorded them by General Fagan at Marks’ Mills. 600   
Surrendering black soldiers suffered horrific fates; therefore to avoid being buried alive, 
summary execution, or re-enslavement, the soldiers of Colored Regiments could not and 
would not accept defeat until their last ability to resist was completely shattered.  The 
regiments would march accompanied by hundreds of contrabands determined, much 
those at Marks’ Mills, to escape bondage at any price.   
     The First Kansas Colored followed orders in March 1864 ready to uphold their 
reputation as combat veterans.  Instead of laurels for a successful campaign, the First 
Kansas Colored added the names of Prairie D’Ane, and Poison Spring to its regimental 
colors.  Glory came not in the form of a victory march through Shreveport, but simply 
through surviving the campaign.  Before the regiment could return to Fort Smith and 
more familiar surroundings, one additional test awaited the Army of Arkansas.  The 
muddy hell of Jenkins’ Ferry would wring the last bit of effort from the Union army, and 
offer the black soldiers of Thayer’s command another opportunity to prove themselves in 
battle.  Their Confederate foes cast down the gauntlet at Poison Spring, and at Jenkins’ 
Ferry the Second Kansas Colored would avenge the First in an orgy of bloodletting and 
reprisal that set the tone for the remainder of the war.  Colored Regiments at Poison 
Spring and Fort Pillow endured Confederate wrath, and the slaughter of black non-
combatants at Marks Mills served as the inspiration for other Colored Regiments to 
heartily embrace the black flag of “no quarter” war.   
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     In the midst of defeat, the First Kansas Colored earned the approval of Union 
regiments and fought back against Confederate enemies with such passion and skill that 
although victorious, the rebels estimated the numbers of black troops at numbers three or 
four times larger than the actual number of men present.  The First Kansas Colored would 
not be beaten in battle, defeated perhaps, but not broken or beaten.  The spirit of the First 
Kansas Colored’s soldiers sustained a significant blow, but the soldiers and officers of the 
regiment held as their prize the total emancipation of the black race.  In this regard the 
First Kansas Colored emerged victorious from Poison Spring, a regiment determined to 
uphold the honor of their race and cognizant of their role as symbol for other black men 
to emulate in their support for the Union and for freedom.  
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Chapter 8 
“It has become a War of Extermination”  
 
 
     The First Kansas Colored’s departure from Fort Smith at the end of March 1864 
occurred in an atmosphere of confidence, despite rushed conditions and crippling 
logistical difficulties. Barely a month later the regiment and the Army of Arkansas faced 
an uncertain fate as the Confederates gathered power from their Arkansan sympathizers.  
The trap appeared to be closing on the Army of Arkansas at Camden.  The Camden 
Campaign and its losses left the regiment much diminished in combat power and 
leadership.  Its casualties and the aftermath of the battle affected many of other regiments 
in the Army of the Frontier. Their assessment of the regiment’s performance in past 
battles and post duty served as the crucible for racial prejudice and a testing ground for  
black soldiers in the cauldron of war.  
      Licking its wounds at Camden, the Army of Arkansas struggled to deal with near 
starvation conditions for soldiers and animals. Steele’s last gambled to subsist his army 
failed at Marks Mills.  When news of the defeat reached Steele, the last act of the 
Camden Campaign played out.  The junction of Confederate Generals Price and Smith 
left Steele with little in the way of options. Steele, confronted with defeat if he kept his 
starving army at Camden, ordered a retreat after holding a command council with his 
subordinate commanders.  General Thayer, his command exhausted from their exertions 
and facing a long return march to Fort Smith, voted in favor of withdrawing to the 
Federal lines around Little Rock, the sooner the better.  His decision appears to have been 
precipitated by the losses at Poison Springs and Marks’ Mills, the supply lines too long 
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and exposed for adequate protection.601  The army’s leadership decided to march light and 
divest the command of all unnecessary encumbrances and march at top speed for the 
safety of Union lines at Little Rock. 
Jenkins Ferry 
     The process of preparing the Army of Arkansas for the retreat occurred with the 
greatest haste, and in their fervor to prevent any supplies from falling into Confederate 
hands, Union personnel acted rashly.   Tents and heavy cooking utensils joined the wagon 
pyres, as did rations of hardtack and bacon that the hungry soldiers could have consumed 
instead of the flames.  Soldiers would march on minimal rations, with only corn meal and 
hardtack to last them until the safety of Union lines.602   
     Captain Earle recorded the First Kansas Colored’s preparations; the men kept their 
rifles, cartridge boxes and ammunition, while the officers retained nothing but the 
clothing on their backs.  In addition, Earle reported that on April 26, the army dumped 
forty wagon-loads of ammunition and vast amounts of rations such as sugar, coffee and 
medicines into the Ouachita River to prevent them from falling into Confederate hands.  
The route chosen for the Federal columns also varied, “the hospital train of twenty-four 
ambulances and three or four hundred disabled men mounted on mules was destined for 
Pine Bluff, and the Army to Little Rock.”603  Preparations cut deeply into the Federal 
army’s substance, and the large numbers of wagons without cargo that would otherwise 
encumber the retreat could not block the roads with their slow-moving bulk. 
     Steele’s Quartermaster acted quickly and destroyed ninety-two wagons and a large 
supply of harness for the animals no longer able to pull the wagons.  Captain Henry 
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endeavored to save the surplus mules, but ultimately lost the majority during the retreat 
from Camden.604  The poor Arkansas roads compelled orders to destroy wagons, the 
realization that the same poor Arkansas roads that slowed Steele’s advance into 
southwest Arkansas would slow his command during a retreat.  Consequently, destroyed 
clothing and surplus wagons, and record books, munitions wagons and ambulances were 
the few exceptions to the destruction order.  After the crippling losses sustained at Poison 
Springs and Marks’ Mills, only one hundred and fifty wagons remained to serve Steele’s 
command.605 Steele’s infantry and artillery it appeared, would measure the pace of the 
retreat. 
     Preparations among at least one regiment’s officers took a decidedly grim tone.  
Convinced that the disproportionate casualties suffered by the First Kansas Colored 
indicated deliberate efforts to murder black soldiers in accordance with Confederate 
President Jefferson Davis’ orders, Colonel Samuel Crawford, the commander of the 
Second Kansas Colored, convened an officer’s council.  The day after Poison Spring, the 
officers of the Second Kansas Colored swore that their regiment would treat Confederates 
as they treated the First Kansas Colored’s soldiers and officers.   As a group the men 
swore, “that in the future the regiment would take no prisoners so long as the Rebels 
continue to murder our men; wounded Confederates would be left where they fell.”606  
The Second Kansas Colored’s officers and soldiers knew that the Confederacy 
considered them to be criminals, but the Confederates transgressed first, and by 
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mutilating and murdering the men of the First Kansas Colored, no Confederates caught in 
similar straits could expect mercy.  
     Uncertainty regarding the next phase of the campaign pervaded the ranks of the Army 
of Arkansas, and the abandonment of Camden’s formidable defenses signaled to many 
that the army faced utter defeat if retreat failed.  Captain Heinemann, a Union officer at 
Camden described the preparations in blunt terms, ““General S. has but one plan, in 
which we all join without dissenting voice.  It is: save our artillery and baggage, run like 
whiteheads for the Saline bottom, cut through anything that puts itself in our way,” and 
then “with the river at our back, the bog on our flanks, face about and fight for our lives.  
Will we make this point?  That is the question.”607  The army’s fate depended in 
outrunning the Confederate army and gaining the relative safety of the Saline River.  If 
the army could put a river between its divisions and the Confederates, salvation seemed 
possible. 
     The Union army assembled under cover of night, prepared to march the one hundred 
and twenty miles from Camden to Little Rock.  The subterfuge of doubled pickets and 
tattoo convinced Confederate spies that the army remained in Camden, while the main 
body of the Federal army took the road east to the Federal lines.608 The deception bought 
the Federal army an entire day of movement, and when the Confederates realized that the 
Army of Arkansas no longer occupied the city, the pursuit commenced. The Federals 
possessed an advantage at this stage: the Army of Arkansas retained its pontoon bridge.  
Lacking a means to bridge rivers quickly, the Confederate army lost a day in its pursuit as 
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engineers worked to span the Ouachita River.609  This lack of bridging capacity proved a 
fatal drag on the Confederate pursuit, and at Jenkins Ferry the Federal pontoon bridge 
once again saved Steele’s army. 
     Federal progress proved slow despite the best efforts to husband the logistical train’s 
animals.  The starving animals obtained their last forage the day after leaving Camden; 
no further forage was obtained for the next six days.610 Man and beast alike forged 
forward through the haze of exhaustion, but the effort of the retreat showed in its wake.  
When their Confederates picked up the retreating army’s trail, the total rout of the Union 
forces appeared likely.  Union soldiers discarded weighty items from their haversacks 
along the route, and the spoor of the Union troops littered the roads where it passed.  Men 
retained arms, ammunition and little else in their haste to outrun their pursuers.611  
Trudging along with the Union army, many recently freed slaves chanced their lives in 
the retreat, willing to share the army’s misery in a bid for freedom.  
     The Federal army arrived at Jenkins Ferry on April 29.  The army’s engineers swiftly 
spanned the rain-swollen Saline River with a pontoon bridge.  The Saline River bottoms 
proved a nightmare, for an incessant downpour reduced roads to a morass of mud.  The 
mud devoured wagons.  Engineer Captain Wheeler described a scene in which “Wagons 
sank to the axles and mules floundered about without a resting place for their feet… the 
rain came down in torrents, putting out [the fires],” exhausted men and animals “sank 
down into the mud and mire, wherever they were, to seek a few hours’ repose.” 612 
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The soldiers of the Army of Arkansas labored through the night. Colonel James Garrett 
of the 40th Iowa Volunteers reported that his men consumed nothing for five days during 
the Camden retreat, their efforts sustained by little more than coffee and a single ration of 
meat the day of the battle of Jenkins’ Ferry.613  There is little evidence to suggest any 
different for the remainder of the Army of the Frontier, and many soldiers labored despite 
injuries and privation to ensure that the Federal retreat proceeded without pause. 
     Those units that fought their way through the sea of mud endured additional 
tribulations after clearing the bottoms.  The roads leading from the river bottoms sucked 
at the wagons and mules, and called for desperate measures to keep the precious wagons 
moving eastward.  Under more favorable conditions the army corduroyed bad roads, but 
in this stretch of road the very forces of nature conspired against the Federals, and the 
inadequate brush and small trees prevented any improvements of the road.  Therefore, 
wagons that suffered damage or carried inconsequential cargo met with destruction, and 
failing mules gave way to straining men that pushed the wagons through the muddy 
track.614  General Thayer’s command secured the crossing site. Men strained to free 
wagons and destroy abandoned military equipment, while General Solomon’s division 
completed the river crossing.  The First Kansas Colored, as part of the security of the 
bridging site, occupied positions to the fore of the army in order to cover its rear against 
cavalry raids during the crossing.615  As a consequence of this decision, the First Kansas 
Colored did not directly engage in battle at Jenkins’ Ferry, but played a vital role in 
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protecting the Federal rear during the engagement.   When the battle commenced, 
Thayer’s Division, less the Second Kansas Colored, acted as the advance guard for the 
Army of Arkansas, and secured the road to Little Rock as the remaining divisions of the 
army engaged Confederate troops in battle. 
     Although the First Kansas Colored did not directly participate in the combat at Jenkins 
Ferry, its soldiers shared the misery and privation suffered by all units in Steele’s 
retreating army.  The First Kansas Colored, the senior Colored regiment of the Army of 
Arkansas, lacked the firepower necessary to hold a place with the main Union force, but 
the Second Kansas Colored’s infantry received orders to join the Union line along the 
Saline as the last Union elements attempted to complete their crossing the morning of 
April 30. The Second Kansas Colored’s skill and determination during the battle won the 
approval of white Union units.   
     The battle of Jenkins Ferry pitted the exhausted, but well defended remnant of Steele’s 
army against piecemeal attacks by a number of Confederate regiments of Price’s Army, 
some of which marched north after soundly defeating Banks’ column south of 
Shreveport.  The terrain around Jekins’ Ferry offered little cause for either set of 
combatants to cheer.   The river overflowed its banks and created a wet hell for all 
combatants, but especially for the attacking Confederates that would have to cross the 
river before closing with the Federal army.   
      The Second Kansas Colored stood with Federal troops near the river, its near-full 
ranks providing vital firepower to the Federal army while the regiment straddled the road 
east. The Second Kansas Colored ached to avenge the slaughter of the First Kansas 
Colored and the Confederate’s abominable treatment of blacks.  During the battle the 
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Second Kansas Colored met Confederate infantry with fast, well-delivered volleys, and 
when Ruffer’s Missouri battery deployed opposite the regiment, the men shredded its 
crews with close-range musketry.  Seeing the guns quieted, the infantry of the Second 
Kansas Colored charged and captured the guns at bayonet point, shouting “Poison 
Springs!” The black infantry, eager for revenge on the men that massacred their fellow 
First Kansas Colored soldiers, purportedly bayoneted their prisoners and cut the throats 
of wounded Confederate artillerists when they captured the two-gun battery.616 The 
Second Kansas Colored’s revenge assumed fevered proportions, shocking white Federals 
with its intensity. 
     The white Union regiments that fought alongside the Second Kansas Colored 
witnessed their black counterparts wreak their retribution upon the wounded 
Confederates.  White Union combatants recorded savage deeds, and one witness 
observed a black soldier smashing at a wounded Confederate gunner with the butt of his 
gun.  The blacks “want[ed] to kill every wounded reb they come to, and will do it too if 
we did not watch them.”617 The black soldiers of the Second Kansas Colored and their 
white officers avenged the horrible deeds perpetrated on the First Kansas Colored with 
their own equally reprehensible deeds. Terror was met with terror. 
      Colonel Crawford and his officers understood the nature of black flag warfare as well 
as Colonel Williams and his men.  The desperate fighting in which both Kansas Colored 
regiments engaged with Confederate forces in their respective battles transcended the 
immediate combat and stood as a test of wills and renegotiation of racial identity.  The 
Second Kansas Colored at Jenkins Ferry engaged in acts contrary to civilized warfare, 
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and Confederate reports conveyed outrage at the Second Kansas Colored’s deeds.  
Confederates may have felt vindicated in their claims of black savagery in battle, the 
killing of prisoners excusable when practiced against black men, but a sign of 
unspeakable barbarity when conducted by former slaves against their social and racial 
betters.  The hypocritical southern attitude appeared justified in southern eyes, black men 
could not be allowed to live after challenging white authority, whereas white Confederate 
soldiers protected their homes and way of life against a perfidious Yankee invader 
willing to stoop to servile insurrection to obtain victory.  
      Various anecdotes illustrate the perceived degeneration of the black race: a severely 
wounded Confederate officer claimed to have lost his lower jaw to a gunshot wound 
sustained after the battle. Black soldiers roamed the battle field as the main Union army 
prepared to withdraw, the vengeful men seeking out wounded Confederates in the muck 
and slime to reenact the Twenty-Ninth Texas and Choctaw Indians’ treatment of the First 
Kansas Colored by cutting the white throats of wounded Confederates.  Wounded 
Confederates suffered mutilation at the hands of black soldiers, and witnesses confirm 
reports of wounded soldiers being stabbed, and ears cut off.618 Confederate massacres and 
mistreatment of black soldiers and civilians generated the impulse for revenge at Jenkins 
Ferry, no mention of black flag, or “no quarter war,” appears in dispatches, but the fact 
remains that Jenkins’ Ferry put paid to Confederate efforts to crush black soldiers’ will to 
fight.      
     The Camden Campaign’s denouement achieved one goal.  However suspect the 
exacting of revenge appeared to observers, the Second Kansas Colored impressed white 
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Union soldiers with their performance in battle.  One white Kansan officer, Lieutenant 
W.B. Clark, in a letter later published in the Fort Scott Daily Monitor praised the Second 
Kansas: “The colored soldiers fought with desperate valor... History has nothing better.  
That man is a traitor, who disputes the valor of Kansas soldiers, white or black.619  Black 
soldiers proved their utility to Kansas and the Union through their battlefield service, a 
duty that separated men from shirkers, and by extension elevated the black race in the 
eyes of Union soldiers. 
     The after action reports of the battle speak volumes to the worth of black soldiers in 
battle, and the laurels accorded the Second Kansas Colored came from the commanders 
of the white units alongside which the Second Kansas repelled successive Confederate 
attacks throughout the day.  Brigadier Solomon described the Second Kansas Colored as 
possessing “conspicuous gallantry,” and Brigadier General C.C. Andrews offered 
“particular praise [for] the Kansas colored troops for their stubborn valor.”620  Perhaps the 
most powerful testimony from the Federal commanders came from General Steele 
himself in a report to General Halleck on his army’s conduct during the Camden 
Campaign.  Steele opined “the conduct of the colored troops of my command proves that 
the African can be made as formidable in battle as a soldier of any other color…”621   
These men did not have a direct and intimate connection to the two Kansas regiments, 
and the black men earned  glowing praise from men more circumspect about the value of 
blacks in the Union ranks.  Steele’s praise for black soldiers is of special note because 
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Steele, unlike Thayer, did not employ his black soldiers in combat but, instead, utilized 
them as garrison troops in lieu of white units. 
     The Army of Arkansas wasted no time at Jenkins’ Ferry.  The men quickly refilled 
cartridge boxes and received the few remaining commissary stores, then prepared to 
resume the march to Little Rock.622 The Confederate cavalry under Brigadier General 
Fagan haunted the vicinity and further combat appeared likely despite the check 
administered the Confederate army at Jenkins’ Ferry.  Until Little Rock’s defenses 
shielded the army from attack, it remained vulnerable to destruction in detail by Fagan’s 
fast, hard-hitting cavalry. 
     Race continued to play a role in the events immediately following the battle of Jenkins 
Ferry.  Confederate ranks contained numerous soldiers burning for revenge against the 
black infantry, and vented their rage against black stragglers and wounded personnel. The 
Union army, as it retreated towards Little Rock, left behind one surgeon and two assistant 
surgeons to attend the wounded, and supplied hospital stores for their care. Seriously or 
fatally wounded personnel, including black soldiers of the First and Second Kansas 
Colored remained in the vicinity of Jenkins Ferry in the belief that wounded soldiers 
would receive humane treatment in lieu of almost guaranteed death or permanent injury if 
transported with the Federal army.623  Helpless, unable to rely upon anything but the hope 
that the Confederates would honor the neutrality of a hospital, the wounded black soldiers 
of the Army of Arkansas expected little sympathy.  The hope for humanitarian treatment 
proved a weak reed to rely upon when the Federal army departed. 
                                                
622 OR: Series I, Volume 34, Part III: Correspondence, 360 
623 General Order No 14, Headquarters Department of Arkansas, April 30, 1864, OR: Series I, Volume 34, 
Part III: Correspondence, 360; Steele to Halleck, May 4, 1864, OR: Series I, Volume 34, Part III: 
Correspondence, 699-671. 
 
 
326 
 
     Hospitals, under civilized rules of warfare could be taken under military control and 
the wounded therein made prisoners.  Often chaplains and doctors remained to look after 
the needs of the wounded, and to monitor any wounded prisoner exchanges that might 
occur as a result of negotiations between combatants.  The Union hospital at Princeton, 
Arkansas initially received protected status, but not all combatants respected it.  Surgeon 
William L. Nicholson of the 29th Iowa reported a Confederate soldier dressed as a Union 
officer sneaking into a storeroom in a hospital to murder black wounded personnel with a 
pistol.624   Killing wounded men in a hospital defied the accepted conventions of warfare, 
and however dispassionately Confederates greeted these reports of revenge, the black 
soldiers of the Army of Arkansas did not forget or forgive.   
     Regimental records verify the report of slaughtered personnel, and the Second Kansas 
Colored records indicate that Privates Andrew Jackson, Thomas Jackson, Joseph 
Washington, and Albert Warren, were murdered on May 8, 1864 while in the hospital at 
Jenkins Ferry.  Black soldiers also died of their wounds in prison.625  Perhaps proximity 
dictated response, and Confederates that witnessed the mutilation and killing of wounded 
whites at Jenkins’ Ferry felt justified in killing black patients.  The repercussions of the 
massacres visited upon black soldiers persisted for the rest of the war. 
     The next two days of the army’s progress occurred along wretched roads, and the 
starving soldiers eagerly watched for relief columns as they marched east. As the column 
neared Little Rock, General Steele altered their dispositions so that the victorious soldiers 
from the battle of Jenkins’ Ferry would lead the army’s entry to Little Rock.  The Third 
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Division and a company of the Second Kansas Colored marched at the head of the 
column, triumphantly escorting three captured guns. The column finally received relief 
on May 3, when a supply train from Little Rock arrived amid cheers of joy.626 The long 
nightmare of the retreat was over. 
     The results of the Camden Campaign left many long serving officers and soldiers 
disenchanted with General Steele’s leadership, and the poor results of the campaign 
crushed morale.  The Fort Scott Daily Monitor picked up on this theme when it reported 
an anecdotal incident of Colonel Williams challenging General Steele, Williams 
allegedly telling Steele to his face that he was a traitor.  According to the story, Steele 
“placed him under arrest; but released him in about fifteen minutes – All the leading 
officers called on him and informed him that it would not be healthy for him to keep 
Williams under arrest.”627  Doubtless Williams’s reputation as a courageous and 
competent soldier with powerful Kansan connections shielded him from retaliation, but 
his fiery dedication to his men serves as proof of his commitment to their welfare, and his 
disgust with Steele’s failure to relieve his command at Poison Springs. 
      Hope appeared in the most unlikely places during the campaign.  The First Kansas 
Colored, on the eve of the battle of Jenkins’ Ferry, found new strength amid the pain of 
retreat. Regimental enlistment also continued unabated during the campaign: Company C 
enlisted three men on April 29; Company D enlisted three men at Rome, Arkansas at the 
start of the campaign on April 8, and Company I one other; an additional six men joined 
Company A at Camden. The regiment, although held in reserve during the battle, 
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sustained losses.  The nighttime river crossing and mud April 29-30 claimed several 
victims, among them Company A’s Private Horace Monan’s reported as a prisoner of 
war, missing in action, and Private Edward Adams of Company B who died of his 
wounds at Jenkins Ferry on May 4, having suffered from them since April 18 and the 
battle of Poison Springs.628   
     The First Kansas Colored sustained the greatest manpower losses of the campaign, 
and when combined with those of attached units at Poison Spring, suffered two hundred 
and four killed. In contrast, the Second Kansas Colored lost fourteen men at Jenkins’ 
Ferry.629  The First Kansas Colored, as a result of the Camden Campaign, is recorded as 
sustaining the greatest number of casualties of any Kansas regiment in the Civil War.  
The First Kansas Colored’s 117 killed in action at Poison Spring constituted nearly 
fifteen percent of Kansas’ estimated 796 casualties killed in battle during the Civil War.630  
The First Kansas Colored’s men purchased their freedom in blood and sweat, and never 
bowed to surrender unless after a fierce battle to the last man or cartridge.  The First 
Kansas Colored’s courage would sustain Union efforts to prevent the resurgent 
Confederates from seeking to exploit the Federal weakness after the Camden campaign.    
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Return to Fort Smith 
     The Camden Campaign proved a greater danger to Federal fortunes in Arkansas than 
may have first appeared.  Stripping Fort Smith and Fort Gibson of their garrisons offered 
Confederate forces a tempting opportunity to capture the twin forts and eject the Union 
army from Indian Territory.  As early as April 6, Colonel Stand Watie and guerrilla 
leader William Quantrill received orders to prepare to attack the Union outposts around 
Fort Smith and Fort Gibson, and the two concentrated their forces near Boggy depot.631  
The reports of gathering Confederate forces under the command of the First Kansas 
Colored’s old enemies, Watie, Cooper and Maxey, gained increasing urgency as they 
filtered through to General Thayer. The Frontier Army’s absence in April emboldened 
Confederates, and the guerrilla bands that formed an essential part of the Confederate 
strategy terrorized freedmen while the Frontier Army fought in the south.  The black 
refugees of Fort Smith found life so intolerable that many sought passage north in lieu of 
the opportunity to farm locally due to the bushwhacker threat.632  Williams’ plan to create 
farming communities could not succeed in such an environment.  
     Union outposts came under increasing attack near Fort Smith and endured a number of 
raids against unfortified targets.   Guerrillas boldly attacked Roseville two times, and 
burned gins and one hundred and thirty three bales of cotton.  Colonel Judson, the 
commander at Fort Smith cared little for trading twenty men’s lives for cotton in the 
attacks and proposed burning the cotton rather than guard it when no boats could remove 
it to Little Rock.  Judson’s concerns centered on the welfare of civilians in the vicinity of 
the fort; many of the black refugees held connections to the men of the Colored 
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Regiments and their upkeep required rations and armed details for protection. Pay delays, 
destitution and predatory Union troops enlisted in Arkansas added to the refugees’ 
woes.633  Colonel Judson, in mid-April, proposed to send refugees to Springfield in 
wagons rather than subject them to guerrilla raids and reprisals.634 The military situation 
demanded the utmost urgency, the increasing strength and frequency of Confederate raids 
directly threatening Fort Smith.  Self-sustainment proved difficult under constant 
guerrilla threat, Fort Smith and Fort Gibson reverted back to the cycle of confiscations 
and supply trains to meet their local needs. 
     The supply situation at Fort Smith competed with military matters in degree of 
urgency.  Confederate raids constrained foraging parties and the Chief of Depot 
Commissary wrote General Kimball in Little Rock pleading for supplies, stating “We 
must starve unless something is done immediately…We cannot exist here unless we can 
control the supplies for our troops…Actual starvation is staring us in the face.”635  
Relieving the command of the burden of feeding civilians could alleviate the supply 
situation, but Fort Smith required supplies of all kinds.   The Union army at Fort Smith, 
lacking adequate manpower to garrison outposts, undertook extensive upgrades to the 
defenses at this time.  Relying on the labor of the Eleventh Colored Infantry Regiment, 
the garrison constructed formidable blockhouses and forts to protect the vital supply 
depot.636 The Union command at Fort Smith possessed only 800 men to garrison these 
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forts and Fort Gibson, in total sixteen hundred soldiers to hold the defenses of the two 
forts, whereas formerly several thousand Union soldiers manned the forts and outposts.   
      The lack of manpower to fully man the Fort Smith did not slow the fortification 
party’s pace, and by the first of May, the fortifications included an impressive array of 
forts and rifle pits, and any attacker would face an entrenched foe.  The new defenses 
included a fort on the Texas Road equipped with two twelve-pound guns and a drop 
bridge. The largest fort, on the Van Buren Road, required another month to complete but 
when finished could hold five hundred men.637   When fully manned the forts could 
garrison several thousand soldiers, and in time of extreme need, some but not all of Fort 
Smith’s civilian populace. 
     Thayer’s Frontier Army rested for a scant four days before marching again.   The 
diminished command broke camp near Little Rock on May 6, and suffered few attacks 
from guerrillas during a ten-day trek back to Fort Smith.638  Thayer’s command deployed 
to their outposts again, determined to keep open the Arkansas River supply line from 
Little Rock to Dardanelle, a point eighty miles distant from Fort Smith.  Federal troops 
boarded every riverboat as escorts for the four-day journey north from Little Rock to Fort 
Smith.  Thayer, by transporting refugees of all colors away from his command on 
returning boats and Fort Scott-bound wagon trains resolved some of the refugee 
problem.639 
     The manifest necessity for regimental post details after arriving at Fort Smith 
demanded an increase in Union patrols to counterbalance Confederate guerrilla raids in 
western Arkansas.  Whereas before the campaign the guerrillas sought escape from 
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pursuing Union patrols, the losses of the failed Camden Expedition breathed new life into 
guerrilla bands. Guerrilla depredations prevented the local communities from resuming 
commerce or farming to any great degree.  The First Kansas colored received new 
assignments, and Lieutenant Horace Johnson assumed Provost Marshal duties at 
Clarksville, Arkansas.  The regiment obtained release from cotton confiscation duty and 
labored on the Fort Smith fortifications.640 While the soldiers of the First Kansas Colored 
worked hard at construction, their officers attempted to assess the damage of the 
campaign. Many of the First Kansas Colored’s men lost guns and equipment as 
evidenced by the charges for lost ordnance in their individual service records, and 
restoring the regiment to operational strength took priority for the officers. The regiment 
utilized the short period of refitting at Fort Smith to account for lost equipment, and 
obtained new issues of clothing, weapons and field equipment.641   
      The presence of approximately eight thousand Confederate soldiers in the vicinity of 
Fort Smith and Fort Gibson and the threat of imminent attack required combat effective 
troops. Thayer’s arrival at Fort Smith on May 16 with the Frontier Army although 
fortuitous, did not disperse Confederate forces. When not manning shovels, the First 
Kansas Colored and other Colored Regiments manned the forts, rifle pits and a protective 
abatis that girded the Fort’s defenses.642 Fort Smith finally possessed the fortifications 
necessary to safeguard the key post against attack, but the army’s existence was far from 
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secure.  Refugees and their demands weakened Thayer’s command, and as a result, their 
relocation gained importance in the summer of 1864. 
     Thayer’s refugee relocation scheme demanded great deliberation on his part.  The 
army’s supply woes did not abate after the Camden Campaign; the refugee communities 
of Fort Smith swelled to three thousand by the end of May.643 The scale of refugee 
relocations was staggering, and the numbers of departing refugees rivaled those of 
armies.  A train of over fifteen hundred refugees left Fort Smith on August 6, bound for 
northern communities exasperated by the steady influx from Arkansas. The ongoing 
refugee exodus from his command had repercussions for nearby Union states, for 
although many refugees voluntarily departed Fort Smith and traded one precarious 
existence for another, the receiving states had to provide for their needs.644 The massive 
shuffling of refugees to other regions added to the escort requirements of Thayer’s 
command, and every departing train or boat required escorts to ensure the safety of the 
refugees.  The lesson of Mark’s Mills had taught the army that non-combatant status was 
no defense against guerrilla raiders bent on punishing escaping slaves for their infidelity 
to their former masters. 
Rehabilitation and Reorganization      
     Reestablishing Union control in Indian Territory and western Arkansas occurred at a 
time when Federal armies also fought great campaigns in the east.  Union soldiers and 
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officers alike devoured news from other parts of the war for a number of reasons, one of 
which was to place their own experience in the context of the overall Union efforts.   
Comparing their battles to those in the east brought readers a sense of how their battles 
compared those in other theaters and contributed to alleviating any sense of regional 
isolation.  Captain Graton eagerly followed the news of the eastern theater and the 
fighting in Virginia.645  What happened in the east affected the west, even if only 
peripherally, for a Union victory in the east could hasten or end the war in the west.  
News from Kansas and Arkansas reported matters closer to home, and gave readers an 
idea of how their performance could be interpreted by civilian readers.   
     The First Kansas enjoyed a good reputation in Kansas as a fighting regiment, and its 
deeds received favorable coverage in Kansas and Arkansas newspapers.  Newspapers 
recognized the First Kansas Colored’s performance during the Camden Campaign, and 
approved of the regiment’s bravery at Poison Spring.  The Little Rock Unconditional 
Union reported that the regiment withstood four charges before giving way to 
Confederate attacks, while the Fort Smith New Era praised the fortitude and fighting 
spirit of the First Kansas Colored in a heroic tone: “the boys, after spending all their own 
ammunition, took what was left in the cartridge boxes of the slain and continued the fight 
to the last.”646 The shift in perception is striking because the regiment, although defeated 
in battle, did not receive criticism for its fighting qualities.  Instead of emphasizing a 
defeat that could have been reported in a very negative manner as indicative of black 
military deficiencies, the First Kansas Colored’s performance at Poison Springs was 
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celebrated.  The battle was transformed into a triumph of willpower and discipline in the 
face of hopeless odds. White observers finally acknowledged the First Kansas Colored’s 
spirit, and the fact that the Fort Scott Union Monitor choose to reprint it pays tribute to 
the growing Kansas pride in the accomplishments of its black soldiers.  
     Kansan papers appeared to take ownership of the First Kansas Colored.  When 
Lieutenant McFarland of Company D wrote a letter that described the regiment’s 
experience during the Camden Campaign, the Leavenworth Daily Conservative published 
it.  McFarland’s letter cast the First Kansas Colored’s in a heroic role, the embattled 
regiment “surrounded, and [forced to] cut our way out.  We were fighting against ten 
thousand rebels.  The niggers fought like hell.”647  The speed in which the story ran 
indicates the immediacy of the battle for Kansan readers, and effectively forestalled any 
rumors of cowardice or incompetence. Closer to the recent battles in Arkansas, the Little 
Rock Unconditional Union’s editor condemned the deaths of black non-combatants and 
Union soldiers in battles such as Marks’ Mills.648  The failed campaign’s consequences 
were not all negative, and change in the officer ranks brought a new opportunity to the 
black soldiers in the Army of the Frontier. 
     One of the few positive outcomes of the Camden Campaign, and one important to 
black Kansans, Colonel Williams received orders promoting him to the command of the 
Second Brigade of the Frontier Army.  Williams’ promotion brought the First and Second 
Kansas Colored Infantry Regiments, the Eleventh United States Colored Troops and the 
Fifty-Fourth United States Colored Troops under a single commander with long 
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connections to black soldiers and their cause.649  The reorganization of the Second 
Brigade under Williams’ command promised better treatment and greater opportunities 
for black soldiers and their families. 
     The First Kansas Colored returned to Fort Smith with gaping holes in its muster rolls., 
Williams, in order to meet the need for more soldiers, authorized the creation of a 
recruiting detachment to return to Kansas and canvass the black community for additional 
volunteers. Amongst the men selected for the detachment were officers and soldiers from 
the communities of eastern Kansas, local men that could appeal to the black community 
based on their combat experience and fidelity to the black cause.  Captain Welch of 
Company K, from Fort Scott, would muster men with the assistance of First Lieutenant 
Macy of Company C, and Clinton, Kansas.   Enlisted soldiers Sergeant Joe Carras of 
Company A, and Sergeant Scipio Johnson of Company K, hailed from Leavenworth and 
Wyandotte respectively, while Privates Sampson Berry of Company G and Private James 
Jacobs of Company K represented Lawrence and Leavenworth.650  This detachment 
departed for Kansas at the end of May, but proved unsuccessful.   
     The shortage of new recruits may have been a consequence of the success of the black 
Kansan recruiting efforts in 1863.  The First and Second Kansas Colored’s had scoured 
the state between January and October 1863, and then recruiters for the Eighteenth U.S. 
Colored Infantry successfully enlisted seventy-seven men primarily from Wyandotte and 
Leavenworth between February and June 1864.  The Second and Eighteenth rejected few 
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recruits.651  The First Kansas Colored’s reinforcements therefore came from local 
Arkansas sources.  A second class of reinforcements originated from the return of 
deserters to the regiment’s ranks. 
     Numbers of deserters, perhaps aware but undeterred by the heavy cost paid by their 
fellow soldiers on the Camden Campaign, returned to service voluntarily.  Seven 
deserters were restored to duty after forfeiting pay and allowances accrued during their 
unauthorized absence.652  Balancing the return of the former deserters against new 
desertions indicates a net gain of soldiers, and desertion in the enlisted ranks dwindled to 
three men between May and August 1864653  Disease, the other great source of manpower 
loss,  claimed ten men, and one soldier died from an accidental gunshot wound.654  The 
stable regimental manpower could be interpreted as confirmation of the black soldiers’ 
commitment to the Union cause and commitment to their friends and fellow soldiers.   
      Replacing the non-commissioned officers killed during the Camden Campaign 
required promotions beginning from the rank of Corporal through to Company First 
Sergeant. Tempering promotions were the reductions of Non-Commissioned officers, 
among them First Sergeant Jeremiah Hall of Company D and Sergeant Charles Jackson 
of Company K, both men reduced to the ranks for “disobeying orders and unsoldierly 
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conduct.”655  The changes in the enlisted ranks, although disruptive, did not compare with 
those in the officer ranks.  The return from the Camden Campaign began an exodus of 
experienced officers that deprived the regiment of many of its most experienced officers. 
     The officer ranks thinned almost upon the regiment’s arrival at Fort Smith. The 
military life was hard on soldiers, but officers unlike their soldiers could resign for a 
variety of reasons. Medical ailments were the foremost reason for resignations, many of 
the men citing diseases or injury contracted during military service. The regiment lost 
Surgeon Abijah Tenny and Assistant Surgeon Eliab Macy within a month of each other, 
the former citing back injury sustained during the Camden campaign, the latter bedeviled 
by dyspepsia and dysentery to the point of prostration.  Chaplain Hutchinson also 
resigned due to general disability and personal finances.  Officers also resigned due to 
ailments ranging from variocule (scrotal swelling) and chronic diarrhea, to liver 
inflammation. Captain Ethan Earle cited an ankle injury sustained at Prairie D’Ann when 
his horse fell on him, as his reason for departing the regiment. The most debilitated was 
Lieutenant Horace Johnson whose list of ailments included recurring typhoid fever, 
anemia, and almost complete loss of vision in one eye.656  The spate of medically-related 
resignations can be interpreted in two ways: the resigning officers no longer could sustain 
their service due to ailments preventable today, but beyond the ability of Civil War 
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medicine to cure, and the officers knew medical discharges had the greatest acceptance 
rates, especially when certified by one’s regimental surgeons. 
     Officer losses, combined with the loss of veteran company grade Non-Commissioned 
Officers, left the regiment with a diminished capacity for leadership.  The Camden 
Campaign exacted a thirty percent loss of company grade officers (nine from a 
complement of 30), resignations reduced and the headquarters staff by three (four if the 
perennially absent Lieutenant Colonel Bowles is included). A turnover rate of this 
magnitude changed the character of the regiment’s officer corps and required less 
experienced Lieutenants filled the roles of Captains. Colonel Williams’s absence from the 
regiment, devolved command to Major Ward, one of the stalwarts in the officer ranks.  
Temporary officers joined the regiment under orders in order to help compensate for its 
manpower losses.  However, only Eli Bouten, one of the six temporary officers seconded 
from the Thirteenth Kansas Infantry and the Ninth Kansas cavalry accepted the offer of a 
commission in the regiment.657   New permanent regimental officers to replace those that 
resigned did not muster until January 1865.  
      The performance of the First Kansas colored may not have affected the decisions of 
temporary officers to join the regiment.  Cavalry Sergeants may have wanted to stay in 
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their more prestigious outfits.  White Kansans may also have declined commissions 
because of discomfort over a more permanent commitment to black soldiers, and by 
extension their particular politicized status as fighting units.  However, no evidence of 
overt racism exists in the regimental records. Kansas white regiments displayed little 
reluctance after early 1863 to serve alongside black units, especially after the First and 
Second Kansas Colored regiments displayed their fighting spirit.   
     The new permanent officers that joined the regiment would be the product of 
promotion boards designed to select the best white officers for black regiments. Senator 
Lane’s ability to directly commissioning diminished as voluntary commissioning of white 
officers across the Union Army replaced local appointments.  The loss of the Lane’s 
appointees that originally led the regiment affected its distinctive abolitionist character, 
far too many of the original officers killed, captured or resigned to retain the regiment’s 
connection with the formative battles of Island Mound and Cabin Creek.  The enlisted 
character would change too, albeit slowly.  The once clearly Missouri-Kansas 
composition, gave way to a hybrid organization pared by casualties and altered by 
Arkansas recruits.   
     Several factors may have ensured continuity in the ranks while the regimental officer 
structure changed.  Although injuries plagued the ranks and resulted in discharges 
through 1865, no drastic non-combat enlisted personnel changes occurred in the period 
May to December 1864. The overt reliance on Colored Regiments to perform garrison 
fatigue duties policy may have influenced desertions in the past, but army-wide 
discontent amongst black regiments aroused by fatigue duty and the inordinate number of 
labor details, officially ended in June 1864. Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas, the 
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officer responsible for the overall recruiting of black soldiers throughout the Union Army 
issued Orders Number 21 in June, and directed the practice of using black soldiers 
disproportionately as labor on fortifications be discontinued in order to prepare the men 
for combat duties.658 Black men did not enlist to work as stevedores or camp details, they 
hungered for the chance to fight the enemy on the field of battle.  Spadework appeared 
too much like the lot of the common laborer, and soldiers sought battle, not a renewal of 
manual labor that smacked of slavery’s repressive overtones.   
Summer 1864: Renewed Combat and Challenges 
      The Confederate armies of Generals Maxey and Cooper were not idle during the 
summer of 1864, and renewed their efforts to isolate Fort Smith and Fort Gibson as part 
of their plans to retake control in the Trans-Mississippi.  Large numbers of Confederate 
troops haunted the vicinity of the Arkansas River and Fort Gibson, alert for any lapse in 
Union defenses. The Arkansas River played a vital part in Thayer’s supply strategy, a 
weakness that Confederate Colonel Stand Watie exploited in one of the most audacious 
raids of the Civil War.   
     Watie, on June 15, successfully ambushed the steamer J.R. Williams while it transited 
between Fort Smith and Fort Gibson.  Onboard the steamer a rich cargo of supplies and 
Indian goods awaited, guarded by a detachment of the Twelfth Kansas Infantry.  Watie’s 
Indians and opened fire on the steamer from carefully prepared artillery positions along 
the riverbank, precipitating a panic amongst the Union infantry, which jumped overboard 
to escape. The steamer ran aground and sans escort, surrendered its cargo of 150 barrels 
of flour, 16,000 pounds of bacon, and a large number of commissary stores.  The Indians 
quickly lost discipline in the ensuing scramble, and after taking their fill a considerable 
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number of Creeks and Seminoles returned home.659 The Union survivors made their way 
to Fort Gibson and roused the Second Kansas Colored and the Second Indian Home 
Guard to pursue the Indians and recapture the cargo. The pursuit, although quickly 
organized did not prevent the looting and burning of the steamer, and confirmed Thayer’s 
inability to interdict Confederate raids.  
     The loss of the J.R. Williams cargo attested to the difficulty in maintaining Union 
supply lines on the river.  Adding to Thayer’s supply woes, when water levels dropped  
during the late summer, steamers could not navigate the river to bring in vital supplies.  
General Thayer had warning of the river’s limitations, and despite four steamers 
delivering their cargoes safely to Fort Smith in July, experienced boat captains warned 
Thayer that the water levels appeared unlikely to sustain any additional steamers from 
Little Rock.660  Thayer’s logistical alternative, wagon trains, played to the Confederate 
strengths in cavalry, and the distance from Fort Scott to Fort Gibson endangered Thayer’s 
strategy for the defense of Fort Gibson and Fort Smith. 
     Confederate forces in Indian Territory faced their own conundrum as they planned to 
cut Thayer’s supply lines: their own logistics could not support a large force along the 
Arkansas River, and its tributary the Poteau River, for long periods.  Despite capturing 
hundreds of Federal wagons during the Camden campaign, “only ten had been forwarded 
to Indian Territory.”661  Without wagons to bring supplies to the Confederate army, their 
advantages of numbers and mobility amounted for naught.   General Maxey possessed a 
secret weapon that could even the odds if Maxey could utilize the intelligence provided 
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by a spy at Fort Smith.  Maxey’s spy furnished detailed plans of the Federal defenses at 
Fort Smith and confirmed the departure of several units leaving the fort to aid General 
Steele elsewhere.  The spy, B.D. Ford also reported low morale and fewer than two 
thousand defenders.662 Confederate General Cooper acted on the intelligence to stage an 
attack on an isolated Federal cavalry regiment outside the fort’s defenses. 
     The Poteau River served as no significant impediment to Confederate forces, and 
Cooper’s raiding party crossed with no opposition.  A reconnaissance of Fort Smith’s 
defenses on July 26 confirmed its lack of preparedness, and after a leadership council that 
evening, Cooper directed Brigadier General Richard Gano of Maxey’s command to raid  
the Federal lines.  Subsequently, in a lightning attack the morning of July 27 Gano’s 
force routed the Sixth Kansas Cavalry at Massard Prairie in an engagement within five 
miles of Fort Smith. The Confederate forces suffered a defeat amidst victory; despite 
routing the regiment, the Confederate withdrawal afterwards cost Cooper’s command a 
wagon train that entered Fort Smith with desperately needed supplies.663  The Confederate 
operations around Fort Smith gained urgency as General Cooper interpreted the poor 
Federal defense at Massard Prairie as a sign that an attack on Fort Smith could capture 
the town and compel a Federal retreat. 
     General Cooper’s army, emboldened by its success, on July 31, attempted to assault 
the Fort Smith defenses. Cooper’s forces achieved initial success in pushing in the 
Federal pickets, but failed to breach the defenses after General Thayer counterattacked 
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with the aid of several batteries of Federal artillery.664 Furthermore, Captain Earle’s 
journal mentions an attack in which the First Kansas Colored defeated the enemy, but 
without his usual elaboration of events, although two companies of the First Kansas 
Colored deployed to protect the guns against the Confederates.665  Cooper’s chance to 
capture Fort Smith passed and his forces resumed their pattern of raiding Federal supply 
lines and burning hay camps.  A Confederate soldier noted, “I don’t think Maxey intends 
to take Fort Smith. We keep our horses, rode down scouting and picketing.  Two hundred 
red men left our camps yesterday evening going thru the vicinity of Fort Gibson to burn 
some hay…”666 Bigger developments concerned Confederate strategists in the west, 
particularly Major General Price, who sought to take the war into his home state of 
Missouri.  The massing of Confederate forces did not escape attention, and when Price 
led his army north into Missouri, Kansans employed Price’s preparatory period to 
undertake some revolutionary military preparations of their own.  
The Price Campaign 
     As military affairs in Indian Territory and western Arkansas returned to the familiar 
pattern of raid and reprisal, wartime Kansas also prepared for a resurgent Confederate 
army and the potential for an invasion of the state.  Several announcements, by their 
provocative tone, indicated growing accommodation with Kansas’s black population.  
George Dimon, the mayor of Fort Scott appealed to all citizens regardless of color to 
form militia companies to defend Fort Scott in case of emergency.  This proposal 
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received particular emphasis a week later, but with biting criticism, when the author of a 
letter to the editor suggested that blacks profited from white military service despite 
having a common interest in Fort Scott’s safety.  The author urged the use of “all power 
and influence [at the authorities’ command] to organize blacks into companies…else 
[blacks] shall imagine we are fighting while they…enjoy their ease.”667 The letter did not 
evidence any doubt regarding the ability of blacks to fight.  Instead it demanded that 
blacks do their share to protect Kansas, a reversal of the prevailing attitudes in Kansas 
when the First Kansas Colored formed.  Black men had proved they could fight, and now 
were expected to fight for Kansas if the state called on their services. 
       Mustering for militia service did not equate to unconditional social acceptance, and 
certainly did not constitute any endorsement of equality between the races.  The 
deteriorating situation in Indian Territory ad Fort Smith, and the decision to send refugees 
north to Kansas endeared few Kansans to the refugees.  Fort Scott’s role as host to 
refugees from points south appeared increasingly strained as violence began blacks and 
whites escalated, and in one case the murder of a white Kansan soldier by a black refugee 
how little racial equality had advanced despite black service.  The Fort Scott Daily 
Monitor’s urged that the black population be “taught their place.” Black refugees that 
proved willing received a fair opportunity, but the increasing numbers of indigent black 
refugees dependent on aid from the fort strained social bonds.  The Fort Scott Union 
Monitor also backed a concealed weapons ban for blacks within the bounds of the fort’s 
jurisdiction.668 Kansans extended a grudging welcome to black refugees provided they 
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proved useful, but indolent refugees generated resentment.  The spirit of opposition did 
not publicly extend to the black regiments of Kansas and their families, and the 
performance of the First and Second Kansas Colored remained a matter of pride for the 
Fort Scott press.   
********************** 
      The failed Confederate assault on Fort Smith alerted the First Kansas Colored’s men 
that their foes were not a spent force.  The Confederates remained a skilled and deadly 
enemy, and the guerrilla raids called for increasingly larger escorts to protect outposts 
and supply trains.  Details to support the Frontier Army continued unabated, and in 
August the regiment departed Fort Smith en route to Fort Gibson with a provisions train 
under the command of Captain John Graton.669  Fort Gibson’s need for government 
rations to feed its refugees increased throughout the summer as Confederate raids took a 
toll on attempts to establish local farms.  Escorting supply trains had proved deadly for 
the regiment in the past, and Union trains drew Confederate parties eager to try their hand 
at capturing the laden trains during transit.670 The distances between Fort Smith and Fort 
Gibson, as well as Federal supply depots at Fort Scott and Little Rock left General 
Thayer with the unenviable and conflicting duties required to preserve the Union’s hold 
on Indian Territory.  
     Thayer’s District of the Frontier covered an immense amount of territory and 
garrisoning the twin forts of Gibson and Smith stretched his logistics to the limits.  The 
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Camden Campaign adversely impacted operations in significant ways also, and the 
wagons lost in the campaign were sorely missed. Garrisoning forts and defending trains 
sapped Thayer’s strength, preventing him from striking a decisive blow against his 
Confederate foes. 
     The First Kansas Colored’s reputation for guarding trains did not suffer despite Poison 
Spring.  The First Kansas Colored had successfully brought through trains from Fort 
Scott in the past, and fought determined battles.  The First Kansas Colored could be 
relied upon to do its duty stoically, and professionally.  The chance of the First Kansas 
Colored surrendering a train appeared beyond the pale, and the black infantry would not 
surrender a train given their enemy’s intense hatred and history of massacre.  The First 
Kansas Colored fought, dug, and marched in Union service, dedicated to service until the 
war ended in Union victory.   
     The march of the First Kansas Colored from Fort Smith to Fort Gibson in September 
1864 began like so many other escort duties, and the infantry successfully escorted the 
train along the dusty trail to the austere surroundings of Fort Gibson.  The regiment 
received additional orders to form hay details after arriving at Fort Gibson.  Mowing 
down the prairie grass in order to create a stock of fodder for the winter was an essential 
task.  Sustaining the cavalry and the long trains of mules and horses required the 
maximum commitment of men to ensure that the supply line stayed open despite 
Confederate guerrillas and the ever-present threat of ambush.  However, for Company K, 
the summer’s hay making details ended with a horrific massacre akin to that of Poison 
Spring.  
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Chapter 9 
“All Men regardless of race shall serve” 
 
     The First Kansas Colored arrived at Fort Gibson as a regiment markedly different 
from the one that allied forth from Fort Smith in late March 1864.  The regiment had 
undergone three periods of transformation by this time.  The first period occurred 
between August 1862 and spring of 1863 when the regiment weathered its growing pains, 
shed blood for the Union at Island Mound, and then mustered for service at Fort Scott.  
The second transformation occurred in the summer of 1863 and winter of 1864 following 
the heady victories at Cabin Creek, Honey Springs and the garrisoning of Fort Smith.  
The third period, and the most traumatic, transpired between the Camden Campaign and 
the regiment’s arrival at Fort Gibson.   The First Kansas Colored was a veteran unit by 
September 1864, and although its personnel turnover had been significant, the regiment 
remained a stalwart unit of fighting men prepared to make whatever sacrifice necessary 
to ensure the freedom of the black race.    
     Over the next several months the regiment would serve a variety of roles across the 
District of the Frontier.  The Army of the Frontier’s cavalry force had lost much of its 
offensive capability due to a lack of remounts and the lingering effects of a drought killed 
the grass that the cavalry horses used for fodder.  Infantry could march to locations that 
the cavalry could not defend, and provide supply trains with essential escorts while the 
cavalry slowly rebuilt its strength. The Army of the Frontier was in dire straits, but the  
First Kansas Colored could be depended upon to hold the line until the Army of the 
Frontier could return to offensive operations.  
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     The Army of the Frontier’s tactical situation deteriorated appreciably in September 
1864. The army’s difficulties in large part derived from the persistence of Confederate 
guerrillas.  The army’s problems were exacerbated by its inability to sustain its forces in 
the wake of a drought that produced die off of forage and food crops across its area of 
operations.    Despite the presence of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry at Fort Smith, Thayer 
was unable to stop guerrilla raids because his cavalry’s mounts no longer possessed the 
physical capacity for long campaigning. 
 
Map 9: Western Arkansas and Indian Territory671 
 
                                                
671“Colton's New Map of the State of Texas : the Indian Territory and Adjoining Portions of New Mexico, 
Louisiana, and Arkansas,”  New York : G.W & C.B. Colton & Co., 1872.  Library of Congress. 
http://www.loc.gov (accessed May 1, 2011). 
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     Colonel Stephen Wattles’s command at Fort Gibson occupied a tenuous position in 
Thayer’s supply chain, and the demands of escorting trains from Fort Scott to Fort Smith 
while also securing the lines of communication to Baxter Springs left Wattles without 
enough manpower to perform this vital mission. Therefore General Thayer ordered 
Colonel Williams on September 14, 1864 to lead the Second Brigade (then comprising 
the combined regiments of the First and Second Kansas Colored Infantry, the Eleventh 
Colored Infantry, the Fifty-Fourth United States Colored Infantry, and a section of white 
artillery of the second Arkansas Battery) west to support Colonel Wattles.672 This large 
force had orders to stop raids on the Union hay cutting detachments, and to protect the 
camps of government contractors.    
     Sustaining the Union regiments at Fort Gibson required massive amounts of forage.  
Unfortunately, the pasturage in the immediate vicinity of Fort Gibson could not supply 
those needs.  Hay cutting expeditions fanned out into the prairies to cut the necessary 
forage in anticipation of another lean winter.   Captain Graton’s First Kansas Colored - 
consisting of six companies (approximately four hundred soldiers) - remained at Fort 
Gibson to augment Colonel Wattle’s Indian Regiments. Four companies of the First 
Kansas colored remained at Fort Smith.673 Therefore, when Company K marched forth 
                                                
672 Brigadier General Thayer to Lieutenant Colonel W.D. Green, Adjutant General, Deptartment of the 
Arkansas; Thayer to Colonel S.H. Wattles,  Headquarters District of the Frontier, Fort Smith, sep 
8,14,1864, OR: Series I, Vol 41, PT III: Correspondence, 105, 188.; Janet B. Hewitt (ed.) Supplement to the 
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Part II, Record of Events, Volume 78, Serial No. 90 
(Wilmington, North Carolina: Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1998), 614-671.  The First Kansas Colored 
arrived with four companies at Fort Gibson on September 18, 1864, the same day of the engagement at Flat 
Rock.   
673 Janet B. Hewitt, Supplement to the Official Records, 614-671; Wiley Britton.  The Civil War on the 
Border, Volume II, 244-247.  September 1, 1864 the regiment recorded six companies of the First Kansas 
Colored at Fort Gibson.  The pattern of detailing the regiment as both guards and labor varied little form 
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fifteen miles north of Fort Gibson in early September to cut hay near Flat Rock, Indian 
Territory, adequate strength seemed to be available.  
     The hay camp, including the mowers, hayricks and wagons, lay in a well-watered 
depression not far from the Grand River.   The depression contained a number of water 
lily dotted shallow pools surrounded by shaded overhanging banks of willows.674 
Although an ideal camp for hard working soldiers, and a welcoming oasis from the 
September heat, the camp proved less than ideal for defense.  The area offered little in the 
way of natural defensive features and if attacked, could expect little relief from Fort 
Gibson. 
     The detachment at Flat Rock contained a mix of infantry and cavalry, the latter from 
the Second Kansas Cavalry.  This one hundred and twenty-five man detachment was 
presumably able to defend itself from a typical raid, but the situation changed in late 
September.  Keenly aware of Thayer’s dependence on supply trains and local foraging, 
Confederate General Samuel Cooper made the destruction of hay camps and interdicting 
Thayer’s supplies his top priority throughout Indian Territory and western Arkansas. 
Depriving Thayer of mobility could be accomplished by destroying fodder and the 
ensuing loss of cavalry would make Thayer’s supply trains vulnerable to seizure.  Stand 
Watie’s raiders proved this supposition in August when the Union garrison at Fort Smith 
was unable to defend a hay party within a short distance from Fort Smith.675   Watie’s 
raiding demonstrated that the Federal garrison controlled only the immediate area around 
the forts of Gibson and Smith.  A more audacious undertaking could potentially compel 
                                                                                                                                            
post duty at Roseville, but more significantly removed the majority of the regiment from fortification duties 
at Fort Smith where the fatigue details grated on veterans accustomed to campaigning. 
674 Wiley Britton.  The Civil War on the Border, Volume II, 244-247 
675 Ibid, 243 – 244; W. David Baird, (ed). A Creek Warrior for the Confederacy: The Autobiography of 
Chief G.W. Grayson.  Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988, 93. 
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an evacuation of the forts and a return of the balance of power in Indian Territory to the 
Confederacy. 
     Perhaps emboldened by their success and of the movement of Confederate forces 
under General Price into Missouri, Watie and Gano planned a raid upon the Federal 
supply train at Cabin Creek. Gano assembled a composite army of Cherokees to ride 
north in search of the Federal supply train moving south from Fort Scott. The wide gaps 
between Federal commands at Fort Scott, Cabin Creek, Fort Gibson and Fort Smith 
created opportunity for the fast-moving Confederate army.  Supplemented by artillery 
and sound intelligence, the Confederate force was confident that it could overwhelm 
Union posts and capture the train.  The cargoes would yield a bounty of rations, materiel, 
and animals to raise morale and fighting capability for the spring campaigns of 1865. 
      The prairie dawn on September 18, 1864 opened with little sign of enemy activity.  
As the day advanced, however, riders appeared in the distance.  The approach of Gano’s 
advance party at Flat Rock initially elicited little alarm, for the Union detachment 
assumed the riders to be a small raiding party.  The detachment commander, Captain E.A. 
Barker of Company C, Second Kansas Cavalry, reacted to reports of several hundred 
riders crossing the Verdigris River by forming up his detachment in a ravine to the rear of 
the camp while he moved forward to ascertain the enemy’s intentions.  What greeted 
Barker when he cleared the rise shocked him into retreat.  He faced the entire force of 
Gano’s army, an estimated thousand to fifteen hundred cavalry supported by six guns.676  
The hay cutting party lay in the path of the advancing army, a force that included the 
vengeful horsemen of the Twenty-Ninth Texas Cavalry and their Choctaw allies, the 
                                                
676 Report Number 7, Captain E.A. Barker, Company C, Second Kansas Cavalry to the Adjutant General, 
Washington, D.C. September 20, 1864, OR: Series I, Volume 41, Part I: Reports, 771-772. 
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nemeses of the First Kansas Colored.  Burning desire to revenge themselves upon the 
perpetrators of the reprisals at Jenkins’ Ferry fueled a massacre unequalled in the 
regiment’s history. 
     Barker immediately attempted to marshal his men for a defense of the camp, 
presumably in the hope that the sound of battle might rouse reinforcements from Fort 
Gibson.  General Gano took position on a rise near the camp and organized his forces for 
attack. Colonel DeMorse’s Twenty-Ninth and Thirty-First Texas regiments assumed 
positions on the right flank, and Brigadier General Stand Watie’s Cherokee and Creek 
Indians took the left.  The Confederate battle plan featured an attack from five directions. 
Confederate infantry closed to within two hundred yards before fighting began.  The 
detachment fought bravely, repelling three charges over the period of half an hour.  
Deciding that he was in imminent danger of being overwhelmed, Barker attempted a 
breakout with his remaining mounted cavalry.  The black infantry and Barker’s 
dismounted cavalry received orders to make for the Grand River timber, a line of trees 
over a mile away.  Barker’s cavalry then charged the Confederates, but only fifteen 
soldiers made their way through to Fort Gibson.677  The Federal defense did not collapse 
with Barker’s desperate charge. The remaining soldiers in the ravine formed for battle 
under Lieutenant Thomas Sutherland of Company K, First Kansas Colored.   
     The black soldiers of the First Kansas Colored expected no relief from Fort Gibson or 
a miraculous escape.  Many veterans survived Poison Spring and knew their fate before 
the battle began.  Their survival depended on causing so many casualties and delaying the 
Confederates that their forces would break off and abandon the attack.  The Confederate 
                                                
677 Report Number 7, Captain E.A. Barker, Company C, Second Kansas Cavalry to the Adjutant General, 
Washington, D.C. September 20, 1864, OR: Series I, Volume 41, Part I: Reports, 771-772; Wiley Britton, 
The Civil War on the Border, Volume II, 244-247 . 
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forces pressed the infantry from the start, their numbers and multi-directional assaults 
forcing the Union soldiers to fire volleys at their attackers in an attempt to keep them off 
balance.  Wiley Britton quotes one of the First Kansas Colored’s survivors, George 
Duval, as describing the battle as one of several sequences of “charge, volley, and 
recovery.”  The deciding factor in the engagement, the Confederate artillery, fired several 
volleys of grapeshot into the infantry ranks, and when the infantry’s ammunition ran low, 
Lieutenant Sutherland ordered the men to disperse in order to save themselves.  The 
Grand River timber offered some shelter, but it lay too far from the ravine.  Some of the 
infantry sought the banks and pools of the ravine, while others tried to hide in the tall 
grass.  What then occurred exceeded the savagery of Poison Spring. 
     After war’s end Britton interviewed the black survivors of the battle, and their 
individual escapes capture the imagination.  While Confederates hunted down black 
soldiers, the white Kansans that survived the initial exchanges entered captivity as 
prisoners.  No quarter was asked or given the black infantry.  Survivors hid in pools deep 
enough to conceal them in the dying prairie light, their noses barely breaking the water’s 
surface, and their bodies shielded by lilies.  One man who had found concealment in a 
collection of driftwood escaped the ravine during the night by crawling between 
Confederate pickets, his gun firmly in hand.   The survivors reported listening to the 
Confederates calling out to one another as they discovered, then killed black soldiers.  
Three thousand tons of hay, mowing machines and ricks lit the macabre scene as they 
burned into the night.  Gano’s army camped at the hay making camp that night, then 
continued on their way the next day.678  Surprisingly, they brought with them five black 
                                                
678 Wiley Britton, The Civil War on the Border, Volume II, 244-247; W. David Baird, (ed). A Creek 
Warrior for the Confederacy, 95-96. 
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soldiers of the First Kansas Colored that survived the battle, prisoners with an uncertain 
future.  Lieutenant Sutherland also survived, but his fate seemed equally precarious.679 A 
white officer in a Colored Regiment could expect a noose or firing squad based on all 
known punishments exacted by Confederate armies on white officers.  
     Confederate accounts of the engagement differ slightly from Union accounts.  
General Gano claimed that a parley attempt under flag of truce took fire from the Union 
soldiers, and blamed this incident for the slaughter that followed.  Chief Grayson, a Creek 
officer under Watie’s command, remembered the Indian troops “hunting [the blacks] in 
the grass like game, shooting down rather than take them prisoner,” Grayson’s 
intervention saved Sutherland, “Blacks, he said, were being killed, not white men.”  Even 
so, Grayson’s memoirs portray a warrior disgusted and shocked by the same events that 
Gano took in stride.680 The historian James Monaghan continued the tale of massacre, 
citing “mounted Cherokees jogging up and down through the uncut hay, shooting men 
like rabbits,” and some Monaghan claimed, “Rose from the weeds calling, ‘O! Good 
master, save and spare me.”  Men hiding in pools died from gunshots and the Cherokee 
hauled them from the water.681 White men would not be treated the same as their black 
soldiers; race mattered in how captives were taken, or not.  
       Confederate reports detail the aftermath of the lopsided engagement and the extent of 
the disaster.  General Watie’s terse battle report referenced “a Union camp destroyed, one 
hundred killed and eighty-five captured.”  Gano proved more detailed in his report, and 
                                                
679 John Graton, Letter September 29, 1864, John Graton Collection, Kansas State Historical Society. 
680 W. David Baird, (ed). A Creek Warrior for the Confederacy, 96. 
681 James Monaghan. Civil War on the Western Border: 1854-1865.  (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1955), 308. 
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listed Union losses as “seventy-three dead, mostly negroes.”682 Gano’s reported only 
three wounded as his losses, a disproportionate number given the estimated two hours of 
combat that elapsed.   Company K however suffered horrifically, the annihilation of the 
company a serious blow to the First Kansas Colored, a grim reminder that the war of 
extermination against black Union soldiers continued unabated.  The handful of survivors 
and prisoners verifies that a concerted effort to kill black soldiers took place at Flat Rock, 
a war crime in any other historical context.  The next day a Union patrol from the second 
Kansas Cavalry arrived at the battlefield, perhaps drawn by large numbers of carrion 
scavengers, to report the vast incongruities between the two Union forces.  White men 
received decent burial, but the naked corpses of black soldiers and teamsters littered the 
ground, and lagoons, with gaping wounds and slit throats stark witness to their last 
moments.683 Not mentioned, but evident to experienced cavalrymen of the patrol, the wide 
swathes of torn prairie and deep ruts of gun carriages informed the Union horse soldiers 
that a great host had occupied the site briefly, then set northwards for the Texas Road. 
     The string of Union defeats continued after Flat Rock. Generals Gano and Watie 
wasted little time, driving their command up the Texas Road to Watie’s old ambush site 
at Cabin Creek. Reports of a massive Union supply train proved to be accurate, and the 
Confederate force possessed for the first time in a long while the numbers, firepower, and 
determination to overwhelm the Federal garrison at Cabin Creek.  The Second Battle of 
Cabin Creek pitted Confederate Indian against Union Indian, and laid open the Union’s 
logistical weaknesses in the Indian Territory.   
                                                
682 Brigadier General Richard M Gano to Brigadier General Cooper, Camp Bragg, September 29, 1864, 
OR: Series I, Volume 41, Part I: Reports, 788 – 789; Brigadier General Stand Watie to Brigadier General 
Cooper, September 23, 1864, OR: Series I, Volume 41, Part I: Reports, 784 – 785; James Monaghan Civil 
War on the Western Border: 1854-1865 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1955), 308. 
683 Leavenworth Daily Conservative, 29 September 1864.  
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     At first glance the fortified Union camp at Cabin Creek appeared well prepared for 
defense, and contained between 900 and 1,000 defenders from the Indian Home Guards, 
Cavalry from Fort Scott, and Fort Gibson, and various armed teamsters and unattached 
Union Indians.  A nighttime raid on September 18 probed the Union lines, and between 
3:00 AM and 9:00 AM on September 19, the Confederates assaulted the Union camp 
with artillery support.  A general panic ensued in the Union ranks as Gano’s men 
breached the defenses, and the Confederates gained their objective as Union troops fled 
in all directions.  The prize of one hundred and thirty wagons fell into Gano’s hands, but 
the possibility of pursuit compelled him to burn an estimated ten ricks of hay, mowing 
machines, and an estimated one hundred and twenty unserviceable wagons.  The value of 
the train, estimated at $1,500,000 lay not solely in the valuable cargo, but in the impact of 
the defeat.684 The earlier passage of Gano’s forces and the deadly swathe they cut through 
Union detachments as they headed north alerted General Thayer at Fort Smith of a 
disaster in the making.  If he could not stop the Confederate army, they would escape 
with the contents of the train into the fastness of Indian Territory where Thayer’s forces 
could not pursue effectively.   
     Thayer’s forces could not muster a significant cavalry force to contest Gano’s raiding 
force for a number of reasons.  Thayer’s cavalry lacked suitable horses for a pursuit, the 
horseflesh having suffered from overuse and the constant demands on cavalry to fight 
guerrillas across western Arkansas.  Although Thayer could send forth infantry 
regiments, he could not guarantee his artillery horses could transport guns quickly 
                                                
684 Brigadier General Stand Watie to Brigadier General D.H. Cooper, Camp Bragg, October 3, 1864; 
Brigadier General Gano to Brigadier general Cooper, September 29, 1864, OR, Series I, Volume 41, Part I: 
Reports, 784-788, 789-191. 
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enough to provide support should a general engagement occur.  Therefore Thayer ordered 
Colonel Williams with his Second Brigade to intercept the Confederates.685  
     Colonel Williams mustered his command for a punishing march north to intercept the 
Confederate army before it could escort away the wagon train captured at Cabin Creek, 
and in a prodigious effort, the Second Brigade covered eighty-two miles in forty-six 
hours.  The effort paid off however, and Williams’ men arrived at Pryor’s Creek about 11 
A.M. on September 19, where shortly afterwards it met Gano’s advance guard flush with 
plunder after Cabin Creek.  Williams gamely formed his line despite its fatigue and 
skirmished with Gano’s forces until 4:30 P.M.686  Colonel Williams possessed the 
experience and wisdom to avoid seeking a general engagement, and having assessed his 
men’s condition and the numbers of the enemy, determined to fight the Confederates 
after reinforcements arrived. The First Kansas Colored’s veterans performed a prodigious 
feat of marching to catch up to the Confederate army, and although the wagon train fell 
into Confederate hands, capturing the train and keeping it were two different things.  
     The likelihood of a battle over the wagons appeared high, but the Confederates held 
significant advantages regardless of the slow-moving train.  Williams’ troops lacked the 
one thing that could have shaped the battle; the relief force lacked cavalry, the entire 
command composed of infantry and artillery. Williams’s battery engaged the Confederate 
artillery when Gano’s forces closed to within range of his Parrott guns, scoring several 
hits that forced the Confederate crews to seek shelter behind some nearby earth 
                                                
685 Thayer to Steele, undated communication, OR: Series I, Volume 41, Part I: Reports, 24. 
686 Report Number 2, Colonel Williams 79th United States Colored Troops, Pryor’s Creek, September 20, 
1864, OR: Series I, Volume 41, Part I: Reports, 765. 
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mounds.687 Battle seemed eminent, but the exhausted soldiers of the First Kansas Colored 
did not fight that evening, the night fell before an engagement developed. 
     The differences between the opposing forces were significant.  Although encumbered 
by the wagon train, the Confederate force was mounted, and Williams’ foot-sore soldiers 
could not match their mobility.  While the regiment rested, the Confederates endeavored 
to move the wagon train away from the blocking force. Generals Gano and Watie 
executed an ingenious ruse to deceive Williams as to their intentions.  A wagon was 
driven across rocky ground throughout the evening and into the early morning hours to 
"give the impression that the wagons were being corralled for the night while 
Confederate troops escorted the wagon train from the area. In the morning, despite 
Williams’ efforts, the Confederate army was gone, and with it, the train. 688  The loss of 
the train did not occur for any inadequacy on Williams’ part, the eighty-two miles march 
from Fort Gibson exhausted his men, and they needed rest before attempting any further 
action.  While his men slept and the deception played out, the bulk of the train moved 
beyond Williams’ reach, slowly moving westward towards the Arkansas River.689  
Williams stayed at Pryor’s Creek one more day and then returned to Fort Gibson to 
assess the damage to the First Kansas Colored, and to report the train’s escape. 
     The First Kansas Colored’s soldiers discovered on their return to Fort Gibson that the 
loss to Company K exceeded the losses at Honey Springs.  Taken in isolation, the 
company had suffered the greatest single-day loss of any company in the First Kansas 
                                                
687 Report Number 2, Colonel Williams 79th United States Colored Troops, Pryor’s Creek, September 20, 
1864, OR: Series I, Volume 41, Part I: Reports, 765; Letter detailing Williams’ attempt to engage Gano in 
battle, Fort Gibson Cherokee Nation, September 22, 1864, John Graton Collection, Kansas State Historical 
Society,  
688 Lawrence M. Hauptman.  Between Two Fires: American Indians in the Civil War.  (New York: The 
Free Press, 1995),57. 
689 Lary C. Rampp and Donald L. Rampp.  The Civil War in the Indian Territory (Austin, Texas: Presidial 
Press, 1975), 114. 
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Colored for the entire war.  Wagon escort and hay parties proved dangerous missions, the 
Confederates having proven adept at harrying hay making parties and overwhelming 
fixed defenses alike.  The First Kansas Colored’s men performed train escort as a regular 
duty at beleaguered Fort Gibson, and while losses were assessed, escorted wagon trains 
between Fort Smith and Fort Gibson, a duty that exposed the men to the constant threat 
of attack.  Trains took between three and four days to complete the trip between these 
posts, and seldom did a single company accompany a train.  When escorting trains the 
men departed with full allocations of ammunition, forty rounds to the man.  Their 
haversacks contained little but hardtack; the escort could not afford to forage for 
sustenance and neglect the train, therefore it marched light and fast.690  Flat Rock proved 
that the penalties for unprepared and isolated detachments attempting to supply Fort 
Gibson with vital forage, could be incredibly high, especially if the parties were 
composed of black soldiers.  Few returned from Flat Rock, and the number of wounded 
personnel recovered testified to the fierce fighting and dreadful slaughter that followed 
the brief engagement at Flat Rock.   
     The loss of the Federal train at Cabin Creek threw the District of the Frontier’s 
logistics into disarray.  The sudden and successful raid convinced other Federal 
commanders in Kansas that their southern flank stood wide open to attack.  The 
movement of thousands of Confederates north of Fort Gibson also highlighted the impact 
that the raid would have on Thayer.  The aggregate losses in transport presented Major 
General Curtis in Kansas with a difficult choice between sustaining Thayer’s forces, or 
exposing another train to attack.  The Confederate army under Gano and Watie remained 
                                                
690 Special Order 19, Captain Graton to Captain Huddleston, Headquaters First Kansas Colored Infantry, 
Fort Gibson. RG 94: Adjutant General’s Office, 79th USCT, Regimental Order Book E112-115, PI-17, Vol 
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intact and posed a deadly threat to southern Kansas.  Should the raiders choose to strike 
again, Fort Scott could feel their wrath.  Militia and regular regiments received notice to 
prepare for an attack, and Thayer’s commander at Fort Gibson, Colonel Adams, added to 
the confusion by reporting an anticipated attack by over five thousand Confederates at his 
post.691  In the midst of the growing apprehension about the Union hold over the Indian 
Territory, General Thayer insisted on his ability to hold Fort Smith despite the loss of the 
supply train at Cabin Creek.  His efforts became increasingly difficult to maintain 
however, as the District of the Frontier faced unexpected threats from a new southern 
army that appeared intent on driving him from Indian Territory. 
     The District of the Frontier operated under constraints that bedeviled Thayer’s 
planning and personnel allocations.  Defending the line from Fort Gibson to Fort Smith, 
as well as western Arkansas often forced Thayer to operate in the absence of intelligence 
regarding his enemy, and outside ready reinforcement from General Steele’s forces at 
Little Rock.  Less than a week after the Second Brigade marched to Fort Gibson, 
disturbing news reached Thayer just before communications with Little Rock were cut 
off, that General Price, with an army estimated at 15,000 men, crossed the Arkansas 
River at Dardanelle and appeared destined for Thayer’s district where it met with the 
Choctaw Nation.  Thayer immediately ordered Colonel Wattles to dig rifle pits and throw 
up barricades around Fort Gibson, and to prepare for an imminent attack by Price’s army.  
Thayer also ordered Wattles to send Williams’ regiments to follow the enemy if they 
                                                
691 Major General Curtis to Major General Rosecrans; Major General Curtis to Kansas Governor T. Carney, 
Fort Leavenworth September 20, 1864; Major General George Sykes to Major C.S. Charlot, Headquarters, 
District of South Kansas, Lawrence, September 23, 1864; Thayer to Steele, Headquarters  District of the 
Frontier, Fort Smith, September 24, 1864;  Major General Curtis to Major General Sykes, Fort 
Leavenworth September 27, 1864, OR: Series I, Volume 41, Part III: Correspondence, 278 – 279, 335, 
341, 427.  In addition to the personnel losses of the Union forces at Flat Rock and Cabin Creek, 202 
wagons, 5 ambulances, 40 artillery horses and 1,253 mules were captured.  The Confederates seized 
enough materiel to sustain their efforts into 1865 with this single raid.   
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made an attempt to seize the supply train at Cabin Creek, with the exception of one 
regiment to secure and return the hay making machines back to Fort Smith if possible, 
situation depending.692  Internal department communications reflected doubt however, 
and Thayer attempted to consolidate his forces as Price’s army crossed the border into 
Missouri. 
Kansas black militias form 
     The danger that Price’s army posed to Kansas was accentuated by Thayer’s decision 
to concentrate his forces at Fort Gibson and Fort Smith.  This left the southern border of 
Kansas open to raids.  Thayer believed that he could hold the forts, and claimed rations 
sufficient to weather a siege existed at Fort Smith.  His guidance for Fort Gibson’s 
defense involved a combination of reconnaissance to maintain situational awareness, 
rations reductions, and further fortification of Fort Gibson.693  While Thayer’s army 
braced for attack, Union forces in Kansas adopted a solution that may have been 
influenced by the fighting skill and valor of the First and Second Kansas Colored.  
     The situation in Indian Territory and Price’s invasion of Missouri called for extreme 
measures to defend Kansas.  General Curtis recognized the utility of Kansas’ black male 
population and contrary to state militia laws, issued General Order 54 authorizing all men 
regardless of color between ages eighteen and sixty to arm themselves.  As a result, 
fourteen companies of black militia enrolled for the state’s defense.  Former First Kansas 
Colored officer Henry Seaman commanded one of those militia companies, Company E, 
First Battalion from Mound City.  Additional black militia companies formed at 
                                                
692 Major General Sykes to Major Charlot, Paola, Kansas, September 17; Thayer to Wattles, Headquarters 
District of the Frontier, Fort Smith, September 18, 19, 1864, OR: Series I, Vol 41, PT III: Correspondence, 
235-236, 238, 249.  
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Leavenworth and Wyandotte.694  Black men proved willing to serve when martial law 
suspended Kansas’s militia laws that barred black militia membership.  Unlike enlisting 
in the twin Kansas Colored regiments, black men could remain close to their 
communities and serve in local defense with the high likelihood of short-term service, 
and minimal disruption to their private lives. 
     A sign of the growing awareness of blacks’ utility to Kansas appeared at the beginning 
of October, when a Fort Scott newspaper carried advertising for a unit of black light 
artillery commanded by black officers.  The recruiter for the new battery was Lieutenant 
William D. Matthews, who had been recruiting since June, 1864.  Joining him was 
Lieutenant Philip Minor, who commanded a two-gun section of Parrott guns, and 
Lieutenant Henry Copeland.  The three men were former officers of Company D, First 
Kansas Colored.695  The trio was not alone.  Roger Cunningham estimated eleven black 
men officered the companies of the First Colored Militia Regiment.696  Kansas papers 
urged black militia enrollment, and the Kansas Tribune and the Leavenworth Daily Times 
carried reports of the black community’s willingness to serve as soldiers.697  Organizing 
the overall black militia effort was another former First Kansas Colored officer, Second 
Kansas Colored’s Captain Richard Hinton. 
     The Price Raid forced Kansan whites to reconsider the enrollment of blacks into the 
state militia, an action contrary to the state constitution.  The Leavenworth Evening 
                                                
694 Roger D. Cunningham “Welcoming  ‘Pa’ on the Kaw:  Kansas’s “Colored” Militia and the 1864 Price 
Raid” Kansas History (Summer 2002), 89-90; RG 94: Seventy-ninth U.S. Colored Infantry (New), 
Combined Military Service Records, Gilbert Van.  Cunningham cites the case of  Gilbert Van, who later 
enlisted with the First Kansas Colored for the duration of the war.  Van is a compelling example because he 
volunteered for the emergency, then apparently felt inspired to enlist after his experience convinced him of 
the need for black men elsewhere to fight the Confederacy.   
695 Recruiting broadside, October 1, 1864, Fort Scott Daily Monitor 
696 Roger D. Cunningham “Welcoming  ‘Pa’ on the Kaw,” 91-93. 
697 October 11, 16, 1864, Kansas Tribune; October 12 Leavenworth Daily Times.  
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Bulletin agitated for full enlistment of all eligible Kansas residents during the summer of 
1864, and advocated a militia organized “without regard to color.”698 When Confederate 
General Price’s army approached Kansas City in mid-October, it generated a flurry of 
correspondence, and Union commanders demanded that all eligible men be rushed to 
defend Kansas’s borders.  Captain Richard Hinton of the Second Kansas Colored to was 
ordered to “bring forward all colored troops, [and] procure arms and equipments as are 
usually given to other volunteer troops…Captain Hinton will also collect all colored 
troops…[and] bring them forward with all speed.” 699  Orders also specifically dictated 
the formation of black artillery sections - including Lieutenant Philip Minor’s section - 
and the forwarding of black militia composed of overage and invalid men from Lawrence 
to join the Union ranks against Price’s army.  Reports of black artillerymen deserting the 
light artillery battery in Leavenworth were met with orders to arrest the deserters and 
return them to duty.700  Kansas’s state of emergency dictated that all possible manpower 
be concentrated for the state’s defense.  Therefore, the Union army commandeered the 
steamer Benton to speed the black militia toward the Union lines, and committed the 
“Iron Clad” cavalry from Leavenworth to join the Union forces south of Kansas City.701   
The former refugee slaves turned Union soldiers added valuable strength to the border 
defenses, and the conspicuous mustering of blacks gave notice that Kansans could put 
aside personal opinions on race when invasion threatened all.  Kansan blacks were allies 
                                                
698 Roger D. Cunning ham, “Welcoming Pa on the Kaw: Kansas’s Colored Militia and the 1864 Price 
Raid,”  Kansas History (Summer, 2002), 92. 
699 Major C.C. Charlot, AAG Department of Kansas, Special Field Order HQ Army of the Border, near 
Independence, MO, Oct 19, 1864; John Williams AAG to Major General Curtis, Fort Leavenworth October 
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of convenience however, and white support diminished when the emergency abated.  
While the danger of Price’s Raid receded after his defeat, the threat posed by Confederate 
armies in Indian Territory did not.  General Thayer’s troops stood directly in the path of 
Price’s retreat, and the threat of attack from Gano to the Union army’s rear forced Thayer 
to order a series of contradictory troop movements in order to meet both threats.  
Price’s Retreat and threats to the District of the Frontier 
     News slowly filtered back to General Thayer of the fighting in Kansas and Missouri, 
but the lack of solid intelligence blinded Thayer to the enemy’s exact locations within his 
massive command.  Thayer nervously queried the commander at Fort Gibson, Colonel 
Wattles for reports of the enemy’s movements, and if attacked, directed Wattles to use 
the Second Brigade to contest any assault.  The First Kansas Colored and the Eleventh 
United States Colored Infantry, although primarily employed as train escorts could 
assemble swiftly to deter any direct attack upon Fort Gibson.  Thayer’s orders contained 
a second proviso; if Wattles felt the situation secure, he would send the fort’s corn supply 
in a supply train to Fort Smith under the escort of the First Kansas Colored.702  Thayer’s 
needs outweighed Wattle’s.  Fort Gibson’s corn would sustain Fort Smith if the 
Confederate army attacked.  Fort Smith was the key to western Arkansas and if it fell, the 
Union strategy for the district would collapse.  Despite rumors of Fort Smith evacuation 
in Kansas papers, Thayer’s intended to hold Fort Smith to the exclusion of all other forts 
and outposts under his command. Accordingly, Wattle’s was ordered to move his 
command to Fort Smith, excepting a skeletal garrison to hold Fort Gibson and destroy 
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military stores, if an attack on Fort Smith appeared imminent.703  Reports of General 
Price’s impending entry into the Indian Territory forced Thayer’s hand, and Colonel 
Wattles release his reserve, including the First Kansas Colored, for the defense of Fort 
Smith.   
     The First Kansas Colored departed Fort Gibson on October 20, just as reports of 
Price’s army at Springfield caused panic in the Army of the Frontier. The Union army in 
Indian Territory prepared for the worst, the potential for the sack of Kansas and the re-
entry of Price’s army into Indian Territory a very real threat if the Union failed to defeat 
the Confederate general’s army.  While Williams’ brigade marched east, events in Kansas 
decided the fate of the Union in Kansas and Indian Territory.   
     The battles of the Big Blue, and then the culminating of Westport on October 23 broke 
Price’s army, and it retreated south into Indian Territory, groping toward the safety of the 
Arkansas River.  Thayer lacked precise intelligence about the location of Price’s forces 
and unsure if the Confederate general would strike at Fort Gibson or Fort Smith, queried 
Colonel Wattles at Fort Gibson as to Price’s location.  Thayer’s last dispatch from Fort 
Gibson mentioned Price about forty miles from the Fort. General Thayer could not 
deploy his forces with certainty until his scouts confirmed Price’s location.704  The 
situation in western Arkansas and General Price’s entry into Indian Territory did not offer 
Thayer many options.  Cooper’s undefeated Confederate army could count on support 
from guerrilla bands, and General Gano maintained a significant number of men just 
                                                
703 Headquarters District of The Frontier, Fort Smith, October 13, 1864 Thayer to Colonel C.W. Blair, OR: 
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Thayer’s intent to defend the post.   
704 Thayer to Wattles, October 27, 1864, OR: Series I, Volume 41, Part 4: Correspondence, 272; Thayer to 
Wattles, Headquarters District of frontier, Fort Smith, October 1, 1864, OR: Series I, Volume 41, Part 3: 
Correspondence, 531. 
 
 
367 
 
south of the Arkansas River, well positioned to strike at Thayer’s army.  General 
Cooper’s strategy to slowly strangling Fort Smith’s supply paid dividends by forcing 
Thayer to retain his Union garrison Fort Smith.  General Steele – Thayer’s superior –
knew that Thayer could not afford to abandon his supply line to Little Rock to marshal a 
reconnaissance in force to locate Price’s army.  If General Price united with General 
Gano on his way south through Indian Territory, Fort Smith could fall to their combined 
armies.705 Until Thayer received relief, the Union garrison at Fort Smith remained tied to 
the fort. 
     Thayer possessed a finite number of regiments to contest Price if he chose to attack 
Fort Smith.  When Thayer ordered the First Kansas Colored, the Fifty-Fourth United 
States Colored Infantry and a section of the second Arkansas battery to make hast to Fort 
Smith, the troop movements attracted General Cooper’s attention.706   The departure of 
the Colored regiments may have influenced Cooper to conduct a demonstration against 
Fort Smith’s vicinity. Almost blind due to poor intelligence, Thayer reasonably assumed 
Cooper’s Confederates were massing for an attack in support of Price’s forces.   
     Spurred into action by Price’s entry into the District of the Frontier, Union efforts at 
Little Rock to relieve Thayer accelerated.  General Steele saw opportunity in Price’s 
defeat, and acted with this potential in mind. Mindful of Thayer’s supply requirements 
and limited offensive capacity, Steele sent a supply train escorted by 3,500 cavalry and 
1,500 infantry to Fort Smith.  Reinforced, Thayer’s command would have the combat 
                                                
705 Report of Major Thomas Derry, Third Wisconsin Cavalry, Little Rock, October 14, 1864; Report 
Number 1, Headquarters Department of Arkansas, Little Rock October 24, 1864, Major General Steele, 
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power to halt Price if he attempted to cross the Arkansas River anywhere between Fort 
Smith and Little Rock.707  As the situation developed, Thayer, informed of Price’s defeats 
at Westport and Mine Creek (near Fort Scott) and reassured by reports that Price lacked 
the artillery for a siege, ordered Colonel Wattles to remain at Fort Gibson to watch for 
General Price’s army and contest its passage.  Major General Curtis and Major General 
Steele both intended to employ Thayer’s army to arrest Price’s retreat.   Thayer didn’t 
believe Price would halt to fight however, and predicted Price would retreat until the 
safety of the Red River and the Confederate forces assembled in southwest Arkansas.708   
Ultimately Price’s demoralized army passed by Thayer’s fortifications without offering 
battle; Thayer’s army didn’t fire a single shot at Price’s retreating army. 
     Price, likely aided by intelligence provided by spies and scouts, crossed the Arkansas 
River at Webber’s Falls through the gap between the Union commands at Fort Gibson 
and Fort Smith.  Cooper’s cavalry screened Price’s retreat by massing near Webbers’ 
Falls.   Thayer, unnerved by the prospect of losing Fort Smith to Cooper while in pursuit 
of Price, abandoned the pursuit with the weak excuse that “he thought the pursuit 
over.”709   Price escaped with the remains of his once massive army to lick his wounds 
after the disastrous conclusion of his failed raid into Missouri.  It was now the 
Confederate’s turn to assess their army’s viability, large numbers of troops having been 
lost in Price’s adventure. 
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Regrouping  
     The fall’s campaigning spared the First Kansas Colored little time to rest or refit. The 
regiment returned to Fort Smith in time to construct regimental winter quarters under the 
supervision of Lieutenant E.F. Bowton.  The systematic dismantling of abandoned homes 
supplied lumber for quarters, and Captain Graton felt this particular duty the just deserts 
of southern secessionists.710  Regimental garrison duties drew men away from the 
command to perform their duties as blacksmiths, orderlies, charcoal burners, and 
ambulance drivers. The regiment also detailed escorts for the embattled steamers plying 
the Arkansas River. Companies B and F served as escorts in November aboard the 
steamers Carrie Jacobs and Green Durbin, on the return run to Little Rock.711 A staple of 
the regiment, wagon train escort duty continued into December, and when the steamer 
Doane struck an obstacle in the Arkansas River on December 16, the regiment escorted a 
recovery train to Clarksville to salvage the steamer’s cargo before rebels could seize it.712 
Civil War armies in the west operated on a seasonal routine, and as winter settled upon 
the land, the pace of operations slowed.  During this period the regiment slowly 
reconsolidated its ranks and received returning members of the command from their 
various duties across the department. 
         Major Ward returned to the regiment in early December when his time on Major 
General Curtis’s staff ended with the collapse of Price’s campaign.   The regiment also 
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received a new veteran Surgeon, J. Fulton Ensor, from the First Maryland cavalry.713  
New officers joined the rosters of the companies as well, Lieutenants William R. Smith 
formerly of the Twelfth Kansas Infantry joined Company A, and James A. McGinnis of 
the Ninth Kansas Cavalry joined Company D.714  Lieutenant Colonel Bowles finally 
dropped off the Regimental rolls. Bowles, the regiment’s capricious second in command, 
was dismissed from military service after over almost a year’s absence from the 
regiment.715  Captain John Graton greatly resented Bowles for Graton possessed 
knowledge of Bowles activities in Kansas that made him especially bitter.  Graton 
claimed “Bowles lays around home yet, has gone into the tanning business, reports say he 
lays around home to watch it…Williams is using every exertion to get him out of the 
service…[he] draws $165.00 a month, [and] sleeps with his wife.”716  Bowles had not 
committed any crime during his absence, but his actions revealed a man no longer 
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committed to the cause, and seemingly content to manipulate the military to achieve his 
own ends.   
      The regimental recruiting detachment left Kansas during this time, in part prevented 
from entering Indian Territory during Price’s Raid.  When Price’s forces retreated, the 
recruiting detachment in Kansas set forth for Fort Smith to rejoin the regiment.  The 
group of seven men consisted of Captains Welsh and Thrasher, Lieutenant Macy, the 
chaplain of the 13th Kansas, Chaplain Gardner, and three Kansas soldiers.  The recruiting 
party entered Indian Territory in November, perhaps convinced that danger had passed 
with Price’s defeat.  However, the small detachment fell afoul of the dregs of the 
Confederate army as Quantrill’s guerrilla band moved south to greener pastures.  The 
guerrillas ambushed the party at Timber Hills on November 19, and slaughtered its 
members in a flurry of gunshots, leaving little but bloody scraps of clothing, discarded 
Enfield rifles and Captain Welsh’s personal papers.  Captain Thrasher and two soldiers 
escaped, and Thrasher later wrote Lieutenant Eberle Macy’s father to inform him of the 
circumstances of his son’s death and that of Captain Welch.  Thrasher’s letter described a 
hundred bushwhackers attacking the small group, a pattern Quantrill’s band employed 
with success in Kansas and Missouri.717  The Confederate raiders took no prisoners. 
     The detachment’s annihilation affected Captain Graton especially hard.  His wrote 
“The First Nigger is out of luck this year, a week ago yesterday Capt[ain]s Thrasher and 
Welch, L[ieutenan]t Macy and four or five others were set upon by a party and it is 
                                                
717 Richard J Hinton, Rebel Invasion Of Missouri And Kansas, And The Campaign Of The Army Of 
The Border Against General Sterling Price in October and November 1864. Leavenworth, Kansas: 
Chicago, Church and Goodman, 1865, 305-307.  Thrasher’s letter to Macy’s father details an ambush 
six miles north of Cabin Creek on 19 November.  The small party had attempted to pass through an 
area that was known to be haunted by bandits, and was the scene of at last three major actions against 
Union forces. 
 
 
372 
 
supposed that they are either killed or captured… Macy belongs to my co[mpany], and 
has lately been married.”718  The loss of another two veteran officers of the regiment cut 
deeply.  However, some men saw opportunity in this loss, and a most unethical act 
occurred when a brother officer used their deaths to insinuate his way back into the 
regiment.  
       Ethan Earle, upon hearing of the deaths of his one-time fellow officers, used the 
occasion to petition Senator Lane for an appointment as Major of the regiment, claiming 
that the Regiment faced imminent annihilation because of its incompetent and unpopular 
commander.719  Earle crudely claimed that Colonel Williams promised the position of 
regimental major to him.  Earle’s claims went unanswered; Senator Lane never pursued a 
Major’s commission for Earle, and Williams had no interest in doing so.  Earle burned 
bridges when he forced his commission upon Lane, and his political maneuverings may 
have been his undoing after he resigned his commission.  
The Evacuation of Fort Smith 
     The crisis sparked by Price’s Raid and the Army of the Frontier’s inability to curb 
guerrilla efforts in western Arkansas precipitated a thorough reexamination of the Army 
of the Frontier at Fort Gibson and Fort Smith.  The conclusion: Thayer lacked control 
over the regional economy, failed to reinvigorate efforts to establish farming 
communities capable of supplying the District of the Frontier’s needs, and continually 
relied on other commands for logistical support for increasing numbers of refugees.  
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Thayer’s logistical problems appeared to have only one solution - the evacuation of Fort 
Smith - and the garrison’s movement downriver to Little Rock.    
    The garrisons could not abandon their duties immediately. General Thayer proved a 
man of insight and compassion as he attempted to carry out the evacuation order.  Unpaid 
soldiers, unpredictable transport and ongoing defensive operations all tested his abilities. 
River steamers continued to supply his command, but several wrecks in mid-December, 
including that of the steamer Doane, demanded that Thayer disperse his resources to 
conduct cargo salvage operations.  Thayer also requested that the garrison at Fort Smith 
be paid since paymasters had not paid the men of his command for at least four months, 
and soldiers’ pay arrears were beginning to affect morale.720  The pay issue hit close to 
home, and as winter set in, soldiers’ families faced starvation of they could not procure 
food.     
     The evacuation orders for Fort Smith arrived at the worst possible time for Fort 
Smith’s inhabitants.  Forage proved impossible to obtain in quantity, and rations equally 
so.  Steele’s order stressed Thayer’s abilities, and those of his command to the limit.  A 
recapitulation of Thayer’s command provides an understanding of the massive scale of 
the evacuation:   
  I have but 100 teams, ninety five of them loading up with forage  
eighteen miles below Clarksville.  I have here twenty-five pieces of artillery  
but no artillery or cavalry horses.  I can only move the artillery by taking 
mule teams which will require fifty, thus leaving me fifty teams for other 
transportation.  I cannot leave before the trains from Fort Scott arrive around the 
1st January…I have here 170 tons of ordnance stores, and 205 tons of 
quartermaster stores.  When we leave Fort Smith the inhabitants will be left to the 
mercy of guerrillas, and loyal people will be subjected to terrible suffering.  Those 
not killed outright will be robbed of their subsistence, and in a short time will be 
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in an actual state of starvation.  There are at least 500 persons, both black and 
white with no transportation and there is none that can be obtained here.  I 
respectfully ask that a train as large as can be spared be sent here to assist in 
transporting government stores and removing these people.  The Indian troops 
were raised for service in the Indian Territory and any attempt to remove them 
would be disastrous.  They will be become entirely demoralized and utterly unfit 
for duty elsewhere.  All those Indians not in the service are of that class 
denominated refugees, and should they be moved in any direction it should be 
Fort Scott Kansas.  Unless I receive instructions to the contrary I shall leave the 
Indian troops where they are.  I will be making all my preparations to move as 
soon as my trains arrive.721  
 
Thayer’s problems could not be solved merely by removing the military garrisons of Fort 
Gibson and Fort Smith; he had to consider the effect upon the families of the soldiers and 
their needs as well as where they would go.  His Indian regiments could not be compelled 
to depart Indian Territory, and any move perceived as abandoning them to the 
Confederate guerrillas would be a morale debacle.  Thayer could not abandon the 
civilians in his district, especially in the middle of winter, despite military demands. 
Thayer also had to consider the needs of his sick soldiers.  The men could not march with 
the escorts or serve actively on the steamers.  Their needs demanded additional boats to 
ensure the evacuation didn’t create unnecessary casualties by exposing wounded or sick 
men to hard service. Surgeon Ensor boarded the Annie Jacobs to tend to the First Kansas 
Colored’s soldiers, and ensured the regiment possessed a dedicated medical asset for the 
evacuation proceedings.722  
          Obtaining transport and escorts for the exodus south created a great stir of activity 
at Fort Smith.  The increase in river traffic also proved an unmistakable signal to 
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Cooper’s forces in Indian Territory.  Interdicting steamers could provide the Confederates 
supplies to weather the winter and prove their ability to strike Union supply lines with 
impunity.  The Confederate forces wintering over in Indian Territory consumed massive 
amounts of forage and foodstuffs. The summer campaigns of 1864 came with a high 
price for the Confederate Indians, especially the Choctaw.  Fort Smith’s proximity to the 
Choctaw Nation resulted in many foraging expeditions, Confederate and Union, and the 
military columns stripped the country of its stocks of corn and cattle.  Confederate 
soldiers remaining in the Choctaw and Cherokee Nations appropriated so much food that 
the Indian civilians faced starvation.  Fort Gibson fared little better despite supply trains 
and steamers.723 Fort Smith’s evacuation would have effects that rippled across the region 
and touched on nearly every inhabitant’s existence.   
      Over the next several weeks, preparations for evacuation did not disrupt necessary 
military activities, and foraging expeditions continued to extract sustenance for Fort 
Smith from an ever-widening geographical area.   Contemporary depictions of areas near 
Fort Smith, and those beyond a day’s ride were striking.  Captain John Graton’s letters 
often mention food, and when the regiment foraged fifty miles north to Cane Hill in the 
Cherokee Nation it found a bounty of apples and over three hundred hogs.724 Food could 
be had, but the difficulty of finding enough to feed an entire army exceeded the ability of 
Fort Smith’s soldiers and the devastated farms of western Arkansas.   
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     The First Kansas Colored’s soldiers possessed few opportunities to enjoy the rich 
bounty of Cane Hill.  The evacuation of Fort Smith required details from the regiment to 
picket the north side of the Arkansas River, while other companies assisted with the 
loading and unloading of steamers, and processing refugees for departure from Fort 
Smith.725   Securing the cargoes of damaged or grounded steamers also demanded the 
regiment’s attention.  When steamers such as the Doane grounded on sand bars or struck 
sunken tree snags, the garrison executed a forced march to the wreck site.  The Doane’s 
wreck required the regiment to march seventy miles south along the Arkansas River, then 
back again as escorts for wagons full of salvaged goods. The pressing need for salvage 
operations eased somewhat at the start of the year when the evacuation order was 
cancelled after vigorous protests by civil and military leaders. 
     Perhaps persuaded by the appeals of Unionist Arkansans that abandoning the fort 
could signal an end to the ongoing efforts to bring Arkansas back into the Union fold, 
President Lincoln countermanded the evacuation order before Fort Smith had been 
completely abandoned. Lincoln ordered General Grant, if necessary, to reoccupy the 
fort.726  C.P. Bertrand, the former mayor of Little Rock, appealed to President Lincoln, 
citing the loss of congressional districts and counties in a state that recently conducted 
elections in favor of the Union.    Kansas’s newspapers offered other reasons for retaining 
Thayer’s forces at Fort Smith, and the Fort Scott Weekly Monitor opined that abandoning 
Fort Gibson and Fort Smith would endanger Kansas.  Evacuating the forts made neither 
military nor moral sense since General Joseph Reynolds, Steele’s replacement as 
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commander of the District of Arkansas, retained 40,000 men at Little Rock.  Although 
Reynolds halted the evacuation, he commanded all Colored regiments to march to Little 
Rock.727    
      The First Kansas Colored’s move to Little Rock began on January 16, 1865, a 
combination of marches and riverboat escort duties along the Arkansas River.  Their time 
at Fort Smith - on half rations because of Confederate raids on river-borne supplies - had 
been exceedingly difficult.728  The boats continued to require escort details while 
transiting the river, and when boats risked travel with inadequate escorts or no protective 
detail, guerrilla bands struck.   A Confederate attack at Ivy Ford on January 17, 1865 
captured the steamer Chippewa, and guerrillas took a large number of refugee families 
and blacks into captivity.729  The river could no longer be counted as a safeguard against 
raids. 
     The Confederate attack at Ivy Ford compelled Thayer allocate increasing numbers of 
men to ensure the river remained open.  Colonel Thomas Bowen of the Thirteenth Kansas 
Cavalry, who commanded the escort for the steamers on the Arkansas River, reported as 
many as 1,500 Confederates with artillery threatening to cut river traffic. Consequently, 
the First and Second Kansas Colored arrived at Dardanelle on January 21, and secured 
the cargo of the Annie Jacobs.   When news of the brigade’s arrival at Dardanelle reached 
                                                
727 Fort Scott Weekly Monitor, January 12, 1865. 
728 General Orders 1, Colonel Williams, Headquarters Second Brigade, Frontier Division, Fort Smith, 
January 16, 1865, RG 94: Adjutant General’s Office, 79th USCT, Regimental Order Book E112-115, PI-17, 
Vol 2 of 4; Graton letter, Fort Smith, Arkansas January 15, 1865, John Graton Correspondence Collection, 
Microfilm Box 913. 
729 Report Number 1, Colonel Abraham H. Ryan, Third Arkansas Cavalry (Union), Lewisburg, Arkansas, 
January 27, 1864; Report Number 3, Major General Magruder, General Orders 18, Headquarters District of 
Arkansas, Washington, Arkansas, January 25, 1865 by command of MG Magruder, OR: Series I, Volume 
48, Part I: Reports and Correspondence, 13,16-17. 
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Confederate ears, the raiders withdrew southwards.730  Williams did not attempt to pursue 
the mounted guerrillas but instead remained in the vicinity of Dardanelle while his 
brigade foraged for a few days. 
     While his brigade consolidated its positions, local southern sympathizers cursed the 
black infantry’s foraging parties and their white officers.  One foraging expedition in 
Dardanelle conducted by a Union officer and black troops, garnered two full wagons of 
corn, several hundred pounds of meat and chickens, and potatoes.  According to the diary 
of the aggrieved party, the family deprived of these victuals prayed for God’s strength to 
resist the “hateful negroes.”  The passage of the Union steamer escorts left wrecked 
communities in their wake.  Many log homes in Dardanelle burned to keep Federal troops 
warm and to shore up entrenchments.731  Convinced that the lack of Confederate 
opposition no longer required his brigade’s intervention, the Second Brigade resumed the 
march south to Little Rock.  Though no resistance was encountered for the rest of the 
march, two men of the First Kansas Colored drowned at Ivy Ford.732   The First Kansas 
Colored arrived at Little Rock prepared for the next chapter in the regiment’s history. 
 
 
   
                                                
730 Report Number 2, Operations January 17-24, 1865, Colonel Thomas M Bowen, Thirteenth Kansas 
Infantry, Commanding US Transports, Jan 24, 1865; Brigadier General Thayer to Major John Levering, 
Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Arkansas; Colonel Ryan to Major General J.J. Reynolds, 
Dardanelle, Arkansas, January 21, 22, 1864; OR: Series I, Volume 48, Part I: Reports and Correspondence, 
15, 605, 613. 
731 Morrow, Mary Hannah Johnston, 1847-1876, Diary and related materials, (1862…1869), 1876, Series 
1: Diary, Folder 2: Bound Volume, MS M 834.320, Loc 121, Special Collections, University of Arkansas, 
Fayetteville, 23-24.   
732 “First Regiment Kansas Colored Volunteers – Infantry,” Report of the Adjutant General of the State of 
Kansas, 1861-1865. Vol. 1, Privates Dewly and Drisdom drowned and Private Buchamp expired January 
12, 1865 at Fort Smith.    
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************************* 
     The First Kansas Colored experienced many traumatic changes during the campaigns 
of 1864.  The Regiment lost many of its soldiers to combat, and the indiscriminate 
massacre of wounded and captured personnel.  Officers resigned in large numbers, 
depriving the regiment of veteran leadership at a time when the regiment’s enemies 
increased their efforts to destroy the regiment.  Guerrilla warfare increased in scope and 
intensity in western Arkansas, and the regiment responded by supporting Union efforts at 
fort Gibson and Fort Smith.  The First Kansas Colored served as the lynchpin of Thayer’s 
Second Brigade, the most experienced of the Colored Regiments continually escorting 
trains and responding to raids throughout the fall.  The effect of the Regiment’s efforts is 
difficult to measure in quantitative terms, but the intensity of Confederate hatred 
confirms the Regiment’s place as one of the District of the Frontier’s most effective units.  
Poison Spring did little to dim the value of the regiment, and despite serving as part of the 
Army of Arkansas at Jenkins’ Ferry, the regiment soldiered on as the premium Colored 
Regiment in western Arkansas.  
      The regiment’s identity had evolved during the campaigns of 1864, and by December 
the transition from once-despised experiment to valued combat formation was complete.  
The Federal government recognized the place of black soldiers in the army by 
systematizing the Colored Regiments, removing state and assigning numerical 
designations.  Instead of the First Kansas Colored being a state regiment, it became a 
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United States Regiment, the Seventy-Ninth Regiment United States Colored troops.733  Its 
distinct Kansas identity was now subsumed to its national role in the union war effort.       
     The regiment experienced a final evolution in its character at Little Rock.  The 
campaigns of 1863 and 1864 exacted a high toll on soldiers, and many continue to endure 
the pain of half-healed wounds and disease.  The disabled veterans of the regiment began 
to leave service in the spring of 1865, honored men who gave much to attain their 
freedom.  The First Kansas Colored’s service at Little Rock would witness the final 
disintegration of the Confederacy, and the stirrings of Reconstruction in Arkansas.           
     The First Kansas Colored’s record of military service begun at Island Mound and 
sustained through Price’s raid, established a timeless reputation for excellence.  The 
regiments sustained the pride of black Kansans at a time when resentment toward 
refugees in Kansas spiked as the result of increasing numbers of refugees.  The First 
Kansas Colored’s officers and men continued to serve the Union cause with fidelity and 
stoic steadfastness, a tradition the regiment sustained as its men marched southward to 
Little Rock and new missions.    
 
 
       
      
 
      
                                                
733 Secretary of War, Orders Number 27, December 13, 1864, RG 94: Records of the Adjutant General, 
Book Records of Volunteer Union Organizations, 79th USCT Infantry, Regimental Book, E112-115, PI-17, 
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Chapter 10 
Jubilee 
 
       When the First Kansas Colored departed Fort Smith, it left behind a community to 
which it possessed links through its soldiers and their families.  Little Rock was a 
relatively unknown place for many, and although the regiment rested several days outside 
the city after the retreat of Camden, the likelihood that the fatigued men of the regiment 
explored the vicinity for anything but food appears slim.  Little Rock would tempt many 
with its dubious entertainments, the allure of liquor, horse racing, gambling and 
prostitutes too difficult for some to resist.  Little Rock, and the regiment’s subsequent 
posting, Pine Bluff, also gave soldiers the opportunity to directly aid in improving the 
welfare of black refugees by establishing security and protection in a state where the new 
relationship between the races was undergoing agonizing birth pains.           
     The First Kansas Colored arrived at Little Rock in two phases.  Company F, which 
served as the escorts aboard the steamers Carrie Jacobs and Green Durbin, reached Little 
Rock when Carrie Jacobs docked on December 29, 1864.734  Company F debarked and 
marched to a camp located near the Arkansas River and a Freedman’s home.  Lieutenant 
Creps’ men then shared picket duty with Captain Herrick’s company of the Sixty-Ninth 
United States Colored Infantry.  The soldiers of Company F received six four-man wedge 
tents  and a wall tent for Creps.  The tents served as the company’s domiciles until a 
cavalry picket relieved the company of its detail on February 15, 1865.  While awaiting 
the remainder of the regiment, Creps and his men took in their new surroundings and 
                                                
734 Janet B. Hewitt (ed.) Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Part II, 
Record of Events, Volume 78, Serial No. 90 (Wilmington, North Carolina: Broadfoot Publishing Company, 
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swapped war stories (and more tangible items) with black Arkansans who served the 
Union army’s various departments.  
     Little Rock changed greatly between April 1864 and February 1865, and the situation 
Company F’s soldiers now experienced constituted a radical change from operations at 
Fort Smith.  The refugee numbers at Little Rock had swelled prior to the regiment’s 
arrival, but General Reynolds refused to expend great sums of money to maintain them, 
and shipped them north by all available means.735  Albert Smith, a contractor in the 
Quartermaster Department during January 1985, recorded the comings and goings of 
riverboats along the Arkansas River.  His letters detailed the constant movement of 
vessels transporting as many as fourteen hundred refugees apiece to Cairo, Illinois.  Food 
speculation was rife, and the price of food commodities shot up as demand increased.  
Purchasing basic foodstuffs such as flour and potatoes exceeded the ability to pay of 
many refugees.  Begging for scraps of bread became the norm.736  Harris hypothesized 
that the boat traffic was linked to preparations for a spring campaign into Texas. 737  
Events proved Harris correct, but for the black soldiers of the First Kansas Colored and 
Williams’ Second Brigade, their arrival at Little Rock presaged a new period of service 
as garrison troops.   
      The Regiment’s arrival in late January brought it closer to a major depot than it had 
been seen since the formative months at Fort Scott.  Perhaps in recognition of their new 
duties as garrison troops, the Regiment’s soldiers received issues of equipment to replace 
                                                
735 Linda W. Reese “Cherokee Women in Indian Territory, 1863-1890 The Western Historical Quarterly, 
Volume 33, Number 3 (Autumn, 2002), 283.  The cost for Indian and black refugees at Fort Gibson alone 
rose to nearly $250,000 by the end of summer 1865. 
736 Albert Harris letter home, January 1, 1865, Harris, Albert 1811-1905, Correspondence, 1864-1866. Box 
1, Folder 1, Loc 1152, MS H24.346 Harris.  Special Collections, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. 
737 Albert Harris letter home, January 15, 1865, Harris, Albert 1811-1905, Correspondence. 
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worn or lost items, many receiving caps, trousers, shirts, drawers, boots or bootees, 
stockings, blouses, blankets and waterproof gum blankets.738  The new clothing improved 
the unit’s appearance, and once the entire regiment occupied their campsite, the men 
received orders to begin construction of new barracks from newly sawed lumber instead 
of demolishing private homes for materials.  The regiment’s companies also turned in 
surplus ordnance and equipment.739 The construction order implied permanency, and the 
First Kansas Colored underwent a period of comprehensive refit and training to prepare 
the unit for operations around Little Rock.  
     While the First Colored performed duties as pickets and provost guards, the white 
regiments of the Army of Arkansas undertook an expedition to the Saline River.  It is 
unknown why the white regiments departed while the Colored Regiments remained, but 
it is reasonable to believe that black regiments freed up white ones for campaign, and 
therefore did not constitute part of Reynold’s army.  If this was the case however, it 
represented a step back for the regiment, and the re-imposition of the sort of servile roles 
that the First Kansas Colored had not performed since spring, 1863. The expedition 
returned after three weeks absence and at once began to prepare for embarkation.  The 
white regiments were to be transported to New Orleans where they would be part of a 
new campaign in Texas. Rumors of a coming peace were everywhere but proved 
premature.   
      
                                                
738 Company returns for January and February, 1865,  RG 94: Adjutant General’s Office, 79th USCT, 
Regimental Order Book E112-115, PI-17, Vol 2 of 4. 
739Special Orders 3, Headquarters Second Brigade, February 14, 1865, RG 94: Adjutant General’s office, 
79th USCT, Regimental Order Book E112-115, PI-17, Vol 2 of 4; Special Orders 6, Major Ward, 
Headquarters, Seventy-Ninth United States Colored Infantry, Little Rock, February 17, 1865, RG 94: 
Adjutant General’s Office, Book Records of Volunteer Union Organizations, 79th USCT Infantry, Order 
Book Companies A-K, E112-115, PI-17, Vol 3 of 4. 
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 Substitutes, test officers, and demotions 
     Change was afoot in Arkansas in the spring of 1865, and Major General Reynolds, 
confident of Union control in central Arkansas, renewed steamer travel to Fort Smith.  A 
draft call went out in mid-February, and two hundred and fifty men, including a number 
of black men entered the Union army.  Many of these joined as substitutes for whites 
desiring to avoid military service.  Contractor Albert Harris admitted operating his 
quartermaster detachment with one eye to buying a black substitute if the draft called him 
for return to the army’s ranks.  Harris felt little shame in buying the services of a black 
substitute and was confident that he could get one for two hundred dollars instead of 
paying much more for a white substitute.740    
     Substitutes offered one solution to the Union army’s manpower woes, and gave large 
numbers of black men a financial incentive to enlist.  Whereas patriotism and appeals to 
the welfare of the black race failed, money swayed some men to enter military service.  
The time-honored practice of hiring men as substitutes to replace draftees or those averse 
to military service was a means of fulfilling their obligations as soldiers, without the 
inconvenience of actual soldiering.  Federal substitutes entered into a binding agreement 
that obligated them to serve in the Union army, and in exchange the substitute received a 
sum ranging from two hundred to five hundred dollars.  The money gained from the 
agreement could give a poor man the ability to improve his station, while the substitute 
gambled that he would not die in service before his term expired.   
The First Kansas Colored’s first group of substitute soldiers entered service 
between February and March 1865.  However, despite one hundred and sixty four men 
listed as substitutes or unassigned men in the regimental records, none of this former 
                                                
740 Albert Harris letters home, February 8, 19, March 18, 1865, Harris, Albert 1811-1905, Correspondence 
 
 
385 
 
group joined the regiment before the Civil War’s conclusion.741  Substitutes could have 
potentially resolved most of the First Kansas Colored’s manpower shortage, but the 
training period required to prepare men for military service and the associated 
transportation requirements kept substitutes from having any impact on the First Kansas 
Colored’s operations in Arkansas.  The surrender of General Lee’s army in Virginia also 
made these potential substitutes redundant, and so their service is a footnote to the 
regiment’s history.   
     The few replacements that filled the First Kansas Colored’s ranks in 1865 went to 
Company K.  The Company mustered thirty men in January 1865, but between February 
20 and 24 twenty-seven men hailing from Kansas and Iowa mustered into Company K at 
Little Rock.742  Company K, on the eve of the Civil War’s conclusion, finally possessed 
enough men to perform its duties.  The addition of new manpower came at an ideal time; 
as a whole the regiment gained few recruits at Little Rock. The Regiment, after two years 
of hard service reported four hundred and fifty-five men present for duty out of an 
aggregate strength of just over six hundred men.743  Over one hundred and fifty men 
absent from the regiment deprived it of nearly a quarter of its strength, a huge number 
when considering that many listed as absent were sick, deserters, or on detached duty at 
posts ranging from Fort Scott to Little Rock. The regiment’s authorized strength of over 
eight hundred men would never again be attained despite attempts to obtain manpower 
throughout the spring of 1865. 
                                                
741 “First Regiment Kansas Colored Volunteers – Infantry,” Report of the Adjutant General of the State of 
Kansas, 1861-1865. Vol. 1, 597 – 599. Nearly all of these men mustered out of service at Benton Barracks, 
Missouri on May 12, 1865. 
742 “First Regiment Kansas Colored Volunteers – Infantry,” Report of the Adjutant General of the State of 
Kansas, 1861-1865. Vol. 1, 594-597. 
743 Monthly Report for Second Brigade, First Division, Headquarters Department of Arkansas, Little Rock, 
February 6, 1865, OR: Series I, Volume 48, Part I: Reports and Correspondence, 756. 
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     Manpower changes in the regimental ranks occurred with increasing regularity during 
the Regiment’s time at Little Rock.  The turnover in many cases was prompted by 
promotions or reductions that occurred as the result of regimental reorganization. Surplus 
Non-Commissioned Officers, those with long service records and newly promoted 
Sergeants alike, received demotions as the regimental Non-Commissioned Officers 
numbers decreased in order to meet manning requirement regulations.  Each company 
could possess one First Sergeant, one Sergeant for every sixteen soldiers, and a Corporal 
for every eight soldiers.744  The key to gradually implementing an otherwise demoralizing 
measure was to not replace men reduced for misconduct or discharged for disability.  
Initially few men received demotions, but as the year progressed, demotion and 
promotion rates accelerated with proximity to the temptations of Little Rock’s gambling 
dens and prostitutes, attempts to break the monotony of camp life, and challenges to 
white authority by Non-Commissioned officers.   
     The Regiment’s officer ranks also experienced changes as the result of promotions to 
fill company command positions left vacant since the previous fall.  First Lieutenants 
Benjamin Jones and Shebua Creps, and Second Lieutenant Granville Lewis received 
Captain’s rank and company commands, and Second Lieutenant Eberly Macy rose to 
First Lieutenant.745  These promotions finally restored the regiment to balance in its 
commissioned ranks.   
                                                
744 “First Regiment Kansas Colored Volunteers – Infantry,” Report of the Adjutant General of the State of 
Kansas, 1861-1865. Vol. 1574 – 597; General Orders 4, Headquarters Second Brigade, First Division, 
Seventh Army Corps, Little Rock, February 17, 1865, RG 94: Adjutant General’s Office, Book Records of 
Volunteer Union Organizations, 79th USCT Infantry, Order Book Companies A-K, E112-115, PI-17, Vol 3 
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745 Special Orders 8, By order of the secretary of War, Vicksburg, Mississippi, January 26, 1865. RG 94: 
Adjutant General’s Office, 79th USCT, Regimental Order Book E112-115, PI-17, Vol 2 of 4. 
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     New officers for Colored Regiments no longer relied on patronage from powerful 
politicians, but received commissions from boards charged with promoting men that met 
physical, moral and mental standards, as well as professional proficiency for the new 
rank.  New officers for Colored Regiments needed to meet educational requirements that 
stressed reading, writing, arithmetic, and geography in addition to knowledge of the skills 
appropriate for the office sought.746  Many white applicants came forward for positions in 
Colored Regiments, but desire and ability didn’t always translate into commissions. One 
for whom the commission system worked, former Private John H. Mockett a musician 
formerly of Company F, Twenty-Eighth Wisconsin Infantry, joined the regiment after 
being appointed a Lieutenant by a commissioning board.747  Mockett possessed combat 
experience, but perhaps more importantly, he willingly sought a commission in a Colored 
Regiment in lieu of service in a white one.  Mockett’s reasons for seeking a commission 
are not recorded in his service record, but the prestige of rank and increased officer pay 
must have been a strong incentive. 
     As the war stabilized in Arkansas and concluded in Virginia, regimental officers 
tendered resignations in increasing numbers.  Officers departed the regiment beginning in 
March.  Lieutenant William Gibbons, the regimental adjutant, resigned after receiving a 
surgeon’s certificate for disability.748  Soon afterwards Captain Granville Lewis received 
a leave of absence to attend to family and business affairs after Regimental Surgeon 
                                                
746 “Extract General Orders 17 of 1864, Headquarters Military Division of West Mississippi, Special Orders 
48, Major General J.J. Reynolds, Headquarters Department of Arkansas, Little Rock, Feb 23, 1865, RG 
393,Part II, Record 1171, General Orders Issued by the Department of Arkansas, 635. 
747 Special Orders 65, Major General Reynolds, Headquarters Department of Arkansas, Little Rock, March 
18, 1865, RG 94: Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, Book Records of Volunteer Union 
Organizations, 79th USCT Infantry, Regimental Order Book, E112-115, PI-17, Vol 2 of 4. 
748 Special Orders 40, Headquarters, Department of Arkansas, February 14, 1865, RG 94: Records of the 
Adjutant General’s Office, Book Records of Volunteer Union Organizations, 79th USCT Infantry, 
Regimental Order Book, E112-115, PI-17, Vol 2 of 4. 
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Ensor diagnosed him with bilious fever, nostalgia (depression), and chronic hepatitis.749  
Captain William Smallwood also tendered his resignation, citing continuous service for 
years, family sickness and business concerns at home as his compelling factors.750  
Officer resignations did not occur without significant outside influence.  Events in 
Virginia gave many military men pause, and the necessity for continued service appeared 
less urgent after Richmond’s fall. 
Prisoners of War return 
          Treatment for black prisoners of war changed little between 1863 and 1864, and 
the record of treatment for this time period is a sad tale of abuse and murder.  Records 
going back to the fall of 1863 detailed the sale of black soldiers after capture, despite 
President Lincoln’s threat to punish Confederate prisoners harshly for each black soldier 
enslaved. Confederate authorities, by 1864 however, increasingly sought to minimize 
reports of this practice.  Confederate authorities in Arkansas, although reporting the 
names of captured blacks in labor bureau communications, adopted a lower profile 
approach to processing black prisoners.  Instead of the open defiance of earlier executions 
and enslavements, black captives traveled with their captors to regional depots where 
prisoners remained until transported south to Texas.751   First Kansas Colored prisoners of 
                                                
749 Special Orders 83, Headquarters Department of Arkansas, Little Rock, April 4, 1865, RG 94: Adjutant 
General’s Office, 79th USCT, Regimental Order Book E112-115, PI-17, Vol 2 of 4; RG 94: Granville 
Lewis, Combined Military Service Records. A surgeon’s certificate of disability appeared in order, but 
Lewis’s discharge was countermanded in June, and he returned to the regiment to serve as Provost Marshal 
at Pine Bluff until the regiment mustered out of service. 
750 Special Orders 94, Department of Arkansas, April 9, 1865, RG 94: Adjutant General’s Office, 79th 
USCT, Regimental Order Book E112-115, PI-17, Vol 2 of 4.  On April 19 Smallwood’s resignation 
received approval, perhaps in recognition of the recent Union victory against lee’s army in Virginia .   
751Report of Major General Banks, October 11, 1863; General Order 252, President Abraham Lincoln, 
Washington D.C. July 31, 1863, OR: Series II, Volume 6, Prisoners of War, 54, 163; General Braxton 
Bragg to Governor Z.B. Vance, North Carolina, April 21, 1864; Lieutenant Colonel Edward P. Turner to 
Colonel R.G. Shaver, Camden, Arkansas November 10, 1864, OR: Series II, Volume 7, Prisoners of War, 
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war experienced a variety of treatment while in Confederate custody, and their stories 
reveal the extent to which black soldiers suffered a double penalty for military service.   
     The soldiers captured at Poison Springs and Flat Rock survived after their capture, 
despite being taken during major military operations. The story of indiscriminate 
massacre at Poison Springs has another side that few reports Union of Confederate 
adequately address.  Not all prisoners died at Poison Springs.  The regimental Combined 
Military Service Records reveal that at least eight men entered captivity after the battle.  
The Poison Springs prisoners of war endured widely varying treatment, and race entered 
into that equation in surprising ways.  Captain Armstrong who became a prisoner at 
Poison Spring, entered captivity at Tyler, Texas but according to reports from other 
prisoners avoided punishment as a white officer by posing as a Private in the Thirty-Sixth 
Iowa.752  White service alongside black regiments did not equate to immediate execution, 
a situation that appears influenced by the muddle of captives after the battle.  The fact 
that Armstrong escaped sure execution as an officer of the hated First Kansas Colored is 
due to his abandonment of his role as an officer, and captivity as a Private rather than 
death as a Captain.   
     The fates of black soldiers did not appear to have changed any from Poison Springs to 
Flat Rock.  Both battles featured wounded soldiers being executed by vengeful 
Confederates, but the few that escaped execution proved the very rare exceptions.  
Private Montgomery Ridings, although sustaining wounds at Poison Springs, didn’t enter 
a camp but died in prison at Camden. The fate of individual prisoners is murky, and 
official records reveal little of what happened in the prisoner of war camps.  Private 
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Thomas Payne traveled to Marshall Texas, and then escaped to Shreveport in July, 1865 
in time to rejoin the regiment at Pine Bluff.  Little is known of Private Jacob Rogers, 
Charles Whittaker, Charles Blackburn, Crayson McMurtry, and Amos Solomon but they 
too survived the war.753 Sergeant James Brown, Corporal Isom Wood, and Privates Perry 
Clarkson, John Gains and London Thompson of Company K accompanied victorious 
Confederate forces to unspecified camps in Texas, and once there, remained listed as 
prisoners of war until October 1865.  Private Thompson went to Hunstville.754  Lieutenant 
Sutherland, like Armstrong went to Tyler, Texas, but his experience is unknown.755    
     The unexpected return of prisoners of war in February 1865 restored to duty a number 
of individuals listed as missing or formally registered as prisoners of war.  A prisoner 
exchange brought Captain Armstrong back to the regiment after a long period in the 
prisoner of war camp at Tyler, Texas.  Although granted a thirty-day leave of absence, 
and paid for his time in a prisoner of war camp, Armstrong immediately rejoined his 
regiment.756  The rumor that Confederates killed all prisoners captured at Poison Springs 
and Flat Rock proved false, and Armstrong’s desire to regain his company command may 
have been influenced by his treatment while a prisoner. Armstrong brought news of other 
First Kansas Colored officers and soldiers captured in battle, and confirmed that 
Lieutenants Sutherland and Hitchcock enjoyed good health.  Six soldiers also weathered 
                                                
753 Combined Military Service Records, USCT, 79th Infantry (New), M1921. Record of Andrew Armstrong, 
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754 Combined Military Service Records, USCT, 79th Infantry (New), M1921. 
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their time in confinement at Tyler, but unlike the white Union officers, the black soldiers 
had slim chances for an exchange.757 The prospects for prisoner exchange and 
confirmation of living black prisoners in Texas must have been compelling news when 
Captain Armstrong shared it with his fellow officers.  However, throughout the regiment, 
especially in the enlisted ranks, manpower remained in its usual state of flux. 
     The numbers of soldiers in the regiment also decreased as personnel received medical 
exams that determined their fitness for continued military service. Disability discharges 
commenced in February and peaked in June 1865 as the regiment discharged medically 
men previously retained on regimental rolls.  Although disability created by wounds 
sustained in combat was a major consideration, many soldiers received surgeon’s 
certificates of disability for ailments that included consumption, organic conditions such 
as “constitutional depravity,” asthma and rheumatism, and scrofula.  Men otherwise 
subject to retention due to demand for bodies to fill the ranks no longer served a purpose 
as the war approached its conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 6: Regimental Discharges for Disability758 
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     Chart 6 depicts the trend in manpower reduction as the First Kansas Colored 
discharged men throughout the spring and summer. Private Henry Thatcher, amongst 
those discharged from the ranks, suffered from a condition that could have been avoided 
by more thorough recruiting practices: Thatcher was in the Regimental Surgeon’s 
estimate not over fifteen years of age and unfit for military service.759  Unlike the 
underage soldiers detected in 1863, Private Thatcher left the service, but with a disability 
pension. 
Racial advancement and civil rights backsliding in Kansas  
     Buoyed by the successes in fall 1864, the black community in Leavenworth rode a 
wave of confidence over its contributions to the defeat of General Price’s army.  The 
community’s pride stemmed in part to the performance of the black state militia when 
Price’s army neared the Kansas border.  One observer believed that the black 
community’s sacrifices were vindicated when the black militia marched into Missouri 
without hesitation when ordered, whereas the white Kansas militia refused to cross the 
state line to bring battle to Price’s forces in Missouri.760  New opportunities opened up for 
black men during the uncertain period of fall, 1864, and news of the promotions of 
Lieutenant William B. Matthews and Second Lieutenant Philip Minor as officers in the 
Independent Light Artillery Battery may have reached the regiment through letters from 
home.  The report of black men wearing officers’ shoulder boards apparently elicited 
little backlash from white Kansans at this time, and became a source of hope for the 
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Leavenworth black community.761  The fidelity of black men to the Union cause in 
Kansas did not waver despite the threat of invasion.  Freedom remained the goal of black 
communities across the Union, and they willingly paid in the lives of their young men to 
attain it.   
     Black refugees also sought to reunite with absent soldiers, their entreaties reaching 
sympathetic ears in the influential Christian Recorder.  The collapse of slavery enabled 
once divided families to gather together their separated parts.  Many Kansas black 
communities came from predominantly Missouri origins and refugees attempted to use 
the few resources available to them to reach their loved ones outside of Kansas’s borders.  
The Christian Recorder, assisted these efforts, and attempted to reunite families with 
their soldiers.  One appeal for the whereabouts of a missing soldier was the example of 
Mrs. Fannie Robinson of Clay County Missouri, who sought Private Caryl Robinson by 
posting an [advertisement].762  It is unknown if Mrs. Robinson located her family 
member, but regimental records contain evidence of Charles Robinson who enlisted at 
Leavenworth in August, 1862 and mustered out in October 1865.763 Robinson’s 
enlistment at Leavenworth at a time when many Clay County men enlisted lends 
credence to this sort of appeal. 
Social changes and refugee life at Little Rock and Pine Bluff, Arkansas 
     Although nothing in the First Kansas Colored’s records indicates the number of 
soldiers’ families that accompanied their men to Little Rock, at least some attempted to 
follow their men to Little Rock.  Black refugees remained the most vulnerable population 
                                                
761 “Black Artillery Company Under Black Officers” National Anti-Slavery Standard, as quoted in Ira 
Berlin (ed.).  Freedom A Documentary History of Emancipation 1861-1867.  New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982, 91. 
762“Information Wanted,” The Christian Recorder, July 1, 1865 (repeated 22 July). 
763 Extracted from Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Kansas, 1861-1865. Vol. 1.  
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around Union camps, for despite the privations experienced by whites and Indians, the 
latter two groups could not be re-enslaved. The war created a playground for speculators 
and Reynolds recognized their pernicious influence on the economy.  Life at Little Rock 
was not easy for any civilian, and in recognition of that fact, General Reynolds issued 
orders to the military commissaries to supply “subsistence stores to families of enlisted 
men, now in service, or widows and orphans of deceased soldiers, at cost price, not to 
exceed in quantity one ration to each adult person.”764  This mercy toward soldiers’ 
dependents carried greater import for the families of black soldiers given their extremely 
low pay and lack of availability to tend to their family’s needs.   
     Secretary of War Stanton may have understood the powerful influence of family when 
he urged President Lincoln to extend the emancipation granted to slaves in Confederate 
states to the families of black soldiers from Border States.  Stanton urged the 
emancipation of soldiers’ family members for military purposes also, and he believed that 
emancipation could increase black military enlistments at a time when every man that 
could serve was needed in the field against the Confederate armies. Liberation could also 
compel greater morale and efficiency in the ranks, the obvious point being the decrease in 
desertions influenced by anxiety over dependents.765   Granting freedom to the families of 
serving soldiers sent a message to black soldiers that their sacrifices sustained the Union 
and that their service mattered to the greater body politic.  However, ill discipline in the 
ranks sent another message, and was dealt with through a system of passes and 
punishments. 
                                                
764 Special Orders 39, Major General J.J. Reynolds, Headquarters Department of Arkansas, Little Rock, 
February 13, 1865, RG 393,Part II, Record 1171, General Orders Issued by the Department of Arkansas. 
765 Secretary of War Stanton to President Lincoln, March 3, 1865, Negro in the Military Service, documents 
3589-3590.  
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Discipline and Punish 
     The lack of a threatening enemy created an environment in which Major Ward was 
forced to impose military discipline to ensure that the temptations of Little Rock did not 
undo the regiment’s record of proud service. Whereas field service and the need for 
constant readiness honed the regiment into a fine combat unit, garrison service with its 
many distractions threatened discipline. Ward demanded increased standards of discipline 
from the regiment, and required details to report condition and accountability after every 
excursion from the camp.  Men marched to their quarters under the leadership of Non-
Commissioned Officers after completing details and Ward demanded greater pride in 
appearance for the camp, extending so far as to prohibit cutting down trees in the vicinity 
of the camp.766  Colonel Williams issued further instructions to officers and soldiers 
prescribing camp discipline and proper wear of uniforms.  Passes also received attention 
and Williams reserved approving authority to his headquarters for any passes issued for 
departure from camp after tattoo.767   Military discipline marked the First Kansas 
Colored’s early reviews by senior Union officers, and both Ward and Williams 
understood that when discipline breaks down, the unit suffers for real and perceived 
indiscretions.  The Regiment no longer operated with the same impunity it once 
possessed at Forts Gibson and Smith; eyes watched the regiment for signs of ill 
                                                
766 General Orders 1, Major Ward, Headquarters, 79th USCI, Little Rock, March 2, 1865, RG 94: Records 
of the Adjutant General’s Office, Book Records of Volunteer Union Organizations, 79th USCT Infantry, 
Regimental Order Book, E112-115, PI-17, Vol 2 of 4. 
767 General Orders 9, Colonel Williams, Headquarters, Second Brigade, Little Rock, March 10, 1865, RG 
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discipline.  Houses would not be torn down for barracks, and trees would not fuel 
campfires unless approved by the regimental commander. 
     Signs of relaxed moral and military indiscipline abounded in Little Rock.  Union 
soldier Albert Harris described Little Rock in October 1864 as harboring “[very 
numerous] whiskey shops and gambling houses…Things are carried on very loos(sic) in 
Little Rock.  [Compared] To what they are at other military posts.”768  The actions of 
white officers came under increased scrutiny, and practices perhaps once tolerated 
received harsh sentences.  Prostitution was also circumscribed; venereal disease could 
debilitate a man, and in an era that predated prophylactics abstinence was the best policy. 
     Military camps and prostitution have a long association stretching back to the dawn of 
warfare.  The needs of soldiers did not trump military discipline and when officers openly 
flouted their authority to keep prostitutes as “temporary wives,” the consequences on 
subordinates damaged morale.  General Reynolds imposed a heavy toll on one officer 
who transgressed against the standards expected of his class, and Captain S.W. Yearlick 
of Company A, Sixty-Ninth United States Colored Infantry paid for his indiscretions by 
his dismissal from service for openly keeping a prostitute.  Yearlick and his paramour 
received three days notice to leave the department of Arkansas.769  Captain Yearlick’s 
example notwithstanding, Major Ward imposed additional restrictions on patronizing 
prostitutes, and threatened imprisonment and the loss of a month’s pay for the first 
offense of “harboring a woman in or around the camp” without permission.  The woman 
                                                
768 Albert Harris, Little Rock, October 30, 1864, Harris, Albert 1811-1905, Correspondence, 1864-1866. 
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769 Special Orders 53, Major General J.J. Reynolds, Headquarters Department of Arkansas, Little Rock, 
March 1, 1865, RG 393,Part II, Record 1171, General Orders Issued by the Department of Arkansas. 
 
 
397 
 
would be sent to the Freedman’s Home.770  Although harbored women could be family or 
unapproved laundresses, Ward drew the line quite firmly against conduct that could 
adversely affect the regiment’s discipline.   
     The necessity for imposing discipline is evident in the regimental records.  Desertions, 
although not a major disciplinary factor at Little Rock, did not fade away.  Soldiers that 
deserted in previous periods found their way back to the regiment, and at least two 
returning deserters returned to ranks in March.771  Personal motivations for voluntary 
return are not recorded, but deserters enjoyed little protection amongst the hostile 
Arkansas refugee populations, and may have sought military camps for protection and the 
assurance of sustenance in the lean wartime economy.  One of the most curious states of 
affairs to develop  occurred in May when two men of Company F with absentee periods 
of fifteen months and eighteen months respectively returned on May 17, and forfeited pay 
and allowances.  Another pair of suspected deserters returned to ranks with no loss of 
pay, their absence explained away as unavoidable due to reasons beyond their control.772  
The most likely cause for the latter two soldiers’ lack of penalty is simple separation from 
their command while the regiment moved between Fort Smith and Little Rock.  
                                                
770 General Orders 2, Lieutenant Colonel Ward, Headquarters, 79th USCI, Little Rock, Arkansas, May 21, 
1865, RG 94: Adjutant General’s Office, Book Records of Volunteer Union Organizations, 79th USCT 
Infantry, Order Book Companies A-K, E112-115, PI-17, Vol 3 of 4. A second offense earned the male party 
a thirty-day period of confinement at hard labor.  The fine assessed for the first offense went to benefit 
Colored Schools, a humane way to assess a fine without appearing arbitrary to the black soldiers of the 
regiment.  
771 Special Orders 35, Brigadier General Frederick Salomon, Headquarters, First Division, Little Rock, 
March 4, 1865; Special Orders 8, Major Ward, Headquarters, 79th USCI, Little Rock, March 13, 1865, RG 
94: Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, Book Records of Volunteer Union Organizations, 79th USCT 
Infantry, Regimental Order Book, E112-115, PI-17, Vol 2 of 4. 
772 General Orders 24, A.J. Kendrick, Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters, First Division, Little Rock, 
May 17, 1865; Special Orders 60, District of Arkansas, May 30, 1865; Special Orders 88, Brigadier 
General Solomon, Headquarters, First Division, Little Rock, May 17, 1865, RG 94: Adjutant General’s 
Office, Book Records of Volunteer Union Organizations, 79th USCT Infantry, Order Book Companies A-K, 
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Individual soldiers left behind in hospitals also filtered back to the regiment throughout 
the spring, as individuals or in pairs. 
     Deserters in military custody at other locations proved a nuisance and as a result most 
received discharge papers.  The case of Private David Reed is one example of a soldier 
that deserted, was recaptured, then escaped, and finally returned to military custody only 
to enter the hospital at Fort Scott in order to treat a raging case of gonorrhea.  Scott 
applied for removal from deserter status, but received a dishonorable discharge.773  While 
the Civil War demanded manpower, deserters could expect to be hunted by professional 
“deserter catchers” willing to return men to military control for a $30 bounty. Escaping a 
Union camp failed to offer many alternatives to deserters.  Although refugee 
communities could offer temporary amnesty if so disposed, vengeful whites existed on 
the fringes ready to seek redress for real or imagined insult or injury.   
     Bounties, whether for catching deserters, or enlistment provided financial inducement 
in cases where little else may have convinced men to risk life and limb.  The subject of 
enlistment bounties reentered discourse in renewed strength in the summer of 1865 when 
a series of enlistment bounties extended to black soldiers that could prove their status as 
freedmen prior to April 19, 1861.  Men fitting that definition could receive bounties 
between $100 and $300 and if wounded in combat could expect to retain that bounty as if 
they completed their term of service.  Black draftees and substitutes also received the 
financial inducement of $100 for military service.774   The bounty did not address the 
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status of many black soldiers that enlisted after achieving their freedom by escaping from 
slave states.    
     Disciplinary problems increased as the regiment remained in the vicinity of Little 
Rock.  Although the city could be blamed for temptations such as gambling dens and 
prostitution, reports of disciplinary infractions amongst the ranks crop up increasingly 
after April 1865.  Throughout the month of May soldiers received punishment worthy of 
mention in the regimental records.  First Sergeants Dabney Snyder and Jeremiah Hall’s 
unsoldierly conduct and disrespect to a superior officer resulted in a reduction to the 
ranks.  First Sergeant John Yokum of Company D also rejoined the ranks after being 
reduced for inefficiency and neglect of his duties.  Private Charles Jennison, at the other 
end of the enlisted ranks, received a more punitive punishment for disobeying orders and 
violating Article Nine of the Laws of Warfare, an article that includes striking a superior 
or threatening bodily harm.  Jennison’s sentence of hard labor for the remainder of his 
enlistment and forfeiture of all pay and allowances after February 1865 implies that 
Private Jennison may have been in an altercation that warranted his sentence.775  The 
cycle of reductions continued into the summer, and appears to have centered primarily on 
Non-Commissioned Officers neglecting their duties, going absent without leave, and 
disobeying orders.776  Some examples of Privates receiving severe punishments may have 
been in part due to an increasing awareness of the effect of how soldiers interacted with 
the local community.   
                                                
775 Special Orders 9, 19, 21, Lieutenant Colonel Ward, Headquarters, 79th UCI, Little Rock, May 2, 21, 25, 
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     The case of Private Jacob Berman is interesting because of the severe penalty he paid 
for transgressing against military regulations. Private Jacob Berman of Company I on 
July 21, 1865, was declared guilty of violating the frequently cited Article 9 of the Law 
of War.  Although found guilty of conduct prejudicial to good order and military 
discipline, Berman was sentenced to wear a twenty-four pound ball and chain, forfeit six 
month’s pay, and to be confined for six months at the Little Rock prison.  Berman’s 
sentence was finally remitted October 3, 1865.777  Article 9 contains punishments for 
infractions varying from insubordination to striking a superior Non-Commissioned 
Officer or Non-Commissioned Officer.  In the absence of detailed information about 
Berman’s offense, he may have threatened violence to a superior and been made an 
example for others.   
     The reductions of First Sergeant John Whalon of Company B and Commissary 
Sergeant Robert Cox for conduct unbecoming a Non-commissioned officer, when taken 
with earlier reductions for First Sergeants, indicates that insubordination increased in the 
ranks, perhaps a reason for increased penalties.  However, superior performance had its 
rewards also, and Sergeant Milton Bassett, having served meritoriously, replaced 
Whalon.778 The restlessness of soldiers more accustomed to field duty than garrison 
details, and the atmosphere of uncertainty of what the regiment would do next may have 
contributed to the sudden spike in insubordination.  However, whereas some individuals 
returned to the ranks, others rose to replace them in almost equal numbers, and in some 
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cases reductions appear in the same paragraph as promotions for the same positions in the 
regimental orders. 
      The reasons for increased disciplinary actions do not devolve into readily discerned 
incidents, but may have been affected by the proximity of the regiment’s soldiers to free 
blacks. After the regiment deployed to Pine Bluff, a location surrounded by freedmen 
camps, Lieutenant Colonel Ward’s response to unauthorized absences from camp and 
entering domiciles without authorization intensified, and in recognition of increased 
fraternization and pass abuses, Lieutenant Colonel Ward threatened dire consequences. 
The sutler store, a popular place for impromptu gatherings, to facilitate management of 
the soldiers, was closed after retreat roll call.779 Closing the sutler store to lingering 
groups of soldiers was an internal camp measure, but outside camp, soldiers came under 
intense scrutiny.  Major Ward utilized pass control and movement restrictions to prevent 
circumventing pass restrictions, especially to control soldiers departing camp to execute 
“official duties.” It is reasonable to hypothesize that these measures concerned 
fraternization given Ward’s previous orders in Little Rock regarding keeping women in 
camp.  Entering domiciles to conduct “business” of whatever unsanctioned nature 
appears to be a recurring problem given the number of reductions due to conduct 
unbecoming and disobeying orders.    
     Officers appear to have been charged with increased police duties, and while in Little 
Rock and Pine Bluff, officers were ordered to improve their appearance when departing 
camp.  In addition, orders compelling officers wear a complete uniform and carry side 
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arms suggest that when outside the camp, officers were expected to impose discipline 
through direct action.  Ward specifically reminded his officers that when departing on 
detail, they were expected to enforce Article 27 of the Law of War.  This particular article 
granted officers the authority to intervene in disputes and to stop any disorders on the part 
of soldiers, as well as arrest them for violating military law.780   Officers were in effect 
deputized to maintain order and if necessary impose order by force if necessary to 
preserve the peace.  Officers could not legally dismiss any act that fell under their 
purview regardless of their personal inclinations.  The absence of civil structures to 
enforce the peace, and the existing state of martial law made Union officers the de facto 
police of their areas of responsibility. 
The Soldier’s life and matters of general health  
     Over the course of these final months of the war, maintaining regimental fitness and 
readiness for Provost Marshal details required attention to matters besides protection 
against moral contagion and venereal diseases.  The additional details performed by 
soldiers, whether as ambulance corps wagons drivers, or as fortification and camp 
laborers necessitated improvements in sanitation and diet to sustain health. Foodstuffs 
improved in variety and availability at Little Rock, aiding the recovery of soldiers from 
their exertions.  Captain Graton reveled in the variety of food that could be purchased or 
requisitioned.  In lieu of hardtack, soldiers in garrison could bake soft bread, and the 
military commissary offered food previously unavailable at Fort Gibson and fort Smith in 
quantity: potatoes, sauerkraut, dried fruit, fish, bacon, rice, beans and molasses.  Many of 
these items re-entered soldiers’ diets as well, the latter three part of a soldiers’ ration 
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when available, and the inclusion of vegetables rich in nutrients helped ward off disease 
in men fatigued from manual labor.  Perhaps most importantly, the men of the regiment 
enjoyed leisure time, and regimental officers played a game of ball against the Second 
Kansas Colored’s officers.781   Other diversions such as gambling and prostitution offered 
more risky entertainments. Gambling appears to have been a favorite vice for the First 
Kansas Colored’s soldiers, but could lose one more than the pay in their pockets. 
     Many of the camp diversions of soldiers in other theaters also figured in the life of the 
First Kansas Colored’s men.  However, when Non-Commissioned Officers played a 
game of “chuck o luck” against their soldiers, the men forfeited the $553 pot and their 
rank.  Colonel Williams tried, sentenced and convicted the offenders, then offered up the 
proceeds for the education of freedmen.782  Fun could be had in the camps, but Williams 
decided that gambling transgressed fun and became fraud.  The fact that Williams and 
Ward both preferred to bestow Freedmen’s Homes with otherwise contraband made the 
fines and penalties serve a purpose that avoided the perception of arbitrary punishment. 
     There remained quite a lot of work to be performed in the regimental camp in addition 
to fatigue details and picket duty. Despite over a month’s occupation in the camp, few 
quarters housed men.  Cookhouses resembling shacks appeared to be the extent of 
construction, and Captain Graton sourly remarked that it would be summer before 
barracks housed men.  The situation resolved by late April however, perhaps in part due 
to new directives giving men engaged in barracks construction credit for fatigue duty.  
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Graton’s letters mention the progress of construction, and when the quarters were 
completed, the officers occupied spacious houses that contained kitchens, a bedroom and 
an office.783  Soldiers occupied barracks in groups, some in two-story buildings.  The 
completion of barracks and increased sanitary discipline in camp may have saved lives in 
the coming summer months, when the environment created a lethal series of challenges to 
the men’s welfare. 
     Soldiers experienced a new development in their personal lives in April when 
Regimental Adjutant Hughes received orders to requisition material for making wills at 
the urging of the medical department.784  The implications of this development coming 
from the medical department are a grim reminder that although the regiment’s soldiers 
enjoyed relative peace, the environment favored a greater enemy than Confederate 
infantry.  Little Rock hosted thick clouds of mosquitoes during the summer, and their 
deadly diseases began killing and disabling about the same time as the call for wills.   
     A survey of medical records revealed a rise in the number of soldiers reporting for 
sick call with the tell tale symptoms of malaria.  The chills and sweats of the disease 
appear to signal a near-pervasive malaria epidemic amongst the ranks, and the diagnosis 
of quotidian malaria makes it clear that the men of the regiment suffered from recurring 
bouts of malaria during their time in Arkansas.  The camp fevers of Fort Scott killed 
many recruits in 1863, but malaria left men alive, but unable to perform their duties 
efficiently.  Chills every twenty-four hours and associated symptoms of swollen livers, 
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jaundice and weakness signaled a widespread incidence of malaria among the troops of 
the First Kansas Colored.785 Disease, unlike Confederate bullets respected no 
fortifications and overcame even the most stalwart soldiers.   Managing personnel 
numbers required continual attention to matters of diet, recreation, and personal hygiene.  
     The black community of Little Rock and Pine Bluff shared medical facilities with the 
soldiers of the First Kansas Colored, and when the groups mixed, as at Fort Smith, the 
results could be lethal.  The shared hospitals were frequently cited as substandard by 
inspectors, and lacked sufficient medical staff.  As a result of neglect, disease and 
unhygienic conditions, at Pine Bluff’s black military hospital ninety-two of three hundred 
and forty-three patients died.786  Ironically, at Little Rock the regimental surgeon 
interacted with local black refugees and freedman’s camp occupants while he treated his 
patients.  Captain Huddleston’s company supplied some of the military labor at Little 
Rock’s general hospital, and after relieving the One Hundred and Thirteenth United 
States Colored Infantry, the company provided security, nurses, and manpower for the 
hospital, assisting Assistant Surgeon Lacky.787  Many of the regiment’s soldiers passed 
through the medical system at both locales, the men continuously under assault by the 
region’s endemic mosquitoes. 
                                                
785 Survey of Regimental and General Hospital sick call slips, RG 94: Entry 534, 79th USCT, Medical 
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The war continues in Arkansas  
     While the regiment continued to support the ongoing Union operations in Arkansas 
throughout the spring, events in the east impacted the dynamic in  the west where  
Confederate forces remained viable.  The surrender of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia 
elicited great hopes for peace, and at Little Rock a spectacular salute of two hundred guns 
blasted forth in celebration.788  However, the exultation attending victory turned to ashes 
days later when Little Rock’s church bells pealed to announce another great event that 
overshadowed the Union’s victory.  President Lincoln’s assassination affected the 
soldiers deeply, and the Regimental Surgeon remarked, “Every person in the United 
States will feel that they have lost a father.”  Captain Graton mourned President Lincoln 
as the greatest American since George Washington.789  The Great Emancipator’s death 
affected the black soldiers deeply, and although not documented, his assassination may 
have created great anxiety regarding the future of black men.  President Lincoln granted 
freedom by issuing the Emancipation Proclamation, but the Civil War’s conclusion was 
yet to come.  
     President Lincoln opposed slavery in his public and private endeavors.  One of the 
Union’s greatest threats in 1864, the northern Peace democrats (referred to as 
“Copperheads”) threatened to restore the status of slavery to its ante bellum status as part 
of their peace platform.790  Many northern civilians continued to oppose black solders 
into early 1865, and at least one congressman was rebuked by President Lincoln who 
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reminded the politician that “although he would not fight to free negroes, some of them 
seem willing to fight for you.”791  The loss of Lincoln’s mediation skills before 
Reconstruction could be implemented left the so-called “Radical Republicans” to assume 
leadership of the Union’s efforts.  Because the war continued in the west and Confederate 
armies remained in the field, so would black regiments. 
     The loss of President Lincoln’s leadership did not shake the Union’s resolve to 
complete the defeat of the remaining Confederate forces.  Regimental officers soon 
received indications that the war would commence again in Arkansas against the last 
remaining holdouts in Texas.  A spate of officer promotions, and the issuance of pay after 
eight months on April 18 and again on April 30, may have caused many to ask what the 
next step would be for the army of Arkansas.  Captain Graton thought that a new 
campaign was about to begin, a grand movement of armies acting in two columns against 
Texas, but with uncertainties regarding participation by the First Kansas Colored.792  The 
uncertainty period ended in early May when the regiment received orders to board 
vessels to continue the elimination of the guerrilla threat south of Little Rock. 
     Several companies of the First Kansas Colored possessed experience in amphibious 
operations, albeit  gained while serving as steamer escorts during the winter months.   
The recently promoted Lieutenant Colonel Ward embarked a combined force consisting 
of three companies of the Fist Kansas Colored and forty cavalry on May 13, onto the 
steamer Rose Hambleton, and the expedition initiated a series of landings that searched 
for the camps of hard core Confederate holdouts.  One man surprised in the bush by 
soldiers of the expedition attempted to escape, but Ward ordered him shot after capture. 
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Despite the lack of contact with guerrillas during the expedition, Captain Graton didn’t 
feel the officers of the regiment entirely safe from danger after returning to Little Rock.  
Graton railed against the temptations of the city and felt that the officers’ gambling, 
whiskey, and prostitutes, made them morally depraved: “wives have more to fear [from 
the causes] than the bullets of the enemy.”793  The once formidable bushwhacker threat 
against Union units disintegrated in the face of impending Confederate defeat, and 
southern men began to return to homes despoiled by war. The First Kansas Colored’s 
men did not have the luxury of returning home, and remained in garrison at Little Rock.  
Their aggregate strength dwindled at little Rock for a number of reasons, foremost 
amongst them discharges for disability.  
Maintaining the peace 
     The First Kansas Colored’s soldiers drew structure from their daily routine, and the 
imposition of additional camp restrictions further defined the scope of soldiers’ daily 
lives.  Maintaining martial proficiency demanded not only drill, but also weapons 
practice.  Soldiers retained their arms while in camp as expected, but unless expending 
some of the thirty rounds authorized for target practice, men leaving camp with weapons 
faced confinement for a week in the guard house, and the exorbitant fee of $1.00 for 
ammunition.794  Wards’ directives do not appear to stem from any particular episode, but 
ensuring that armed black soldiers did not antagonize the populace by wandering the 
streets with loaded muskets while not performing their official duties could ease the 
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efforts of the Provost Marshal of the city.  The Provost Marshal imposed peace on the 
city by maintaining a monopoly on violence, and by restricting the numbers of weapons 
in circulation. Strictly controlling firearms may have ensured a relatively stable civilian 
populace, but within the camps a serious lack of discipline evidenced itself on an 
increasing basis in the summer of 1865, and became so widespread that every month’s 
regimental orders contained notices of reductions or promotions to full gaps created by 
disciplinary infractions. 
     One had to acknowledge that the Regiment’s disciplinary woes worsened in June.  
The top ranks of the regimental Non-Commissioned Officers, in particular, displayed 
heightened levels of insolence and incompetence while performing their duties.  The 
surrender of the last of the Confederate forces in July 1865 may have influenced the 
senior Non-Commissioned Officers’ behaviors.  Increasing citations and reductions for 
disobeying orders and insubordination indicate increasing tension between officers and 
soldiers, but no single cause can be cited.  Hospital Steward Gibbons avoided 
incarceration on grounds of a formality, but two Corporals were reduced to the ranks 
while four received promotions in order to replace reduced men.795  Corporals could be 
expected to lapse in their military bearing in part due to inexperience or inability to adjust 
to leading men who were messmates a short time before their promotions.  Reductions of 
senior enlisted personnel cast doubt on their professional bearing, and commitment to 
their covenant with their race to serve as upright men deserving of respect and emulation. 
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     The reduction of Company First Sergeants Thomas Montgomery and Harrison Reed, 
and their return to the ranks, after trial and conviction for charges of disobeying orders 
and conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline, set the tone for the performance 
expected from black soldiers as the Civil War’s pace wound down in the west.  Reed’s 
punishment is unusual because he also received a public reprimand from Lieutenant 
Colonel Ward in front of the regiment.  However, if former First Sergeants Reed and 
Montgomery stood as examples of miscreants, the actions and deportment of returning 
prisoners of war did them great credit.   The return of First Lieutenant Bethuel Hitchcock 
and First Sergeant Randolph Morgan from imprisonment confirmed their fidelity, and 
along with other former prisoners that rejoined the regiment after repatriation, the staunch 
faith of most men of the Colored regiments in the cause of freedom and the Union.  
Instead of taking the standard thirty-day leave of absence proffered to returning prisoners, 
both men immediately rejoined their companies and assumed their former duties.796  
Insubordination charges, despite the few details written in the Regimental records, give 
an incomplete record of discipline across the regiment.  More serious crimes demonstrate 
that black regiments, like their white counterparts, contained elements inured to moral 
approbation, and primed for crime. Two Company K soldiers personified some of the 
worst sort of behavior that a soldier could exhibit toward civilians, a heinous act of 
betrayal and premeditated murder that left no room for doubt about a the loss of 
discipline beginning to affect the regiment. 
     Captain Graton described the murder of one civilian and the attempted murder of a 
second in lurid tones.  Privates George Dixon and John Johnson of Company K enticed 
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an old man and a boy into following them into some woods with the tale of changing 
hidden money for the civilians’ Federal greenbacks.  The unsuspecting civilians followed 
and the soldiers robbed them of $400.00, after killing the old man and wounding the boy 
so severely they also thought him dead.  After identification, trial, and sentencing, 
Johnson jumped into the river and drowned on account of the eighteen-pound chain and 
iron ball to which he was shackled.  George Dixon was hanged on July 21, 1865.797   
Mistreatment of black soldiers  
     Stories of equally horrible problems in Kansas appeared to have been limited to the 
vicinity of the Independent Light Artillery Battery’s Camp Sully.  The coercive 
enlistment practices utilized to create the battery, described in a letter delivered to 
Captain H. Ford Douglas, were a litany of abuse and horror.  Seeking to be mustered 
from the service, enlisted men claimed that they were beaten, imprisoned, held under 
water in the nearby river, starved, and left exposed to the elements until they agreed to 
enlist. Captain Douglas added his own observations that men were starved to exhaustion 
to compel enlistment, and stated that he was prepared to swear to this treatment and could 
produce over a thousand witnesses.798 Shortly thereafter, the Union Department 
Commander ordered the battery disbanded.  Without question the accusations of 
mistreatment and violent coercion would not have been ignored in a white unit.  It is 
unknown why Douglas, if he knew such abuses provided his manpower for the battery, 
did not confront them sooner.  His complaint in June 1865 is extremely controversial 
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because Douglas’s battery did not play any significant role after Price’s defeat in late 
1864. 
     Mistreatment of soldiers could take many forms.  Unlike the shocking treatment 
accorded the black artillerists in Leavenworth’s Camp Sully, mistreatment of the First 
Kansas Colored’s soldiers took the form of pay inequities that occurred after 
normalization of pay occurred in March, 1865.  Colonel Williams, Lieutenant Colonel 
Ward, and the Company Commanders of the regiment addressed the Secretary of War 
with an appeal to pay the men of the First Kansas Colored the same as white regiments 
backdated to their initial enlistments in August, 1862. Williams’ attempt to collect back 
pay for his regiment foundered on Federal bureaucracy, and adding insult to injury, 
Williams’ soldiers were refused back pay because Senator Lane lacked authorization to 
offer equal pay at the time of enlistment in August 1862.799  The pay inequities endured 
by black soldiers across the Union army prior to pay equalization prevented many from 
gaining access to sutler stores, and may have contributed to desertion rates and a general 
lack of motivation to seek greater responsibility.  When Sergeant Majors, First Sergeants, 
and Privates earned the same pay for unequal duties and responsibility levels, remaining a 
Private with minimal responsibilities seemed a sensible thing for unambitious men. 
     Pay remained an issue for black soldiers throughout the war.  The issue of pay 
extended far beyond wallets or gambling circles, and affected the black community as a 
whole.  Remittances home could not be relied upon to offset expenses for civilians in 
Kansas, and pay often went un-issued for long periods of time when paymasters transited 
between commands. The previously inadequate $10.00 per month, $7.00 after clothing 
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was deducted, could not sustain families, and memories of the pay disparity rankled even 
after the War Department approved equal pay for black soldiers in July 1864.  Most black 
soldiers supported families in improvised housing near military camps, and the additional 
meager pay that laundresses, cooks, or teamsters could earn to purchase food or clothing 
failed to keep pace with wartime inflation and availability.800  Williams understood pay 
difficulties; his own pay was stopped because he failed to clear accounts from when he 
was a captain in the Fifth Kansas Cavalry.  Ultimately Williams requested a leave of 
absence to travel to Washington D.C. to settle his accounts, and remained absent from the 
Second Brigade into late July.801  Williams’ financial woes and those of other white 
officers reflect the difficulty of all ranks to maintain their fortunes, and several First 
Kansas Colored officers cited monetary concerns in their resignations.  When pay 
drought combined with the ennui of camp life and the realization that the war was over, 
discipline problems surfaced in the Regimental ranks. 
     Maintaining discipline among garrison troops proved a challenge to the 
professionalism and creativity of officers.  The Second Brigade of General Salomon’s 
First Division drilled for six hours per day, six days per week, and although men 
maintained their proficiency with their .58 rifles and .69 caliber muskets, some problems 
occurred when men exited the camp on leave or for Provost Marshal duties. Captain 
Armstrong shocked many when he was charged on July 17 with “assault with intent to 
kill” in Cairo, Illinois.  According to regimental records, Armstrong shot and killed 
Private Flynn, a soldier that Armstrong accused of murdering a soldier, when he 
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attempted to escape Armstrong’s custody.  Armstrong was acquitted, but his use of 
deadly force was an unsettling footnote to his post-prisoner of war military service. 
Needless to say his leave of absence had not turned out very well.802   
Homeward Bound 
 
     The departure of white soldiers in the summer of 1865 was matched in some cases by 
the mustering out of First Kansas Colored soldiers assigned to details apart from the 
regiment.  Soldiers at Leavenworth Kansas, either as members of detachments 
established to facilitate logistical operations or soldiers incarcerated for desertion, 
mustered out in six distinct periods, between June 7, 1865 and November 29, 1865. Two 
men mustered out from Little Rock in June are a divergence from the Regimental 
discharges for disability, and at least one was mustered out as a result of his 
incarceration.803 
     The First Kansas Colored continued to receive prisoners of war throughout the fall.  
Despite their period of imprisonment, the repatriated soldiers from various companies 
remained in ranks until their muster out from service with the general regimental out-
muster on October 1, 1865.804  Deaths continued to occur after the regiment’s relocation 
to Little Rock and later deployment to Pine Bluff.  Sixteen deaths recorded between 
February and October 1865 serve as witness to the fact that no regimental members died 
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as the result of combat in this time period, but that most died from disease with the 
exception of the men sentenced to execution for the premeditated murder of civilians.  
Company Number Cause of Death Date of Death 
Location of 
Death 
C 1 Disease February 15, 1865 Fort Scott 
C 1 Fever July 23, 1865 Little Rock 
C 1 congestive fever September 24, 1865 Pine Bluff 
E 1 Dropsy June 1, 1865 Little Rock 
E 1 Disease February 21, 1865 Little Rock 
E 1 congestive fever July 2, 1865 Fort Smith 
E 1 Disease September 26, 1865 Pine Bluff 
F 1 Disease February 9, 1865 Little Rock 
F 1 intermittent fever July 19, 1865 Little Rock 
G 1 Scrofula May 20, 1865 Little Rock 
G 1 typhus fever August 2, 1865 Fort Smith 
G 1 Scrofula  Unknown Little Rock 
H 1 inflammation of bowels May 17, 1865 Little Rock 
K 1 chronic diarrhea August 1, 1865 Little Rock 
K 1 Suicide June 23, 1865 Little Rock 
K 1 hanged  July 21, 1865 Little Rock 
Table 9: Regimental Causes of Death, February – October 1865805 
 
The symptoms of the deceased indicate that their deaths resulted from mosquito-borne 
diseases, especially when febrile fevers accounted for the majority of losses. 
     The First Kansas Colored received new orders directing the regiment to assume duties 
previously performed by white cavalry regiments.  When the white regiments neared 
their muster-out date, on July 25, Major General J.J. Reynolds ordered the First Kansas 
Colored to march to Pine Bluff, Arkansas  to assume garrison duties at that place.806The 
regiment’s arrival at Pine Bluff did not significantly change the nature of their duties.  
Although engaged as primarily as the garrison and Provost Marshal detachment for Pine 
Bluff, companies of the regiment also performed Provost Marshal duties at the towns of 
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Monticello and Warren, Arkansas. The march of the First Kansas Colored to Pine Bluff 
exposed the men to new environmental conditions from which many men contracted 
malaria.  Pine Bluff served as a key logistical center for the Army of Arkansas during the 
Civil War, and a sizeable freedman community remained after the war to farm.  The 
return of many discharged white southern soldiers to the vicinity heightened racial 
tensions, but with the First Kansas Colored conveniently located to intervene should 
violence erupt, no incidents of note were recorded in regimental records. 
     The first intimations of the First Kansas Colored’s impending muster-out appear in 
regimental records the second week of September.  The relatively uneventful Provost 
Marshal duties of Captain Crep’s Company F began at Warren, Arkansas on September 
8, but their duties and those of the regiment ended September 20 when the regiment 
received instructions to concentrate at Pine Bluff to prepare for muster-out.  The process 
of preparing men and equipment lasted for a little over two weeks, ordnance and 
equipment passing from the companies to Lieutenant Colonel Ward’s control and from 
there to the Department of Arkansas.  The soldiers maintained their arms, and service 
records reflect that many accepted charges equal to nearly half the monthly pay of a 
private in order to keep their weapons; many men left military life wearing Union blue 
uniforms and carrying the accoutrements to service their Springfield muskets.807 
     The First Kansas Colored’s soldiers officially mustered out of service October 1, 
1865, with soldiers that enlisted in Arkansas returning to their places of origin if the men 
desired.  The regiment’s enlisted Kansas soldiers remained for a brief period in Arkansas 
while their commanders accounted for equipment and stores, and began movement to the 
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riverboat Prairie Rose for return to Kansas. The final regimental casualties in Arkansas 
passed away in general hospitals in Little Rock and Pine Bluff between September 7 and 
September 22, and at least four fell prey to fevers of various types.  Additional men died 
while the regiment moved north aboard the steamer Prairie Rose; at least four men 
succumbed to fevers.  The final recorded regimental casualty occurred in Leavenworth 
when a soldier of Company G passed away from typho-malarial fever on October 27, 
1865.808  Surviving the pestilential Arkansas environment could legitimately be accounted 
the last campaign of the First Kansas Colored’s service.  
      The soldiers that enlisted in 1862 fulfilled their enlistments with honor.  However, 
some of the regiment’s officers never completed this final stage of movement.  Perhaps 
sensing the regiment’s impending muster out of service, a minority of officers took leaves 
of absences in August and September, and several never reported back to the regiment 
due to a combination of medical ailments.809   The last acts of several regimental officers 
should not cast doubt upon the whole, and as made evident by their military service 
records, the majority of the regiment’s officers applied for retention on the rolls after the 
war, and most were accepted.  Very few remained in the Union army after the regiment 
marched north.  The general reduction in the size of the Union army meant that those that 
remained would lose rank in order to remain, a too bitter pill for most.   Whatever their 
motivations, whether the reliability of a job that out-paid civilian occupations, especially 
for young men, or a sincere desire to remain with a Colored Regiment in what became a 
post-war army dominated by Colored regiments in the south, the fact that many proved 
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willing to extend their service with a black regiment is evidence of a deeper commitment.    
Two notable exceptions remained in the ranks however: the last regimental surgeon, 
Chauncy Burr volunteered to remain in the service in “whatever capacity he could serve,” 
and Brevet Brigadier General. Williams accepted a Captain’s commission in order to 
continue his military service.810   Williams seemed to enjoy being a soldier, and possessed 
a talent for war.  His service would take him through the Indian Wars where he received a 
Major’s brevet for valor in Arizona, and in 1871, when too disabled to serve any longer, 
Williams took the fight to Washington D.C. where he would fight once again for his men. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
     A brief analysis of the regiment’s performance encapsulates the price paid by the 
regiment’s personnel for their service.  Regimental records, although incomplete, contain 
mention of two hundred and fifty-four men who died from wounds, disease, and 
accidents.  Dozens received discharges due to disability, and although a black mark 
against the regiment, at least fifty-three deserted, but at least twenty percent returned to 
service, some of who died as a result to recommitting themselves to the Union cause.  
These raw numbers fail to truly reflect the regiment’s performance.  The eighteen 
separate battles, skirmishes, and raids undertaken by the regiment during its service 
reveal it to be a hard-fighting, dependable command.  Only in the last few months of the 
regiment’s service did any indication of widespread disciplinary problems arise, barring 
the rough-and-tumble days of the regiment’s formation at Fort Scott.  The First Kansas 
Could march off the Prairie Rose with heads held high and secure in the knowledge that 
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their service had secured for them the right to be called men, and evidence that black men 
shirked no duty in their service. 
     Returning to civilian lives proved a different challenge for many of the regiment’s 
veterans.  Although the armies of the south lay prostrate, and slavery as an institution no 
longer countenanced, achieving equality in the post-war United States opened a new 
battleground for the black veterans of the First Kansas Colored.   War did not prove the 
sweeping catalyst that many hoped would transform their lives; white America debated 
what to do next as freedmen also exercised their new freedoms in American society.  
Kansas, the land of abolitionists and pioneer in black enlistment did not openly embrace  
social change.  Black military service proved that the black race was not a fawning or 
corrupted shadow of mankind, or that if free from the subjugation of white slave owners; 
the race would revert into savagery.  The tropes of slave, master and assumed racial 
superiority entered a new phase of redefinition, and many that deferred their judgment of 
the black Kansas communities, no longer could ignore a population that wanted to 
exercise their ability to gain home and hearth in Kansas.  Former contrabands did not 
depart en masse after muster out of service, but remained, and added their voices to the 
demand for racial equality.    
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Chapter 11 
Conclusion 
“What shall become of the Negro?” 
 
 
     The First Kansas Colored arrived in Leavenworth, Kansas to great acclaim on 
December 23, 1865.  Following the regiment’s march through the streets, the black 
community feted the veterans with a reception at the A.M. E. Church .  As the regiment 
formed up in front of the church, General Williams and Lieutenant Colonel Ward 
reviewed the troops.  A moving speech by Col. Daniel R. Anthony, who welcomed the 
veterans on behalf of Leavenworth’s white citizens, followed.  Anthony’s address 
encompassed the entirety of the Regiment’s experience, paying tribute to the black 
soldiers on behalf of a grateful government and “the vindication of the courage and 
manhood of the African race.”  He frankly acknowledged the mistake that whites made 
by refusing the military service of black men. “We lacked the courage to say we wanted 
you to fight in defense of the nation.  Instead we said we want you as laborers…[W]e will 
enroll you in companies and for your protection we will arm you.”811  Anthony admitted 
that the failures of white Union troops opened the door to black enlistment, a 
development that might never have occurred if the Union had not lost as many men as it 
did in 1862.  
     Anthony’s speech tackled the race issue head-on, for addressed the post-war 
conundrum many whites faced: What to do with the Negro? He excoriated those that 
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favored colonization in lieu of civil rights and implored the black veterans to forge a new 
identity for the black community now claiming its status as freedmen.. “Now, by 
morality, industry and economy, brand that other lie that [N]egroes are vicious, lazy and 
improvident, Anthony averred.”812 The First Kansas Colored’s men, Anthony and other 
white Kansans believed, represented the best example for others to follow.  Significantly, 
the approbation of those who agreed with Anthony was conditional.  The First Kansas 
Colored finally had its parade, but it came with caveats for the men to make the best of 
their liberty.  As it happened, Leavenworth proved an excellent place for black veterans 
to demonstrate their worth, and in the months following the end of the Civil War, black 
businesspeople and residents alike solidified their wartime sacrifices by participating 
actively in the economic life of the city. 
     While the First Kansas Colored fought battles against Confederates and their white 
sympathizers in Arkansas and Indian Territory, the rapidly expanding black Kansan 
communities underwent the painful transition from slave to citizen, often with little or no 
assistance from the larger white community.  Former slaves possessed potential and 
desire but little else, and unscrupulous Kansans often took advantage of their ignorance to 
cheat them of the little money or property the refugees  possessed.  Clashes between 
groups at the lowest levels of Kansas society also occurred with the Irish and black 
communities pitted against one another for unskilled jobs in an increasingly polarized 
society.  H.C. Bruce, a former contraband turned businessman in Leavenworth 
remembered the Irish forming mobs to “clane [sic] the nagurs [sic] out from the Baptist 
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church in Leavenworth.” 813  The presence of Colonel Anthony forestalled violence 
between black and Irish mobs. His reputation for firm resolve and desire for orderly 
discourse was happily enforced by the power of the city police.814   Anthony had a well-
established reputation for violence against mobs, slave owners, and unwelcome visitors 
to the city.  His close friend, William D. Matthews of the First Kansas Colored served as 
a constable on his city’s police force, and Anthony’s history as a conductor on the 
Underground Railroad sensitized him to the needs of the Leavenworth black community. 
     The black community of Leavenworth, a cohesive group at the beginning of the 
conflict, had contributed many of the First Kansas Colored’s initial recruits.  Solidarity 
gradually decreased as contrabands entered the state, and free blacks sought to impose a 
measure of dominance over the new arrivals.  Many free blacks owned businesses or 
practiced trades, and their time spent in Kansas before the war fighting for a place in 
Kansas’s society may have influenced how they interacted with the new arrivals.  Free 
blacks referred to black refugees with the same term employed by white soldiers who 
liberated persons from neighboring slave states: contraband.  The “contraband” label 
served to differentiate free from slave and distinguished established residents (those that 
had patiently built their lives in racially stratified pre-Civil War Kansas) from the largely 
unskilled, penniless former slaves that now were competing for jobs and status.    Newly 
liberated slaves outnumbered free blacks in Kansas by a factor estimated at “ten to one” 
by one contemporary observer, and the latter imposed their will  by establishing social 
circles that sought to exclude “contrabands” from exercising a voice in political or social 
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affairs.815  Racism and social strife influenced the new Leavenworth black community’s 
character, although individuals were expected to make their own way by the merit of 
their labor.      
     One measure of the impact that the migration of blacks into Kansas had on local 
communities can be gauged by the entries in city directories.  Leavenworth, possessed a 
nascent black community at the start of the war, and by the end boasted a number of fully 
employed black citizens, some in such highly specialized trades as blacksmithing, 
masonry, and carpentry.  Leavenworth possessed a large number of lesser skilled workers 
as well predominately laborers, but also laundresses, barbers, and cooks; at least thirty 
soldiers also claimed Leavenworth as their residence.816  Although not fully 
representative of the black communities across Kansas, the black citizens listed in the city 
guide possessed enough wealth to afford to advertise their presence.  The importance of 
the listings of these businesspeople and soldiers, when compared to the absence of black 
demographic data from earlier in the Civil War, offer proof of their contribution to 
Kansas society.  Their presence in Leavenworth confirms a sense of permanency in their 
residency, and no reports exist of a massive black influx back into Missouri.  The black 
community of Kansas wanted recognition for their contribution to the Union war effort, 
and former black soldiers led the charge for equality.  Emancipation no longer sufficed. 
Black Kansans wanted equal rights and at the top of their list was suffrage. 
     One needs acknowledge that the demand for a greater voice in Kansas and rights for 
black residents preceded the return of the First Kansas Colored’s soldiers to Kansas. 
Lacking a deep historical basis in Kansas, blacks communities possessed an organizing 
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structure in their religious communities. The Bethel African Methodist Episcopal Church 
(A.M.E. Church) in Leavenworth, one of the most influential of the religious 
organizations in Kansas, nurtured black political aspirations while celebrating the 
numbers of black mechanics entering trades. To that end, the A.M.E. Church hosted the 
State Convention of Colored Citizens of Kansas on October 6, 1865, a convocation at 
which black delegates from across the state met for three days. The Convention sent 
resolutions to the Kansas Legislature and Congress, and heavily emphasized the service 
of black soldiers as entitling blacks to equal rights.817  Local leaders and visiting black 
dignitaries stressed the need for black Kansans to change their status in Kansas through 
political means, and personal actions. 
     Black community leaders enacted change through several different avenues. Blacks 
were exhorted by leaders in their communities to branch out into new trades, and 
abandon the ones tainted with traditions of servitude such as waiters and barbers. Their 
aim was to see large numbers of their brethren take up skilled trades, stressing that   
mechanics and laborers were in demand in Kansas.  Blacks wanted “wealth and 
position,” and such aspirations appeared possible in the heady days of emancipation.818 
One visitor, Bishop Campbell, urged the black Kansas communities to improve their 
station, and while integrating into Kansas communities to “form leagues and societies, 
make petitions to the state’s political bodies, and to raise funds to buy positions if 
necessary.”819  Politically, the A.M.E. Church and black community leaders backed 
Senator Lane, who received their backing due to his support of human rights, and black 
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rights.  Many of the men who exercised influence in the Leavenworth black community 
maintained their primacy after the war, and enjoyed links to the charismatic senator. 
     The demands for civil rights did not place too great a strain on Kansan society, but 
suffrage threatened the established social order in a way that emancipating slaves did not. 
Suffrage embodied a change in the social order that required white and black Kansans to 
renegotiate the social contract understood by all during the Civil War, namely that 
Kansas would shield blacks from Confederate slave owners in return for faithful service 
in the state’s military, farms, and wartime economy.  The end of the war did not translate 
into universal equality for Kansans, and generated ferocious debate in black and white 
circles alike.  Senator Lane, during a reconstruction meeting in Kansas in January 1866, 
expressed his support for protecting black civil rights and freedom, but he balked at 
granting suffrage.   Lane’s opposition came from the imposition of suffrage against the 
interests of the states.  Lane favored individual state ratification of a constitutional 
amendment, in part because he believed such a ratification scheme would avoid 
bloodshed between the black and white races.820   Lane’s stance on rights and suffrage 
depended on a very clear definition of the rights and privileges of blacks in Kansas’s 
society.  The Civil War goal of Emancipation served a purpose for anti-slavery Kansans, 
uniting the populace of Kansas in opposition to the slave holding south, and providing 
valuable labor and soldiers for Kansas.   
      The debate over conferring full racial equality in Kansas appeared little affected by 
the recent service of the black militia during the Price Raid, or the sterling service of the 
First and Second Kansas Colored Infantry Regiments, and the Independent Light 
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Artillery Battery at Fort Leavenworth.  Although many Kansans supported protection of 
the civil rights gained by blacks during the Civil War, civil rights and equality were two 
issues that did not mean the same thing.  Granting blacks suffrage would grant the 
appearance of equality, but in post-Civil War Kansas, suffrage was out of the question for 
the returning white veterans and communities attempting to ensure that free white men 
would have the ability to retain their social and economic primacy. During the war, 
former Governor Charles Robinson believed that the majority of Kansans favored equal 
rights for all and claimed that the word “white” had been inserted into the state 
constitution to earn favor in Washington D.C.821 The pressures of the war and the need 
for black support for the war effort may have affected Robinson’s assessment, for  he 
could not have known that there would be a political backlash against blacks when white 
citizens tried to resume lives disarranged by war.   
     Less than six months after the First Kansas Colored’s soldiers enjoyed the thanks of 
the citizens of Leavenworth, the intensification of political wrangling brought out 
sentiments suppressed during the war.  John Wright, the publisher of the Leavenworth 
Daily Conservative wrote that blacks should not claim social equality, and opined that the 
great majority of blacks lacking the capacity for the political privileges that whites 
enjoyed.822  Wright’s sentiments stand as testimony to the degree to which pre-war racial 
attitudes quickly crept back into Kansans’ consciousness despite the growing 
politicization of Kansas’s black communities throughout 1864 and 1865, and into 1866.  
Black Kansans increasingly met resistance from whites fearful of economic competition 
and unsure of the ability of free blacks to determine the state’s political direction on equal 
                                                
821 Charles Robinson letter, Leavenworth Daily Conservative, January 5, 1864. 
822 John w. Wright, Leavenworth Daily Conservative, June 13, 1866.   
 
 
427 
 
footing with white residents.  Some black leaders attempted to force change locally by 
acting on the national stage. 
      Former First Kansas Colored officer William D. Matthews possessed local and 
national influence.  Matthews,  a recognized leader in the Leavenworth black community, 
represented Kansas’s blacks at a series of National Conventions held in early 1866.  
National agitation for black suffrage intensified in early 1866, and veterans and black 
political leaders stridently advocated change on a national level.  Black veterans meeting 
at the National Hall in Philadelphia in January 1866 urged delegates, amongst them 
representatives from Kansas, to seek equal rights with whites, their military service in the 
Civil War payment for civil rights to include suffrage, for the entire race. Former First 
Kansas Colored Infantry soldiers William D. Matthews and Richard Hinton represented 
the black community of Kansas;  the former was elected as president of the convention, 
and the latter was proud to claim the right as the first to enlist black soldiers.  A second 
national meeting at Washington D.C. on September 1, 1866 concluded with delegates 
demanding suffrage for their role in preserving the Union.  The convention charged 
veterans to ask their neighbors “in the name of sympathy and the battles they fought in 
the defense of the country, to grant them all their rights.”823  Black military service 
presented the black community with a powerful moral and political weapon to use in the 
fight for suffrage.    
      Black and white veterans in Leavenworth, Kansas, fought to keep the issue of 
suffrage alive while Kansans still remembered the contributions that blacks in military 
service had made to putting down the Confederacy’s rebellion..  H. Ford Douglas, former 
commander of the Independent Light Artillery Battery appealed to the black community 
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and First Kansas Colored veterans, citing his own military service as an example of how 
hard he had to fight to serve the Union.  Douglas also addressed strife within the veteran 
community, acting as peacemaker between Henry Langston who excoriated whites in 
general for their involvement in slavery, and Richard Hinton who defended the white 
race.  Racial partisanship amongst the whites that commanded black troops, and black 
veterans weakened the cause of black suffrage as the two races shared service against a 
common enemy.824  Interestingly enough, the Leavenworth community supported 
interracial social discourse among school students at academic events, and three free 
colored schools, two of which possessed black schoolteachers operated in 
Leavenworth.825  Less overt than political conventions, but perhaps more persuasive on a 
local level, black schools proved that blacks could elevate their place in society.  While 
political leaders fought with  rhetoric against racism, students made favorable 
impressions with their eagerness to educate themselves. 
     Nonetheless, intolerance, while tempered by wartime experience, received support 
from unlikely sources. One example that influenced whites was the speech of Honorable 
John Randolph of South Carolina at the Kansas Constitution convention.  Randolph 
expressed the belief that blacks possessed all the traits of an inferior race, that blacks 
were “a cross between the Baboon and the man,” evident from “woolly, lips thick, nose 
flat, skull thick- and couldn't any anatomist tell the bones of a nigger from those of any 
human being's? …Niggers were animals, but a little more intelligent than a dog, and, but 
are remove from the baboon.”826  Few sought to refuse his racist rant by citing the record 
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of the Kansas colored regiments.  But the words of a former Confederate carried less 
weight than fears of competition between the races for the future of Kansas.   
     The status of the black citizens of Kansas depended on political solutions, and the rule 
of law.  Blind racism no longer held sway, but regardless of the wishes of the black 
populace of Kansas, when the issue of suffrage came to a vote on November 5, 1867, 
10,483 votes were cast for extending suffrage, but 19,421 against excising “white” from 
the state constitution.  When the Fifteenth Amendment passed in Congress extending 
suffrage to blacks, ratification devolved to the states for approval, and Kansas ratified the 
Amendment on March 30, 1870.827  The national debate presented Kansans with a choice 
that fitted into the national debate over race, rights, and suffrage.   
      The ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment changed little for black men serving in 
the post-Civil War army.  Two regiments of black infantry guarded the western reaches 
of the state, and their service echoed the wartime beliefs of many whites toward the 
abilities of black men.  Black soldiers at Fort Hays, Kansas, fought against old prejudices 
anew.  According to one black soldier, white ranchers expressed the belief that blacks 
would not fight.  The past achievements of the black Kansan regiments appeared to have 
faded with time and proximity.  Whites expected that black men would bow to white  
superiority.  However, according to Henry Carpenter, a black soldier at Fort Hays, the 
hostile Indian tribes of western Kansas regarded black soldiers “with holy terror,” and at 
least one attack black soldiers ended with Indians fleeing while shouting the refrain 
“nigger, nigger, nigger.”828  Once again black men fought for respect and recognition on 
a mission that offered neither despite their service. The post-war racial situation in 
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Kansas reflected the growing collective amnesia of white America, and as Reconstruction 
began to falter in the face of resurgent white Southern political influence, black 
achievements became irrelevant to many.  
     The effect of black military service on American politics is difficult to judge out of 
context.  Perhaps the legacy of the First Kansas Colored’s military performance and the 
character of its soldiers are best understood by examining how communities restructured 
in the first few years after the Civil War.  Where once communities possessed few black 
residents, by 1865 most Kansas communities supported small communities determined to 
improve their lot in life.  Instead of southern racial ideologies ruling local interactions, 
shared combat experience brought blacks and whites together in ways unfathomable 
before the Civil War.  Black communities proved industrious additions to their Kansas 
host cities, and the memory of wartime sacrifice left an indelible impression on the white 
officers that commanded the black men of the First Kansas Colored.   
       The bond between commanders and men remained strong after the war.  Decades 
after the war veterans of the regiment gathered in Leavenworth to celebrate their bond in 
Grand Army of the Republic halls, and as the nineteenth century entered its final decade, 
soldiers and officers united to relive their youth.  Colonel Williams proved a steadfast 
supporter of his veterans, visiting Washington D.C. to lobby for their behalf and 
faithfully supporting pension claims submitted by his soldiers with affidavits of support.  
The mass meeting drew the support of the local black community and many of all ages 
flocked to listen to Brevet General Williams and others speak of the past.  Other First 
Kansas Colored officers and Non-Commissioned Officers joined Williams in the 
celebration; Captains Huddleston, Matthews, and McFarland all enjoyed the respect of 
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their veterans, as did Sergeants Joe Carris, Dempsey Legett, John Matthews, Henry 
Yokum, and Alex Collins.  Williams’ speech transformed the regiment’s most tragic 
battle into triumph, and he favorably compared the Poison Springs to the legendary 
battles of Thermopylae and Balaclava.  His most outstanding achievement in Washington 
D.C., the creation of records for the War Department, detailed the First Kansas Colored’s 
performance at the battles of Island Mound, Poison Springs, and Jenkins’ Ferry.829 
Williams’ determination to ensure that his regiment’s service did not disappear from the 
records of the Civil War served as a fitting tribute both to the men and to his leadership. 
     The gathering placed the service of the First Kansas Colored into perspective for many 
that may not have known the regiment’s story of bravery and sacrifice.  Colonel Anthony 
regaled the audience with tales of Williams’ early awkward days as a soldier, and 
William D. Matthews praised his one-time commander for his support in gaining 
Matthews a well-deserved pension after many years of fighting for recognition.  
Williams’ words carried weight, and his efforts to introduce bills in the house and senate 
proved his commitment.  The audience included veterans of black Civil War infantry, 
artillery, and cavalry units, and when Williams praised William D. Matthews for his 
military service and pre-Civil War work in the Underground Railroad, he did so 
unreservedly and with great enthusiasm.  The elected committee of black veterans paid 
Williams a great complement at the closing of the meeting, and declared that not for 
Williams’ efforts, “The fate of black men would have been the fate of the Chinese, and 
the emancipation measures and bills passed to enfranchise all blacks never advanced for 
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consideration.”830  The obligation between commander and soldier, the leader and the led 
lasted long after the debris and ruin of the Civil War passed into history.   
     Judging the commitment of white Kansans to their black soldiers is a difficult task.  It 
is too easy to declare white officers in black regiments to be abolitionists, and to assume 
their commitment derived from deep-seated convictions about racial equality and worth.  
Each man mustered his own secret passions and motivations.  Former Underground 
Railroad conductors populated the First Kansas Colored’s officer ranks in the early days 
of the regiment, but so did political appointees of Senator Lane.  Contrasting the degree 
of commitment demonstrated by Captain Gardner with that of Captain Van Horn may 
offer some basis for comparison, but to do so would overlook the degree to which these 
men stood staunchly before their men in garrison, and with the ranks in combat.   
     A better statistical measure of commitment may be determined from the regiment’s 
record books, and the travails endured by all.  Officers could and did resign their 
commissions before the war concluded, but many gave their lives and freedom in service 
to their men.  The uncertain fate of white officers in black regiments during the bloody 
conflict dissuaded many white men from seeking commissions in black regiments, but 
those that accepted the honor proved on the whole to be honorable and committed.  The 
First Kansas Colored’s service records contain countless examples of personal courage, 
but paper cannot convey the visceral reactions of men in combat, however eloquent.  The 
more mundane regimental rolls and medical records show a composite picture of a 
regiment staffed by men committed to the cause of freedom.  Many veterans suffered 
life-long disability as a result of their service, and white officers shed their blood 
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alongside their men.  The regiment’s officers attended to their men’s needs when 
possible, and endured along with them the vicissitudes of tiresome details in Union 
installations where reduced rations and seasonal illness affected all. 
     Regimental statistics reveal a regiment of deep experience and shattering loss.  The 
First Kansas Colored lost the greatest men of the Kansas regiments, and lost the most of 
any regiment in a single battle.831   The regiment does not however, appear anywhere 
near the top of any list of surrendered soldiers, despite the temptation for self-
preservation at such horrific battles as Poison Spring and Flat Rock.  Officers entered 
captivity alongside their men, but as small clusters of captured men.  Officers died during 
battle and after losing personal fights against disease, while many of their men passed 
away in southern lands from a variety of causes.  The initial days of Kansan disapproval 
and War Department opposition winnowed the wheat from the chaff, and a number of 
potential officers deigned to refuse commissions.  The men that fought eighteen separate 
engagements from Island Mound to Ivy Ford did so knowing all the while that a noose 
awaited them.   
     Isolated incidents illustrate the bond between the First Kansas Coloreds officers and 
men, whether the surreptitious sale of coffee in exchange for eggs to sustain sick men, or 
hard-fought battles where officers and Non-Commissioned Officers stemmed the flight of 
exhausted men from vengeful Confederate pursuers.  The men of the First Kansas 
Colored wanted recognition as fighting men, soldiers willing to weather bouts of garrison 
utilization as labor in exchange for the opportunity to engage the enemy in battle.  The 
regiment’s soldiers believed Frederick Douglass’s exhortations for “men of color” to 
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seize their freedom rather than wait for white men to give it to them.  Many eligible black 
men remained in communities far from battle, their hearts unmoved by appeals for 
service.  Their decision cannot be fairly condemned for the men of the First Kansas 
Colored fought bravely for pay less than white counterparts, and their families endured 
log pay droughts.  Life at home beside a warm fire and with a full belly paled in 
comparison to the clash of arms and the acrid smell of burnt powder.   
     Redemption and renewal could be earned in the First Kansas Colored’s ranks.  Many 
men that sought succor outside the military while hiding away as fugitive deserters later 
returned to the ranks, and in some cases died as a result of that fateful decision.  The 
ranks of the First Kansas Colored beckoned with the siren call that pulls at young men’s 
souls, the chance to measure oneself in battle.  Military service offered the opportunity 
for glory and adventure, but the charnel house stench of battle’s aftermath tempered 
many men’s resolve.  The regimental rolls offer silent testimony to their commitment, 
many men that enlisted in summer and fall of 1862 mustered out in October 1865 with 
the knowledge that they had stayed the course and earned their manhood against white 
opposition.  Men like First Sergeant Clement Johnson took strength from personal goals 
that transcended glory or adventure.  Johnson sought to redeem his family from slavery, 
and when he reunited with them, he continued to fight to ensure their freedom.  White 
officers could resign if war’s enchantments no longer appealed, but black soldiers fought 
for the duration of the war.  Failure meant slavery, and conversely, victory became 
freedom.   
     The service rendered by black soldiers to the Union cause in the Indian Territory, 
Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas created dividends for the refugee communities from 
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which many originated.  Black service shielded their families from retribution, and 
opened the borders of Kansas to refugees in search of a better life to replace the one they 
abandoned when they moved north by foot, wagon, and boat.  The First Kansas Colored’s 
black soldiers proved excellent citizens after the war, and enriched Kansas with their 
skills and devotion.  Black veterans could stand tall with the knowledge that they 
bolstered the Union cause at Cabin Creek, Honey Springs, and during the Camden 
Campaign.  The same newspapers that doubted the wisdom of enlisting black men for 
soldiers as potentially damaging to the cause of abolitionism, later reported the feats of 
the First and Second Kansas Colored and the black infantry’s outstanding performance.  
When white southerners marched into battle equipped with shackles, the First Kansas 
Colored’s men laughed after their victory, and when white Union soldiers fought 
alongside them, many remarked in the same report of the men’s humanity toward 
prisoners.  As the war progressed and wrathful southern guerrillas and soldiers massacred 
black soldiers at Sherwood, Poison Springs, and Flat Rock, black men fought back, not 
content to suffer without seeking redress.   Utilizing the term “race war” to describe the 
escalating cycle of violence misrepresents black military responses.  Black soldiers met 
white atrocities with firm resolve and after Fort Pillow, increasing numbers of black 
soldiers vowed to treat their Confederate enemy as they had been treated.  Though both 
sides were familiar with the biblical adage of an eye for an eye, Confederate 
consternation over black retaliation reflects the degree to which the changing racial 
paradigm deranged their understanding of the world.   
     The experiment first inaugurated in Kansas in 1862 arose from the ambitions of 
Senator James Lane, but it took committed men such as James Williams to make it a 
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reality, On the other side, James Montgomery and Charles Jennison sought to destroy the 
new creation if they could not control it.  Surviving first contact at Island Mound and 
muster in January 1863 ensured that the First Kansas Colored would become a reality.  
The overriding question of “what to do with the Negro,” in Kansas during and 
immediately after the war tested long established social norms.  The Thirteenth through 
the Fifteenth Amendments answered the question on a national level and generated - 
often grudgingly - state approval.  Black military service obviated potential answers to 
the question, for blood spilled on battlefields proved a persuasive answer to suggestions 
that blacks be colonized elsewhere, or denied citizenship on the basis of racial 
mythologies.  The former slaves who found their way to Kansas became citizens, and 
their descendents continue to serve America in the military to this day.  The possibility 
that the Civil War could have ended with slavery intact galvanized black men into action, 
and from the first days of the war, black men offered their service until the Federal 
government accepted.   
     The liberty and rights accrued unto black Americans after the Civil War suffered 
many setbacks, but race no longer justified slavery.  The lasting legacy of the First 
Kansas Colored and the “Colored Regiments” that served everywhere in the Union Army  
is with us today, despite the collective national amnesia that descended upon America 
after the collapse of Reconstruction.  Black citizens fought long battles to reassert their 
dignity and right to equality in America.  One fact is clear.  The unstinting service of the 
First Kansas Colored Regiment eradicated the pigmentation of one’s skin as a sign of 
bondage.  
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